THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


FRENCH 
FOREIGN  POLICY 


FRENCH 
FOREIGN  POLICY 

FROM  FASHODA  TO  SERAJEVO 

(1898-1914) 


BY 
GRAHAM  H.  STUART,  Ph.D. 

Ancien  Eleve  de  Pl^cole  Libre  des  Sciences  Politiques 

Instructor  in  Political  Science,  University 

of  Wisconsin 


WMW^WW 


NEW  YORK 

THE  CENTURY  CO. 

1921 


Copyright,  1920,  by 
The  Centuby  Co. 


College 
library 

DC 


TO 
MADAME  L.  dk  HUPPY  NEUVILLE 


1248592 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2007  with  funding  from 

Microsoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/frenchforeignpolOOstuaiala 


FOREWORD 

As  the  United  States  is  slowly  being  brought  to  the 
realization  that  an  American  policy  of  isolation  is  no 
longer  possible,  the  fact  that  European  diplomacy  has 
a  fundamental  effect  upon  our  own  foreign  policy  is 
becoming  correspondingly  evident.  The  result  has 
been  a  greater  interest  in  foreign  politics,  and  a  keener 
desire  to  solve  the  problem  of  international  relation- 
ships. The  best  hope  that  we  have  of  avoiding  world 
conflicts  in  the  future  seems  to  be  in  a  League  of  Na- 
tions, which  would  not  only  offer  the  means  of  settling 
disputes  by  other  methods  than  that  of  war,  but  would 
possess  the  power  to  compel  the  employment  of  these 
peaceful  methods.  But  even  with  a  League  of  Nations, 
we  must  have  an  intelligent  appreciation  of  the  under- 
lying causes  of  national  antagonisms,  with  a  view  to 
remedying  them  before  an  acute  situation  arises,  if  we 
are  to  have  an  enduring  peace. 

When  Bismarck  imposed  the  unjust  and  humiliat- 
ing Treaty  of  Frankfort  upon  France,  the  spirit  of  the 
revanche  was  born.  Instead  of  trying  to  come  to  an 
agreement  with  the  neighbor  whom  she  had  despoiled, 
thereby  making  a  reconciliation  possible,  Germany  de- 
pended upon  the  secret  treaties  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
to  overawe  France  and  to  maintain  her  own  dominant 
position.  But  France  could  also  make  secret  treaties. 
The  Dual  Alliance  and  the  Triple  Entente  were  her  an- 
swer.   This  created  the  famous  balance  of  power  upon 


viii  FOREWORD 

which  the  peace  of  Europe  was  nicely  adjusted.  We 
now  realize  that  neither  secret  treaties  nor  a  balance  of 
power  are  of  any  value  in  maintaining  the  world's 
peace.  A  close  study  of  the  European  situation  pre- 
ceding the  World  War  makes  us  wonder  that  the  bitter 
rivalries  could  have  been  held  in  leash  so  long. 

To  all  Americans,  the  role  that  France  played  in 
this  critical  period  of  the  world's  history  is  of  par- 
ticular interest.  In  the  following  study  I  have  at- 
tempted to  portray  impartially  the  policy  of  the  French 
foreign  office,  from  the  crisis  of  Fashoda  to  the  crime 
of  Serajevo.  Before  1898,  French  foreign  policy 
seemed  for  the  most  part  to  be  merged  in  her  colonial 
policy;  after  the  murder  of  the  Archduke  Ferdinand, 
the  foreign  policy  of  France  was  inextricably  mingled 
with  the  foreign  policy  of  her  allies.  In  the  critical 
intervening  period  the  policy  of  the  Quai  d'Orsay 
stands  forth  in  clear  outline  against  the  cloudy  back- 
ground of  European  diplomacy. 

The  revolutions  brought  about  by  the  World  War 
have  aided  materially  in  such  a  survey  by  bringing 
to  light  secret  documents  which  ordinarily  would  have 
remained  hidden  in  the  state  archives  for  generations. 
The  governments  of  the  leading  states  of  Europe  have 
also  found  it  to  their  advantage  to  break  the  custo- 
mary veil  of  silence  and  publish  many  of  their  secret 
communications. 

It  has  been  of  considerable  advantage  to  me  in  mak- 
ing a  study  of  this  period  that  I  was  present  in  Paris 
throughout  the  critical  Agadir  Affair  of  1911,  and  also 
during  the  year  preceding  the  outbreak  of  the  World 
War. 


FOREWORD  ix 

I  am  particularly  indebted  to  Professor  F.  A.  Ogg 
whose  assistance  has  been  invaluable  to  me  at  every 
point  in  the  preparation  of  the  manuscript,  and  to  my 
wife  for  her  helpful  suggestions  and  careful  reading 
of  the  proof. 

Graham  H.  Stuabt. 
University  of  Wisconsin, 
September,  1920. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I    France  and  the  International  Situation  in 
1898 

1.  The  Dual  and  Triple  Alliances     ....       3 

2.  Franco-British  Relations 12 

II    Fashoda 

1.  The  Franco-British  Agreement  of  March  21, 

1899 .19 

2.  The  First  Peace  Conference  at  The  Hague    .     33 

3.  France,  Germany,  and  the  Boer  War     .     .     37 

III  French  Diplomacy  in  the  Orient 

1-  The  Cretan  Affair 44 

2.  France  Settles  with  Turkey     .      .      .      .      .46 

3.  France  and  the  Boxer  Rebellion     ....     52 

4.  Franco-Siamese  Relations 71 

IV  Diplomatic  Relations  with  Italy  and  the  Pope 

1.  The  Franco-Italian  Rapprochement  ...     77 

2.  French  Relations  with  the  Vatican     ...     89 

V     The  Entente  Cordiale 

1.  France  and  the  Bagdad  Railway  ....     98 

2.  Franco-British  Accord  of  April  8,  1904  .      .   107 

3.  The  Ratification  of  the  Franco-British  Ac- 

cord         127 

4.  The  Russo-Japanese  "War 132 

VI    European  Rivalry  in  Morocco 

1.  The  Internal  Condition  of  Morocco    .      .      .  137 

2-  The  Franco-Spanish  Arrangement  of  October 

3,  1904 145 

3.  German  Attitude  Towards  the  French  Policy 

in  Morocco 156 

xi 


xii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

VII    The  Fall  op  M.  Delcasse" 

1.  Preparations  for  the  Kaiser's  Visit  to  Tan- 

gier         170 

2.  Germany  Forces  the  Issue 179 

3.  M.  Rouvier  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay   .     .     .     .192 

VIII    The  Conference  op  Algeciras 

1.  The  Drafting  and  Signing  of  the  Act     .      .  206 

2.  The  Significance  and  Ratification  of  the  Gen- 

eral Act 220 

3.  The  Application  of  the  Act 227 

IX    Franco-German  Rivalry  in  Morocco,  1907-1909 

1.  The    Second    Hague    Conference    and    the 

Franco-Japanese  Accord 240 

2.  The  Two  Sultans  of  Morocco 246 

3.  The  Deserters  of  Casablanca 253 

4.  The  Franco-German  Accord  of  1909  .      .     .261 

X    Results  op  the  Accord  of  1909 

1.  The  Bosnian  Crisis  and  the  Triple  Entente  .  26? 

2.  The  Fall  of  Clemenceau  and  Further  Diffi- 

culties in  Morocco 274 

3.  Failure  of  the  Accord  of  1909     .     .     .     .283 

4.  The  Fez  Expedition1 292 

XI    Agadir 

1.  The  German  Demands 301 

2.  French  Offers  and  the  Final  Settlement  .     .  316 

3.  The  Settlement  with  Spain 327 

XII    Towards  the  World  War 

1.  The  Ministry  of  M.  Poincare 332 

2.  The  Awakening 343 

3.  Radicalism  vs.  Patriotism 358 

4.  Conclusion 373 

Bibliography 377 

Index 385 


FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 


FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 


CHAPTER  I 

FRANCE  AND  THE  INTERNATIONAL 
SITUATION  IN  1898 

1.     THE  DUAL  AND  TRIPLE  ALLIANCES 

SPEAKING  of  the  position  of  minister  of  foreign 
affairs,  an  old  diplomat  once  remarked,  "II  ne 
suffit  pas  a" avoir  de  genie,  Vessentiel  c'est  de  durer." 
In  the  Third  French  Republic,  where  there  have  been 
fifty  changes  of  ministry  from  the  promulgation  of  the 
present  constitution  in  1875  up  to  the  outbreak  of  the 
World  War,  it  would  seem  that  there  would  be  little 
chance  for  a  successful  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  if 
durability  constitutes  success.  Therefore  the  regime 
of  M.  Delcasse,  which  commenced  on  June  28,  1898, 
and  which  was  destined  to  endure  practically  seven 
years,  would  be  noteworthy  if  for  no  other  reason 
than  that  it  holds  the  record  by  a  wide  margin  for  its 
sojourn  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay.  But  still  more  remark- 
able is  the  fact  that,  though  ministries  rose  and  fell, 
the  guidance  of  foreign  affairs  was  kept  in  the  hands 
of  the  same  man  until  he  was  able  to  carry  out  the  policy 
that  he  had  laid  out  for  himself  upon  taking  the  posi- 
tion— a  policy  of  rapprochement  with  Great  Britain. 
During  the  four  preceding  years  the  foreign  policy 


4  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

of  France  had  for  the  most  part  been  under  the  direc- 
tion of  Mr.  Gabriel  Hanotaux,  a  very  able  diplomat, 
but  an  Anglophobe  in  his  tendencies.  When,  on  June 
28, 1898,  M.  Brisson  formed  a  new  Radical  cabinet,  and 
at  the  suggestion  of  M.  Joseph  Reinach  chose  M.  Theo- 
phile  Delcasse  as  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  it  would 
have  been  only  natural  to  expect  that  the  new  foreign 
minister,  inexperienced  and  following  a  minister  of 
exceptional  ability,  would  attempt  to  carry  out  the 
policy  of  his  predecessor.  Instead  M.  Delcasse  elected 
to  blaze  a  new  trail,  to  make  a  complete  volte- face  in 
the  foreign  policy  of  France.  While  maintaining  the 
existing  alliance  with  Russia,  he  was  determined  to 
seek  new  friendships,  and  from  the  day  he  entered  the 
foreign  office  he  was  resolved  that  perfide  Albion  must 
be  changed  into  the  fidus  Achates  of  France.  The 
Entente  Cordiale  of  April  8,  1904,  which  finally  re- 
solved itself  into  the  Triple  Entente,  an  understand- 
ing strong  enough  to  resist  the  shock  of  a  world  war, 
will  ever  remain  a  monument  to  the  success  of  his 
endeavors. 

While  a  young  man,  M.  Delcasse  had  been  a  member 
of  a  group  of  journalists  associated  with  the  "Repub- 
lique  Francaise,"  and,  like  other  members  of  the  staff, 
was  an  ardent  disciple  of  that  grand  old  man  of  Repub- 
lican France,  Leon  Gambetta.  In  such  an  entourage  it 
would  have  been  just  as  impossible  for  the  young 
enthusiast  from  the  Midi  to  avoid  being  drawn  into 
politics  as  to  avoid  becoming  impregnated  with  the 
doctrines  and  beliefs  of  the  great  tribune.  Perhaps 
it  was  then  that  he  first  came  to  consider  seriously 
Gambetta 's  views  on  French  foreign  policy;  but  there 


THE  INTERNATIONAL  SITUATION  5 

is  no  doubt  that  he  knew  that  Gambetta  believed  that 
France  would  only  recover  the  position  that  she  lost 
in  1871,  by  obtaining  the  friendship  of  Eussia  and 
Great  Britain.  The  first  part  of  this  program  had 
been  completed  several  years  before  M.  Delcasse  took 
charge  of  the  foreign  office ;  the  second  and  more  diffi- 
cult part  was  to  be  his  task,  and  it  is  not  likely  that 
France  will  ever  forget  that  the  glorious  victory  won 
at  such  cost  in  1918  was  due  in  great  part  to  the  policy 
which  led  to  the  Entente  Cordiale,  whose  cornerstone 
was  laid  by  M.  Theophile  Delcasse. 

In  order  fully  to  appreciate  the  magnitude  of  the 
task  to  which  M.  Delcasse  set  himself  when  he  took  the 
office  of  foreign  minister,  it  is  essential  that  we  take 
note  of  the  situation  in  which  France  found  herself  at 
the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century.  In  as  much  as  the 
Russian  Alliance  was  the  key-note  to  which  the  whole 
foreign  policy  of  France  was  attuned,  let  us  first  con- 
sider her  position  in  regard  to  Russia. 

When  M.  Ribot,  on  June  10, 1895,  formally  announced 
the  Franco-Russian  Alliance,  he  was  merely  giving 
official  sanction  to  an  arrangement  which  was  either 
known  or  suspected  in  all  the  chancellories  of  Europe. 
The  acclamation  with  which  the  French  squadron  was 
received  on  its  visit  to  Cronstadt  in  1891,  the  equally 
enthusiastic  reception  given  to  the  Grand  Duke  Con- 
stantine  upon  his  visit  to  France  to  pay  his  respects 
to  President  Carnot  in  1892,  the  ovation  given  to  the 
Russian  squadron  at  Toulon  in  1893,  were  such  clear 
indications  of  a  rapprochement,  that  the  announcement 
of  the  fait  accompli  caused  scarcely  a  ripple  of  surprise. 
From  its  inception  the  alliance  was  popular  in  France, 


6  FKENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

and  there  is  little  question  that  the  French  nation  as  a 
whole  looked  upon  it  as  ' '  an  understanding  which  war- 
ranted great  hopes."  In  plainer  terms,  it  was  the 
means  to  an  end,  and  the  end  was  the  revanche — for 
never  since  the  debacle  of  1870  was  the  hope  absent 
from  the  hearts  of  the  French  that  some  day,  somehow, 
the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  would  be  torn  up  and  Alsace- 
Lorraine  restored.  The  feeling  that  the  alliance  was 
the  ' '  dawn  of  a  policy  of  reparation, ' '  that  it  was  offen- 
sive as  well  as  defensive  in  its  nature,  persisted  until 
1898,  when  the  French  gradually  began  to  perceive 
that  a  mariage  de  raison  between  an  autocracy  and  a 
democracy  was  not  conducive  to  the  vigorous  progeny 
of  a  warlike  spirit.  In  fact  now  that  France  no  longer 
felt  isolated,  there  was  a  tendency  to  relax,  to  forget 
the  crisis  of  1875,  to  indulge  in  internationalistic  ideal- 
ism, to  banish  the  thought  of  the  perpetual  menace 
which  had  long  lain  like  a  black,  ominous  cloud  athwart 
the  eastern  frontier.  Socialism  became  rampant,  the 
army  became  honeycombed  with  intrigue,  a  "  Dreyfus 
Case"  was  rendered  possible,  the  glorious  soul  of 
France  itself  became  enervated.  M.  Emile  Faguet  de- 
clared that  the  Russian  Alliance  was  the  beginning  of 
the  moral  and  patriotic  degradation  of  France;  M. 
Millerand,  who  later  was  to  prove  himself  one  of  the 
greatest  ministers  of  war  that  the  Third  Republic  has 
produced,  arose  in  the  Chamber  and  asked  if  France 
had  not  made  "un  marche  de  dupes."1  M.  Jean 
Jaures  summed  up  the  sentiment  of  a  large  group  when 
he  declared  that  it  was  "a  sort  of  seal  placed  upon  the 
misfortunes  of  France." 

i  Annates  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  54i,  p.  574. 


THE  INTERNATIONAL  SITUATION         7 

When  in  1898  the  Czar  announced  his  intention  of 
issuing  a  call  for  an  international  conference  for  the 
limitation  of  armament  and  for  the  purpose  of  the 
maintenance  of  peace  upon  the  basis  of  the  status  quo, 
France  felt  as  though  the  keystone  of  her  arch  of  hope 
had  been  withdrawn.  Yet  even  with  the  feeling  of 
disillusionment  came  the  realization  that  the  appeal 
for  disarmament  and  peace  must  be  made  upon  the 
basis  of  the  status  quo,  if  made  at  all,  and  for  the  great 
ideal  of  world  peace  France  was  willing  to  make  the 
sacrifice  of  her  lost  provinces.  As  a  ''Times"  corre- 
spondent aptly  expressed  it,  "The  Czar  has  sown  in 
the  teeth  of  a  driving  Gallic  wind  the  germs  of  pacifism 
in  France. ' ' 2  Yet  even  if  the  Russian  Alliance  had 
drawn  in  its  wake  a  feeling  of  disillusionment,  it  was 
realized  that  without  it  France  would  not  have  been 
free  to  follow  her  policy  of  colonial  expansion,  which 
was  now  more  than  ever  essential  to  maintain  her  posi- 
tion in  the  ranks  of  the  great  powers.  Furthermore, 
by  providing  a  counterweight  to  the  Triple  Alliance, 
France  was  enabled  to  draw  closer  to  Italy,  who  was 
not  entirely  content  with  her  position  in  the  Triplice. 

It  was  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  that  Italy 
had  joined  the  Triple  Alliance  as  much  through  fear 
of  Austria  as  through  hostility  towards  France,  al- 
though France,  by  taking  Tunis  in  1881,  had  aroused 
the  passionate  jealousy  of  the  Italians,  who  still  saw 
the  Carthage  of  Hannibal  in  the  Tunis  of  to-day,  and 
looked  forward  to  a  renaissance  of  the  imperial  city 
in  all  its  ancient  glory.  With  the  disaster  of  Adowa 
in  1896,  which  brought  about  the  final  fall  of  Crispi, 

2  Fullerton,  "Problems  of  Power,"  p.  31. 


8  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

the  principal  trouble-fete  between  the  two  Latin 
nations,  an  opportunity  was  made  for  a  Franco-Italian 
rapprochement.  Three  months  before  he  became  min- 
ister of  foreign  affairs,  M.  Delcasse  visited  Rome,  and 
in  addition  to  consulting  with  M.  Barrere,  French  am- 
bassador to  Italy,  he  had  interviews  with  the  Marquis 
di  Rudini  and  with  the  Marquis  Visconti-Venosta,  min- 
ister of  foreign  affairs,  and  both  showed  a  willingness 
to  discuss  a  Mediterranean  policy  which  should  be  more 
favorable  to  the  two  countries. 

"There  is  plenty  of  room  for  our  two  countries  on 
the  Mediterranean,"  declared  M.  Delcasse;  "the  same 
thing  which  has  separated  us  is  able  to  reunite  us. " 3 
The  seed  did  not  fall  upon  barren  soil.  One  of  the 
first  acts  of  M.  Delcasse  after  becoming  foreign  minis- 
ter was  to  bring  about  a  treaty  of  commerce  between 
France  and  Italy.4  This  was  to  prove  a  veritable  god- 
send to  Italy  financially,  and  was  destined  to  pave  the 
way  to  a  political  arrangement  a  few  years  later.  So 
although  sixty  years  before  M.  Delcasse  came  into  office, 
Mazzini  had  declared  northern  Africa  to  be  Italy's 
inheritance,  the  Pyrenaean  was  enabled  to  outline  and 
carry  through  a  Mediterranean  policy  which  recog- 
nized the  interests  of  France  in  both  Tunis  and  Mo- 
rocco. 

To  understand  Franco-German  relations  at  this  same 
period,  it  is  necessary  to  go  back  to  the  Franco-Russian 
alliance.    This  alliance,  coming  so  soon  after  Kaiser 

•  Reynald,  "L'Oeuvre  de  M.  DelcasseV'  p.  30. 

*  Arrangement  announced  by  letters  exchanged  between  M.  Delcasse" 
and  the  Italian  ambassador  M.  Tornielli  Nov.  21,  ratified  by  France  Feb. 
2,  1899,  and  by  Italy  Feb.  11,  1899.  Archives  Diplomatiques,  Vol.  68, 
p.  333. 


THE  INTERNATIONAL  SITUATION         9 

William  II  had  dropped  his  great  pilot,  Bismarck, 
necessitated  very  careful  diplomacy  on  the  part  of  the 
Emperor.  He  quickly  determined  to  enter  into  more 
friendly  relations  with  France,  as  the  most  feasible  way 
to  neutralize  the  new  force  which  might  counterbalance 
the  weight  of  the  Triplice.  In  1891  he  arranged  the 
voyage  of  the  Empress  Frederica  to  Paris,  but  this 
visit  was  ill-advised,  and  failed  completely  to  promote 
more  friendly  relations  between  the  two  powers.  Nev- 
ertheless the  Kaiser  in  a  personal  way  continued  to 
show  his  neighborly  intentions.  In  1893  it  was  a  letter 
of  condolence  to  the  widow  of  ex-President  McMahon 
who  had  fought  against  Germany  in  1870,  the  follow- 
ing year  a  similar  telegram  of  sympathy  to  Madame 
Carnot,  and  thereafter  every  year  he  found  occasion 
to  impress  upon  the  minds  of  the  French  his  personal 
good  will.5  At  one  time  it  seemed  as  though  the 
Dreyfus  Affair  might  embitter  the  relations  between 
the  two  countries,  but  the  French  wisely  decided 
to  circumscribe  this  scandal  within  the  borders  of 
France.6 

The  German  government  also  sought  various  oppor- 
tunities to  enter  into  political  relations  with  France. 
On  March  15,  1894,  there  was  signed  a  convention  of 
delimitation  of  territory  between  the  Congo  and  Came- 
roons  and  a  mapping  out  of  spheres  of  influence  in  the 
region  of  Lake  Chad.7  The  following  year  Germany 
induced  France  to  join  with  her  and  with  Russia  to 
force  a  revision  of  the  Shimoneseki  Treaty  in  favor  of 

5  "Kaiserreden,"  Klausman    (ed.),  pp.  37-62. 

eDebidour,  "Histoire  Diplomatique  de  l'Europe   (1878-1904),"  p.  205. 

t  Text  in  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers  (1894),  p.  974. 


10  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

China,  though  it  was  made  to  appear  in  this  case  as 
though  the  initiative  came  from  Russia.8  In  January, 
1896,  Baron  Marschall  von  Bieberstein  suggested  to  M. 
Herbette,  French  ambassador  in  Berlin,  the  possibility 
of  a  Franco-German  entente  against  Great  Britain  to 
save  the  independence  of  the  South  African  Republics, 
which  seemed  about  to  be  swallowed  up  in  the  maw 
of  the  British  lion.  Incidentally  it  was  pointed  out 
to  France  how  detrimental  British  ambitions  were  to 
the  reciprocal  interests  of  the  two  powers  in  Africa. 
This  conference  was  followed  two  days  later  by  the 
famous  Kruger  telegram  from  the  Kaiser,  which  pro- 
voked such  hostility  towards  Germany  throughout 
England  that  the  German  government,  realizing  that 
France  might  prove  undependable  in  case  of  serious 
difficulties,  quickly  steered  the  imperial  ship  of  state 
back  into  the  haven  of  strict  neutrality.9 

The  final  effort  made  by  Germany  to  reach  a  friendly 
understanding  with  France  brings  us  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  M.  Delcasse  as  French  foreign  minister. 
Early  in  1898  it  was  rumored  that  Great  Britain 
wished  to  make  a  loan  to  Portugal,  with  a  lien  upon 
the  Portuguese  colonies  in  Africa  as  security.  Portu- 
gal, being  in  dire  financial  straits  and  fearing  a  quarrel 
with  Great  Britain  over  the  award  of  the  arbitral  tri- 
bunal in  the  Delagoa  Bay  Affair,  asked  Germany  for 
her  protection,  suggesting  as  compensation  that  she 
might  have  the  right  of  preemption  over  the  African 
colonies  of  Portugal.  The  German  government  auth- 
orized Count  Minister,  German  ambassador  to  Paris, 

•  M6vil,  "De  la  Paix  de  Frankfort  a  Algdsiras,"  p.  4. 

•  M6vil,  op.  cit.,  p.  8. 


THE  INTERNATIONAL  SITUATION        11 

to  solicit  the  cooperation  of  the  French.  On  June  19, 
Count  Minister  handed  a  note  to  M.  Hanotaux  calling 
his  attention  to  the  danger  of  allowing  Portugal  to 
compromise  her  sovereign  rights  in  order  to  procure 
money  from  Great  Britain,  and  urged  economic  re- 
prisals, or  at  least  financial  pressure.  As  the  Meline 
ministry  had  already  fallen,  the  whole  question  was 
turned  over  to  M.  Brisson  and  M.  Delcasse.  M.  Andre 
Mevil,  whose  authority  can  hardly  be  questioned,  says 
that  M.  Delcasse  investigated,  and  finding  the  fears  of 
Germany  wholly  without  foundation,  let  the  matter 
drop.10  However,  three  years  later,  March  20,  1902, 
when  M.  Gotteron  interpolated  M.  Delcasse  in  the  Sen- 
ate on  this  subject,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  de- 
nied the  whole  affair  categorically,  declaring : 

"No  proposition  from  Germany  concerning  the 
Portuguese  colonies  and  for  a  decision  about  them 
with  France  was  addressed  to  my  predecessor  in  June, 
1898.  I  add  that  as  far  as  I  am  concerned  it  has  been 
absolutely  impossible  for  me  to  decline  the  proposals 
for  the  peremptory  reason  that  no  proposals  were  made 
to  me."11 

Whether  definite  proposals  were  made  or  not,  the 
question  did  come  up  in  some  form  or  other,12  and  if 
M.  Delcasse  had  nothing  to  do  with  it,  the  inference 
is  that  from  the  very  beginning  of  his  term  of  office, 
he  was  determined  not  to  be  a  party  to  any  arrange- 
ment with  Germany  which  might  tend  in  any  way  to 
increase  the  tension  in  the  already  strained  relations 

ioMevil,  op.  cit.,  p.  19. 
ii  Annates  du  S^nat,  Vol.  61,  p.  598. 

12  See  Lemonon,  "L'Europe  et  la  Politique  Britannique,"  pp.  152-3; 
also  Fortnightly  Review,  March  1,  1902, 


12  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

between  France  and  Great  Britain.13  His  sails  were 
trimmed  to  the  steady  winds  from  across  the  Channel 
rather  than  to  the  fitful  gusts  from  across  the  Vosges. 

2.     FRANCO-BRITISH  RELATIONS 

When  M.  Delcasse  entered  upon  his  duties  as  minis- 
ter of  foreign  affairs  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  he  is  said 
to  have  remarked:  "I  do  not  wish  to  leave  here,  I 
do  not  wish  to  leave  this  armchair,  until  I  have  re- 
established a  friendly  understanding  with  England."  14 
Inasmuch  as  he  made  this  purpose  the  framework  of 
his  whole  foreign  policy,  it  is  necessary  to  resume 
briefly  the  relations  between  the  two  powers  just  be- 
fore he  became  foreign  minister.  Such  a  summary  will 
show  the  magnitude  of  the  task  which  the  new  incum- 
bent of  the  French  foreign  office  had  mapped  out  for 
himself. 

Ever  since  M.  Waddington,  the  French  representa- 
tive, had  returned  from  the  Congress  of  Berlin  in 
1878  with  Tunis  in  his  pocket,  as  he  phrased  it,  Great 
Britain,  who  had  been  the  first  to  suggest  this  as  com- 
pensation, began  to  look  askance  at  the  colonial  am- 
bitions of  France.  But  with  men  like  Gambetta  and 
Jules  Ferry  leading  the  way,  the  Third  Republic 
marched  steadily  ahead  in  its  colonial  enterprises,  and 
at  the  beginning  of  1898  it  had  practically  doubled  the 

13  Directly  after  this  an  arrangement  was  concluded  between  Great 
Britain  and  Germany  regarding  the  Portuguese  colonies  (see  Lemon  on, 
op.  cit.,  p.  186),  but  according  to  Prince  Radziwell,  representing  the 
German  emperor  at  the  funeral  of  Felix  Faure,  "Nothing  in  this  ar- 
rangement is  in  opposition  to  a  rapprochement  between  my  country 
and  yours."  Liberty,  Feb.  26,  1899,  quoted  by  Fullerton,  op.  cit.,  p.  55 
note. 

i*  B6rard,  "La  Politique  Francaise,"  Revue  de  Paris,  July  1,  1905. 


THE  INTERNATIONAL  SITUATION        13 

territories  of  France.  During  the  period  when  M. 
Hanotaux  was  in  charge  of  the  French  foreign  office — 
a  period  when  the  colonial  ambitions  of  France  were 
especially  conspicuous — Great  Britain  and  France 
found  themselves  at  odds  in  every  part  of  the  globe 
where  their  colonial  interests  were  neighboring. 

In  Tunis,  awarded  to  France  by  the  kindness  of 
Beaconsfield  and  Salisbury,  the  treaty  of  Kassar-Said, 
which  established  the  French  protectorate  in  1881, 
recognized  the  validity  of  previous  treaties  entered 
into  with  European  countries.  Such  capitulations 
giving  these  countries  jurisdiction  over  their  nationals, 
and  granting  them  the  most  favored  nation  clause 
in  all  their  commercial  arrangements,  interfered  seri- 
ously with  the  policy  of  the  French  Colonial  Office. 
M.  Hanotaux  took  upon  himself  the  task  of  trying  to 
obtain  the  renunciation  by  the  powers  of  these  capitula- 
tions, and  a  revision  of  the  commercial  treaties  to  the 
advantage  of  France.  By  his  astute  and  delicate 
handling  of  the  situation,  M.  Hanotaux  obtained  new 
and  satisfactory  arrangements  with  all  the  powers ;  but 
Great  Britain  was  the  last  to  give  her  consent,  and 
then  only  after  imposing  irksome  conditions. 
*  The  situation  was  even  less  satisfactory  in  Morocco, 
which,  owing  to  its  long  frontier  bordering  upon 
Algeria,  the  French  have  always  considered  a  natural 
prolongation  of  their  sphere  of  influence  in  northern 
Africa.  At  the  court  of  the  Sultan  we  find  two  English- 
men in  high  esteem,  a  Mr.  MacLean,  formerly  an 
officer  of  the  garrison  at  Gibraltar,  and  a  Mr.  W.  B.  H. 
Harris,  correspondent  of  the  London  " Times,"  both 
of  whom  had  been  conducting  a  campaign  of  British 


14  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

propaganda  based  upon  jealousy  and  hatred  of  France. 
France,  although  not  strongly  desirous  at  this  time  of 
destroying  the  power  of  the  Sultan  and  of  annexing 
Morocco,  could  not  permit  any  other  power  to  obtain 
preponderant  interests  there.  For  if,  as  Jules  Ferry 
declared,  with  France  possessing  Algeria,  Tunis  is  the 
key  of  her  house,  so  with  France  possessing  both  Tunis 
and  Algeria,  Morocco  is  a  most  convenient  and  exposed 
back-door  entrance.  Nor  was  Great  Britain  ignorant 
of  the  special  interests  which  France  could  with  justice 
claim  in  Morocco.  A  report  from  Sir  Henry  Johnston, 
Consul-General  at  Tunis,  who  was  exceptionally  well 
posted  on  North  African  affairs,  had  in  summing  up 
the  situation  stated  that ' '  England  ought  not  to  oppose 
the  extension  of  French  interests  in  Morocco." 

In  Madagascar  also  we  find  the  two  powers  at  odds 
with  each  other.  In  1896,  when  France  wished  to 
change  her  protectorate  into  full  sovereignty,  it  was 
only  after  numerous  arguments  that  she  succeeded  in 
persuading  the  British  government  to  put  into  writing 
an  acknowledgment  of  her  position  made  orally  ten 
years  before.  Even  then  she  might  have  failed  if  she 
had  not  been  able  to  point  out  her  acceptance  of  Great 
Britain's  high-handed  action  in  Zanzibar  in  making  £ 
treaty  with  Germany  in  utter  disregard  of  a  previous 
treaty  made  with  France.15  There  were  also  disputes 
in  the  region  of  the  Congo,  in  the  basin  of  the  Niger, 
in  Ethiopia,  in  the  Egyptian  Soudan,  and  in  the  valley 
of  the  Upper  Nile — in  this  last  a  dispute  which  was  to 
bring  the  two  nations  to  the  very  brink  of  war. 

is  See  E.  Lavisse,  "France  et  Angleterre,"  Revue  de  Paris,  Feb.  1, 
1899. 


THE  INTERNATIONAL  SITUATION        15 

In  the  Orient  we  find  the  same  antagonism.  During 
the  period  of  1897-1898  France  was  carrying  on  a  very 
active  policy  in  the  Far  East,  gathering  in  the  fruits 
of  her  support  of  China  against  dismemberment  by 
Japan — railway  concessions,  mining  concessions, 
treaties  of  commerce,  a  ninety-nine  year  lease  on  the 
bay  of  Kwang-Chou-Wan.  But  it  was  only  against  the 
constant  opposition  of  Great  Britain,  who  was  already 
looking  with  favor  upon  Japan  as  a  potential  ally  to 
arrest  the  steady  progress  of  Russia,  the  ally  of  France, 
towards  the  warm  open  seas  of  the  east.  Proceeding 
south  to  Indo-China,  where  France  possessed  a  great 
colonial  area  comprising  Tonkin,  Annam,  Cochin-China, 
Cambodia  and  Laos,  we  again  find  the  two  nations  with 
rival  interests.  Great  Britain  possessed  Burma  and 
was  determined  that  Siam,  which  bordered  on  French 
Indo-China,  should  not  fall  under  French  influence.  By 
the  Convention  of  London,  signed  in  1896,  both  nations 
agreed  to  respect  the  independence  of  the  valley  of 
the  Menam  and  of  Bangkok,  the  capital  of  Siam;  yet 
in  the  years  which  followed  a  constant  struggle  went 
on  in  which  each  side  attempted  to  increase  its  power 
in  this  region  at  the  other's  expense,  especially  over 
Yunnan,  which  as  the  only  route  to  the  upper  Yangtse 
must  be  kept  open  to  both. 

Nor  could  the  French  forget  their  interests  in  Egypt, 
where  Napoleon  had  raised  his  victorious  standards, 
where  de  Lesseps  had  made  the  shorter  route  to  India 
possible,  and  where  France  had  shared  the  power  with 
Great  Britain,  only  to  withdraw  ignominiously  through 
the  inexcusable  vacillation  of  a  weak-kneed  foreign 
minister.     But  even  if  France  had  withdrawn  of  her 


16  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

own  free  will,  she  would  not  let  Great  Britain  forget 
that  she,  too,  had  given  many  assurances  that  she  had 
no  intention  of  maintaining  a  permanent  position  there. 

Finally  there  was  the  century-old  conflict  over  the 
fishing  rights  granted  on  what  was  called  the  French 
shore  in  Newfoundland.  Here  the  French  had  to  con- 
tend not  only  with  Great  Britain,  but  also  with  a 
colonial  government  which  was  not  always  willing  to 
carry  out  arrangements  made  by  the  mother  country.18 
But  whether  the  question  raised  was,  "Is  a  lobster  a 
fish  under  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht?"  or  whether  the 
dispute  was  over  a  Chinese  pagoda  and  a  cemetery, 
the  two  powers  were  mutually  engaged  in  a  policy  of 
"pin-pricks"  that  might  at  any  moment  bring  them 
into  active  conflict.  The  Fashoda  incident  only  too 
clearly  showed  the  danger: — "France  and  England 
were  face  to  face  like  birds  in  a  cock-pit,  while  Europe 
under  German  leadership,  was  fastening  their  spurs, 
and  impatient  to  see  them  fight  to  the  death."  17  Be- 
fore taking  up  the  Fashoda  affair,  with  which  our  nar- 
rative proper  begins — for  although  the  roots  of  the 
affair  go  back  to  the  regime  of  M.  Hanotaux,  it  was  M. 
Delcasse  who  was  given  the  disagreeable  task  of  finding 
a  solution — a  brief  glance  at  French  internal  politics  is 
essential. 

Ever  since  1894,  when  Captain  Dreyfus  was  con- 
victed of  treason  in  a  trial  which  left  much  to  be  desired 
from  the  point  of  view  of  justice,  the  Dreyfus  affair 
hovered  like  a  bird  of  ill  omen  over  successive  minis- 

i«  See  Lemonon,  "L'Europe  et  la  Politique  Britannique,"  pp.  136-169, 
for  a  very  excellent  discussion. 

«  Fullerton,  "Problems  of  Powers,"  p.  57. 


THE  INTERNATIONAL  SITUATION        17 

tries,  refusing  to  be  driven  away  until  the  whole  rotten 
carcass  should  be  dragged  forth  and  exposed  to  the 
light  of  publicity.  Four  successive  ministers  of  war, 
after  examining  the  famous  dossier,  upon  whose  con- 
tents Captain  Dreyfus  was  convicted,  had  declared  him 
guilty,  and  had  opposed  revision  of  the  case.  M. 
Meline,  premier  of  the  government  preceding  that  of 
M.  Brisson,  swore  on  his  honor  that  Dreyfus  was  guilty. 
M.  Cavaignac,  minister  of  war  in  the  Brisson  cabinet, 
declared  in  his  speech  announcing  the  policy  of  the 
government  (July  7)  that  the  door  was  closed  upon 
the  Dreyfus  question.  The  murder  or  suicide  of  Col. 
Henry,  chief  witness  against  Dreyfus  in  1894,  and  self 
confessed  forger,  coming  at  this  time  (August  1898), 
made  it  evident  that  a  revision  must  take  place  in  the 
near  future,  and  that  for  some  time  to  come  the  minis- 
ter of  foreign  affairs  had  to  count  upon  a  war  depart- 
ment weak  and  disorganized,  unrespected  either  at 
home  or  abroad.  Even  in  discussions  on  foreign  af- 
fairs in  the  Chamber  the  ' '  affair ' '  was  dragged  in.  M. 
Jules  Guesde,  the  Socialist,  declared  that  the  Quai 
d'Orsay  was  subject  to  occult  influences,  "that  the 
French  Republic  has  a  king  who  is  named  Rothschild," 
and  M.  Firmin  Faure  asserted  that  the  government  of 
M.  Brisson  was  established  with  one  purpose, — namely 
to  obtain  the  acquittal  of  Dreyfus,  a  traitor,  and  recom- 
mended a  French  policy  instead  of  a  Jewish  policy.18 
The  Franco-Russian  alliance  itself  was  being  under- 
mined, and  Russia  could  rightly  question  whether 
France  with  the  Dreyfus  incubus  attached  to  its  war 
department  was  a  very  valuable  partner. 

is  Annalea  de  la  Chambre,  Vol,  59iv,  p.  167. 


18  FEENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

So  it  was  with  the  Dual  Alliance  weakening,  with 
Italy  jealous  and  disgruntled,  with  Germany  dubiously 
friendly,  and  with  Great  Britain  openly  hostile,  that 
France  put  her  foreign  policy  into  the  hands  of  M. 
Delcasse,  who  for  seven  years  was  to  guide  her  destinies 
and  finally  lead  her  into  a  friendly  entente  with  Great 
Britain,  the  one  power  which  for  centuries  had  been  her 
open  and  avowed  enemy. 


CHAPTER  II 
FASHODA 

1.     THE  FRANCO-BRITISH  AGREEMENT  OF  MARCH  21,  1899 

THE  Spanish- American  War  was  in  progress  when 
M.  Delcasse  entered  upon  his  duties  as  minister 
of  foreign  affairs,  and  he  immediately  conceived  the 
idea  that  France  as  a  sincere  friend  of  both  powers 
might  be  able  to  bring  about  an  understanding  between 
them.  Admirals  Schley  and  Sampson,  at  Santiago, 
had  completed  the  destruction  of  Spanish  sea  power 
which  Admiral  Dewey  had  begun  in  Manila.  Spain 
unable  to  continue  the  struggle,  solicited  the  good 
offices  of  M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  ambassador  at 
Washington,  to  ask  for  terms  of  peace.  The  United 
States  was  willing  to  offer  reasonable  terms,  and  on 
August  12,  a  protocol  was  signed  by  William  R.  Day, 
Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States,  and  M.  Cam- 
bon, representing  Spain.  As  a  mark  of  appreciation  of 
M.  Delcasse's  position  as  mediator  and  M.  Cambon 's 
valuable  services  towards  ending  the  war,  Paris  was 
chosen  as  the  place  where  the  peace  terms  were  ar- 
ranged and  signed.1  Although  M.  Delcasse  had  thus 
earned  the  right  to  the  blessing  conferred  by  the  beati- 
tudes upon  the  peacemaker,  he  was  now  to  embark 
upon  a  dangerous  course  in  which  he  would  need  all 
possible  benedictions  to  escape  the  reefs  of  disaster. 

i  Johnson,  "America's  Foreign  Relations,"  Vol.  II,  p.  264. 

19 


20  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Ever  since  Lord  Beaconsfield,  in  1877,  had  given  to 
the  world  that  clever  exhibition  of  haute  finance  worthy 
of  the  best  traditions  of  his  race,  by  purchasing  on  his 
own  authority,  for  four  million  pounds,  the  hundred 
and  seventy-seven  thousand  shares  of  the  Suez  Canal 
held  by  the  Khedive,  Great  Britain  had  found  herself 
unable  to  withdraw  from  Egypt.  In  the  early  eighties 
France,  who  had  gone  in  as  an  equal  partner,  allowed 
herself  to  be  forced  out  by  the  pusillanimity  of  a 
foreign  minister.  Great  Britain  gave  notice  on  several 
occasions  of  her  intention  to  withdraw,  and  in  1885, 
after  the  fall  of  Khartoum,  did  withdraw  from  the 
Egyptian  Soudan.  But  from  1891  to  1894  she  gave 
new  impetus  to  her  expansion  both  on  the  Upper  Nile 
and  in  the  territory  between  Lakes  Albert  Nyanza  and 
Victoria.  France  countered  with  a  treaty  with  the 
Congo  Free  State,  August  14, 1894,  opening  to  her  influ- 
ence territory  north  of  the  Bornu  to  the  Nile.2  To- 
wards the  close  of  1895  the  French  government  was 
apprised  of  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  intended  to 
crush  the  Mahdi  and  retake  the  Soudan.3  The  dream 
of  Cecil  Rhodes  for  a  Cape  to  Cairo  Railroad  was  ap- 
proaching the  possibility  of  fulfillment.  This  scheme 
conflicted  with  a  plan  that  the  French  had  long  cherished 
of  extending  their  territory  across  the  continent,  and 
instructions  to  this  effect  had  been  given  as  far  back 
as  1893  to  M.  Liotard  by  M.  Delcasse,  who  was  at  that 
time  Colonial  Secretary.     M.  Liotard  had  been  ordered 

2  Doc.  Dip.,  "Afrique,  Arrangements,  Actes  et  Conventions,  1881- 
1898,"  No.  16.  In  reference  to  this  convention  M.  Deloncle  in  the  Cham- 
ber, Feb.  28,  1895,  declared  that  "to-day  the  English  dream  of  possess- 
ing all  the  upper  Nile  is,  I  believe,  forever  disturbed."  Annales  de  la 
Chambre,  Debats  Pari.,  Vol.  451,  p.  761. 

3  Tardieu,  "France  and  the  Alliances,"  p.  43. 


FASHODA  21 

to  seek,  by  the  Upper  Ubanghi,  an  outlet  upon  the  Nile 
for  the  French  possessions  in  Central  Africa.4  The 
instructions  for  the  Marchand  expedition  proper  were 
not  signed  till  February  24,  1896,  more  than  two  years 
later,  an  inexcusable  fault  in  an  expedition  of  this 
sort.5  The  expedition  left  France  in  June  of  the  same 
year,  "  charged  with  relieving  those  troops  which  had 
completed  their  term  of  service  and  with  assuring 
under  the  high  direction  of  the  government's  commis- 
sioner, M.  Liotard,  the  occupation  and  the  defence 
of  the  regions  that  the  Franco-Congo  Convention  had 
recognized  as  ours. ' ' 6  The  instructions  further  or- 
dered Captain  Marchand  to  avoid  all  hostilities;  in 
fact  his  expedition  was  purposely  made  small  in  order 
to  avoid  even  the  appearance  of  aggression. 

Before  continuing  with  Captain  Marchand  to  his 
encounter  with  General  Kitchener  at  Fashoda,  we  must 
take  note  of  the  diplomatic  sparring  between  the  two 
governments.  Between  the  time  when  M.  Liotard  first 
received  orders  to  seek  an  outlet  upon  the  Nile  in  1893, 
and  the  setting  out  of  the  Marchand  expedition  in  1896, 
both  governments  gave  clear  expressions  of  their  views. 
On  March  28, 1895,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Under  Secretary 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  stated  in  the  House  of  Commons : 
"We  have  no  reason  to  suppose  that  any  French  ex- 
pedition has  instructions  to  enter,  or  the  intention  of 
entering,  the  Nile  Valley  .  .  .  because  the  advance  of  a 
French  expedition  under  secret  instructions  right  from 

*  Lebon,  "La  Mission  Marchand  et  le  Cabinet  Meline,"  Revue  de 
Deux   Mondes,  March   15,    1900. 

s  See  Darcy,  "Cent  Annees  de  Rivalite  Coloniale,"  Chap  X,  for  an 
excellent  discussion  of  the  mistakes  which  led  to  the  ultimate  failure 
of  the  expedition. 

«  Doc.  Dip.,  Haut  Nil  et  Bahr-el-Ghazal,  Nos.  3  to  7. 


22  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

the  other  side  of  Africa  into  a  territory  over  which 
our  claims  have  been  known  for  so  long  would  be  not 
merely  an  inconsistent  and  unexpected  act,  but  it  must 
be  perfectly  well  known  to  the  French  government  that 
it  would  be  an  unfriendly  act  and  would  be  so  viewed  by 
England."7 

Neither  did  France  allow  Sir  Edward  Grey's  state- 
ment to  pass  unchallenged.  On  April  5,  M.  Hanotaux, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  declared  in  the  Senate: 
.  .  .  "the  position  taken  by  France  is  the  following — 
the  regions  under  discussion  are  under  the  complete 
sovereignty  of  the  Sultan.  They  have  a  legitimate 
master,  it  is  the  Khedive.  Therefore  we  say  to  the 
English  government : 

"  'You  declare  that  by  virtue  of  the  convention  of 
1890  England  has  placed  a  part  of  these  territories  in 
its  sphere  of  influence.  Very  well,  let  us  know  at  least 
to  what  territories  your  claims  apply;  tell  us  how  far 
this  sphere  of  influence  extends,  which  according  to  you 
commences  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Nile  and  extends 
northward  indefinitely  .  .  . '  ' ' 8 

Great  Britain  made  no  reply  to  this  request  for  a 

i  Pari.  Debates,  Vol.  32,  p.  405.  That  all  English  opinion  was  not 
identical  with  that  expressed  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  is  shown  by  the 
speech  made  by  Mr.  H.  Labouchere  in  the  same  debate.  .  .  .  "Why 
must  France  be  ordered  to  keep  her  hands  off  a  territory  extending 
some  thousand  miles  along  the  banks  of  the  Nile  between  the  lakes  and 
the  southern  frontier  of  Egypt  ...  he  would  like  the  Honorable  Gentle- 
man to  tell  the  Committee  whether  in  any  diplomatic  document  it  had 
ever  been  stated  to  France  that  we  had  any  more  right  to  this  long 
stretch  of  the  valley  of  the  Nile  than  France  herself.  ...  It  was  per- 
fectly true  that  we  made  some  arrangement  between  Germany  and 
Italy,  telling  Germany  they  might  go  to  one  part  and  telling  Italy  they 
might  go  to  another  part;  but  towards  third  powers,  France  or  Russia, 
for  instance,  that  did  not  give  us  any  right."     Ibid.,  p.  416. 

«  Annales  du  Senat,  Vol.  42i,  p.  469. 


FASHODA  23 

definite  delimitation  of  territory,  for  the  very  good 
reason  that  she  could  hardly  claim  at  this  time  terri- 
tory which  still  remained  to  be  conquered.  But  she  did 
better — she  sent  the  Sirdar  Kitchener  to  resume  opera- 
tions against  the  Mahdists  and  to  wipe  out  once  and 
for  all  the  stain  of  the  Gordon  massacre  and  England's 
subsequest  loss  of  the  Soudan. 

General  Kitchener  carried  out  his  mission  in  a  most 
brilliant  fashion,  completely  annihilating  the  power  of 
the  Mahdi  at  Omdurman.  Thereupon  proceeding 
southward,  he  arrived  with  his  army  at  Fashoda,  Sep- 
tember 19,  1898,  and  found  Captain  Marchand  en- 
camped there  with  his  little  force  of  eight  officers  and 
one  hundred  fifty  Sudanese  tirailleurs.  Captain 
Marchand  had  arrived  two  months  earlier,  July  10, 
after  a  heroic  journey  of  two  years,  a  desperate  effort 
rivaling  the  expeditions  of  Livingstone  and  Stanley. 
An  expedition  under  M.  de  Bonchamps,  which  had  set 
out  from  Abyssinia  to  meet  the  Marchand  expedition 
at  Fashoda,  was  forced  to  turn  back  owing  to  the  in- 
explicable failure  of  M.  Lagarde,  French  ambassador 
to  Abyssinia,  to  provide  it  with  the  necessary  equip- 
ment.9 The  meeting  was  courteous  on  both  sides, 
and  the  two  soldiers  wisely  turned  the  question  over 
to  the  Quai  d'Orsay  and  Downing  Street  for  settle- 
ment.10 

It  was  the  task  of  M.  Delcasse  to  settle  a  difficult 
situation  into  which  he  had  been  brought  by  the  pre- 

9  See  Darcy,?  op.  cit.,  p.  432. 

10  M.  Delcasse"  writing  to  M.  Geoffray,  French  representative  at 
London,  agreed:  "II  n'appartient  ni  au  capitaine  Marchand,  ni  au  Gen. 
Kitchener  de  tirer  les  consequences  politiques  des  expeditions  qu'ils  ont 
eu  a  diriger."    Doc.  Dip.,  Haut  Nil  et  Bahr-el-Gahzal,  No.  3. 


24  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ceding  administration.  As  soon  as  he  learned  that 
Kitchener  had  taken  Khartoum  and  that  an  English 
fleet  was  proceeding  up  the  Nile  (September  8)  he  noti- 
fied England  of  the  existence  of  the  Marchand  expedi- 
tion, although  even  at  that  time  he  did  not  know  its  exact 
position,  declaring  that  it  was  merely  an  expedition 
of  penetration,  affirming  no  exclusive  right  nor  preju- 
dicing in  any  way  respective  delimitations  that  the 
governments  alone  could  settle  after  an  examination.11 
His  fixed  determination  to  maintain  friendly  relations 
is  shown  by  the  conciliatory  tone  of  his  note  of  Sep- 
tember 8,  to  M.  Gfeoff ray : 

"Whatever  questions  divide  us  in  the  case  of  Egypt, 
we  cannot  help  associating  ourselves  in  the  eulogies 
excited  by  the  able  manner  with  which  the  Sirdar  has 
conducted  his  expedition  .  .  .  and  I  do  not  doubt  that 
the  English  government  will  look  with  like  sentiments 
upon  the  efforts  of  certain  of  our  compatriots  with 
equal  profit  to  the  cause  of  civilization. ' ' 12 

Summarizing  the  arguments  pro  and  con  as  put 
forth  by  the  Yellow  and  Blue  Books  issued  by  the  re- 
spective governments,  we  find  them  running  something 
like  this: 

Great  Britain  asserted  that  France  had  no  right  in 
the  Bahr-el-Ghazal  regions,  because  these  regions  be- 

ii  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  7,  or  Pari.  Papers,  "Egypt,  Upper  Nile, 
1899,"  Vol.  112  (c9054)  No.  7;  in  his  speech  before  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  Jan.  23,  1899,  M.  Delcasse  declared  that  the  Marchand  mission 
was  only  a  continuation  of  plans  outlined  in  1893  whereby  Gen.  Liotard 
was  to  finish  occupying  territory  granted  to  France  by  the  Franco- 
Congo  Convention  of  Aug.  14,  1894,  and  at  all  times  the  expedition  was 
under  Gen.  Liotard's  control.  Thus  these  plans  were  prepared  before 
Grey's  speech  and  at  time  when  the  Egyptian  Soudan  had  been  wholly 
abandoned  by  England.     Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  57i,  p.  146. 

12  Ibid.,  No.  3. 


FASHODA  25 

longed  theoretically  to  the  Khedive  (although  in  fact 
he  had  lost  them  by  the  revolt  of  the  Mahdi),  and  she 
was  assisting  the  Khedive  to  recover  them. 

France  asked  by  what  right  Great  Britain  spoke  in 
the  name  of  Egypt,  and  especially  of  the  unconquered 
Egyptian  Soudan. 

Great  Britain  claimed  that  she  had  occupied  the 
Equatorial  Province  only  to  defend  Uganda  against 
the  Mahdist  peril. 

France  countered  by  claiming  possession  of  the  Bahr- 
el-Gahzal  to  protect  French  possessions  of  Ubanghi 
against  the  same  peril. 

Great  Britain  then  declared  that  in  1895  Sir  Edward 
Grey  had  warned  France  that  England  considered  the 
whole  valley  of  the  Nile  within  her  sphere  of  influence. 

To  this  France  opposed  M.  Hanotaux's  answer  in 
the  Senate.  Furthermore  she  asserted  that  the  princi- 
ple of  the  " first  occupant"  established  by  the  Act  of 
Berlin  would  be  nullified  if  a  country  could  designate 
lands  as  belonging  to  it  which  it  had  not  yet  reached. 

Great  Britain  then  found  a  better  argument — this 
country  belonged  to  the  Khalif — but  Omdurman  by 
right  of  conquest  had  given  her  possession  of  the 
Khalif 's  territory. 

The  French  conceded  this  willingly,  but  argued  that 
if  conquest  settled  this  point,  by  England's  own  argu- 
ment France  should  hold  the  Bahr-el-Gahzal,  since  they 
had  taken  it  from  the  Khalif  before  the  battle  of  Om- 
durman.13 

is  Doc.  Dip.,  ibid.,  especially  Nos.  7  and  13 ;  Pari.  Papers  "Egypt, 
Upper  Nile,  and  Fashoda,  1899,"  Vol.  112  (c9055)  Nos.  1  and  3;  see 
Ebray,  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  Nov.  1898,  for  excellent  summary  of  the 
official  document" 


26  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Then  M.  Delcasse  demanded  a  delimitation  of  the 
respective  territories  before  Captain  Marchand  should 
leave,  declaring  that  "to  ask  France  to  evacuate 
Fashoda  preliminary  to  all  discussion,  would  be  in  sub- 
stance to  formulate  an  ultimatum,  and  who  then,  know- 
ing France,  could  have  any  doubt  of  her  reply."  14 

This  rejoinder  was  especially  criticised  in  France  on 
the  ground  that  M.  Delcasse  was  preparing  his  own 
humiliation  by  allowing  any  idea  of  an  ultimatum  to 
creep  into  the  discussion.15  However,  the  reply  was 
made  early  in  October,  when  M.  Delcasse  was  still  at- 
tempting to  win  out  for  France.  Had  not  M.  Honotaux 
demanded  precisely  the  same  thing  in  1895  in  his  Senate 
speech?  When  Great  Britain  finally  declared  that  in 
her  eyes  the  rights  of  Egypt  to  Fashoda  were  above  all 
discussion,  and  that  she  was  prepared  to  maintain  her 
stand,  M.  Delcasse  realized  that  France  either  had  to 
withdraw  or  fight.  As  we  have  shown  before,  the 
ravages  of  the  Dreyfus  Affair  upon  the  War  Depart- 
ment precluded  all  possibility  of  the  latter.  Even 
Russia  could  not  be  depended  upon  in  this  crisis,  if 
we  may  put  full  credence  in  the  statement  of  Sir 
Thomas  Barclay.  He  declared  that  when  Count  Mura- 
vieff  first  communicated  the  Czar's  proposal  for  an 
international  peace  conference  about  a  month  after 
Marchand 's  arrival  at  Fashoda,  those  on  the  inside  of 
French  politics  were  inclined  to  believe  that  France 
was  being  left  in  the  lurch.  In  fact  Count  Muravieff 
stated  plainly  to  M.  Delcasse  that  "Russia  could  not 

"Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  22. 

is  Millet  "Quatre  Ans  de  Politique  Exterieure,"  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari., 
Oct.  1902. 


FASHODA  27 

be  counted  upon  to  support  an  attitude  on  the  part  of 
France  which  might  endanger  peace."  16 

With  humiliation  on  one  side  and  disaster  on  the 
other,  M.  Delcasse  saw  a  means  to  turn  a  temporary 
defeat  into  a  permanent  victory — reculer  pour  mieux 
sauter.  Just  as  a  general  may  retreat  in  order  to  ob- 
tain a  better  position  to  face  about,  M.  Delcasse  con- 
ceded that  Fashoda  was  not  worth  a  war;  it  could 
only  be  reached  from  the  Congo  during  the  rainy  sea- 
son, and,  with  Great  Britain  holding  Egypt  and  the 
Soudan,  the  Bahr-el-Gahzal  was  of  little  value  to 
France.  Captain  Marchand,  having  done  all  that  a 
brave  man  could  to  uphold  the  honor  of  France,  was 
ordered  to  withdraw.17 

M.  Delcasse  realized  that  even  if  France  were  in  a 
position  to  wage  a  successful  war  to  retain  this  terri- 
tory it  would  not  be  the  victor  who  would  profit  most 
by  the  victory.18  But  more  important  than  this  was 
his  idea  that  France  might  use  this  temporary  humilia- 
tion as  a  stepping-stone  to  an  understanding*  with 
Great  Britain.  This  was  the  occasion  for  the  two 
great  powers  to  find  a  common  ground  and  to  meet 
upon  it  loyally  and  fair-mindedly,  to  sink  the  question 
of  a  trading-post  in  central  Africa  into  the  greater  one 
of  a  delimitation  of  the  frontiers  of  their  respective 
territories.  Taking  the  Anglo-French  Convention  con- 
cerning the  Niger,  signed  by  M.  Hanotaux,  June  14, 

16  Barclay,  "Thirty  Years  Anglo-French  Reminiscences,"  p.   150. 

"Debidour,  "Histoire  Diplomatique"  (1878-1904),  p.  248,  says:  "the 
little  force  withdrew  by  way  of  Abyssinia  pour  sauver  la  face  by  not 
taking  the  same  route  by  which  it  had  entered." 

i*  Speech  of  April  3,  1900,  Annales  du  Senat,  Vol.  56i,  p.  364. 


28  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

1898,19  as  a  basis,  the  whole  question  of  central  Africa 
might  be  brought  up  for  settlement. 

M.  Delcasse's  position  was  rendered  the  more  diffi- 
cult by  the  irreconcilable  attitude  assumed  by  a  num- 
ber of  English  statesmen.  Mr.  Joseph  Chamberlain, 
Colonial  Secretary,  and  very  influential  in  the  Salis- 
bury cabinet,  had  ever  maintained  a  bellicose  attitude 
towards  France.  Speaking  at  Wakefield,  December  8, 
1898,  he  declared  that  a  friendship  between  the  two 
nations  was  impossible  so  long  as  France  continued 
her  policy  of  twisting  the  lion's  tail.20  An  even  more 
provocative  speech  had  been  delivered  two  days  before 
by  Sir  Edward  Monson,  British  ambassador  at  Paris, 
upon  the  occasion  of  the  fete  organized  by  the  English 
Chamber  of  Commerce  in  Paris.  He  urged  the  French 
government  to  refrain  from  continuing  "that  policy  of 
pin-pricks  which  while  it  can  only  procure  an  ephem- 
eral gratification  to  a  short-lived  ministry,  must  in- 
evitably perpetuate  across  the  channel  an  irritation 
which  a  high-spirited  nation  must  eventually  feel  to  be 
intolerable."  21 

Fortunately  for  M.  Delcasse's  policy  the  Liberal 
opposition  was  now  in  the  hands  of  Sir  Henry  Camp- 
bell-Bannerman,  who  was  outspoken  in  his  opposition 
to  Mr.  Chamberlain's  bellicosity.  Speaking  in  the 
House  of  Commons  February  7, 1899,  he  declared :  "We 
should  regard  the  establishment  of  a  hostile  and  sus- 
picious spirit  between  the  two  countries  as  an  unmiti- 
gated calamity. ' ' 22    Mr.  Balfour  replying  for  the  gov- 

i»  Doc.  Dip.,  rel.  a  la  Convention  Franco- Anglais  du  14  Juin,  1898. 

20  London  Times,  Dec.  9,  1898. 

21  Annual  Register,  1898,  p.  [189  ff. 

22  Pari.  Debates,  Vol.  66,  p.  91;  Speaking  at  Hull,  March  8,  he  was 


FASHODA  •  29 

ernment,  could  see  no  reason  why  the  various  questions 
between  England  and  France  should  not  be  settled  in  a 
manner  satisfactory  to  both  nations,  as  every  govern- 
ment had  felt  the  great  inconvenience  of  these  outstand- 
ing questions.23 

In  France,  sentiment  for  the  most  part  backed  M. 
Delcasse  in  withdrawing  from  Fashoda,  even  before  it 
was  evident  that  he  was  following  a  do  ut  des  policy. 
There  was  some  hostile  criticism  in  the  press,  but  the 
prevailing  sentiment  seemed  to  be  that  he  had  made  the 
best  of  a  bad  bargain.  The  popular  view  was  aptly 
summed  up  by  the  expression  of  an  artisan:  "Que  ga 
nous  fait,  Egypt?  Anglais  c'est  pas  prussien." 24 
When  the  question  was  raised  in  the  Chamber,  M. 
d'Estournelles  de  Constant  urged  that  the  government 
put  an  end  to  the  misunderstandings  which  divided  the 
two  countries  "not  by  a  partial,  ephemeral,  local,  miser- 
ably geographical  arrangement,  but  by  a  general  ac- 
cord, durable  as  far  as  possible,  honorable  for  the  two 
countries. ' ' 25  M.  Eibot,  former  minister  of  foreign 
affairs,  spoke  in  the  same  vein : 

"Two  great  countries  like  France  and  England, 
united  by  so  many  souvenirs  and  interests,  ought  to  be 
in  accord,  not  only  for  the  benefit  of  each  other  but  for 
the  good  of  the  whole  world.  Both  Thiers  and  Gam- 
much  more  violent  in  his  denunciation  of  Chamberlain's  imperialism: 
"We  adjure  this  vulgar  and  bastard  imperialism  made  of  irritation, 
of  provocation  and  aggression,  this  imperialism  which  consists  in  per- 
mitting ourselves  tricks  and  clever  manoeuvers  against  our  neighbors 
and  grabbing  everything  even  if  we  have  no  need  of  it  ourselves." 
London  Times,  March  9,  1899. 

23  Pari.  Debates,  Vol.  66,  p.  91. 

2*  Annual  Register,  1898,  p.  [189  ff. 

26Annales  do  la  Chambre,  Vol.  57i,  p.  134. 


30  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

betta  defended  such  an  accord  on  this  side  of  the  Chan- 
nel and  Gladstone  on  the  other.  The  policy  of  France 
was  not  a  policy  of  pin-pricks  .  .  .  the  effort  made 
during  the  past  fifteen  years  has  sufficed  for  her  colo- 
nial ambition  and  she  is  now  ready  to  be  satisfied  by 
working  laboriously  to  exploit  this  vast  domain." 26 

Fortified  by  this  backing,  and  by  a  vote  of  confidence 
in  his  own  explanation,27  M.  Delcasse  proceeded  to 
make  a  general  settlement.  By  the  Convention  of 
March  21,  1899,  a  complement  of  Article  4  of  Anglo- 
French  Convention  of  June  14, 1898,  Great  Britain  was 
given  the  territory  of  the  Upper  Nile,  including  Darfur 
and  the  disputed  Bahr-el-Gahzal  region;  in  fact  her 
influence  was  to  extend  to  the  15th  parallel.  In  return, 
France  was  given  the  basin  of  Lake  Chad,  including 
Wadai,  Baghirmi,  and  Kanem,  making  a  homogeneous 
whole  of  Algeria,  Tunis,  Senegal,  Dahomey  and  Central 
Soudan.  Both  parties  were  given  equal  commercial 
treatment  in  these  regions.28  The  question  of  Egypt 
proper  was  not  raised  in  this  arrangement  and  was  still 
to  provide  a  fertile  field  for  diplomatic  cultivation. 

Considering  all  the  circumstances  in  the  case,  it  must 
be  conceded  that  France  fared  very  well.  But  when 
the  Convention  came  up  for  discussion  in  the  Senate, 
M.  de  Lamarzelle  objected  to  the  arrangement  on  the 
ground  that  France  was  ceding  the  Bahr-el-Gahzal,  in 
which  they  had  established  several  posts  at  great  ex- 
pense and  in  accord  with  the  regulations  of  the  Treaty 
of  Berlin  of  1885,  in  return  for  unknown  and  unoccu- 

26  Ibid.,  p.  141. 

27  Ibid.,   p.   146. 

28  For  text   see  Doc.   Dip.   rel.  a  la  Convention   Franco-Anglais  du 
14  Juin,  1898,  et  La  Declaration  Additionelle  du  21  mars,  1899. 


FASHODA  31 

pied  territories.  Furthermore,  this  cession  was  made 
to  bring  to  an  end  difficulties  with  England,  yet  the 
principal  causes  for  dispute  with  England  still  re- 
mained unsettled.29 

The  reply  of  M.  Delcasse  was  a  brilliant  example  of 
his  ability  both  to  persuade  and  to  convince.  He 
agreed  that  in  the  case  of  the  Niger,  important  conces- 
sions had  been  made  by  France,  but  pointed  out  that 
in  return  the  unity  of  the  French  Soudan  had  been  ob- 
tained. Furthermore,  even  if  there  was  a  great  deal 
of  sand  where  the  Gallic  cock  could  scratch  at  his  ease, 
the  Bahr-el-Gahzal  offered  immense  marshes  where 
the  British  duck  could  rejoice  in  full  liberty.  Finally, 
to  bring  the  realities  of  the  case  before  the  Senators 
he  demanded:  " after  M.  Cecil  Rhodes  had  pushed  the 
British  flag  to  the  southern  shores  of  Lake  Tanganika, 
when  in  the  north,  successively  Dongola,  Berber,  and 
Khartoum  had  been  snatched  from  the  Mahdists,  what 
statesman  who  had  not  completely  lost  the  sense  of 
reality,  what  minister  knowing  that  from  Cairo  in 
twenty  days  thousands  of  soldiers  could  be  brought  to 
Bahr-el-Gahzal  by  the  Nile,  whilst  it  would  have  taken 
the  French  a  year  to  bring  up  a  few  hundred  exhausted 
soldiers — knowing  this,  who  would  have  dared  to  ask 
of  the  country  the  useless  sacrifice  of  the  blood  and 
treasure  by  which  one  might  have  been  able  merely  to 
try  to  dispute  this  territory?"30  The  Convention 
passed. 

29  Annates  du  Senat,  Vol.  54,  p.  828. 

so  Annales  du  Senat,  Vol.  54,  p.  830.  At  this  time  even  M.  Delcasse" 
would  hardly  have  believed  it  possible  that  this  forced  agreement  would 
later  be  regarded  by  Frenchmen  as  the  "Open  Sesame  of  the  Future," 
"la  porte  du  magnifique  palais  de  la  Revanche." 


32  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Even  before  M.  Delcasse  was  able  to  settle  the 
Fashoda  Affair  another  little  difficulty  had  risen  be- 
tween the  two  powers  in  Arabia.  Early  in  1899  the 
Sultan  granted  to  France  the  right  to  lease  a  coaling 
station  at  Bandar-Jisseh,  a  short  distance  from  Muscat. 
The  English  resident  at  Bender-Bouchir,  being  ap- 
prised of  the  situation,  demanded  of  the  Sultan  that  he 
withdraw  this  concession  from  France.  The  Sultan 
was  forced  to  comply,  and  when  France  refused  to  give 
it  up,  the  Sultan  declared  it  annulled.  According  to 
M.  Delcasse,  France  was  only  asking  a  privilege  that 
Great  Britain  already  possessed,  and  to  which  France 
had  an  equal  right,  since  both  nations  were  bound  by 
the  same  treaty  of  1862.  When  he  took  up  the  ques- 
tion with  the  Queen's  Government,  it  agreed,  and  re- 
gretted that  perhaps  its  agents  had  been  over  zealous.31 
According  to  the  English  version,  Great  Britain  was 
perfectly  willing  that  France  should  have  a  coaling  sta- 
tion, but  she  objected  to  the  cession  of  the  port  of 
Bandar-Jisseh  to  France,  since  it  was  capable  of  being 
made  into  a  strong  naval  port  in  clear  contradiction  of 
the  convention  of  1862.  Under  these  circumstances  the 
Queen's  Government  upheld  its  agents  in  demanding 
the  cancelation  of  this  lease.32  Whatever  the  first  in- 
tention of  M.  Delcasse  may  have  been,  he  was  not  will- 
ing to  allow  it  to  interfere  with  more  important  plans, 
and  France  contented  herself  with  a  coal  depot. 

Great  Britain  also  complained  that  since  France  had 
formally  annexed  the  island  of  Madagascar  she  had 

si  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  51ii,  p.  840. 

32  See  statement  of  Mr.  Brodrick,  Under-Secretary  of  Sate  for  For. 
Affairs,  in  House  of  Commons,  March  8,  1899;  also  editorial  London 
Times,  March  7,  1899. 


FASHODA  33 

imposed  higher  duties  upon  English  goods  than  was 
justified,  that  she  tried  to  dissuade  the  natives  from 
buying  English  merchandise,  and  that  she  imposed 
restrictions  upon  the  commerce  of  Indian  subjects. 
When  in  June,  1898,  France  issued  a  decree  increasing 
the  import  duties  upon  the  principal  articles  of  British 
manufacture,  Lord  Salisbury  in  a  note  to  Sir  Edward 
Monson,  July  9,  1898,  made  a  formal  protest  to  M. 
Delcasse.33  Inasmuch  as  France  now  claimed  Mada- 
gascar as  a  colonial  possession,  Great  Britain  rested 
her  case  upon  very  weak  grounds.  When  Lord  Salis- 
bury protested  again,  in  November,  1898,  at  the  French 
intention  of  restricting  coasting  trade  between  Mada- 
gascar and  the  French  ports  to  vessels  flying  the 
French  flag,  M.  Delcasse  was  able  to  announce  that  the 
decree  had  been  revoked  by  reason  of  the  insufficiency 
of  French  vessels  in  number  and  tonnage  for  the  needs 
of  commerce.84  The  other  questions  were  to  lie  dorm- 
ant until  the  entente  of  1904. 

2.     THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  AT  THE  HAGUE 

Considering  the  military  condition  of  France  at  the 
close  of  the  Nineteenth  Century,  it  was  to  be  expected 
that  she  would  welcome  any  concerted  effect  on  the  part 
of  the  Powers  which  might  lead  to  disarmament  and 
world  peace.  We  have  already  noted  that  when  Russia 
first  broached  the  idea  of  a  peace  conference  it  came 
as  a  cruel  awakening  to  those  in  France  who  saw  in 
the  Dual  Alliance  a  means  towards  the  revanche.  To 
the  great  majority  of  the  French,  however,  world  peace 

38  Pari.  Papers,  "Madagascar,"  1899,  Vol.  109  (c9091)  No.  12. 
s«Ibid.,  Nos.  30  and  32. 


34  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

was  an  ideal  towards  which  the  Third  Republic  would 
struggle  with  as  great  enthusiasm  as  Louis  IX  entered 
upon  the  Crusades.  Had  not  Michelet  prophesied  that 
in  the  Twentieth  Century  "la  France  declarer  a  la  Paix 
au  monde"1  Had  not  Henry  IV,  Sully,  the  Abbe  de 
St.  Pierre,  and  Jean  Jacques  Rousseau  formulated 
plans  for  a  league  of  nations  with  world  peace  as  its 
object?  Had  not  Victor  Hugo  spoken  in  impassioned 
eloquence  on  the  same  subject?  It  is  not  surprising 
then  that  France  was  the  first  to  accept  the  proposal 
set  forth  in  the  circular  of  Count  Mouravieff.  The 
Third  Republic  could  be  expected  to  maintain  the 
French  tradition.    In  the  words  of  M.  Delcasse: 

"The  sympathy  of  France  was  acquired  for  the 
proposition  of  Czar  Nicholas,  first,  because  the  idea 
recommended  itself,  and  it  can  only  be  hoped  that  an 
end  may  be  put  to  this  perfecting  of  armaments  which, 
adopted  by  one  power,  forces  the  others  either  to  imi- 
tate them  or  surpass  them.  France  also  supported  the 
proposal  because  the  Sovereign  who  submits  it  to  the 
world  is  the  head  of  a  great  nation,  an  ally  and  a 
friend  with  whom  never  has  the  accord  been  more  com- 
plete nor  the  relations  more  confident.  Finally, 
France  is  favorably  disposed  towards  it  because  at 
diverse  periods  of  her  history,  and  up  to  the  day  before 
the  war  from  which  she  emerged  mutilated,  she  con- 
ceived and  wished  to  execute  the  same  magnanimous 
design."  35 

Although  the  Conference  did  not  accomplish  all  that 
was  originally  hoped,  and  although  it  was  scorned  by 
some    and    ridiculed    by    others — a    favorite    epithet 

»s  Annates  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  57i,  p.  146. 


FASHODA  35 

directed  at  it  was  "le  monde  ou  Von  s'ennuie" — it  did 
make  a  beginning  towards  the  amelioration  of  the  con- 
duct of  war  on  the  one  hand,  and  towards  a  means  of 
settling  international  disputes  without  recourse  to  war 
on  the  other.  To  facilitate  the  work,  three  commis- 
sions were  formed,  the  first  on  rules  of  warfare,  the 
second  on  applying  to  maritime  warfare  the  rules  es- 
tablished by  the  Conference  o£  Geneva,  and  the  third 
on  arbitration.  The  third  and  most  important  com- 
mission was  under  the  presidency  of  M.  Leon  Bour- 
geois, the  first  French  delegate,  and  both  MM.  d'Es- 
tournelles  de  Constant  and  Louis  Renault  were  also 
members.  The  results  of  this  commission  were  the 
most  tangible,  for  they  established  the  right  of  third 
powers  to  offer  mediation  or  good  offices  without  its 
being  considered  an  unfriendly  act,  and  they  instituted 
a  permanent  court  of  arbitration  sitting  at  the  Hague 
accessible  to  all  at  all  times.  If  this  first  Hague  Con- 
ference did  nothing  more  than  open  a  way  for  a  set- 
tlement of  the  Dogger  Bank  incident,  which  not  only 
prevented  war  between  Russia  and  Great  Britain  but 
ultimately  led  to  the  formation  of  the  Triple  Entente, 
Czar  Nicholas  might  well  feel  that  he  was  amply  repaid 
for  this  bread  cast  upon  the  waters. 

Even  the  German  war  lord  felt  the  effect  of  the  peace 
waves  in  the  air,  and  while  cruising  on  his  yacht  off 
Norway  he  met  the  French  training-ship  Iphigenie  and, 
after  a  short  visit  on  board,  invited  the  officers  on  board 
the  Hohemollern.  The  Kaiser  could  be  most  amiable 
when  it  served  his  purpose,  and  to  make  his  friendly 
disposition  the  more  noticeable,  he  telegraphed  to  Pres- 
ident Loubet,  telling  him  how  much  his  heart  of  a  sailor 


36  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

and  a  comrade  was  rejoiced  by  the  gracious  reception 
which  had  been  accorded  him.36 

M.  Delcasse  decided  that  the  time  was  propitious  for 
strengthening  the  Russian  alliance,  and  hardly  had  the 
Hague  Conference  come  to  an  end  before  he  hastened 
to  pay  a  visit  to  St.  Petersburg.  There  is  little  doubt 
that  he  also  wished  to  acquaint  Count  Mouravieff  of 
his  new  policy  towards  Great  Britain,  though  he  could 
hardly  have  hoped  at  this  early  date  to  bring  the  Brit- 
ish lion  and  Russian  bear  into  the  same  ark  of  peace 
and  friendship.  He  may  also  have  attempted  to  mini- 
mize the  effects  of  the  reappearance  of  the  Dreyfus 
Affair  upon  the  military  power  of  France,  for  it  was 
realized  only  too  well  that  Russia  was  beginning  to 
lose  patience  at  her  ally's  long  continued  washing  of 
her  soiled  linen  in  public.37  However,  the  toasts  were, 
as  usual,  very  cordial  in  tone,  and  when  in  October 
Count  Mouravieff  returned  the  visit  the  official  note 
communicated  to  the  Russian  press  declared:  .  .  . 
"the  friendship  and  intimacy  already  established  be- 
tween Count  Mouravieff  and  M.  Delcasse  had  been  in- 
creased and  will  greatly  facilitate  common  action  in 
the  interest  of  the  two  countries."  38 

The  hands  of  M.  Delcasse  were  much  strengthened  at 

36  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  Aug.  1899. 

37  The  following  editorial  from  Novie  Vremia  quoted  in  Ques.  Dip. 
et  Col.,  Jan.  1,  1901,  is  extremely  pertinent:  "Until  these  recent  times 
the  French  army  has  been,  and  has  been  considered  by  the  most  power- 
ful European  armies  as  an  equal,  an  organization  formed  according 
to  all  the  rules  of  military  science,  possessing  with  excellent  equipment 
an  admirable  spirit  and  perfect  discipline.  At  the  present  time  it 
appears  to  be  changing  its  way  and  its  destination;  it  seems  to  be 
turning  into  a  political  army,  feeble  for  the  enemies  abroad  and  both 
tyrannical  and  vexatious  for  its  own  country." 

88  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  Nov.  1899. 


FASHODA  37 

this  time  through  the  fact  that  he  was  now  a  member  of 
the  Waldeck-Rousseau  ministry  established  for  "  De- 
fence of  the  Republic,"  with  a  real  soldier,  General  de 
Gallif  et,  at  the  head  of  the  war  department.  This  min- 
istry, the  beginning  of  the  Republican  bloc,  was  re- 
solved to  give  justice  to  Dreyfus  at  whatever  cost  and 
to  stamp  out  the  clericalism  and  royalism  which  had 
become  so  closely  interwoven  with  the  " Affair."  The 
Waldeck-Rousseau  ministry  proved  to  be  one  of  the 
ablest  and  longest-lived  ministries  of  the  Third  Repub- 
lic, but  the  task  which  it  had  outlined  was  beyond  its 
ability,  and  it  was  forced  ultimately  to  resign  with  its 
work  unfinished.  Throughout  the  three  years  of  its 
duration  (June  22,  1899- June  7,  1902)  the  pressure  of 
internal  affairs  was  so  great  that  M.  Delcasse  was  al- 
lowed to  proceed  carte  blanche  with  his  foreign  policy 
and  he  made  the  most  of  his  opportunity. 

3.     FRANCE,  GERMANY  AND  THE  BOER  WAR 

With  the  Fashoda  Affair  settled,  with  Italy  again 
brought  into  friendly  commercial  relations,  with  the 
Russian  Alliance  revamped,  and  with  the  great  nations 
of  the  world  having  for  the  first  time  in  the  world's 
history  come  together  to  establish  more  peaceable  in- 
ternational relations,  it  loooked  as  though  the  year 
1899  was  going  to  bring  the  century  to  an  end  with  the 
world  at  peace  and  with  France  well  started  upon  her 
new  policy  of  friendly  understandings.  It  was  merely 
the  calm  before  the  storm.  With  the  outbreak  of  the 
Boer  War  Great  Britain  found  herself  still  in  ' '  splen- 
did isolation,"  but  in  an  isolation  such  as  is  usually 
allotted    to    outcasts    and    pariahs.    Public    opinion 


38  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

throughout  Europe  seemed  to  rise  with  a  unanimous 
voice  to  protest  against  Great  Britain's  imperialistic 
policy  in  South  Africa.  M.  Lavisse  expressed  the  feel- 
ing of  France  when  he  declared  "England  would  like 
to  keep  the  benefits  of  having  been  the  country  of  Glad- 
stone when  she  has  become  the  country  of  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain. ' ' 89  Whether  her  policy  was  defensible  or  not 
made  little  difference.  The  mere  fact  that  two  small 
states  in  South  Africa  would  dare  to  take  up  arms 
against  the  great  British  Empire  was  bound  to  make 
their  cause  sympathetic.  M.  Delcasse  saw  his  care- 
fully cherished  plans  sinking  in  the  quicksands  of  pop- 
ular prejudice.  French  public  opinion,  already 
aroused  by  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  was  inflamed  still 
further  by  reports  of  a  possible  entente  between  Ger- 
many and  Great  Britain.  The  London  correspondent 
of  the  "Echo  de  Paris"  declared  that  Herr  von  Biilow, 
while  on  his  visit  to  London  in  November,  1899,  had 
paid  a  confidential  visit  to  Mr.  Chamberlain,  and  in  the 
course  of  his  interview  asked  whether  Great  Britain 
could  be  induced  to  enter  the  Triple  Alliance.  Being 
informed  that  this  was  out  of  the  question,  he  urged  an 
entente  between  Germany  and  England.  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain conceded  that  such  an  arrangement  might  be 
possible  and  promised  to  consider  it.40  Three  days 
later,  in  a  speech  at  Leicester,  he  added  fuel  to  the 
flames.  After  declaring  that  in  character  the  Teutonic 
race  differs  very  slightly  from  the  Anglo-Saxon,  and 

so  Revue  de  Paris,  Jan.  1,  1900. 

«>Lenionon,  "L'Europe  et  la  Politique  Britannique,"  p.  190;  Von 
Biilow  in  the  revised  edition  of  his  "Imperial  Germany,"  p.  37,  states 
that  Chamberlain  made  the  overtures  but  that  they  were  not  endorsed 
by  Lord  Salisbury  and  intimates  that  even  if  the  overtures  had  been 
official  Germany  could  not  have  afforded  at  that  time  to  accept  them. 


FASHODA  39 

that  the  same  sentiments  which  brought  Great  Britain 
into  close  sympathy  with  the  United  States  might  also 
be  invoked  to  bring  her  into  closer  sympathy  and  alli- 
ance with  Germany,  he  said  that  "if  the  union  between 
^England  and  America  is  a  powerful  factor  in  the  cause 
of  peace,  a  new  triple  alliance  between  the  Teutonic 
race  and  the  two  great  branches  of  the  Anglo-Saxon 
race  will  be  a  still  more  potent  influence  in  the  history 
of  the  world.  .  .  ."41 

The  speech  was  not  favorably  received  in  Great  Brit- 
ain, Germany,  or  the  United  States;  and  in  France  it 
provoked  a  veritable  outburst  of  condemnation  —  not 
so  much  for  its  far-fetched  international  readjustments, 
but  because  in  the  first  part  of  his  speech  Mr.  Chamber- 
lain referred  to  a  gross  caricature  of  the  Queen  which 
had  appeared  in  a  French  comic  paper  and  declared 
that  "these  attacks  upon  her  Majesty  .  .  .  have  pro- 
voked in  this  country  a  natural  indignation  which  will 
have  serious  consequences  if  our  neighbors  do  not  mind 
their  manners." 

Strong  pressure  was  immediately  brought  to  bear 
upon  M.  Delcasse  by  both  politicians  and  the  press, 
urging  intervention  or  at  least  demanding  of  Great 
Britain  that  she  arbitrate  the  case.  In  reply  to  a  ques- 
tion raised  by  M.  Chaumie  in  the  Senate  on  March  15, 
1900,  M.  Delcasse  replied  that  France  could  not  even 
suggest  arbitration,  since  Lord  Salisbury  had  already 
declared  that  the  dispute  did  not  lend  itself  to  arbitra- 
tion.42   Even    though    the    President    of   the    South 

«  Annual  Register,  1899,  p.  226. 

*2  Lord  Salisbury  in  his  Mansion  House  speech  Nov.  9,  1899,  de- 
clared that  no  government  would  interfere  in  the  Boer  War  "in  the 
first  place  because  we  should  not  accept  such  an  interference  gladly; 


40  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

African  Republics  had  addressed  the  Powers  to  obtain 
a  satisfactory  peace  for  both  parties,  such  action  would 
mean  recognition  of  their  independence.  When  Great 
Britain  had  learned  of  this  manoeuvre,  had  she  not 
publicly  declared  that  she  would  not  recognize  their 
independence,  thus  rendering  further  intervention 
superfluous?  Realizing  the  French  tendencies  to  quix- 
otic endeavors,  he  ended  with  a  strong  plea  that  they 
recognize  the  fact  that  "  France  had  not  ceased  to  be 
the  generous  nation  that  the  world  had  known,  admired 
and  sometimes  abandoned,  but  after  so  many  harsh  ex- 
periences, France  could  not  longer  admit  that  her 
duties  towards  the  world  should  make  her  forget  her 
obligations  towards  herself."43 

Although  M.  Delcasse  was  publicly  proclaiming  a 
course  of  absolute  neutrality — and  there  is  no  ques- 
tion that  he  earnestly  favored  such  a  policy — he  could 
not  show  himself  averse  to  a  proposal  to  bring  about 
peace  if  there  seemed  any  chance  of  success.  The 
Queen  of  Holland,  imbued  with  the  sentiments  so  re- 
cently promulgated  at  the  Hague,  and  sympathizing 
keenly  with  the  cause  of  the  Boers,  suggested  to  her 
kinsman,  the  Czar,  that  he  approach  the  other  powers 
and  that  they  intervene  collectively  with  an  offer  of 
their  good  offices.44  As  Count  Mouravieff  happened  to 
be  in  Paris  at  that  time,  it  was  but  natural  that  he 

in  the  second  place  because  I  am  convinced  that  no  such  idea  is  present 
in  the  minds  of  any  government  in  the  world."  Annual  Register,  1899, 
p.  [222. 

«  Annales  du  Senat,  Vol.  56i,  p.  172 ;  M.  Paul  Deschanel  in  a  speech 
at  Nogent-le-Rotrou  echoed  these  sentiments:  "Quand  on  ne  secoure 
pas  les  faibles,  fussent-ils  admirablea  et  heroiques,  il  est  a  la  fois  pueril 
et  imprudent  de  harceler  les  forts  et  surtout  de  les  outrager.  .  .  ." 
Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  Mai,  1900. 

**  Vizetelly,  "Republican  France,"  p.  458. 


FASHODA  41 

should  suggest  to  M.  Delcasse  that  Kussia,  France, 
and  Germany  ought  to  use  their  good  offices  in  the 
cause  of  peace.  M.  Delcasse  approved  the  project,  see- 
ing that  it  was  in  accordance  with  the  traditions  of  the 
French  policy  to  assist  in  every  effort  making  for  peace. 
According  to  the  authority  of  M.  Andre  Mevil,  in  an 
article  appearing  in  the  "Echo  de  Paris,"  Count 
Mouravieff  went  directly  from  Paris  to  Berlin  intend- 
ing to  sound  Count  von  Biilow  on  the  subject,  but  no 
suitable  opportunity  arose.  However  in  February, 
1900,  the  Kussian  ambassador  in  Paris,  again  asked 
the  cooperation  of  France  "to  intervene  to  prevent  fur- 
ther shedding  of  blood,"  with  the  understanding  that 
Germany  should  take  the  initiative.  Again  M.  Del- 
casse gave  his  consent,  stipulating  that  Russia  alone 
should  make  the  proposition  to  Germany,  but  with  the 
assurance  that  France  was  ready  to  join  in  any  effort 
at  mediation.  After  considering  several  days,  the 
Kaiser  replied  that  "the  intervention  of  the  three 
powers  in  English  affairs  appeared  to  him  a  grave  act, 
an  act  of  long  breath,  and  consequently  he  demanded 
that  Germany,  Eussia  and  France  take  in  advance  the 
mutual  engagement  of  guaranteeing,  the  integrity  of 
each  other's  territories."45  As  Russia  immediately 
recognized  that  any  such  proposal,  which  postulated  a 
recognition  of  the  status  quo  as  imposed  by  the  Treaty 
of  Frankfort  as  a  basis,  would  be  wholly  unacceptable 
to  her  ally  and  would  completely  nullify  the  Franco- 
Russian  Alliance,  the  idea  was  dropped.  Although  this 
version  does  not  coincide  with  the  explanation  given  by 
the  Kaiser  in  his  famous  declarations  published  in  the 

«  M6vil  quoted  in  L^monon,  op.  cit.,  p.  199. 


42  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

" Daily  Telegraph/'  October  28,  1908,  in  which  he  de- 
clared that  Germany  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  any 
enterprise  which  might  be  destined  to  hasten  the  down- 
fall of  England,46  we  have  only  to  contrast  these  senti- 
ments with  those  which  he  expressed  to  President 
Krnger  in  1896  after  the  Jameson  raid,  to  feel  a  little 
dubious  over  Germany's  friendship  towards  England. 
If  further  evidence  is  needed,  Prince  von  Biilow  gives 
it.  He  declares  that  although  to  many  it  seemed  that 
the  European  situation  was  favorable  to  a  momentary 
success  against  England  and  that  French  assistance  was 
assured,  he  realized  that  the  deeply  rooted  national 
hatred  against  the  German  Empire  among  the  French 
would  have  quickly  ousted  the  momentary  ill-feeling 
against  England — Fashoda  had  not  effaced  the  memory 
of  Sedan.  "Our  neutral  attitude  during  the  Boer 
War,"  he  says,  "had  its  origin  in  weighty  considera- 
tions of  the  national  interests  of  the  German 
Empire."47 

Prince  von  Biilow  had  correctly  interpreted  French 
sentiment — Fashoda  had  not  effaced  Sedan.  And  al- 
though such  a  conservative  historian  as  M.  Lavisse, 
writing  at  the  close  of  1899,  feared  that  the  possibility 
of  a  war  between  France  and  England  seemed  "the 
most  redoubtable  of  those  which  threaten  the  peace  of 
the  world,"48  M.  Delcasse  did  not  seem  to  entertain 
the  same  fears,  and  at  a  private  dinner  party  at  which 
the  Russian  correspondent  of  the  "Rossia"  was  pres- 

46  Laloy,  "La  Diplomatic  de  Guillaume  II,"  p.  70. 
*7  Von  BUlow,  "Imperial  Germany,"  p.  30. 

4«  Lavisse,  "Precautions  contre  PAngleterre,"  Revue  de  Paris,  Jan.  1, 
1900. 


FASHODA  43 

ent,  M.  Delcasse  thus  expressed  his  views  to  a  French 
deputy  who  brought  up  the  question : 

<f  .  .  .  You  say  that  after  finishing  with  the  Trans- 
vaal the  English  will  turn  against  us.  Very  frankly, 
I  do  not  think  so  .  .  .  the  English  know  very  well  that 
we  have  no  reason  to  make  war  upon  them,  since  there 
is  nothing  we  should  care  to  take  from  them.  My 
policy  is  neither  one  of  menace,  nor  of  excitement — 
blustering  is  repugnant  to  me.  It  is  not  worthy  of  a 
great  nation  which  wishes  to  play  a  great  role  in  the 
world.  On  the  contrary  I  wish  to  put  the  whole  world 
in  good  humor.  .  .  . "  49 

Speaking  in  the  Senate  on  April  3,  1900,  in  reply  to 
a  question  of  the  Count  d'Aunay,  M.  Delcasse  summed 
up  in  a  clear  and  statesmanlike  manner  his  policy  dur- 
ing this  trying  period : 

"If  the  points  of  contact  between  France  and  Eng- 
land are  numerous,  and  numerous  consequently  the 
subjects  of  litigation,  much  more  numerous  and  much 
stronger  are  the  reasons  for  forestalling  or  regulating 
them  in  accordance  with  the  mutual  respect  of  the 
rights,  interests  and  dignity  of  each,  and  among  these 
reasons  the  most  decisive  in  my  eyes  is  that  if  by  mis- 
chance a  conflict  should  break  out  between  these  two 
powers,  it  is  not  to  the  conqueror,  whichever  it  might 
be,  that  would  go  to  the  principal  benefits  of  the  vie- 
tory."50 

« Article  of  M.  Pavlovsky  in  la  Rossia,  quoted  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col. 
Jan.  1,  1900. 

eo  Annales  du  Senat,  Vol.  56i,  p.  364. 


CHAPTER  ni 
FRENCH  DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  ORIENT 

1.     THE  CRETAN  AFFAIR 

WHEN  M.  Delcasse  entered  upon  his  duties  at  the 
Foreign  Office,  one  of  the  first  problems 
brought  to  his  attention  was  that  of  Crete.  This,  like 
most  of  the  questions  arising  between  the  Ottoman 
Empire  and  the  European  powers,  was  one  in  which 
the  desire  to  find  a  speedy  and  satisfactory  solution 
lay  wholly  on  the  side  of  Europe.  The  long-cherished 
aspiration  of  Crete  to  be  annexed  to  Greece  had  seemed 
at  the  dawn  of  fulfillment  in  February,  1897,  when 
Greece  seized  the  island  in  defiance  of  the  Powers. 
But  the  Powers  were  relentless,  and  the  quick  defeat 
of  the  Greeks  at  the  hands  of  the  Turks,  in  the  short 
and  disastrous  Greco-Turkish  War,  threw  a  pall  for  a 
time  over  the  hopes  of  the  Cretans. 

As  a  temporary  solution,  it  was  decided  by  the  four 
powers,  France,  Great  Britain,  Russia  and  Italy,  whose 
squadrons  had  been  blockading  the  island,  to  give  the 
long-suffering  ''Island  of  Liars"  provisional  auton- 
omy, based  upon  a  plan  submitted  May  27,  1897,  by  M. 
Hanotaux.1  In  accordance  with  this  plan,  Russia,  early 
in  1898,  proposed  Prince  George  of  Greece  as  Governor 
of  Crete  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan.  France 
and  the  other  Powers  agreed.    But,  as  is  often  the  case 

iDoc.  Dip.,  Affaires  d'Orient  (Mai-Decembre,  1897),  Nos.  1  and  8. 

44 


DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  ORIENT  45 

in  dealings  with  Sublime  Porte,  obstructions  constantly 
arose,  and  when  M.  Delcasse  became  foreign  minister, 
in  June,  1898,  the  affair  was  still  under  discussion. 
At  length  a  commission  of  consuls  of  the  four  Powers, 
working  with  an  executive  committee  of  the  Cretan 
Assembly,  succeeded  in  drawing  up  a  constitution  for 
the  provisional  regime.2  Before  it  could  be  put  into 
effect  a  Mussulman  uprising  took  place  in  Candia  re- 
sulting in  a  massacre  in  which  the  British  vice-consul, 
a  British  officer,  and  several  soldiers  were  killed.3 
Italy  now  took  the  lead  and  backed  by  the  other  three 
Powers  (Germany  and  Austria  refused  to  participate) 
demanded  the  complete  withdrawal  of  Turkish  forces.4 
This  time  the  Sultan  realized  that  he  must  pay  the 
piper,  and  after  one  final  vain  objection  he  met  their 
demands  in  full.  "With  the  Turkish  forces  withdrawn, 
the  Powers  established  their  regime  of  autonomous 
government  with  Prince  George  as  High  Commissioner 
— "they  had  succeeded  in  reestablishing  peace  but  only 
by  a  bastard  solution  which  in  reality  terminated  noth- 
ing. ' ' 5  In  reality  it  was  the  last  trench  in  the  Cretans ' 
long  struggle  for  unification  with  their  mother,  Hellas. 
Let  the  Powers  henceforth  look  upon  their  hope  with 
bienveillance  or  not,  one  of  their  own  flesh  and  blood, 
Eleutherios  Venizelos,  was  to  make  it  a  living  reality 
in  spite  of  the  European  powers  if  not  with  their  assist- 
ance.6 

2  Doc.  Dip.,  "Affaires  d'Orient,  Autonomie  Crgtoise,  Janvier-Octobre," 
1898,  No.  159  annexe. 

s  Ibid.,  No.  168. 

*  Ibid.,  No.  219. 

o  Debidour,  "Histoire  Diplomatique  de  1'Europe  (1878-1904),"  p.  238. 

«  See  Gibbons,  "The  New  Map  of  Europe,"  Chap.  XII,  for  an  excellent 
sketch  of  the  Cretan  question. 


46  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

2.     FRANCE   SETTLES  WITH  TURKEY 

In  the  Cretan  affair  France  had  played  only  a 
secondary  role,  but  this  was  sufficient  to  give  M.  Del- 
casse  experience  which  proved  very  valuable  when  it 
came  time  for  France  to  deal  individually  with  Abdul 
Hamid.  It  must  be  remembered  that  France,  in  addi- 
tion to  her  right  as  cosignatory  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin, 
to  exercise  a  guardianship  over  Christians  in  the  Otto- 
man Empire  in  concert  with  the  other  powers,  pos- 
sessed a  special  prerogative  obtained  by  secular  usage 
to  protect  all  Catholics  in  the  Sultan's  dominions. 
In  both  of  these  categories  the  actions  of  the  Turkish 
government  had  been  anything  but  satisfactory.  The 
Armenian  vilayets  were  the  constantly  recurring 
scenes  of  new  outrages,  the  Porte  had  been  delaying 
endlessly  in  vesting  with  authority  recently  founded 
schools  and  hospitals,  it  had  resisted  the  customs  im- 
munities established  by  the  capitulations,  and  it  had 
refused  the  berat  of  investiture  to  the  Patriarch  of  the 
United  Chaldeans.  To  these  moral  grounds  for  com- 
plaint were  now  added  more  material  ones.  A  French 
company,  which  had  constructed  certain  wharves  in 
Constantinople  through  a  concession  officially  granted 
before  work  was  started,  was  now  refused  possession. 
The  alleged  grounds  were  that  the  Government  in- 
tended to  purchase  the  wharves,  although  it  was  no- 
torious that  the  Ottoman  Treasury  was  wholly  unable 
to  buy  them  back.  Another  French  subject  was  by 
force  dispossessed  of  lands  which  he  had  drained  and 
made  possible  of  cultivation.  Finally  two  bankers, 
MM.  Tubini  and  Lorando,  one  a  son,  and  the  other  a 


DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  ORIENT  47 

grandson,  of  naturalized  Frenchmen,  could  not  obtain 
reimbursements  of  loans  long  overdue  which  had  been 
made  to  the  Porte.7 

The  case  of  the  wharves  was  a  violation  of  a  contract 
pure  and  simple,  and  if  permitted  to  go  unchallenged 
the  Sultan  might  do  the  same  with  the  concessions 
granted  to  the  Syrian  and  Libyian  Railways,  with  the 
quais  in  Smyrna  and  Salonika,  with  the  Ottoman  Bank, 
in  fact  with  all  the  contracts  signed  with  French  con- 
cessionaires.8 Furthermore,  as  M.  Delcasse  indicated 
in  his  dispatch  of  July  17, 1900,  to  M.  Constans,  French 
ambassador  at  Constantinople,  the  selling  back  of  the 
concession  would  be  a  serious  blow  to  French  prestige 
on  the  Bosphorus,  and  should  only  be  consented  to  upon 
condition  that  the  administration  and  exploitation  be 
given  to  a  French  company.9  The  Sultan  finally  agreed 
to  buying  the  concession  back  under  these  conditions, 
but  after  haggling  for  six  months  over  the  price  with 
no  prospect  of  reaching  a  decision,  M.  Constans  again 
demanded  that  the  company  be  allowed  to  exercise  the 
rights  granted  by  the  concession  (March,  1901).  He 
reiterated  the  French  demands  in  a  more  forceful 
despatch  to  Tewfic  Pasha,  Turkish  minister  of  foreign 
affairs,  three  months  later  (June  22). 10 

About  this  same  time,  M.  Constans  learned  that  the 
Ottoman  government  intended  to  refuse  to  pay  the 
judgment  rendered  against  it  by  the  regular  tribunals 
of  the  country  in  the  Lorando-Tubini  claims,  and  that 

t  See  Henri  de  Peyerimhoff,  "Le  Conflit  Franco- Turc,"  Ques.  Dip.  et 
Col.,  15  Nov.,  1901. 

8  See  speech  of  M.  Delcasse"  in  Chambre  Nov.  4,  1901.  Annales  de  la 
Cham'bre,  Vol.  65iv,  p.  152. 

fl  Doc.  Dip.,  "Affaires  de  Turquie,"  1900-1901,  No.  4. 

io  Ibid.,  No.  6. 


48  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

the  Sultan  had  issued  a  secret  trade  to  this  effect  to  his 
minister  of  finance.11  France  now  decided  upon  more 
forcible  measures,  but  before  she  found  it  necessary  to 
employ  them  the  Sultan  suddenly  became  amenable 
and  a  satisfactory  settlement  was  effected  on  all  three 
questions.12  However,  the  settlement  proved  to  be 
merely  a  two  days '  intermission,  until  the  Sultan  could 
catch  his  breath.  This  time  France  was  weary  of  the 
game,  and  although  Turkey  once  more  promised  to  con- 
cede all  points,  M.  Constans  returned  to  Paris. 

M.  Delcasse  now  showed  that  he  had  mastered  the 
finesse  of  the  Oriental  methods  of  diplomacy.  Al- 
though after  the  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  the 
Sultan  hastened  to  settle  the  question  of  the  wharves 
and  the  claims  of  Tubini  with  the  parties  concerned, 
hoping  thus  to  get  an  opportunity  to  bargain  concern- 
ing the  Lorando  claims,  France  refused  to  abate  her 
demands  in  the  slightest  degree.  On  the  contrary  it 
was  decided  to  settle  all  the  difficulties  at  once.  A 
new  note  was  despatched  October  26,  which  covered 
not  only  the  original  demands,  but  all  the  other  out- 
standing questions  which  had  long  awaited  solution, 
and  a  squadron  was  sent  to  obtain  its  endorsement.18 
The  additional  demands  were  as  follows: 

1.  Official  recognition  and  authorization  must  be  af- 
forded to  all  schools,  hospitals,  and  religious  estab- 
lishments under  French  protection. 

2.  Immediate  firmans  authorizing  necessary  con- 
struction and  repairs  upon  institutions  damaged  in 
recent  troubles. 

ii  Ibid.,  No.   5. 

12  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  13. 

is  Ibid.,  No.  52. 


DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  ORIENT  49 

3.  Berat  of  recognition  of  the  Chaldean  Patriarch  to 
be  delivered  in  terms  acceptable  to  the  Holy  See. 

A  joint  note  was  then  dispatched  to  the  Powers  indi- 
cating the  reasons  for  sending  a  squadron  to  Mitylene, 
and  outlining  the  claims  as  just  indicated  "not  doubt- 
ing that  all  the  European  governments  appreciate  the 
moderation  of  our  demands  and  the  obligation  in  which 
we  have  found  ourselves  to  enforce  them  by  the  means 
indicated.  .  .  ." 14 

The  squadron  under  Admiral  Caillard  arrived  at 
Mitylene  on  November  5,  1901.  The  same  day  final 
arrangements  were  made  for  meeting  the  Lorando  and 
Tubini  claims,  the  following  day  the  Council  of  Minis- 
ters approved  the  other  French  demands  and  sent  a 
note  of  acceptance  in  full.15  Upon  being  informed 
that  immediate  action  was  being  taken  to  carry  out  the 
conditions,  M.  Delcasse  ordered  the  fleet  to  withdraw 
and  notified  the  Powers  to  this  effect. 

This  whole  incident  seems  in  itself  trivial  enough 

i*  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  53.  A  much  more  elaborate  explanation 
to  the  powers  was  sent  out  through  the  press  than  appears  in  the 
Yellow  Book,  in  which  it  was  declared  that  "France  sought  no  con- 
quest; the  measures  taken  were  rendered  necessary  by  the  attitude  of 
the  Porte  which  took  the  patience  and  moderation  of  the  cabinet  for 
weakness,  and  which  constantly  avoided  promising  unreservedly  the 
execution  of  the  French  demands.  France  was  positively  obliged  to 
convince  the  Turkish  government  by  a  naval  demonstration  that  the 
recognition  of  its  claims  was  an  unavoidable  necessity.  If  the  French 
minister  seized  the  occasion  for  demanding  at  the  same  time  that  the 
Porte  fulfill  its  obligations  towards  France  especially  in  that  which 
concerns  the  religious  institutions  in  the  Orient,  that  cannot  be  con- 
sidered truly  as  the  fact  of  arbitrarily  making  use  of  the  situation,  but 
rather  as  an  act  of  political  wisdom,  because  the  repetition  of  difficult 
explanations  with  the  Porte  may  thus  be  avoided  in  the  future.  Finally 
the  government  gives  the  clearest  assurances  of  regarding  itself  as 
bound  by  the  Treaty  of  Berlin."  Vienna  Corr.  of  Daily  Telegraph, 
quoted  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  December,  1901. 

is  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  65  (annex). 


50  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

and  would  be,  if  it  were  detached  from  its  surround- 
ings. But  to  see  its  vital  importance  to  France  at  this 
time,  it  is  only  necessary  to  balance  it  against  the  rapid 
extension  of  German  influence  in  Turkey  as  shown  by 
the  granting  of  the  concession  to  continue  the  Bagdad 
Railway  from  Konia  to  the  Persian  Gulf  the  year  be- 
fore. The  "sick  man"  of  the  East  was  failing  rapidly 
and  the  German  eagle  was  ready  to  swoop  and  carry 
off  the  whole  of  Mesopotamia  if  the  field  were  clear. 
Great  Britain  was  clever  enough  to  seize  Koweit,  the 
only  feasible  outlet  for  the  railway  on  the  Persian 
Gulf ;  it  was  imperative  that  France  take  advantage  of 
the  occasion  to  strengthen  her  position  in  the  Near 
East.  By  increasing  her  prestige  among  the  Moham- 
medans, France  had  added  one  more  girder  to  the 
bridge  which  she  was  building  across  the  Channel. 
The  English  respect  strength  above  all  other  qualities 
in  both  individuals  and  in  nations,  and  M.  Delcasse  in- 
tended to  strengthen  France.  "Ne  trouhlez  pas 
Vagonie  de  la  France"  was  forever  discarded. 

When  the  affair  came  up  in  the  Chamber,  M.  Delcasse 
was  criticised  by  the  Socialists  on  the  ground  that 
France  had  not  interfered  in  the  Armenian  massacres, 
yet  had  sent  a  squadron  to  collect  some  private  debts. 
M.  Denys  Cochin  declared  that  the  Sultan  should  ren- 
der an  account  of  inundating  the  quais  of  Constanti- 
nople with  blood  before  accounting  for  his  arrange- 
ments with  the  masons  who  constructed  them.16 

16  See  speeches  of  MM.  Marcel  Sembat  and  Denys  Cochin,  Nov.  4, 
1901,  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  65iv,  p.  148;  on  Jan.  20,  1902,  the 
question  was  again  raised,  and  M.  Gustave  Rouet  scathingly  denounced 
M.  Delcass6's  handling  of  the  Turkish  question,  declaring  the  French 
nary  could  be  sent  to  enforce  monetary  claims  while  it  would  lie  at 


DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  OKIENT  51 

In  reply  M.  Delcasse  pointed  out  that  France  could 
intervene  in  Turkey  only  in  a  question  essentially 
French.  The  question  of  Armenia  was  an  interna- 
tional one  and  could  not  be  settled  by  France  alone, 
and  to  join  it  with  questions  essentially  French  would 
have  brought  about  delays,  increased  the  difficulties, 
and  in  no  way  improved  the  situation  of  the  Armenians. 
As  soon  as  the  powers  signatory  of  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin  were  willing  to  take  up  the  question,  France 
would  join  with  them  only  too  gladly.  Then  abandon- 
ing specific  instances,  he  indicated  forcefully  his  ideas 
on  French  foreign  policy  in  its  broader  aspects: 

"In  the  question  of  foreign  policy  there  are  two 
schools,  one  which  considers  France  as  the  means  to 
pursue  a  chivalric  ideal  abroad;  the  other  as  an  end 
which  should  suffice  in  itself.  The  first  declare  that 
the  rupture  was  caused  by  "une  question  de  gros  sous." 
Yet  if  France  permitted  the  Porte  to  disregard  the 
interests  upon  which  the  conflict  directly  bore,  a  pre- 
cedent would  be  created  for  the  future  which  would 
permit  the  same  treatment  to  be  accorded  to  all  French 
enterprises.  France  is  ready  to  do  her  part  liberally, 
very  liberally,  in  every  way  which  international  soli- 
darity and  humanity  demands,  but  she  cannot  forget, 
and  you  will  not  ask  her  to  forget  the  superior  duty 
which  she  owes  to  herself."  17 

anchor  while  a  whole  people  were  being  exterminated.     Annales  de  la 
Chambre,  Vol.  66i,  p.  75. 

17  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  65iv,  p.  152.  See  also  speech  of 
Jan.  20,  1902,  ibid.,  Vol.  66i,  p.  75;  the  eleventh  Peace  Congress  meet- 
ing the  following  summer  "considering  that  the  recovery  of  the  debts 
Tubini-Lorando  which  had  served  as  pretext  for  armed  intervention  by 
France  was  a  matter  incontestably  of  judicial  character  .  .  .  regrets 
exceedingly  that  appeal  was  not  made  to  the  Arbitration  Court  of  the 
Hague."    Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  Sept.  1902. 


52  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 


3.  FRANCE  AND  THE  BOXER  REBELLION 

Simultaneously  with  the  difficulties  arising  in  rela- 
tion to  the  Ottoman  Empire  M.  Delcasse  found  himself 
involved  in  even  more  serious  troubles  in  the  Far  East, 
for  "the  sick  man  who  sits  yonder  at  Pekin  upon  the 
tottering  throne  of  the  Manchu  princes,  preoccupies  the 
European  chancellories  just  as  much  as  he  who  agon- 
izes at  Constantinople  upon  the  worm-eaten  throne  of 
the  autocratic  and  bloody  sultans. ' ' 18  In  fact  after 
Russia,  Germany  and  France  had  forced  Japan  to  re- 
vise the  Shimonoseki  Treaty  to  protect  the  integrity  of 
China,  the  Powers  seem  to  be  agreed,  that  in  order  to 
continue  their  protection,  it  would  be  well  for  each  of 
them  to  have  as  large  a  sphere  of  influence  as  possible 
to  protect.  This  imperialistic  banquet  at  the  expense 
of  China  finally  developed  into  a  gluttonous  orgy.  In 
the  year  1898,  Germany  by  the  treaty  of  March  6  ob- 
tained a  ninety-nine  year  lease  of  the  port  of  Kiao- 
Chau,  the  inalienability  of  Shantung,  and  the  right  of 
constructing  and  exploiting  mines  and  railways  in  this 
province;  Russia  by  the  treaty  of  March  27  received 
a  twenty-five  year  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  the  Liao- 
Tung  Peninsula — the  very  territory  she  had  refused  to 
Japan  in  1895 — and  also  the  right  of  connecting  Port 
Arthur  to  the  Trans-Manchurian  Railway,  thus  giving 
her  an  outlet  upon  open  water,  the  dream  of  centuries ; 
France  by  the  treaty  of  April  5  had  obtained  confirma- 
tion of  the  concession  of  the  Yunnan  railway,  the  in- 
alienability of  the  three  provinces  bordering  Tonkin, 

i«  Augier,  "La  France  et  l'Angleterre  en  Extreme  Orient,"  Rev.  Pol. 
et  Pari.,  April  1,  1904. 


DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  ORIENT  53 

namely:  Yunnan,  Kwang-Si  and  Kwang-Tung,  a  lease 
on  the  Bay  of  Kwang-Chou-Wan,  the  promise  not  to 
cede  Hainan — another  protection  of  Tonkin — and 
promise  to  employ  a  Frenchman  as  director-general 
of  the  posts.  Two  months  later  she  obtained  the  right 
to  construct  a  railroad  ending  at  Pakhoi.19  Finally 
Great  Britain  who  had  long  looked  with  hostile  and 
jealous  eyes  at  French  and  Russian  expansion  which 
menaced  India,  by  the  arrangement  of  April  4  obtained 
a  lease  on  the  port  of  Wei-hai-Wei,  the  right  to  navigate 
on  all  the  rivers  of  the  Empire,  exclusion  of  foreign 
interests  in  the  basin  of  the  Yangste-Kiang,  the  open- 
ing of  another  port  in  Hun-nan,  and  the  reservation  of 
the  position  of  inspector-general  of  Chinese  customs 
to  an  Englishman.20  Even  Italy  tried  to  crowd  in  for 
a  place  at  the  feast  by  claiming  the  Bay  of  San  Mun, 
but  in  vain. 

As  has  already  been  indicated  France  found  Great 
Britain  to  be  her  chief  opponent  in  the  Far  East  as 
well  as  elsewhere.  With  her  chief  interests  in  Indo- 
China  she  encountered  British  interests  in  Siam,  in 
Yunnan  and  even  in  Hong-Kong — for  in  order  to  com- 
pete with  the  French  railway  from  Yunnan  to  Hanoi, 
which  afforded  an  outlet  for  the  entire  middle  Yangste 
Valley,  Great  Britain  could  offer  the  three  routes  to 
Shang-hai,  Hong-Kong  or  Rangoon.21.  Furthermore, 
by  the  Treaty  of  January  15,  1896,  Great  Britain  had 
cleverly  excluded  France  from  monopolizing  the  direct 
route  to  the  Yangtse  through  Yunnan.  "When  sup- 
ping with  the  French,  it  was  best  to  use  a  long  spoon." 

loDebidour,  "Histoire  Diplomatique  de  l'Europe  (1878-1904),"  p.  267. 
20  Debidour,  op.  cit.,  p.  269. 
2i  E.  Augier,  op.  cit.,  supra. 


54  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

With  the  constant  play  and  interplay  of  these  various 
foreign  interests  in  the  very  heart  of  her  empire,  every 
one  of  which  aimed  ultimately  at  the  destruction  of  her 
sovereignty,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  long  dormant 
China  began  to  be  aroused  from  her  lethargy.  France 
found  that  although  she  had  the  concession  of  Kwang- 
Chou-Wan  on  paper,  there  would  be  difficulty  in  carry- 
ing out  the  provisions.  The  Viceroy  of  Canton 
showed  himself  especially  hostile,  and  after  a  long 
period  of  negotiations  the  French  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  Naval  Division  of  the  Far  East  on  June 
24,  1899,  seized  three  ports  and  proclaimed  the  cession 
made.22  The  Tsong-li-Yamen,  or  Chinese  foreign 
office,  continued  to  resist,  and  at  length  M.  Stephen 
Pichon,  the  French  minister,23  declared  that  he  would 
ask  for  his  recall  if  a  more  conciliatory  attitude  were 
not  shown.  The  Viceroy  replied  by  threatening  to  or- 
ganize a  rebellion  to  prevent  the  French  from  taking 
possession.24  If  France  was  to  maintain  her  position 
in  the  Orient  she  could  not  recede,  and  M.  Delcasse 
ordered  two  battalions  from  Indo-China  to  Kwang- 
Chou-Wan.  Affairs  were  brought  to  a  climax  by  the 
murder  of  two  French  officers  at  Men-tao.  Demands 
were  now  made  for  the  immediate  adoption  of  the  con- 
vention, the  recall  of  the  Viceroy,  the  punishment  of 
all  those  implicated  in  the  murder  and  reparation  to 
the  families.    At  length  on  December  25,  M.  Pichon 

22  Doc.  Dip,  "Chine"  (1898-99),  No.  18. 

23  This  is  the  same  M.  Pichon  who  was  to  serve  so  ably  as  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  during  the.  Clemeneeau  ministry  (1906-1909)  and 
also  during  the  recent  Clemeneeau  ministry  (1917-1920)  which  brought 
France  from  the  gloom  of  internal  dissentions  and  the  fear  of  defeat 
to  the  most  glorious  victory  of  her  history. 

24  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  Nos.  22  and  27. 


DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  ORIENT  55 

was  able  to  declare  that  the  demands  would  be  met  in 
full.26 

Another  source  of  difficulty  to  France  was  her  posi- 
tion as  protector  of  all  Catholics  in  the  Orient,  for  as 
sentiment  grew  against  the  " foreign  devils,"  the  mis- 
sionaries were  the  first  to  suffer.  She  had  taken  it 
upon  herself  to  bring  to  justice  the  murderers  of  the 
Belgian  missionary,  M.  Delbrouck,  who  had  been 
butchered  in  an  unspeakable  manner,  when  in  October 
came  the  news  of  the  murder  of  M.  Chanes  of  the 
Canton  mission  with  several  other  Catholics  at  Pak- 
tong.26  Settlement  was  obtained  for  these  outrages 
at  the  same  time  as  the  ratification  of  the  French  con- 
cessions, but  they  gave  very  clear  indications  of  a 
deadly  hatred  towards  the  growing  influence  of  the 
foreigners. 

At  Shanghai,  the  French  found  themselves  at  odds 
with  both  the  Chinese  and  the  English.  The  conces- 
sion of  Shang-hai  included  an  ancient  Chinese  cemetery 
surrounding  the  Pagoda  of  Ning-po.  The  French  had 
refused  to  allow  further  burials  there,  and  had  given 
the  Association  of  the  Pagoda  of  Ning-po  six  months ' 
time  to  exhume  the  bodies  already  buried.  No  action 
was  taken,  however,  and  when  the  French,  in  order  to 
put  through  some  streets,  were  forced  to  exhume  some 
of  these  bodies  a  violent  outbreak  occurred.  To  settle 
the  difficulty  the  Chinese  authorities  offered  an  exten- 
sion of  the  French  concession  in  another  direction  in 
return  for  the  lands  of  the  Pagoda  of  Ning-po.  The 
French  were  willing  to  treat  upon  this  basis  but  the 
British  now  interfered,  and  at  the  behest  of  Lord  Salis- 

2B  Ibid.,  No.  48. 

«  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  Nob.  72-90. 


56  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

bury,  the  English  minister  at  Pekin  protested  against 
any  extension  of  the  French  concession  (December  14, 
1898). 27  The  Chinese  now  broke  off  negotiations.  M. 
Delcasse  thereupon  sent  a  long  dispatch  to  M.  Paul 
Cambon,  French  ambassador  at  London,  outlining  the 
whole  affair,  and  pointing  out  to  the  English  govern- 
ment that  in  1896  plans  had  been  formulated  and  ap- 
proved for  the  enlargement  of  both  the  French  con- 
cession and  the  International  Concession,  and  as  Great 
Britain  was  especially  interested  in  the  latter,  he  could 
not  understand  English  interference  at  this  time.28 

Mr.  Chamberlain  took  up  the  cudgels  in  behalf  of 
Great  Britain  and  in  a  speech  made  at  Wolverhampton, 
January  18,  he  asserted  that  English  action  was  based 
upon  the  accords  of  the  9th  and  24th  of  February, 
1898,  between  the  Chinese  government  and  the  British 
minister,  wherein  assurance  had  been  given  that  no 
further  cession  of  territory  to  any  foreign  power  would 
be  made  in  any  part  of  the  Yang-tse  region.29  M.  Del- 
casse thereupon  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
open-door  policy  was  included  in  terms  of  the  French 
concession,  and  by  notes  to  the  Chinese  government  of 
April  4  and  9  France  had  extended  this  policy  to  the 
two  Kwangs  and  to  Yunnan.  He  also  politely  pointed 
out  that  when  Great  Britain  had  wished  to  enlarge 
her  possessions  at  Kao-Lon,  opposite  Hong-Kong,  the 
French  government  had  not  protested,  though  it  was 
in  violation  of  the  French  entente  with  China.30  Great 
Britain  gave  no  immediate  indication  that  she  appreci- 

27  Ibid.,  especially  Nos.  103,  105  and  115. 

28  Ibid.,  No.  122. 

2»  London  Times,  Jan.  19,  1899;  also  quoted  in  note  of  M.  Delcasse" 
«oDoc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  123. 


DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  ORIENT  57 

ated  the  conciliatory  attitude  of  France,  but  when  in 
the  following  month  the  question  arose  concerning  an 
extension  of  the  International  Concession,  France  used 
it  as  an  effective  means  of  barter.  Lord  Salisbury  was 
now  led  to  see  the  justice  of  the  French  demands  and  a 
reciprocal  adjustment  to  the  mutual  advantage  of  the 
two  powers  was  finally  effected.31 

While  Europe  was  thus  engrossed  in  opening  up 
China  to  the  advantages  of  Western  civilization  in 
return  for  certain  nominal  economic  advantages,  the 
current  of  hostility  towards  everything  foreign  was 
running  stronger  than  ever.  The  young  Emperor 
Kuang-Su  who  had  lent  himself  to  a  program  of  re- 
forms, was  unseated  by  the  xenophobe  Empress- 
Dowager  in  September,  1898.  She  instituted  a  ruth- 
less crusade  against  all  who  had  shown  any  leanings 
towards  reform  and  made  open  hostility  to  the 
foreigner  the  key-note  of  her  policy.32  She  found  an 
excellent  tool  at  her  hand  in  the  ''Righteous  Harmony 
Fists,"  a  secret  society  originating  in  the  Province 
of  Shantung,  whose  avowed  intent  was  extermination 
of  the  foreigners.  The  earliest  indication  that  we  have 
that  the  European  powers  were  beginning  to  realize 
the  danger  of  their  position  occurs  in  an  identic  note 
sent  by  France,  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  and 
Germany,  January  27,  1900,  to  the  Tsong-li-Yamen 
demanding  an  imperial  edict  pronouncing  the  dissolu- 
tion and  prohibition  of  all  secret  societies.33    They 

si  Ibid.,  Nos.  124-148  inc. 

32  This  sentence  is  found  in  one  of  her  decrees:  "Let  no  one  think 
of  making  peace,  but  let  each  strive  to  preserve  from  destruction  and 
Bpoilation  by  the  ruthless  hand  of  the  invader  his  ancestral  home  and 
graves."     Pott,  "A  Sketch  of  Chinese  History,"  p.  204. 

a»  Doc.  Dip.,  "Chine,"  1899-1900,  No.  5. 


58  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

were  met  with  evasive  answers  and  at  length  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  Powers  considered  staging  a  naval 
demonstration.  Both  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  refused  to  associate  themselves  in  any  such 
undertaking  although  both  decided  to  send  warships 
to  protect  their  interests.34  While  the  Powers  debated 
over  what  measures  should  be  taken,  the  rebels  in- 
creased in  numbers  and  boldness,  nor  was  it  evident 
that  the  government  was  making  much  effort  to  repress 
them.  In  the  words  of  M.  Pichon:  "  .  .  .  the  blind 
hostility  of  the  government  of  the  Empress  against  all 
strangers  is  manifest.  She  is  surrounded  by  man- 
darins who  are  for  the  most  part  quite  ignorant  regard- 
ing things  outside  and  most  passionate  against  all  that 
departs  from  Chinese  traditions.  Her  favor  is 
acquired  by  those  who  wish  to  refuse  everything  to 
the  representatives  of  the  Powers  .  .  .  the  secret  so- 
cieties are  not  ignorant  of  this  attitude  and  are  ready 
to  profit  by  it."85 

On  May  20,  M.  Pichon  proposed  to  the  diplomatic 
corps  that  a  despatch  be  sent  to  the  Chinese  govern- 
ment demanding  immediate  repression  of  the  disorders, 
and  unless  complied  with  to  have  forces  disembarked 
from  the  war-ships.86  A  very  interesting  side-light  is 
thrown  upon  the  diplomatic  situation  at  Pekin  from  the 
narrative  of  a  rather  frank  eye-witness.    It  is  the  24th 

3*  Ibid.,  Nos.  11-16;  the  United  States  played  a  generous  r61e 
throughout  this  most  difficult  period  of  Chinese  history,  commencing 
with  Secretary  Hay's  famous  memorandum  of  Sept.  6,  1899,  concerning 
the  open  door,  to  which  all  nations  interested  had  subscribed  by  March 
20,  1900,  and  ending  with  the  voluntary  return  of  that  part  of  the 
indemnity  left  over  after  the  legitimate  claims  had  been  settled.  See 
"Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,"  1899,  p.  128. 

85  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  22. 

so  Ibid.,  No.  29. 


DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  ORIENT  59 

of  May  and  the  British  legation  is  en  fete  in  honor  of 
Queen  Victoria's  birthday,  "  .  .  .  the  eleven  Legations 
and  the  nondescripts  have  forgotten  their  cares  for  a 
brief  space  and  have  been  enjoying  the  evening  air 
.  .  .  where  the  devil  is  the  protocol  and  the  political 
situation  you  will  say?  Not  quite  forgotten  since 
the  French  minister  attracted  the  attention  of  many 
all  the  evening  by  his  vehement  manner  .  .  .  'les 
Boxeurs/  he  says,  and  what  the  French  minister  says 
is  always  worth  listening  to  since  he  has  the  best  intel- 
ligence corps  in  the  world — the  Catholic  priests  of 
China — at  his  disposal.  It  is  Monseigneur  Favier's 
letter  (Vicar  Apostolic  of  the  Manchu  capital)  written 
but  five  days  ago  that  was  the  subject  of  his  impromptu 
oration.  Monseigneur  Favier  wrote  and  demanded  a 
force  of  marines  for  his  cathedral,  his  people  and  his 
chattels  .  .  .  and  his  request  has  been  cruelly  refused 
by  the  Council  of  Ministers  on  the  ground  that  it  is 
absurd  .  .  . 

"The  French  Minister  was  irate  .  .  .  took  a  dis- 
creet look  around  him  and  then  hinted  that  it  was 
this  legation,  the  British  legation,  which  stopped  the 
marines  from  coming.  ...  So  the  Boxers,  with  half 
the  governments  of  Europe,  led  by  England  as  we  know 
by  our  telegrams,  seeking  to  minimize  their  importance, 
have  already  moved  from  their  particular  habitat 
which  is  Shantung  into  the  metropolitan  province  of 
Chihli."37 

Fortunately  for  the  safety  of  the  legations,  about 
450  men  from  the  foreign  war-ships  were  sent  forward 
and  arrived  in  Pekin  before  it  was  cut  off  from  the 

»t  Weale,  'Indiscreet  Letters  from  Peking,"  p.  13. 


60  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

world.  By  June  10,  even  America  was  aroused,  and 
M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  ambassador  at  Washington, 
was  able  to  telegraph  his  government  that  the  United 
States  which  had  hitherto  consistently  refused  to  par- 
ticipate with  the  European  powers  in  any  military  or 
naval  demonstration  now  realized  the  gravity  of  the 
situation,  and  that  if  a  military  action  became  neces- 
sary the  American  troops  would  join  with  the  Euro- 
pean forces,  and  would  serve  under  the  same  command. 
The  same  day  a  relief  expedition  under  Admiral  Sey- 
mour of  the  British  fleet  started  for  Tientsin,  but  was 
unable  to  fight  its  way  through  the  hosts  of  rebels  op- 
posing it.  The  Powers  now  realized  that  the  legations 
could  be  saved  only  by  quick  and  concerted  action.  In 
reply  to  a  question  raised  in  the  Chamber,  M.  Del- 
casse  declared  that  M.  Pichon  had  been  authorized  to 
act  with  the  representatives  of  the  other  powers ;  the 
whole  force  of  the  naval  division  had  been  placed  at  his 
orders,  and  other  forces  if  necessary.  The  Chinese 
government  also  had  been  notified  that  it  would  be  held 
responsible  for  all  French  subjects  within  its  jurisdic- 
tion.38 

It  is  not  essential  to  our  purpose  to  pursue  the  tortu- 
ous efforts  of  the  Chinese  government  to  settle  the 
affair  by  diplomacy,  while  its  troops  were  aiding  the 
rebels  to  exterminate  the  official  representatives  of  the 
Powers  in  Pekin.  Neither  have  we  space  to  describe 
the  heroic  defence  made  by  the  legations  for  two  whole 
months,  day  and  night,  against  an  intrepid  and  fero- 

38  Speech,  June  11,  1900.  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  Gliii,  p.  158; 
on  June  21,  M.  Delcass6  declared  that  France  would  have  2500  men 
in  China  by  the  end  of  the  month.     Ibid.,  p.  339. 


DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  ORIENT  61 

cious  foe.39  The  Powers  for  the  time  forgot  their 
wrangling  and  jealousy  and  agreed  to  concerted  action 
upon  this  basis:  (1)  the  safety  of  their  representatives 
and  citizens  in  Pekin  and  other  parts  of  the  Empire; 
(2)  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo;  (3)  guarantees 
against  future  outbreaks  of  this  kind.40  However, 
when  the  question  came  up  as  to  who  should  be  placed 
in  command  of  the  allied  forces,  there  was  considerable 
jockeying  for  position.  Since  her  ambassador,  Baron 
von  Kettler,  had  been  murdered,  Germany  resolved  to 
obtain  the  position,  and  went  about  securing  it  in  a 
very  clever  manner.  The  Kaiser  first  communicated 
privately  with  the  Czar  on  the  subject 41  and  then  in- 
formed the  British  ambassador  at  Berlin  that  both 
Russia  and  Japan  thought  that  a  German  supreme 
command  would  be  of  advantage  inasmuch  as  the  Ger- 
man interests  in  the  Far  East  were  not  so  extensive  as 
those  of  certain  other  powers.42  Lord  Salisbury  im- 
mediately replied  that  "Her  Majesty's  government 
will  view  with  great  satisfaction  an  arrangement  by 
which  so  distinguished  a  soldier  is  placed  at  the  head 
of  the  international  forces. ' ' 43 

This  prompt  acquiescence  of  Great  Britain  following 
that  of  Russia  made  it  very  difficult  for  the  French 
government  to  find  a  valid  excuse  for  refusal.  The 
Quai  d'Orsay  thereupon  informed  the  German  govern- 
ment that  as  soon  as  Marshal  von  Waldersee  arrived 

39  For  a  vivid  and  interesting  account,  see  the  narrative  of  M.  Pichon 
as  published  in  the  French  Yellow  Book.  Doc.  Dip.,  "Chine,  1899-1900," 
Rapport  de  M.  Pichon. 

40  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  107. 

4i  Reventlow,  "Deutschlands  auswartige  Politique,"  p.  161. 
«  Pari.  Papers,  1901,  Vol.  91   (c436),  No.  128. 
43  Ibid.,  No.  143. 


62  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

in  China  "and  shall  have  taken  the  eminent  position 
due  to  his  superior  rank,  General  Voyron,  commander 
of  the  French  forces  will  not  fail  to  place  his  relations 
with  the  Marshal  upon  a  proper  footing  (ne  manquera 
pas  d' assurer  ses  relations  avec  le  Marechal)."  44  The 
United  States,  the  only  other  power  that  was  unwilling 
to  have  its  troops  serve  under  a  German  commander-in- 
chief,  side-stepped  the  difficulty  in  a  very  neat  fashion. 
She  gave  her  consent  if  there  should  be  further  need  of 
joint  action  after  his  arrival.45  When  Count  von  Wal- 
dersee  did  reach  Pekin,  two  months  after  the  siege  was 
raised,  General  Chaffee,  in  command  of  the  American 
expeditionary  forces,  refused  to  participate  in  opera- 
tions ordered  by  the  German  commander-in-chief,  on 
the  ground  that  his  instructions  did  not  permit  him  to 
engage  in  offensive  work  tending  to  promote  rather 
than  allay  hostilities.46 

As  was  to  be  expected,  the  news  that  the  French 
forces  in  China  were  to  serve  under  a  German  general 
provoked  an  outburst  of  indignation  in  France.  M. 
Marcel  Sembat  protested  strenuously  in  the  Chamber : 
"when  the  Chinese  see  the  troops  of  Europe  under  the 
command  of  a  general  from  the  State  which  has  shown 
itself  most  brutally  aggressive  towards  them,  will  they 

44 Pari.  Papers,  1901,  Vol.  91  (c436)  No.  215.  This  correspondence 
concerning  the  supreme  command  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  French 
Yellow  Books  on  China. 

45  "Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,"  1900,  No.  1338. 

46  Carter,  "Life  of  Lieut.  Gen.  Chaffee,"  p.  210;  a  little  later  when  the 
Germans  commenced  to  introduce  Hun  methods  in  the  administration 
of  that  part  of  Pekin  entrusted  to  them — stripping  the  Chinese  Astro- 
nomical Observatory  and  sending  the  instruments  to  Germany — Gen. 
Chaffee  so  frankly  enunciated  his  opinion  of  these  acts  that  friendly 
relations  between  the  two  generals  were  seriously  threatened.  Ibid., 
p.  215. 


DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  ORIENT  63 

not  feel  that  Europe  is  making  war  upon  them  with  the 
purpose  of  continuing  the  policy  shown  at  Kiao-Chau? 
Furthermore,  knowing  in  advance  the  directions  given 
to  the  German  troops  47 — which  unfortunately  were 
being  carried  out  only  too  well — why  should  the 
other  troops,  despatched  in  the  name  of  civilization, 
be  placed  under  the  control  of  a  nation  which  con- 
sidered the  Chinese  beyond  the  pale  of  international 
law?"48 

Now  that  all  danger  was  passed  many  fruitful  causes 
of  conflict  came  up  between  the  powers.  Russia  sug- 
gested as  a  preliminary  to  the  negotiations  that  the 
Powers  evacuate  Pekin,  and  she  was  backed  by  the 
United  States.  Great  Britain  and  Germany  opposed 
this  stoutly,  France  remaining  non-committal.  Ger- 
many then  suggested  that  before  negotiations  be  en- 
tered into  with  China,  a  demand  should  be  made  for 
the  surrender  of  all  officials  connected  with  the  up- 
rising, and  they  should  be  punished  by  the  powers  in 
accordance  with  their  crimes.  The  United  States  re- 
fused to  consider  this  program.  Neither  of  these  views 
obtaining  much  success,  France  now  took  the  lead,  and 
M.   Delcasse,   after   first   obtaining   the   adhesion    of 

*7  The  Kaiser  on  saying  good-bye  to  his  troops  at  Bremerhaven, 
addressed  them  as  follows:  "You  know  you  will  have  to  fight  with  a 
cunning,  brave,  well-armed  savage  foe.  When  you  come  to  close  quarters 
with  him  remember  pardon  must  not  be  given,  prisoners  must  not  be 
taken,  whoever  falls  in  your  hands  is  doomed.  As  a  thousand  years 
ago  the  Huns  under  King  Etzel  made  a  name  for  themselves  which  still 
renders  them  terrible  in  tradition  and  story,  in  like  manner  may  the 
name  'German'  in  China  through  you  be  so  famed  that  for  a  thousand 
years  to  come  no  Chinaman  will  dare  to  look  askance  at  a  German." 
Cf.  this  version  found  in  D.  J.  Hill,  "Impressions  of  the  Kaiser,"  p.  175, 
with  the  official  mutilated  version  given  in  Klausman  "Kaiserreden," 
p.  357. 

4»  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  62iv,  p.  279. 


64  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Russia,  outlined  the  following  six  points  as  a  basis  of 
their  collective  negotiations: 

I.  Punishment  by  the  Chinese  government  of  the 
principal  officials  considered  guilty;  these  to  be  desig- 
nated by  the  representatives  of  the  Powers  at  Pekin. 

II.  Maintenance  of  the  embargo  in  the  importation 
of  arms.  (M.  Delcasse  had  made  this  suggestion  at 
the  beginning  of  the  trouble  and  the  Powers  had 
agreed.) 

III.  Payment  by  China  of  equitable  indemnities. 

IV.  Constitution  at  Pekin  of  a  permanent  guard  for 
the  legations. 

V.  Dismantling  of  the  fortifications  of  Taku. 

VI.  The  military  occupation  of  two  or  three  points 
on  the  route  from  Tientsin  to  Pekin,  thus  keeping  a 
free  route  open  to  the  sea.49 

Italy  was  the  first  to  give  her  adherence  (October  5, 
1900)  followed  three  days  later  by  Austria.  Great 
Britain  and  Japan  followed  with  slight  reservations — 
Great  Britain  thought  there  should  be  as  many  points 
as  powers  in  the  sixth  proposal.  The  United  States 
agreed  tentatively  until  she  had  further  information, 
and  Germany  came  in  last. 

Hardly  had  the  governments  come  to  an  agreement 
upon  this  basis  than  they  were  astounded  to  learn  that 
Great  Britain  and  Germany  had  signed  a  separate  dual 
agreement  on  the  16th  of  October  in  London  upon  a 
threefold  basis:  (1)  maintenance  of  the  open  door  pol- 
icy in  China;  (2)  maintenance  of  the  territorial  integ- 
rity of  China;  (3)  in  case  another  power  should  make 
use  of  the  complications  in  China  to  obtain  territorial 

48  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  327. 


DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  ORIENT  65 

advantages,  ''the  two  contracting  parties  reserve  to 
themselves  to  come  to  a  preliminary  understanding  as 
to  the  eventual  steps  to  be  taken  for  the  protection  of 
their  own  interests  in  China." 50 

At  first  glance  the  accord  seemed  to  be  aimed  clearly 
at  France  and  Russia.  In  an  analysis  of  the  accord 
given  by  M.  Rene  Henry,  he  asserted  that  the  third 
article  directly  menaced  Russia,  who  possessed  both 
railroads  and  strategic  points  in  Manchuria,  while  for 
France  "a  new  Fashoda  was  possible  between  the  hint- 
erland of  Tonkin  and  the  English  pretensions  upon  the 
Yangtse-Kiang,  the  Asiatic  Nile."51  Great  Britain, 
however,  hastened  to  disclaim  any  such  imperialistic 
designs  and  the  foreign  office  on  October  22  issued  a 
note  to  that  effect.52  France  could  not  help  feeling 
somewhat  wounded  in  her  amour-propre  by  this  unex- 
pected thrust  of  Salisbury,  and  in  his  reply  M.  Del- 
casse  instead  of  adhering  to  the  sentiments  laid  down 
simply  "took  notice"  of  the  arrangement.  He  then 
declared  that  France  "has  long  since  manifested  its 
desire  of  seeing  China  open  to  the  economic  activity 
of  the  whole  world.  The  quick  adhesion  which  it  gave 
last  December  to  a  proposal  of  the  government  of  the 

so  Pari.  Papers,  "China,"  1900,  Vol.  105  (Cd365)  ;  also  in  Yellow 
Book,  No.  361. 

si  Rene"  Henry,  "Accord  Anglo- Allemand,"  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  Jan.  1901. 

52  "It  is  perfectly  exact  that  the  Anglo-German  Accord  is  directed 
in  no  fashion  against  Russia,  and  that  it  will  effect  in  no  manner 
the  Russian  railway  concessions  in  Manchuria,  where  Russia  has 
already  obtained  the  right  to  construct  railroads.  The  accord  in  ques- 
tion, to  the  principles  of  which  it  is  hoped  that  all  the  powers  will 
subscribe,  has  for  its  object  the  maintenance  of  the  integrity  of  China, 
and  has  no  relation  to  the  arrangements  that  the  powers  may  take 
among  themselves  to  construct  railroads  in  China."  Rev.  Pol.  et 
Pari.,  Nov.,  1900,  p.  435. 


66  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

United  States  was  dictated  by  the  same  feelings.  Its 
sentiment  in  this  regard  has  not  changed. 

"As  to  the  integrity  of  China  the  government  of  the 
Republican  affirms  so  much  the  more  willingly  this 
principle  that  it  has  made  it  the  base,  as  it  has  said  sev- 
eral times,  of  its  policy  in  the  crisis  in  which  the  com- 
mon efforts  of  the  Powers  tend  to  find  a  satisfactory 
solution.  The  universal  assent  to  this  principle  ap- 
pears to  the  French  government  a  sure  guarantee  of  its 
respect.  If  contrary  to  all  expectation  it  should  fail 
to  be  maintained,  France  would  act  as  circumstances 
required  to  safe-guard  its  interests  and  its  treaty 
rights."53 

Very  soon  France  began  to  realize  that  Great  Britain 
had  been  innocent  of  any  ulterior  motives  in  making 
the  arrangement,  that  it  was  Germany  who  was  follow- 
ing a  poudre  aux  yeux  policy  at  the  expense  of  her 
Anglo-Saxon  cousin.  Just  as  Italy  had  joined  with 
Austria  in  the  Triple  Alliance  as  a  measure  of  self- 
protection  against  her  ally,  so  Germany  who  had  much 
larger  interests  in  the  Yangtse  region,  the  British 
sphere  of  influence,  than  Great  Britain  had  in  Shan- 
tung, the  German  sphere  of  influence,  found  it  very 
much  to  her  interest  to  sign  up  her  rival  in  a  self- 
denying  agreement.54 

53  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  362. 

64  John  Hay  in  a  private  letter  to  Henry  Adams  shows  that  he  was 
wide-awake  to  the  situation:  "What  a  business  this  has  been  in  China! 
So  far  we  have  got  on  by  being  honest  and  naif  ...  at  least  we  are 
spared  the  infamy  of  an  alliance  with  Germany.  I  would  rather,  I 
think  be  the  dupe  of  China  that  the  chum  of  the  Kaiser.  .  .  . 

"My  heart  is  heavy  about  John  Bull.  Do  you  twig  his  attitude  to 
Germany?  When  the  Anglo-German  pact  came  out,  I  took  a  day  or  two 
to  find  out  what  it  meant.  I  soon  learned  from  Berlin  that  it  meant 
a  horrible,  practical  joke  on  England.     From  London  I  found  out  what 


DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  ORIENT  67 

While  the  diplomats  were  staging  this  little  entre 
acte  in  Europe,  the  diplomatic  corps  at  Pekin,  taking 
M.  Pichon's  six  points  as  a  basis,  drew  up  and  adopted 
the  conditions  to  be  imposed  upon  the  Chinese  govern- 
ment. In  addition  to  the  six  points  which  were  kept 
almost  intact,  it  was  demanded  that  the  Chinese  gov- 
ernment send  expiatory  missions  to  Germany  and 
Japan,  and  to  raise  expiatory  monuments  in  the  Chris- 
tian cemeteries  in  which  tombs  had  been  profaned. 
It  was  also  demanded  that  a  ministry  of  foreign  affairs 
take  the  place  of  the  Tsong-li-Yamen.  The  indemnity 
was  set  at  450  million  taels  (about  337  million  dollars) 
and  France  was  to  receive  286  V2  million  francs  (about 
57  million  dollars).  China  had  neither  the  means  nor 
the  desire  to  resist,  and  the  final  protocol  embodying 
the  terms  was  signed  by  her  plenipotentiaries  Septem- 
ber 7,  1901.65 

Although  with  the  signing  of  the  protocol,  the  storm 
raised  by  the  Boxers  had  subsided,  still  a  few  echoes  of 
thunder  could  be  heard  in  the  chancellories  of  Europe. 
In  order  that  there  might  be  a  concerted  and  simultane- 
ous evacuation  of  Shanghai  there  were  required  two 
and  a  half  years '  time,  and  fifty-four  notes  on  the  part 
of  the  Quai  d'Orsay.  Lord  Lansdowne,  the  new  head 
of  the  British  foreign  office,  was  to  learn  that  according 
to  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  the  famous  arrangement  of 
October  16, 1900,  did  not  include  Manchuria,  no  matter 
what  the  opinion  of  Downing  Street  might  be  on  the 
subject.     Count  von  Bulow  was  new  in  the  Chancellor- 

I  had  suspected,  but  what  it  astounded  me  after  all  to  be  assured  of — 
that  they  did  not  know!     Germany  proposed  it,  they  saw  no  harm  in 
it  and  signed."     Thajrer,  "Life  and  Letters  of  John  Hay,"  Vol.  II,  p.  248. 
•5  Doc.  Dip.   (June-October,  1901),  "Protocol  Finai." 


68  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ship,  but  he  was  old  in  foreign  affairs,  and  he  made  a 
very  clear  distinction  between  China  and  the  Chinese 
Empire.  Lord  Lansdowne  did  not  argue,  he  acted, 
and  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  of  January  30,  1902, 
was  the  result.  Germany  was  caught  between  the 
upper  and  nether  millstone — *  'jealous  of  England  and 
afraid  of  Russia  she  accidentally  treads  on  British  toes 
while  blacking  Russia 's  boots. ' ' 5e 

This  alliance  which  put  a  sudden  end  to  Great  Brit- 
ain's policy  of  "splendid  isolation,"  purposed  to  main- 
tain the  two  principles  of  the  status  quo  and  the  open 
door,  already  subscribed  to  on  several  occasions  by 
all  the  powers  interested  in  China;  and  in  addition  it 
declared  that  if  either  country  should  be  attacked  by  a 
single  power  while  maintaining  the  alliance,  the  other 
would  remain  neutral;  but  if  a  coalition  were  formed 
the  casus  foederis  intervenes  and  both  would  make 
war.57  To  France  acting  solely  in  her  own  interests, 
the  alliance  was  wholly  harmless — had  not  M.  Delcasse 
as  far  back  as  November,  1899,  before  he  had  sub- 
scribed to  the  note  of  the  United  States  regarding  the 
open  door,  declared  in  the  Chamber:  "we  must  try  to 
maintain  China  open  to  the  free  struggle  of  the  intelli- 
gence and  capital  of  the  whole  world. ' ' 58  For  France 
as  the  ally  of  Russia,  the  answer  was  not  so  simple,  for 
both  Great  Britain  and  Japan  considered  Manchuria  as 
an  integral  part  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  no  matter  what 
the  Russian  or  German  theories  might  be.     The  ques- 

s«  An  excellent  summary  of  the  causes  leading  up  to  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Treaty  is  found  in  an  article  by  Bushby,  "The  Anglo-Japanese 
Treaty,"  Nineteenth  Century,  March,  1902. 

67  Pari.  Papers,  Agreement  between  the  United  Kingdom  and  Japan, 
1902,  Vol.  130  (Cd914). 

68  Annales  du  Senat,  Vol.  61,  p.  605. 


DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  OEIENT  69 

tion  in  reality  was — how  closely  was  France  willing 
to  bind  herself  to  Russia  in  the  latter 's  imperialistic 
enterprises  in  Manchuria?  Russia,  in  the  eyes  of 
Britain,  was  "creeping  over  Manchuria  behind  a  foggy 
cloud  of  assurances,  secretly  backed  by  Germany, 
openly  backed  by  France,  and  posing  all  the  time  as  a 
friend  of  China."59 

M.  Sembat  raised  the  question  in  the  Chamber  (Feb- 
ruary 3,  1902),  of  the  danger  of  maintaining  the  Rus- 
sian Alliance,  declaring  that  no  longer  was  it  possible 
to  marry  "le  grand  Turk  avec  la  Republique  de  Ven- 
ise";  for  a  true  alliance  there  must  be  a  community  of 
interests  and  directing  principles.00  This  was  a  week 
before  the  publication  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance ; 
after  its  publication  the  Socialists  were  not  alone  in 
believing  that  France  was  playing  a  dangerous  game 
in  the  Far  East  in  sustaining  Russian  schemes.  How- 
ever, the  Government  was  in  no  position  to  desert 
Russia  at  this  time  even  if  it  so  desired ;  its  only  safety 
lay  in  a  bold  statement  of  its  position.  On  March  20, 
the  diplomatic  representatives  of  France  and  Russia 
communicated  the  following  declaration  to  the  minis- 
ters of  foreign  affairs  of  the  powers  signatory  of  the 
Protocol  of  Pekin : 

"The  allied  governments  of  France  and  Russia,  hav- 
ing received  communication  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  con- 
vention of  January  30,  1902  .  .  .  are  fully  satisfied  at 
finding  there  the  affirmation  of  the  essential  principles 
which  they  have  themselves  on  several  occasions  de- 
clared to  constitute  and  which  remain  the  base  of  their 

69  H.  N.  G.  Bushby,  op.  cit.,  supra. 

so  Annates  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  66i,  p.  491. 


70  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

policy.  The  two  governments  esteem  that  the  respect 
of  these  principles  is  at  the  same  time  a  guarantee  of 
their  special  interests  in  the  Far  East.  However,  they 
too,  being  obliged  to  envisage  the  case  when  either  the 
aggressive  action  of  third  powers,  or  new  troubles  in 
China  .  .  .  might  become  a  menace  to  their  interest, 
the  two  allied  governments  reserve  the  right  to  take 
measures  to  assure  their  protection."  61 

Once  more  France  found  herself  face  to  face  with 
Great  Britain  in  a  situation  which  at  first  glance  held 
possibilities  just  as  sinister  as  those  of  Fashoda.  For- 
tunately for  the  long  cherished  purpose  of  M.  Delcasse 
the  danger  was  not  as  great  as  it  appeared.  With 
Edward  VII  on  the  throne,  and  Lord  Lansdowne  in 
the  Foreign  Office,  it  soon  became  evident  that  the 
desire  for  an  understanding  was  mutual.  The  Boer 
War  had  surfeited  the  English  people  with  wars  of 
conquest,  and  at  last  it  began  to  dawn  upon  even  the 
most  ardent  francophobe,  that  the  real  enemy  of  Great 
Britain  was  Germany.  The  phenomenal  commercial 
expansion  of  Germany,  the  great  naval  bill  of  1900, 
the  Bagdad  Railway  scheme,  with  the  domination  of 
Asia  Minor  as  its  corollary,  cast  no  uncertain  shadow 
of  coming  events.  Therefore  when  M.  Denys  Cochin 
arose  in  the  Chambre,  and  declared  that  the  Yalu  River 
would  be  a  second  Rubicon,  and  that  the  Franco- 
Russian  note  was  a  defiance  to  the  Anglo-Japanese 
challenge,  M.  Delcasse  confidently  replied  that  the  new 
declaration  meant  simply  that  there  was  a  " concours 
de  forces"  towards  a  similar  object,  the  maintenance 

«i  Text  may  be  found  in  "Chronologie  francaise,"  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari., 
April,  1902,  p.  208. 


DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  ORIENT  71 

of  the  status  quo  and  the  common  peace,  a  condition 
which  is  equally  precious  to  all — "a  house  well  guarded 
and  known  to  be  well  guarded  discourages  tempta- 
tion."62 

4.     FRANCO-SIAMESE  RELATIONS 

Before  leaving  the  Far  East  we  must  touch  briefly 
upon  French  relations  with  Siam,  the  land  of  the  White 
Elephant,  which  borders  upon  French  Indo-China  and 
whose  productive  rice  fields  and  magnificent  forests  of 
teak  had  long  been  a  temptation  to  French  governors 
of  Indo-China.  Great  Britain,  established  in  Burma 
and  the  Malay  Peninsula,  again  acted  as  a  check  upon 
the  aspirations  of  the  French  colonial  party  when  they 
tended  to  overreach  themselves.  As  a  consequence, 
Siam  found  herself  in  the  unfortunate  position  of  a 
weak  buffer  state  between  two  powerful  imperialistic 
nations — her  only  safety  in  the  equal  balance  of  their 
jealous  rivalry.  France  had  signed  a  treaty  of  de- 
limitation of  frontiers  with  Siam,  October  3,  1893, 
which  it  had  been  hoped  would  put  an  end  to  disputes 
between  the  two  countries.  Instead,  by  the  main- 
tenance of  a  neutral  zone  twenty-five  kilometers  wide 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Mekong  River,  which  became 
a  rendezvous  for  bandits,  and  by  holding  possession 
of  Chantabun,  in  the  heart  of  Siamese  territory  as  a 
guarantee,  the  hostility  of  the  Siamese  against  the 
French  was  increased  rather  than  diminished.  The 
French  soon  found  themselves  completely  eliminated 
from  participation  with  other  nations  in  the  political, 
economic,  or  administrative  life  of  the  little  kingdom. 

aa  Annates  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  66ii,  p.  1898. 


72  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

An  arrangement  had  been  concluded  in  1896  with  Great 
Britain,  in  which  a  satisfactory  delimitation  of  terri- 
tories and  of  spheres  of  influence  between  France  and 
Great  Britain  had  been  established.  It  remained  to 
make  a  satisfactory  settlement  with  Siam.  Immedi- 
ately upon  coming  into  office  M.  Delcasse  had  taken  the 
matter  up,  and  in  April,  1899,  M.  Doumer,  Governor 
General  of  French  Indo-China,  after  visiting  the  King 
of  Siam  at  Bangkok,  was  enabled  to  make  an  arrange- 
ment satisfactory  to  both  parties.  The  agreement 
settled  the  four  outstanding  questions  of  dispute : 

1.  In  regard  to  French  proteges  Siam  was  to  recog- 
nize those  at  present  enrolled,  also  the  Annamites, 
Laotians  and  Cambodians  to  the  second  generation, 
and  Chinese  if  they  wished. 

2.  The  twenty-five  kilometer  zone  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Mekong  was  to  be  considered  under  the  civil 
administration  of  Siam,  but  not  under  its  military  con- 
trol. 

3.  Siam  to  cede  to  France  the  provinces  on  the  right 
boundary  of  the  realm  Luang-Prabang. 

4.  France  to  withdraw  her  garrison  from  Chanta- 
bun.63 

Hardly  had  M.  Doumer  left  Bangkok  before  the  King 
repudiated  the  whole  arrangment,  and  when  after  a 
series  of  unsuccessful  negotiations  it  was  evident  that 
no  satisfactory  arrangement  could  be  arrived  at,  M. 
Delcasse  broke  off  the  pour  parlers.  Nothing  further 
was  attempted  during  the  Boxer  Rebellion,  but  in  July, 
1901,  M.  Delcasse  despatched  a  new  envoy,  M.  Klobu- 
kowski,  to  see  if  a  new  basis  of  settlement  might  be 

«3  Doc.  Dip.,  "Affaires  de  Siam,"  1893-1902,  No.  37  annexe. 


DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  ORIENT  73 

reached.  After  another  year  of  intermittent  negotia- 
tions a  new  treaty  was  signed  October  7,  1902.  This 
treaty  gave  France  fishing  rights  on  the  Great  Lake, 
two  provinces  formerly  belonging  to  Cambodia, 
namely  Meluprey  and  Bassac,  and  a  small  piece  of 
land  north  of  Great  Lake;  in  return  France  gave  up 
Chantabun,  took  away  the  twenty-five  kilometer  zone 
of  neutrality,  and  cut  down  considerably  on  the  num- 
ber of  her  proteges.64  In  explaining  the  treaty  before 
the  Chamber  M.  Delcasse  declared  that  in  signing  the 
accord  the  government  had  been  guided  by  two 
thoughts :  first,  to  bring  about  more  friendly  relations 
with  the  Siamese;  secondly,  to  obtain  new  elements 
of  strength  and  new  guarantees  for  the  safety  of  Indo- 
China.  No  friendly  relations  would  ever  be  possible 
so  long  as  the  French  remained  at  Chantabun — this 
occupation  the  Siamese  considered  as  a  humiliation 
and  a  menace.  Nor  could  the  French  demand  that  the 
zone  of  twenty-five  kilometers,  where  the  troops  of 
neither  might  penetrate,  should  be  left  as  the  abode 
of  brigands  and  malefactors  of  all  sorts.  The  conces- 
sions made  secured  the  safety  of  Cambodia  and  gave 
important  new  fishing  rights  on  Great  Lake.  Already 
to  show  its  friendly  intentions,  the  Siamese  govern- 
ment had  promised  to  install  a  department  of  sanita- 
tion under  French  engineers,  a  bacteriological  institu- 
tion under  French  physicians,  and  to  allow  teaching  of 
French  in  their  schools  and  colleges.65 

Unfortunately  for  the  success  of  the  treaty,  "M.  Del- 
casse was  about  the  only  one  who  found  the  diplomatic 

«*  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  79  annexe. 

es  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  63,  p.  1228. 


74  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

instrument  which  had  come  from  his  hands  satisfac- 
tory."66 The  colonial  group  of  the  Senate  rose  in 
arms  against  it,  its  organ  ''Questions  Diplomatiques 
et  Coloniales"  conducted  what  it  called  an  impartial 
inquest  on  the  subject  but  in  which  most  of  the  opinions 
expressed  were  exceedingly  hostile.67  M.  Rene  Millet, 
a  brilliant  and  authoritative  critic  of  foreign  affairs, 
called  M.  Delcasse's  policy  "une  politique  d' aban- 
don." ** 

Realizing  the  futility  of  trying  to  carry  through  the 
treaty  opposed  so  strenuously  by  public  opinion,  M. 
Delcasse  let  the  matter  drop  until  1904,  when  on  Febru- 
ary 13,  a  new  convention  was  announced.  It  main- 
tained those  advantages  gained  by  the  other,  namely 
the  cession  of  Bassac  and  Meluprey,  and  also  reestab- 
lished the  rights  of  France  over  that  part  of  the  realm 
of  Luang-Prabang  situated  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Mekong.  It  also  accorded  to  France  the  maritime  dis- 
trict of  Korat,  made  her  participant  in  the  large  public 
works,  and  reestablished  to  a  great  extent  her  power 
of  exterritoriality  over  former  inhabitants  of  Annam 
and  Laos  now  established  in  Siam.  In  return  France 
gave  up  the  twenty-five  kilometer  zone  on  the  west  bank 
of  the  Mekong  and  withdrew  from  Chantabun.  Appar- 
ently this  treaty  was  more  satisfactory,  or  at  least  it 
was  good  in  comparison  with  the  other,  and  when  it 
came  up  for  vote  November  12,  it  passed  without  fur- 
ther discussion.69 

«« "Histoire  des  Relations  de  la  France  et  du  Siam."  These  par 
Gabriel  Mauriel,  p.  41. 

«7  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.,  Dec.  1,  1902. 

«8  Rene  Millet,  "L' Affaire  du  Siam,"  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  Dec.  1902. 

•»  Text  may  be  found  in  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.,  Feb.  16,  1904.     For  further 


DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  ORIENT  75 

When  the  mixed  commission  of  delimitation  made  its 
report  regarding  the  boundaries  established  by  this 
treaty  it  was  found  that  France  had  obtained  a  narrow 
stretch  of  territory,  that  of  Dan-Sai,  of  little  use  to  her 
but  "a  thorn  in  the  side  of  Siam."  Also  with  Siam's 
rapid  progress  in  adapting  herself  to  western  civiliza- 
tion the  extraterritoriality  rights  of  the  nations  became 
more  and  more  irksome.  So  it  was  that  on  March  23, 
1907,  the  French  government  and  the  King  of  Siam 
"  desirous  of  assuring  the  final  regulation  of  all  ques- 
tions relative  to  the  common  frontiers  of  Indo-China 
and  Siam  .  .  .  and  desirous  of  facilitating  thfe  rela- 
tions between  the  two  countries  .  .  .  have  decided  to 
conclude  a  new  treaty."  In  the  articles  of  the  treaty 
which  followed  Siam  ceded  to  France  or  to  the  French 
protectorate  of  Cambodia,  the  three  provinces  of  Bat- 
tambong,  Siem-rap  and  Sisophon,  in  return  for  which 
France  retroceded  to  Siam  the  territories  of  Dan-sai 
and  of  Korat.  Furthermore  France  modified  con- 
siderably the  extraterritorial  rights  which  she  formerly 
enjoyed  in  return  for  which  Siam  guaranteed  that 
French  Asiatic  subjects  and  proteges  should  enjoy  the 
same  rights  in  the  kingdom  as  her  own  nationals.70 

This  treaty,  although  France  received  appreciable 
advantage,  was  drawn  upon  a  basis  of  more  generous 
compromise,  and  has  proved  more  satisfactory  to  all 
concerned.  It  enabled  the  rich  little  kingdom  in  the 
basin  of  the  Menam,  with  its  American  general  adviser, 

discussion  see  Francis  Mury,  "Nouvelle  Traits  avec  le  Siam,"  ibid.,  1 
Apr.,  1904;  "Nouvelle  Convention  franco-siamois,"  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari., 
March,  1904;  also  Gabriel  Maurel,  op.  cit.,  supra. 

7»  An  analysis  of  the  terms  of  this  treaty  may  be  found  in  Ques. 
Dip.  et  Col.,  Apr.  16,  1907;  an  excellent  disoussion  of  its  terms  by 
Robert  de  Caix,  ibid.,  May  16,  1907. 


76  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

its  British  departmental  directors,  its  French  and  Eng- 
lish judicial  advisers,  its  German  railway  managers,  its 
French  and  Italian  engineers,  its  Danish  naval  officers, 
all  under  a  Siamese  minister  to  pursue  its  cosmopolitan 
existence  in  peace. 


CHAPTER  IV 

DIPLOMATIC  RELATIONS  WITH  ITALY  AND 
THE  POPE 

1.     THE  FRANCO-ITALIAN  RAPPROCHEMENT 

WHEN  a  great  nation  risks  a  war  with  another 
great  nation,  to  bring  to  fruition  the  dreams  of 
freedom  of  an  ardently  patriotic  but  weak  and  op- 
pressed neighbor,  such  action  will  surely  be  attributed 
to  selfish  motives.  Acts  inspired  by  such  sentiments 
as  "greater  love  hath  no  man  ..."  are  not  the  ordi- 
nary basis  of  international  relations.  Consequently 
it  is  safe  to  say  that  Napoleon  III  had  a  selfish  motive 
in  aiding  Cavour.  His  throne  needed  the  luster  which 
a  popular  and  successful  war  would  bring,  and  Savoy 
and  Nice  were  pearls  worthy  of  any  crown.  Further- 
more the  sacrifice  of  the  young  and  beautiful  Princess 
Clotilde  to  the  jaded  appetite  of  Prince  Napoleon  gave 
evidence  enough  that  he  was  not  wholly  a  knight-errant 
in  his  motives.  But  whatever  ulterior  purposes  Na- 
poleon may  have  had,  Villa  franca  assured  the  unity  of 
Italy,  and  Magenta  and  Solferina  sealed  it  with  French 
blood.1  Yet  from  that  time,  France  found  to  her  sor- 
row that  she  had  aided  in  the  birth  of  a  new  enemy. 

\ 

i  Cavour  himself  confessed  that  the  political  and  military  campaign 
following  Villa  franca  was  more  advantageous  to  Italy  than  that  pre- 
ceding it — '"how  many  times  in  the  solitude  of  Leri  did  I  cry  out, 
'Blessed  be  the  peace  of  Villa  franca!'"  Quoted  by  Charles  de  Saint- 
Cyr,  "Pourquoi  l'ltalie  est  notre  alliee?"  p.  204. 

77 


78  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Thiers'  declaration,  "the  gratitude  of  Italy  will  endure 
in  proportion  to  its  feebleness"  did  not  become  famous 
without  grounds.  Nor  was  Bismarck  wrong  when  he 
declared  that  the  Mediterranean  could  not  be  divided 
between  kindred  nations ;  especially  so  long  as  he  was 
there  and  ready  to  play  upon  the  strings  of  their  mutual 
jealousy.  Even  after  Bismarck  had  fallen,  Crispi  re- 
mained; "he  had  listened  too  long  to  the  Mephistoph- 
eles  of  Berlin"  2  to  change  the  direction  of  his  course 
even  if  he  wished.  When  he  came  to  realize  that  Italy 
was  merely  a  lever  for  Germany  and  Austria  to  obtain 
advantages  for  themselves,  it  was  too  late.  We  have 
clear  evidences  of  his  disillusionment  just  before  his 
downfall  in  March,  1896.  We  find  this  note  in  his 
diary  upon  occasion  of  a  visit  from  Von  Biilow: 
"  ...  he  declared  that  Germany  would  always  be  on 
our  side.  I  expressed  some  doubt  of  this.  I  said  that 
I  had  indeed  perceived  the  advantages  of  the  alliance 
in  Bismarck's  day,  but  not  afterwards  with  his  suc- 
cessors."3 A  little  later,  in  a  note  to  Germany,  he 
declared:  "...  The  Italian  people  are  not  yet  dis- 
illusioned with  regard  to  the  alliance  with  Germany, 
but  who  can  guarantee  that  they  may  not  be  so  to- 
morrow, if  things  continue  as  they  are."  4  His  words 
were  prophetic.  The  disaster  of  Adowa  dragged  him 
down  in  its  wake  and  a  new  era  in  Franco-Italian  rela- 
tions began. 

Before  the  year  was  over  the  new  foreign  minister, 
the  Marquis  Visconti-Venosta,  signed  two  conventions 
with  France  which  did  away  with  the  regime  of  capitu- 

2  Jacques  Bainville,  "Italy  and  the  War,"  p.  163. 
«  "Memoirs  of  Francesco  Crispi,"  VoL  III,  p.  335. 
4  Ibid.,  p.  347. 


ITALY  AND  THE  POPE  79 

lations  in  Tunis  by  which  France  had  bound  herself  in 
the  Treaty  of  Kassar-Said,g  and  also  a  Maritime  Con- 
vention for  the  one  which  had  expired  in  1886.  How- 
ever, in  order  to  bring  the  nations  back  into  satisfactory 
commercial  relations,  it  was  essential  to  obtain  a  new 
treaty  of  commerce  for  the  one  which  Crispi  had  so 
rashly  allowed  to  lapse.  France  was  willing  to  receive 
her  wayward  sister  back  into  the  commercial  fold,  and 
the  treaty  drawn  up  by  MM.  Hanotaux  and  Billot,  was 
signed  by  MM.  Delcasse  and  Barrere  February  2, 
1899.  "Italy  could  breathe  again;  the  cord  which  was 
choking  and  threatening  to  strangle  her,  was  loosed. ' ' 6 
A  wedge  had  been  driven  into  the  Triple  Entente, 
and  M.  Delcasse  was  determined  that  the  fissure  should 
be  widened.  The  rapprochement  begun  on  a  com- 
mercial basis,  must  be  carried  on  to  a  political  basis. 
What  were  the  differences  still  outstanding?  The 
question  of  Tunis  had  been  settled  by  the  arrange- 
ment of  1896.  There  still  remained  the  fear  that  ever 
haunted  the  Italians  that  France  might  attempt  to 
restore  the  Pope;  also  the  question  of  Tripoli,  which 
had  now  taken  the  place  of  Tunis  as  a  field  for  Italian 
expansion.  The  attitude  of  the  Waldeck-Rousseau 
ministry  towards  the  Church,  as  evidenced  by  the  Law 
of  Associations  introduced  in  1899,  was  most  reassur- 
ing to  the  Quirinal ;  we  shall  show  later  how  the  Combes 
ministry  laid  the  ghost  forever.  Let  us  first  consider 
the  question  of  Tripoli. 

s  Rene  Pinon,  "L'Empire  de  la  Mediterranee,"  p.  39 ;  see  also  A. 
Billot,  "La  France  et  l'ltalie,"  Vol.  II,  p.  372. 

•  Rene"  Pinon,  op.  cit.,  p.  40 ;  the  letters  exchanged  by  M.  Delcasse" 
and  Count  Tornielli  and  the  terms  of  the  arrangement  in  full  may  be 
found  in  Archives  Diplomatiques,  Vol.  88,  p.  333. 


80  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Once  more  we  are  brought  back  to  the  relations  be- 
tween the  two  powers  and  Great  Britain.  Although 
since  1882  Italy  had  been  a  member  in  good  standing 
of  the  Triple  Alliance,  she  was  none  the  less  closely 
bound  by  ties  of  friendship  to  Great  Britain.  In  fact, 
in  her  struggle  to  uphold  her  interests  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, Italy  found  her  friendship  with  Great  Britain 
far  more  useful  than  her  alliance  with  Germany  and 
Austria.  In  1887,  the  Marquis  de  Rudini,  Italian  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs,  had  said : 

' ;  .  .  .  Italy  tenaciously  wishes  for  the  maintenance 
of  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe,  and  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  status  quo  in  the  Mediterranean  espe- 
cially. .  .  . 

"An  exchange  of  opinions  took  place  only  a  few 
years  ago  with  England,  followed  by  declarations  on 
the  part  of  Sir  James  Fergusson  in  the  English  parlia- 
ment; his  language  was  strictly  conformable  to  the 
facts  of  the  case.  Both  Italy  and  England  purpose  to 
maintain  peace  while  preserving  the  status  quo.  I  may 
say,  moreover,  that  I  perceive  no  questions,  respecting 
which,  the  views  of  Italy  are.  not  in  accordance  with 
those  of  England,  seeing  that  their  interests  are  iden- 
tical."7 

In  his  speech  at  Guild  Hall  Lord  Salisbury,  Novem- 
ber 9,  1887,  was  more  non-committal  but  declared  that 
the  speech  of  the  minister  of  Italy — a  state  with  which 
England's  sympathies  were  deeply  bound  up — indi- 
cated that  its  aims  were  identical  with  those  of  Eng- 
land, and  its  hopes  to  have  England's  sympathies  on 
its  side  were  not  groundless.     The  unsatisfactory  part 

i  Quoted  from  Tardieu,  "France  and  the  Alliances,"  p.  92. 


ITALY  AND  THE  POPE  81 

of  the  reply  for  Italy  came  in  the  fact  that  Lord  Salis- 
bury associated  Austria's  name  with  Italy's — attribut- 
ing to  both  the  same  ideals  of  peace.8 

With  Italy  thus  closely  joined  to  Great  Britain  in 
ties  of  friendship,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  Treaty 
of  March  21,  1899,  between  France  and  Great  Britain, 
establishing  a  delimitation  of  their  boundaries  in  Cen- 
tral Africa  aroused  both  interest  and  fear  in  Italy.  A 
mere  glance  at  the  map  will  show  that  by  this  arrange- 
ment the  greater  part  of  the  hinterland  of  Tripoli  thus 
came  under  French  influence,  the  only  other  outlet 
being  through  the  Libyan  Desert,  which  was  under 
British  influence.  The  danger  to  Tripoli  in  the  rapid 
expansion  of  French  influence  in  this  hinterland  is 
clearly  pointed  out  in  a  memorandum  sent  to  Crispi  by 
the  Colonial  Department  in  1894:  "  ...  As  Tripoli's 
prosperity  depends  entirely  upon  trade,  deprived  of 
her  caravan  ways  which  lead  into  Sokoto,  Bornu, 
Baghirmi,  and  Wadai,  Tripoli  might  well  be  compared 

8  A  complete  report  of  the  speech  may  be  found  in  London  Times, 
Nov.  10,  1887.  In  his  book,  "From  Triple  to  Quadruple  Entente" 
(London,  1915),  Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon  says  that  Lord  Salisbury  in  this 
speech  "told  his  hearers  that  the  traditional  fraternity  between  England 
and  Italy  was  about  to  assume  more  concrete  forms  and  that  England 
would  see  that  the  status  quo  in  the  Mediterranean  was  not  upset  to 
the  prejudice  of  the  Italian  nation,"  but  this  is  contradicted  by  the 
report  appearing  in  the  Times.  In  fact  as  late  as  1896  Italy  called  her 
relations  with  England  "her  alliance  of  friendship,"  and  Lord  Lans- 
downe,  speaking  in  the  House  of  Lords,  July  18,  1902,  declared  that 
there  never  had  been  an  Anglo-Italian  alliance.  However  when  early 
in  1920  the  secret  treaties  of  Austria-Hungary  were  published,  it  was 
found  that  Great  Britain  had  made  secret  agreements  with  both  Italy 
and  Austria  in  regard  to  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  in  the 
Mediterranean,  Adriatic,  Aegean  and  Black  Sea.  The  first  Mediter- 
ranean Agreement  was  signed  February  12,  1887,  and  the  second,  De- 
cember 12  of  the  same  year.  For  the  text  of  these  agreements  see 
Pribram,  "The  Secret  Treaties  of  Austria-Hungary,"  pp.  96  and  128. 


82  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

to  an  empty  jewel-case. ' ' 9  Italy's  only  hope,  now  that 
she  could  no  longer  count  on  English  support  against 
the  French — her  own  allies  being  quite  uninterested  in 
her  Mediterranean  aspirations — lay  in  making  some 
sort  of  an  agreement  with  France. 

It  is  to  the  credit  of  M.  Delcasse  that  he  did  not  try 
to  make  Italy  pay  for  the  French  set-back  in  the  Sudan. 
He  was  playing  for  larger  stakes  than  one  or  two  extra 
oases  in  the  Sahara  Desert.  Like  Bismarck,  after 
Sadowa,  he  realized  that  sometimes  it  pays  to  make  a 
generous  bargain.  He  had  most  excellent  instruments 
at  his  hand  to  accomplish  his  task.  M.  Barrere,  the 
French  ambassador,  a  most  energetic  and  able  man, 
was  eager  to  carry  out  his  chief's  wishes,  and  his  work 
was  rendered  easier  by  his  popularity  in  Rome. 
Among  the  Italians  both  the  Marquis  de  Rudini  and 
the  Marquis  Visconti-Venosta  were  equally  anxious  to 
make  "lafraternite  latitie"  more  than  an  empty  phrase. 
Finally  the  new  king,  Victor  Emmanuel  III,  who  in 
1896,  had  made  a  love-match  with  Princess  Helen  of 
Montenegro,  thus  drawing  more  closely  to  Russia,  now 
cast  his  influence  on  the  side  of  France,  and  "les 
miasmes  deposes  par  Crispi  au  fond  vaseux  du  tonneau 
triplicien  se  sont  evanouis  sous  le  clair  et  loyal  regard 
du  souverain."  10 

The  first  tangible  results  were  seen  early  in  1900. 
On  January  24,  a  protocol  was  signed  at  Rome  by  MM. 
Visconti-Venosta  and  Barrere  fixing  delimitations  of 
the  French  and  Italian  possessions  on  the  Red  Sea  and 
the  Gulf  of  Aden.11    This  was  completed  by  another 

»  "Memoirs  of  Francesco  Crispi,"  III,  70. 

10  Charles  de  Saint  Cyr,  op.  cit.,  supra,  p.  203. 

n  Archives  Diplomatique*,  Vol.  76,  p.  44. 


ITALY  AND  THE  POPE  83 

protocol  signed  July  10, 1901,  in  which  the  special  com- 
mission provided  for  in  the  former  arrangement  gave 
a  definite  delimitation  to  the  frontiers.1*  There  still 
remained  the  more  important  question  of  Tripoli.  As 
an  evidence  of  increasing  friendliness  between  the  two 
countries,  on  April  10, 1901,  an  Italian  squadron  under 
the  cornnand  of  the  king's  uncle,  anchored  in  the  port 
of  Toulon  as  a  mark  of  respect  to  President  Loubet, 
who  was  en  voyage  accompanied  by  the  French  fleet. 
The  telegrams  and  toasts  exchanged  were  more  than 
cordial.  In  the  course  of  the  year  confidential  notes 
were  exchanged  between  the  two  powers  and  on  De- 
cember 14,  M.  Prinetti,  the  Italian  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  speaking  in  the  Chamber,  referred  to  "the 
mutual  confidence  which  had  become  the  rule  in  the 
relations  between  the  two  countries. ' '  Continuing,  he 
declared  that : 

"  .  .  .  This  confidence  is  so  much  the  better  founded 
on  our  part  since  already  some  time  ago,  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Eepublic  has  taken  care  to  inform  us  that 
the  Franco-English  Convention  of  March  21,  1899, 
marked  for  France  in  regard  to  the  countries  and 
regions  touching  on  the  eastern  frontier  of  her  African 
possessions,  notably  the  vilayet  of  Tripoli,  a  limit  that 
she  had  no  intention  of  passing,  adding  that  neither 
did  she  have  any  intention  of  cutting  the  caravan 
routes  from  Tripoli  to  Central  Africa. 

"  Since  then  the  friendly  relations  of  the  two  coun- 
tries have  become  such  that  they  have  permitted  the 
two  governments  to  exchange  explanations  both  clear 

12  Ibid.,  Vol.  84,  p.  42.     The  text  of  both  of  these  protocols  may  also 
found  in  British. and  Foreign  State  Papers,  Vol.  94,  pp.  588-589. 


84  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

and  satisfactory  upon  their  interests  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, and  these  explanations  have  led  them  to  state 
the  perfect  agreement  of  their  views  upon  that  which 
is  of  a  nature  to  interest  their  respective  situations."  13 
This  speech  indicated  that  an  understanding  had 
been  reached  and  pointed  out  clearly  enough  the  ad- 
vantages to  Italy.  What  M.  Prinetti  omitted  to  indi- 
cate was  what  France  should  receive  in  return.  The 
French  were  just  as  anxious  to  know  this  as  were  the 
Italians;  and  M.  Delcasse  did  not  keep  them  long  in 
suspense.  On  January  3,  1902,  "le  Giornale  d 'Italia" 
published  a  lengthy  interview  of  its  Paris  correspond- 
ent, M.  Ugo  Ojetti,  with  M.  Delcasse.  The  French 
Foreign  Minister  informed  him  that  the  idea  of  such 
an  accord  had  come  to  him  in  1898 — three  months  be- 
fore becoming  minister — upon  the  occasion  of  a  visit 
to  Rome.  Meeting  a  number  of  eminent  Italian  states- 
men, among  others  the  Marquis  di  Rudini  and  the  Mar- 
quis Visconti-Venosta,  he  pointed  out  to  them  that  of 
all  the  nations  of  Europe  France  and  Italy  had  the 
fewest  real  causes  of  conflict.  He  then  went  on  to 
show  how  the  agreement  with  England  had  made  an 
arrangement  with  Italy  possible.  But  as  every  accord 
in  politics  is  a  bilateral  contract,  a  do  ut  des  arrange- 

13  Text  of  this  speech  in  full  may  be  found  in  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col., 
Jan.  15,  1902.  On  January  1,  1902,  M.  Barrere,  the  French  ambassador, 
alluding  to  this  speech,  said:  "...  It  indicates  with  an  eloquent  pre- 
cision that  the  era  of  Franco-Italian  misunderstandings  upon  a  ground 
where  their  vital  interests  are  at  stake  belongs  henceforth  to  the  past, 
and  there  now  exists  between  the  two  governments  a  perfect  concord- 
ance of  views.  There  is  no  longer  between  France  and  Italy  a  Mediter- 
ranean question;  and  that  is  the  surest  guarantee  that  the  future  re- 
serves to  the  two  great  Latin  nations  a  long  and  fecund  period  of 
fraternal  friendship  and  peace."  Ibid.;  also  to  be  found  in  Rev.  Pol. 
et.  Pari.  Feb.,  1902. 


ITALY  AND  THE  POPE  85 

ment,  and  since  Italy's  interests  were  in  the  east  and 
those  of  France  in  the  west,  the  balance  upon  the  whole 
northern  coast  of  the  Mediterranean  was  easy  to  strike. 
In  reply  to  a  query  of  the  correspondent  if  he  meant 
Morocco,  he  replied,  " Precisely,  including  Morocco."  14 

In  order  that  all  doubts  as  to  a  rapprochement  might 
be  set  at  rest  M.  Delcasse  followed  this  up  by  a  state- 
ment in  the  Chamber  (January  21, 1902).  He  declared 
that  political  relations  had  become  so  friendly  that 
"they  have  permitted  the  two  countries  to  exchange 
directly  to  their  equal  satisfaction  complete  expla- 
nations regarding  all  their  interests  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean. .  .  ,"15  In  a  subsequent  statement  to  the 
Senate  (March  20,  1902),  he  pointed  out  that  "France 
and  Italy  realize  how  much  they  have  gained  in  security 
and  in  liberty  of  moving,  each  in  the  sphere  which  is 
proper  to  it,  and  everything  strengthens  them  in  this 
precious  conviction,  that  to  assure  to  their  new  rela- 
tions a  long  and  fecund  future,  they  have  only  to  per- 
severe in  a  way  whereby  their  general  policy  will  be 
put  more  and  more  in  harmony  with  the  spirit  which 
has  presided  at  their  rapprochement."  16 

The  arrangement  did  not  wholly  escape  criticism  in 
France,  even  though  it  was  everywhere  realized  that 
two  very  satisfactory  results  had  been  accomplished — 
the  Triple  Alliance  had  been  weakened,  and  the  ap- 
proach to  Great  Britain  had  been  made  easier.     The 

i*  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.,  Jan.  15,  1902. 

is  Annates  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  66i,  p.  130. 

is  Annales  du  Senat,  Vol.  61,  p.  605.  M.  Barrere  speaking  at  Rome 
on  Jan.  1,  1920,  declared  that  the  Franco-Italian  agreement  of  1902 
established  that  in  case  of  an  aggressive  war  either  country  would 
maintain  strict  neutrality,  even  in  case  one  of  tbem  was  obliged  to 
declare  war  to  defend  her  honor  and  safety.     N.  Y.  Times,  Jan.  2,  1920. 


86  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

colonial  party  were  by  no  means  willing  to  consider 
Tripoli  forever  alienated  from  their  sphere  of  influ- 
ence. They  refused  to  subscribe  to  M.  Decrais'  state- 
ment: "Our  colonial  empire  is  completely  consti- 
tuted."17 M.  Etienne,  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  co- 
lonial group,  wanted  to  know  what  Italy  could  give  in 
Morocco  corresponding  to  the  renunciation  which 
France  was  making  in  regard  to  Tripoli.18  M.  Rene 
Pinon,  who  is  usually  very  sound  and  clear-sighted  in 
his  judgment,  asked  if  France  was  not  walking  "like 
the  astrologist  of  the  fable,  her  eyes  fixed  upon  her 
ideal  of  justice  and  peace  while  her  rivals  were  dig- 
ging before  her  steps  the  well  in  which  she  was  to 
fall."  Perhaps  even  M.  Delcasse  himself  "builded 
wiser  than  he  knew." 

What  did  Germany  think  of  an  arrangement  which 
was  aptly  called  "Voraison  funebre  de  la  Triple  Al- 
liance"? On  January  8,  1902,  Chancellor  von  Bulow 
speaking  in  the  Reichstag  regretted  that  a  certain  part 
of  the  German  press  seemed  uneasy  over  the  Franco- 
Italian  arrangement.  "A  husband  does  not  take  of- 
fense if  his  wife  dances  a  waltz  innocently  with  an- 
other. The  essential  thing  is  that  she  return  to  him, 
and  she  will  do  it  if  she  is  best  off  with  him  .  .  .  the 
Franco-Italian  arrangements  upon  certain  Mediter- 
ranean questions  are  in  no  way  opposed  to  the  Triple 

17  On  December  11,  1899,  M.  Decrais,  Minister  of  the  Colonies,  out- 
lined the  future  colonial  policy  of  France  stating  that  in  his  belief 
"to  the  period  of  conquest  and  territorial  expansion  .  .  .  must  succeed 
the  still  more  difficult  period  of  pacification,  organization  and  ex- 
ploitation."    Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  59iv,  p.  382. 

is  Eug.  Etienne,  "L'Accord  franco-italien  et  le  Maroc,"  Ques.  Dip. 
et  Col.,  Jan.  15,  1902. 


ITALY  AND  THE  POPE  87 

Alliance."18  The  only  fault  with  the  metaphor  was 
that  Italy  was  not  so  sure  that  she  was  well  off  in  what 
had  only  been  at  best  a  mariage  de  convenance.  On 
the  whole  it  was  rather  a  dark  day  for  the  Chancellor, 
for  not  only  did  he  have  to  explain  the  harmless  flirta- 
tion of  a  member  of  the  Triplice,  but  he  was  also  forced 
to  criticize  M.  Chamberlain  publicly  for  a  lack  of  diplo- 
matic courtesy.20  The  same  forces  that  were  drawing 
France  towards  Italy  were  apparently  drawing  Eng- 
land away  from  Germany.  Nor  did  Great  Britain  ap- 
pear to  regret  that  the  two  Latin  states  were  becoming 
more  friendly.  When  Sir  Charles  Dilke  pointed  out 
that  the  Anglo-Italian  understanding  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  status  quo  had  been  replaced  by  the 
Franco-Italian  understanding,21  Lord  Lansdowne  re- 
plied: "We  regard  it  as  natural  considering  her  geo- 
graphical position  and  her  commercial  requirements 
that  she  should  wish  to  be  on  terms  of  friendship  with 
her  French  neighbor  ...  we  should  be  the  last  to  com- 
plain if  by  means  of  such  an  arrangement  as  she  has 
arrived  at,  she  has  improved  and  strengthened  her  in- 
ternational position."  22 

However,  when  in  June,  1902,  Italy  did  renew  her 
allegiance  to  the  Triple  Alliance  and  the  question  was 
raised  as  to  the  effect  of  this  return  ' '  after  the  ball  was 
over,"  M.  Delcasse  was  able  to  state  publicly  in  the 

18  J.  Penzler,  "Fiirst  Biilows  Reden,"  I,  241. 

20  Mr.  Chamberlain,  angered  at  the  German  press  criticisms  of  the 
Boer  War,  had  in  his  speech  at  Edinburgh,  Oct.  25,  1901,  invited  the 
Germans  to  recall  their  own  acts  when  marching  on  Paris.  In  reply 
Prince  von  Billow  said:  "When  a  minister  is  obliged  to  justify  his 
policy  he  would  do  well  not  to  drag  in  foreign  countries." 

2i  Pari.  Debates,  Vol.   110,  p.  703. 

22  Ibid.,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  662. 


88  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Chamber:  "The  declarations  made  by  the  Italian 
government  have  permitted  us  to  be  certain  that  Italy's 
policy  through  its  alliances  is  directed  neither  directly 
nor  indirectly  against  France,  in  no  way  does  it 
threaten  us  either  in  diplomatic  form  or  by  interna- 
tional military  protocols  and  in  no  fashion  can  Italy 
become  either  the  instrument  or  auxiliary  of  an  aggres- 
sion against  our  country."  23 

If  M.  Delcasse  had  been  able  to  read  Articles  IX  and 
X  of  the  Fourth  Treaty  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  which 
Italy  signed  June  28,  1902,  he  would  not  have  been  so 
confident  that  Italy's  policy  was  not  directed  against 
France.  The  Revolution  of  November,  1918,  in  Aus- 
tria, which  opened  up  the  national  archives,  has  made 
it  possible  for  Professor  Pribam  of  the  University  of 
Vienna  to  give  to  the  world  the  texts  of  the  various 
secret  treaties  to  which  Austria-Hungary  was  a  party. 

Article  X  of  the  Triple  Alliance  Treaty  of  1902 
states  that  "if  France  should  make  a  move  to  extend 
her  occupation,  protectorate,  or  sovereignty,  under  any 
form  whatsoever,  in  the  North  African  territories,  and 
that  in  consequence  thereof  Italy,  in  order  to  safeguard 
her  position  in  the  Mediterranean,  should  feel  that  she 
must  herself  undertake  action  in  the  said  North  Afri- 
can territories,  or  even  have  recourse  to  extreme  meas- 
ures in  French  territory  in  Europe,  the  state  of  war 
which  would  thereby  ensue  between  Italy  and  France 
would  constitute  ipso  facto,  on  the  demand  of  Italy, 
and  at  the  common  charge  of  Germany  and  Italy  the 
casus  foederis  ..."  The  protocol  attached  to  this 
treaty  declares  that  the  signatory  powers  would  exert 

23  Annates  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  67,  p.  455. 


ITALY  AND  THE  POPE  89 

themselves  to  obtain  the  accession  of  England  to 
the  program  established  by  Articles  IX  and  X. 
If  any  further  proof  were  needed  of  the  remarkable 
diplomatic  insight  of  M.  Delcasse,  this  evidence  of 
Italy's  real  attitude  gives  it.  If  England  could  be 
drawn  into  the  Triple  Alliance,  Italy's  agreement  with 
France  would  have  been  another  ''scrap  of  paper." 
But  if  France  could  bring  England  to  her  support, 
Italy  would  find  it  contrary  to  her  interests  to  oppose 
France,  and  it  would  then  become  necessary  to  find 
means  of  releasing  herself  from  the  inconvenient  bonds 
of  the  Triple  Alliance.  Whether  M.  Delcasse  sus- 
pected Italy  or  not,  if  the  secret  treaties  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  were  before  his  eyes,  he  could  not  have  acted 
more  wisely  to  safeguard  the  interests  of  France  than 
by  pushing  forward  rapidly  his  plan  to  bring  about  a 
rapprochement  with  England. 

2.     FRENCH  RELATIONS  WITH  THE  VATICAN 

At  last  the  two  Latin  nations  had  settled  their  co- 
lonial differences,  and  had  come  to  a  definite  agree- 
ment in  regard  to  their  general  foreign  policy.  There 
remained  the  more  delicate  question  of  the  Third  Re- 
public's relations  to  the  Vatican.  As  the  "  eldest 
daughter  of  the  Church,"  as  the  avowed  protector  of 
Catholics  in  the  Orient,  how  could  France  consistently 
enter  into  cordial  relations  with  the  government  of 
Italy,  still  regarded  by  the  Vatican  as  the  despoiler 
of  the  papacy?  To  answer  this  question  intelligently 
we  must  consider  the  internal  politics  of  this  period. 

Ever  since  the  Third  Republic  was  established,  the 
Republicans,  especially  those  with  radical  tendencies, 


90  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

believed  that  the  Concordat  had  served  its  purpose.24 
The  clarion  call  of  Gambetta,  "le  clericalism,  voild 
I'ennemi,"  rang  ever  in  their  ears,  and  the  Boulanger 
Affair  only  brought  matters  to  a  head.  The  life  of 
the  Republic  itself  was  being  threatened  by  a  small 
group  of  Royalists  aided  by  a  larger  group  of  Clericals. 
After  the  utter  collapse  of  the  Boulanger  movement, 
and  the  impeachment  of  its  leader,  Leo  XIII,  "le 
Fabius  Cunctator  de  la  nouvelle  Rome  assiegee,"  as  M. 
Hanotaux  aptly  designated  Mm,  diplomatically  decided 
to  accept  the  Third  Republic  as  really  established.  His 
famous  encyclical  letter  of  1892  called  the  attention  of 
his  adherents  to  this  fact.  From  then  on  till  the  Drey- 
fus Affair,  there  was  a  lull  in  the  attempts  to  under- 
mine the  Republic,  but  before  this  long  and  bitter 
struggle  was  ended,  it  was  realized  that  the  snake  had 
only  been  scotched;  now  it  must  be  killed.  The  Wal- 
deck-Rousseau  ministry  bad  saved  the  state;  it  re- 
mained to  safeguard  it  for  the  future.  The  Associa- 
tions Bill  of  1899,  aimed  especially  at  the  Jesuits  and 
Assumptionists,  as  finally  promulgated  in  July,  1901, 
allowed  no  religious  association  to  be  formed  without 
express  authorization  of  the  government,  and  also 
made  it  possible  to  dissolve  a  religious  order  by  min- 
isterial degree.  In  the  hands  of  a  broad-minded  states- 
man like  M.  "Waldeck-Rousseau,  it  safeguarded  the 
state ;  in  the  hands  of  his  successor,  M.  Combes,  a  vin- 
dictive anti-clerical,  it  meant  destruction  to  the  re- 
ligious orders.  The  Pope  protested  against  its  pro- 
mulgation as  an  unjust  law  of  reprisals  in  opposition 

2*  It  has  been  said  that  Napoleon  at  St.  Helena  regarded  the  Con- 
cordat as  the  greatest  mistake  of  his  life. 


ITALY  AND  THE  POPE  91 

to  the  principles  of  natural  law,  and  pregnant  with  de- 
plorable consequences,  but  the  anti-clericals  would  not 
be  called  off.26 

Nevertheless  while  the  government  was  stamping 
out  clericalism  at  home,  it  did  not  forget  that  Gambetta, 
who  saw  the  enemy  in  clericalism,  had  also  maintained 
that  clericalism  was  not  an  object  of  exportation.  So 
that  although  M.  Marcel  Sembat  violently  arraigned 
the  policy  of  the  government  as  being  absolutely  in- 
coherent— atheistic  in  France  and  clerical  in  China — 
it  still  maintained  its  policy  of  protecting  Catholic 
missionaries  and  associations  in  the  Orient.28  Upon 
another  occasion  when  M.  Cassagnac  cynically  re- 
marked that  it  was  much  better  to  be  a  Chinese  than  a 
French  Christian,  M.  Waldeck-Rousseau  replied  that 
the  government's  attitude  was  that  if  it  did  not  ex- 
tend its  protection  to  religious  orders  which  had  gone 
there  at  its  request  and  relying  upon  its  treaties,  it 
would  be  renouncing  its  protectorate.  The  real  in- 
terest of  France  demanded  that  not  one  of  its  hospitals, 
schools,  or  dispensaries  should  be  abandoned.27 

The  question  of  discontinuing  the  embassy  at  the 
Vatican  was  also  raised  by  the  Socialists,  on  the  ground 
that  France  ought  not  strengthen  the  forces  of  an  ad- 
versary which  it  was  combatting.    M.  Delcasse  came 

25  Doc.  Dip.,  "Saint  Siege,"  (1899-1903),  No.  15  Annexe.  A  very 
excellent  discussion  of  the  attitude  of  the  clerical  party  in  France  may 
be  found  in  Mr.  Fullerton's  "Problems  of  Power,"  pp.  75-95. 

26  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  64iii,  p.  803.  The  Pope  had  already 
made  it  clear  that  he  would  not  sustain  the  historic  rights  of  France 
to  the  Catholic  protectorate  of  the  world  the  day  when  these  vexatory 
measures  should  be  approved  by  the  government.  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit., 
No.  3. 

27  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  65iv.,  p.  461. 


92  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

out  strongly  against  any  such  policy.  He  pointed  out 
that  even  if  the  Church  and  State  should  separate,  it 
was  necessary  to  remain  in  communication  with  the 
head  of  the  Church.  Any  other  policy  might  weaken 
the  Vatican,  but  it  most  certainly  would  not  strengthen 
France.28  The  government  seemed  determined  to  con- 
fine its  anti-clericalism  within  the  borders  of  France. 
Perhaps  it  might  have  succeeded  in  doing  so  indefi- 
nitely, if  the  far-seeing  opportunist,  Leo  XIII  had  con- 
tinued to  direct  the  policies  of  the  Holy  See.  His 
death  in  July,  1903,  after  twenty-five  years  of  able 
service  in  his  high  office  was  the  death  blow  to  the 
Clerical  Party  in  France.29  His  successor,  Cardinal 
Sarto,  who  entered  the  Vatican  in  August,  taking  the 
name  of  Pius  X,  was  a  man  of  different  type.  He 
visioned  a  renaissance  of  the  ultramontane  movement, 
and  he  was  supported  enthusiastically  by  his  Franco- 
phobe  Secretary  of  State,  the  Cardinal  Merry  del  Val. 
Opportunity  was  not  lacking  to  show  his  intentions. 

Almost  simultaneously  with  the  publication  of  the 
first  encyclical  of  the  new  Pope,  Victor  Emmanuel 
III  and  Queen  Helen  were  setting  out  for  France. 
Their  reception  was  encouraging  in  the  extreme.  At 
the  reception  given  in  their  honor  at  the  Elysee,  Presi- 
dent Loubet  saw  in  their  visit  "a  striking  manifesta- 
tion of  the  close  relationship,  which  answering  equally 
to  the  sentiments  and  interests  of  the  Italian  people 

zs  Ibid.,  Vol.  69i,  p.  368. 

23  M.  Gabriel  Hanotaux  thus  characterized  him  the  day  after  his 
death:  "He  had  neither  passion,  nor  stubbornness,  nor  rancor;  attached 
to  principles,  he  was  the  slave  of  no  formula,  he  lent  himself  to  com- 
binations. He  saluted  nascent  Republics,  he  listened  to  the  complaints 
of  uneasy  democracies,  he  held  hig  own  with  the  powerful,  but  never 
cringed  and  never  despaired."    Le  Journal,  July  21,  1903, 


ITALY  AND  THE  POPE  93 

and  the  French  people,  has  been  established  between 
their  governments.80  The  king's  reply  was  equally 
cordial:  "Rightly  does  France  consider  my  presence 
in  Paris  as  the  natural  result  of  the  work  of  the  rap- 
prochement happily  accomplished  between  our  two 
countries.  .  .  . ' ' 31  The  Czar  also  in  a  personal  letter 
to  President  Loubet  complimented  him  upon  the 
friendly  relations  which  France  had  established  with 
Italy  and  Great  Britain,  and  saw  in  it  a  new  guarantee 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  world's  peace.32  Only  the 
adherents  of  the  Eoyalist  and  Clerical  factions  were 
pessimistic.  Count  de  Castellane  writing  in  the 
"Gaulois"  asked  whether  "nos  vivats  salueront-ils 
d'avance  en  Victor-Emmanuel  III  I'heritier  de  la 
grandeur  francaise  en  Orient."  33  But  France  had  no 
intention  of  turning  back,  and  in  the  same  month  M. 
Briand  introduced  his  bill  for  the  separation  of  the 
Church  and  State. 

It  was  well  understood  that  diplomatic  usage  de- 
manded that  President  Loubet  should  return  Victor 
Emmanuel's  visit.  It  was  equally  understood  that 
"an  inflexible  protocol  has  regulated  once  for  all  ques- 
tions of  this  sort  and  has  closed  the  entrance  of  the 
Vatican  to  every  head  of  a  Catholic  state  who  comes 
to  salute  the  representative  of  the  dynasty,  despoiler 
of  the  papacy. "  34  As  the  Count  de  Castellane  pointed 
out,  not  even  his  Apostolic  Majesty,  the  Emperor  of 

so  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.,  Oct.  15,  1903. 
si  Ibid. 

32  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  Nov.  1903. 

33  Le  Gaulois,  Oct.  11,  1903. 

3*  From  the  speech  of  Count  Boni  de  Castellane  explaining  his  reasons 
for  refusing  to  vote  the  funds  necessary  for  the  return  visit  of  President 
Loubet.    Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  72ii,  p.  1179. 


94  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Austria,  although  bound  in  the  ties  of  a  close  alliance, 
had  ever  been  able  to  visit  his  ally,  the  King  of  Italy, 
at  Rome.  Therefore,  even  if  President  Loubet  had 
any  intention  of  visiting  the  Vatican  as  well  as  the 
Quirinal,  he  would  not  have  been  received,  and  the 
debate  on  the  subject  showed  clearly  enough  that  the 
French  Government  had  no  intention  of  attempting 
to  conciliate  the  Pope.  The  fact  that  the  credits  for 
the  visit  were  voted  502  to  12,  indicated  the  over- 
whelming sentiment  of  the  Chamber. 

As  soon  as  the  idea  of  a  return  visit  was  mentioned 
in  the  press,  the  nuncio  at  Paris  protested  on  behalf 
of  the  pope,  but  M.  Delcasse  refused  even  to  discuss 
the  question,  on  the  ground  that  any  such  doctrine  was 
manifestly  contrary  to  the  inalienable  independence 
of  French  policy.35  On  the  23d  of  April,  President 
Loubet,  accompanied  by  M.  Delcasse,  set  out  for  Rome ; 
and  for  the  first  time  since  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  cen- 
tury the  head  of  the  French  government  entered  the 
Holy  City  as  a  friend.  The  cardinal  fact  in  the  eyes 
of  the  Italians  was  that  the  President  of  France  had 
visited  the  Quirinal  without  making  any  attempt  to 
see  the  Pope.  His  reception  became  an  ovation. 
"The  two  sisters  have  ceased  pouting"  said  the  editor 
of  the  'Messagero.'  "  "The  general  enthusiasm 
marking  the  festivities  at  Rome  and  Naples,  and  the 
manifestations  of  all  Italy  in  honor  of  the  French  Re- 
public, and  the  great  reconciliation,  seemed  like  a  fault 
repaired,  like  the  joy  of  seeing  the  dawn  after  the  night- 
mare of  a  long  night,"  wrote  a  French  eye  witness.86 

86  Annates  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  73i,  p.  103. 

»oGustave  Rivet,  "La  France  et  l'ltalie,"  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  June, 
1904. 


ITALY  AND  THE  POPE  95 

The  Pope  could  no  longer  repress  his  indignation. 
On  April  28,  while  the  President  was  still  on  Italian 
soil,  a  note  was  sent  to  the  French  ambassador  ac- 
credited to  the  Vatican,  protesting  formally  and  ex- 
plicitly against  the  visit,  and  pointing  out  that  the  of- 
fense was  the  greater  in  that  the  President  of  France 
was  the  head  of  a  great  Catholic  nation  towards  which 
the  Holy  See  had  always  shown  the  greatest  considera- 
tion. At  the  same  time  a  note  was  despatched  to  the 
other  Catholic  powers  couched  in  the  same  language, 
but  including  in  addition  a  sentence  which  did  not  ap- 
pear in  the  communication  to  France.  The  sentence, 
which  was  nothing  less  than  a  threat,  stated  that  if  in 
spite  of  the  act  of  France,  the  apostolic  nuncio  was  al- 
lowed to  remain  in  Paris,  it  was  due  to  very  grave  mo- 
tives of  a  special  nature.  M.  Delcasse  who  had  con- 
stantly endeavored  to  prevent  a  complete  rupture, 
even  in  the  teeth  of  strong  Eadical  opposition,  did  not 
publish  the  note,  but  contented  himself  with  a  reply 
in  which  "he  repulsed  both  the  considerations  devel- 
oped and  the  form  under  which  they  were  pre- 
sented." 37 

The  incident  might  have  been  considered  closed  had 
not  M.  Jaures  published  in  his  paper,  "L'Humanite," 
May  17,  the  version  which  had  been  received  by  the 
other  governments.  When  the  French  government 
compared  its  copy  with  this  new  version,  and  noted 
the  difference  in  text,  explanations  were  immediately 
demanded  of  the  Vatican;  and  when  the  Secretary  of 

37  A  brief  but  comprehensive  statement  of  the  whole  affair  is  found 
in  the  speech  by  M.  Delcasse  in  the  Chamber,  May  27,  1904,  in  which 
he  replies  to  several  interpellations,  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  73  i, 
p.  103. 


96  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

State  to  the  Pope  attempted  to  escape  replying,  by 
demanding  the  question  in  writing,  M.  Delcasse  or- 
dered the  French  ambassador  to  return  to  Paris.  The 
Pope  had  thrown  down  the  gage  of  battle  to  the  death, 
and  France  had  picked  it  up  without  hesitation. 
Separation,  which  Thiers  had  declared  would  be  a 
"saut  dans  les  tenebres,"  was  at  hand.  The  Con- 
cordat after  a  century's  service  was  doomed.  M. 
Combes  did  not  intend  that  there  should  be  any  linger- 
ing doubts,  for  after  the  explanation  of  M.  Delcasse, 
the  President  du  Conseil  declared : 

".  .  .  the  immediate  recall  of  our  ambassador  .  .  . 
indicates  that  we  have  been  unwilling  to  tolerate  the 
interference  of  the  Pontifical  Court  in  our  international 
relations,  also  that  we  wished  to  finish  once  for  all 
with  the  outworn  fiction  of  a  temporal  power  which 
has  disappeared  more  than  thirty  years  ago."38 

Two  months  later  the  last  attache  remaining  at  the 
Vatican  was  withdrawn  and  diplomatic  relations  were 
officially  severed.  The  Clerical  party  made  one  final 
effort  to  stem  the  tide  by  attempting  to  play  upon  the 
fears  of  the  Colonial  party.  Again  they  used  as  a 
stalking-horse  the  argument  that  France  was  bound 
to  lose  her  protectorate  over  the  Catholics  in  the 
Orient.39  It  was  a  vain  hope.  M.  Combes  found  this 
protectorate  as  embarrassing  as  it  was  glorious,  and 
in  a  much  commented  upon  interview  given  to  the 
Parisian  correspondent  of  the  Neue  Freie  Presse  of 
Vienna,  he  declared  that  France  drew  so  little  advan- 

ss  Annates  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  73i,  p.  109. 

39  The  Bpecch  of  the  Count  de  Castellane  in  the  Chamber,  Oct.  21, 
1904,  upon  the  religious  protectorates  is  an  example.  Annales  de  la 
Chambre,  Vol.  74i,  p.  55. 


ITALY  AND  THE  POPE  97 

tage  from  it  that  he  advised  Austria  not  to  allow  her- 
self to  be  drawn  into  the  same  adventure.40  To  con- 
tinue the  story  would  lead  us  far  afield.  The  belief 
had  become  fixed  that  "  religions  organized  in  the 
service  of  the  state  was  an  idea  of  the  past."41  But 
even  if  a  slight  loss  of  French  prestige  should  ensue 
in  the  Orient,  was  it  not  more  than  counterbalanced 
by  the  firm  foundations  of  friendship  laid  on  the  shores 
of  the  Mediterranean?  The  Humpty-Dumpty  policy 
of  Napoleon  III,  and  the  chari-vari  policy  of  Signor 
Crispi  were  both  cast  into  the  discard.  Republican 
France  was  rapidly  mending  her  diplomatic  fences 
with  no  Bismarck  on  the  ground  to  interfere  with  the 
work.42 

40  Quest.  Dip.  et  Col.,  Sept.  1,  1904. 

4i  M.  Paul  Deschanel  speaking  in  the  Chamber,  Oct.  21,  1904,  gave 
a  dispassionate  and  unbiased  presentation  of  the  subject  as  viewed  by 
the  majority.     Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  74i,  p.  65. 

42  An  amusing  incident  is  told  by  "L'Agence  Information"  in  regard 
to  the  Kaiser's  method  of  showing  his  displeasure  at  the  reception 
given  by  Victor  Emmanuel  III  to  President  Loubet.  The  Franco- 
Italian  League  had  planned  to  present  a  statue  of  Victor  Hugo  to  the 
city  of  Rome  in  connection  with  the  visit  of  President  Loubet,  and  the 
King  and  Queen  of  Italy  were  to  be  present  at  the  ceremony.  When 
the  Kaiser  learned  of  the  plan  he  informed  the  Italian  government 
through  his  ambassador,  that  the  statue  of  Goethe  which  he  had  pre- 
sented to  Rome  three  years  before  had  not  yet  been  unveiled.  Under 
these  circumstances  he  was  much  surprised  that  his  ally,  the  King  of 
Italy,  should  assist  officially  at  the  unveiling  of  the  statue  of  Victor 
Hugo.  M.  Giolitti  informed  the  King  that  under  the  circumstances  he 
had  best  not  participate.  As  a  result  the  ceremony  took  place  with 
only  President  Loubet  present  at  the  Villa  Medicis. 


CHAPTER  V. 
THE  ENTENTE  CORDIALE 

1.     FRANCE  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

THE  rapprochement  with  Italy  was  a  very  impor- 
tant link  in  the  chain  of  friendships  that  M.  Del- 
casse  was  forging  to  strengthen  France  against  the 
ever-increasing  might  of  the  Teuton,  but  it  was  of 
secondary  importance  as  compared  with  a  rapproche- 
ment with  Great  Britain.  So  long  as  Italy  remained 
a  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  her  value  as  a  friend 
must  be  of  a  negative  sort.  The  Triplice,  it  is  true, 
was  rendered  less  dangerous  as  an  instrument  of  ag- 
gression, but  in  a  time  of  emergency,  France  still  had 
only  Russia  to  depend  upon,  and  Russia's  interests 
were  in  the  East.  Great  Britain  had  renounced  her 
policy  of  isolation  when  she  allied  herself  with  Japan. 
If  she  was  willing  to  join  in  an  alliance  with  a  nation 
at  the  other  side  of  the  globe,  whose  racial  character- 
istics, government,  and  aspirations  were  wholly  at 
variance  with  her  own,  just  because  she  feared  that 
Russia  was  becoming  too  dangerous  as  a  rival  in  the 
Far  East,  could  she  not  see  the  advanage  of  joining 
with  a  nation  at  her  very  doorstep,  whose  interests 
were  identical  with  hers,  if  she  once  realized  that  Ger- 
many had  already  become  a  most  dangerous  rival  in 
all  the  seaports  of  the  world?  Colonial  aspirations 
and  ventures  had  ever  been  the  bone  of  contention  be- 
tween France  and  England,  but  now  France  considered 

98 


THE  ENTENTE  CORDIALE  99 

her  colonial  empire  as  established,  while  Germany  was 
still  seeking  a  place  in  the  sun.  In  commerce,  France 
and  England  had  become  natural  allies,  while  Ger- 
many had  become  England's  most  bitter  rival.  France 
had  long  since  given  up  any  thoughts  of  challenging 
Britain's  naval  supremacy;  the  Kaiser  had  declared 
Germany's  future  was  on  the  water.  That  England 
needed  France  just  as  badly  as  France  needed  Eng- 
land was  almost  self-evident;  the  only  question  was 
whether  the  advantages  to  be  gained  were  sufficient 
to  bring  about  a  settlement  of  the  outstanding  differ- 
ences. 

Although  France  considered  her  colonial  empire 
practically  established,  its  exact  boundaries,  and  the 
delimitations  of  spheres  of  influence  were  in  many 
places  exceedingly  vague.  This  was  especially  true 
in  the  various  regions  where  it  came  in  contact  with 
the  British  Empire.  Fashoda  had  shown  that  a  settle- 
ment could  be  reached  even  under  the  most  difficult 
conditions,  but  no  government  in  France  could  live 
through  a  second  Fashoda.  In  fact  any  arrangement 
of  the  future  must  be  of  such  a  sort  that  it  would  en- 
tirely blot  out  the  humiliation  of  1898 — it  must  be  a 
quid  pro  quo  arrangement  in  which  each  side  would 
make  concessions  of  approximately  equal  value,  so 
that  when  a  basis  should  be  finally  reached,  it  would 
stand  firmly  upon  the  foundations  of  a  fair  and  just 
compromise.  Was  it  possible  to  make  any  such  ar- 
rangement between  two  nations  who  found  their  fields 
of  conflict  in  almost  every  part  of  the  world,  from  New- 
foundland to  Morocco,  from  Siam  to  Madagascar,  from 
Egypt  to  the  New  Hebrides? 


100  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

In  order  to  answer  this  question  it  is  not  necessary 
to  consider  the  individual  difficulties  in  each  one  of 
these  places.  As  far  back  as  1891  M.  Delcasse  had 
with  rare  intuition  found  the  real  secret  of  a  success- 
ful foreign  and  colonial  policy,  and  this  was  his 
formula:  "It  is  in  Europe  that  you  will  most  surely 
defend  your  colonies/'  l  So  that  in  order  to  estimate 
the  possibilities  of  a  rapprochement  it  is  necessary  to 
note  the  changes  which  had  taken  place  in  Europe  since 
1900,  when  we  left  France  still  nursing  her  resentment 
at  her  policy  of  abasement,  and  Great  Britain  suspi- 
ciously watching  her,  mistrustful  of  every  move. 

The  gradually  growing  hostility  between  Germany 
and  Great  Britain,  as  evidenced  by  the  differences  in 
the  interpretation  of  the  Anglo-German  Accord  of 
1900  in  regard  to  Manchuria,  by  the  violence  of  Mr. 
Chamberlain's  Edinburgh  speech  of  October  25,  1901, 
and  Herr  von  Biilow's  sarcastic  reply  in  the  Reichs- 
tag, have  already  been  shown.  The  Boer  War  was 
unpopular  throughout  Europe,  but  nowhere  had  there 
been  such  outspoken  and  virulent  denunciation  of  the 
British  policy  as  in  the  German  Press.2  But  over- 
shadowing these  was  the  fear  that  Germany  seemed 
about  ready  to  strike  another  blow  at  British  commer- 
cial supremacy,  and  in  a  vital  spot — the  short  route 
to  India. 

The  Bagdad  Railway  scheme,  which  had  been  matur- 

i  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  35i,  p.  598. 

2  The  Kolnische  Zeitung  said:  "Instead  of  spending  milliards  in 
crushing  the  freedom  of  the  Boer  Republics,  England  should  rescue  the 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  human  lives  in  India  .  .  .  but  she  has  money 
only  for  the  war  of  oppression  and  not  for  the  relief  of  hunger  and 
misery  in  India — a  terrible  reproach  but  unfortunately  a  true  one." 
Quoted  London  Times,  May  14,  1900. 


THE  ENTENTE  COEDIALE  101 

ing  in  the  Kaiser's  brain  long  before  his  famous  visit 
to  Jerusalem  in  1898,  was  with  good  reason  a  cause  of 
jealousy  between  the  two  countries.    As  far  back  as 
1835,  the  English  government  had  undertaken  a  sur- 
vey of  Mesopotamia  under  Colonel  Chesney,  who  sub- 
sequently suggested  a  railway  through  the  Euphrates 
Valley  to  connect  the  Mediterranean  with  the  Persian 
Gulf.     On  various  other  occasions  official  reports  re- 
garding a  similar  project  were  submitted  by  English 
commissioners,  but  the  Suez  Canal  destroyed  their 
interest.    However,  when  in  1888  the  Anatolian  Rail- 
way Company,  a  German  enterprise,  obtained  the  con- 
cession to  build  a  railway  from  Haidar-Pasha  to  An- 
gora, Great  Britain  again  became  interested.    In  1895 
Major  Law  was  sent  to  survey  the  whole  railway  situa- 
tion in  Asia  Minor.    His  report  was  not  flattering  to 
British  pride.    He  found  that  although  in  the  beginning 
the  railway  enterprise  was  almost  completely  in  Eng- 
lish hands,  only  one  road  remained  under  their  man- 
agement, the  Smyrna-Aidin  line.     Although  he  found 
no  immediate  prospect  of  a  railway  through  the  Eu- 
phrates Valley,  he  thought  it  would  be  built  ultimately, 
and  would  be  the  inevitable  mail  route  between  the 
Mediterranean    and   the    Persian    Gulf.3     Germany's 
policy  here  as  elsewhere  was  to  exceed  expectations. 
On  November  27, 1899  the  Sultan  gave  to  Germany  the 
right  to  extend  the  railway  from  Konia  to  the  Persian 
Gulf  by  way  of  Bagdad  (this  was  confirmed  by  an 
irade  more  specific  in  its  terms  dated  January  16, 
1902)  and  Great  Britain  realized  the  time  for  action 
had  come.    Quietly  and  unostentatiously,  she  placed 

s  Pari.  Papers,  1896,  Vol.  96  (c8019). 


102  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

under  her  control  Koweit,  the  best  port  on  the  Persian 
Gulf,  and  practically  the  only  satisfactory  terminus 
for  the  Bagdad  Railway.  She  was  then  ready  to  talk 
business  with  Germany  regarding  financial  coopera- 
tion when  the  proposition  should  be  made.4 

France  was  even  more  interested  in  the  scheme  than 
Great  Britain.  Not  only  was  she  expected  to  con- 
tribute mainly  in  financing  the  project,  but  it  crossed 
or  connected  with  several  lines  already  under  the  con- 
trol of  French  interests.  As  Germany  realized  that 
the  whole  plan  was  impossible  without  French  coopera- 
tion, a  most  attractive  proposition  was  made  to  the 
French  financial  interests,  with  a  veiled  threat  that 
if  it  were  not  accepted,  both  the  Smyrna-Cassaba  and 
the  Mersina-Adana  lines  would  be  forced  to  the  wall 
by  the  stronger  German  concern.  The  accord  signed 
by  the  French  and  German  financial  interests  in  Ber- 
lin, May  6,  1899,  gave  each  party  equal  shares  in  both 
stock  and  direction,  separated  the  Bagdad  Railway 
Company  from  the  Anatolian  Company,  and  provided 
that  France  should  not  oppose  any  negotiations  be- 
tween the  Anatolian  Company  and  the  Sultan.5 

All  these  preliminary  plans  were  made  strictly  sub 
rosa,  and  we  find  scarcely  a  mention  of  the  project  in 
the  press  of  either  France  or  England  until  late  in 
1901.  In  October  the  London  " Times"  quoted  an  in- 
teresting and  enlightening  statement  from  the  Cologne 
"Gazette,"  to  the  effect  that  both  French  and  German 
capital  and  engineers  were  interested  in  the  Bagdad 

*  One  of  the  best  documented  treatises  on  the  Bagdad  Railway  is  "Le 
Chemin  de  Fer  de  Bagdad,"  by  Abel  Muratet,  a  thesis  presented  in 
June,  1914,  and  published  at  Aurillac   (Imprimerie  Moderne). 

•  Abel  Muratet,  op.  cit.,  p.  56. 


THE  ENTENTE  CORDIALE  103 

Railway,  and  that  Russia  was  to  be  permitted  to  take 
some  shares.  As  for  Turkey,  she  would  reap  the  great- 
est benefit,  and  it  was  very  important  that  the  excel- 
lent harbor  of  Koweit  should  not  be  alienated  from  her 
immediate  sovereignty.  In  conclusion  it  was  noted 
that  English  atlases  show  Koweit  to  be  the  property 
of  Turkey,  so  it  was  hardly  likely  that  the  Sultan  would 
divest  himself  of  his  rights.6  At  approximately  the 
same  time  we  have  a  leading  French  review  quoting 
from  the  same  German  newspaper  as  follows : 

"...  German  and  French  capitalists  and  en- 
gineers with  the  cooperation  of  Russians,  they  say,  have 
formed  the  plan  of  joining  the  Persian  Gulf  with  the 
Mediterranean  by  railway.  The  Deutsche  Bank  repre- 
senting French  and  German  groups  has  obtained  the 
concession  of  the  construction.  .  .  .  Neither  Turkey 
nor  the  railway  enterprise  can  admit  that  the  terminus 
be  anywhere  but  at  Koweit,  recognized  as  Turkish  ter- 
ritory." 7 

The  question  was  now  up  to  the  governments  con- 
cerned. France,  as  a  government,  could  hardly  co- 
operate without  consulting  her  ally,  Russia,  and  M. 
Delcasse,  on  his  visit  to  Russia  in  April,  1901,  was 
probably  not  left  uncertain  as  to  Russian  feelings  on 
the  subject.  The  "Novoie  Vremia"  pointed  out  that, 
not  only  would  this  railroad  offer  serious  competition 
to  the  Trans-Siberian,  but  also  touch  vitally  upon  Rus- 
sia's economic  interests  and  political  preponderance 
in  Central  Asia.  Russia's  neighbors  should  under- 
stand that  she  would  never  tolerate  any  interference 

o  London  Times,  Oct.  20,  1901. 
TQues.  Dip.  et  Col.,  Nov.  1,  1901. 


104  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

with  the  status  quo  in  Asia  Minor  or  Mesopotamia.8 
French  public  opinion  was  almost  equally  hostile  to 
strengthening  German  interests  at  the  expense  of  Rus- 
sia. Furthermore  it  was  feared  that  instead  of  Ger- 
many and  France  each  contributing  forty  per  cent,  of 
the  capital,  other  powers  contributing  the  remaining 
twenty  per  cent.,  France  would  have  to  do  much  more 
than  her  share  financially  while  Germany  would  still 
be  on  an  equality  with  France  in  the  control.9  The 
question  was  brought  to  a  head  by  M.  Firmin  Faure 
proposing  a  law,  not  to  allow  the  sale  of  stocks  or 
bonds  for  the  Bagdad  Railway  upon  French  territory 
without  passage  of  a  special  law  permitting  it  by  Par- 
liament.10 M.  Delcasse  demanded  to  be  heard,  and  de- 
clared that  neither  directly  nor  indirectly,  had  French 
diplomacy  interfered  in  the  affair.  The  Anatolian 
Company  had  got  into  touch  with  French  interests  and 
he  for  one  thought  if  suitable  arrangements  could  be 
made,  it  would  be  preferable  for  French  interests  to 
participate.  However  the  only  conditions  possible 
would  be  if  Russia  should  have  full  rights  of  entry,  and 
if  the  French  element  would  have  both  in  construction 
and  direction  of  the  enterprise,  rights  equal  to  the 
most  favored  foreign  element.11 

Even  if  Russia  should  participate,  which  was  doubt- 
ful, there  still  remained  the  question  of  Great  Britain 

8  Quoted  by  Andre"  Cheradame,  "Douze  ans  de  Propagande" ;  see  also 
the  views  of  M.  Witte,  Minister  of  Finances,  appearing  in  the  Messenger 
des  Finances,  quoted  in  London  Times,  Jan.  15,  1902. 

»M.  Etienne  speaking  in  the  Chamber  Jan.  21,  1902,  declared  that 
France  would  be  furnishing  80  per  cent,  of  the  capital  before  the  road 
was  constructed.     Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  6Gi,  p.  123. 

io  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  66ii,  p.  1855. 

"Ibid.,  p.  1857. 


THE  ENTENTE  CORDIALE  105 

and  Koweit.  France  with  M.  Delcasse  in  the  saddle, 
would  have  been  only  too  glad  to  welcome  English 
participation,  and  early  in  1903  an  offer  was  made 
granting  thirty  per  cent,  each  to  Germany,  France  and 
Great  Britain,  and  to  various  other  nations  the  other 
ten  per  cent.12  An  arrangement  on  this  basis  was  al- 
most reached,13  but  with  the  "Times,"  " Westminster 
Gazette,"  " Daily  Mail"  and  other  influential  organs 
opposing  strenuously,  M.  Balfour,  on  April  23,  1903, 
declared  that  the  enterprise  as  shown  by  the  Conven- 
tion of  March  5,  which  divided  shares  among  the  three 
powers  but  reserved  the  directorship  in  German  hands, 
placed  the  enterprise  under  German  control,  and  "to 
such  a  convention  we  have  never  been  asked  to  assist 
and  we  could  not  in  any  case  be  a  party  to  it."  14  The 
following  month,  Lord  Lansdowne  made  it  clear  that 
Great  Britain  never  had  any  idea  of  allowing  a  Ger- 
man railroad  from  Konia  to  the  Persian  Gulf  but 
rather  to  substitute  a  line  of  international  character, 
constructed  under  guarantees  which  would  have  se- 
cured for  the  commerce  of  all  nations  absolutely  free 
and  equal  treatment  from  sea  to  sea.15 

If  Germany  had  been  willing  to  guarantee  France 
an  equal  share  in  the  management,  an  arrangement 
might  yet  have  been  made,  for  M.  Rouvier,  the  new 
Minister  of  Finances,  had  been  heartily  in  favor  of 
the  project  as  a  banker,  and  in  his  new  position,  his 
influence  was  almost  decisive.     Throughout  the  affair 

12  Abel  Muratet,  op.  cit.,  p.  135. 

is  A.  von  Gwinner,  "The  Bagdad  Railway  and  the  Question  of  British 
Cooperation,"  Nineteenth  Century,  June,  1909. 
i*  Pari.  Debates,  Vol.  121,  p.  221. 
is  Ibid.,  p.  1345. 


106  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Germany  had  also  been  able  to  count  upon  the  coopera- 
tion of  M.  Constans,  French  ambassador  at  Constan- 
tinople.18 Relying  upon  the  support  of  M.  Rouvier, 
Berlin  demanded  both  the  positions  of  president  and 
director  of  the  company.  This  gave  M.  Delcasse  his 
opportunity  to  withdraw  all  support  of  the  govern- 
ment from  the  enterprise,  for  with  Russia  still  hostile 
to  it,  and  Great  Britain  now  eyeing  it  askance,  France 
could  no  longer  afford  to  participate.  The  rapproche- 
ment with  Great  Britain  was  of  more  importance  than 
a  venture  in  high  finance.  If  M.  Rouvier  "held  the 
golden  key  which  could  open  the  paradise  of  Bagdad," 
M.  Delcasse  was  powerful  enough  to  prevent  its  use. 
In  October  the  Conseil  des  Ministres  refused  to  allow 
the  sale  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  stock  on  the  Parisian 
market,17  and  November  19,  1903,  replying  to  an  ac- 
cusation made  by  M.  Deschanel  that  French  money 
was  being  engaged,  M.  Delcasse  publicly  affirmed  that 
the  government  could  not  advise  the  participation  of 
French  capital,  unless  guarantees  of  full  equality  in 
direction,  construction  and  exploitation  of  the  line 
should  be  previously  secured.18  As  a  matter  of  fact 
French  capital  did  enter,  but  it  was  contrary  to  the 
expressed  wishes  of  the  government.19 

i«  M.  Cheradame,  op.  cit.,  pp.  55-559,  declares  that  M.  Constans  aided 
in  obtaining  the  concession,  while  M.  Rouvier  was  considered  by  all 
whom  he  met  in  the  Orient  as  the  "agent  of  the  Deutsche  Bank,  and 
the  very  efficacious  collaborator  of  the  German  policy  in  the  East." 

17  Victor  Bgrard,  "Le  Discours  du  Chancelier,"  Revue  de  Paris,  Dec. 
15,  1906. 

is  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  71i,  p.  605. 

i»  For  an  illuminating  discussion  of  the  diplomatic  side  of  the  ques- 
tion bringing  it  up  to  1914,  see  A.  Geraud,  "The  Story  of  the  Bagdad 
Railway,"  Nineteenth  Century,  May-June,  1914. 


THE  ENTENTE  COEDIALE  107 

2.     THE  FRANCO-BRITISH  ACCORD  OF  APRIL  8,   1004 

Once  more  France  and  Great  Britain  found  them- 
selves on  common  ground  in  their  distrust  of  Germany, 
and  with  their  paths  leading  in  the  same  direction. 
Not  yet  was  it  possible  to  assert  that  they  would  soon 
meet,  but  powerful  influences  were  being  brought  to 
bear,  which  were  at  least  making  them  converge.  One 
of  the  most  important  of  these  factors  was  the  acces- 
sion of  Edward  VII  to  the  throne  of  England.  Try  as 
we  may  to  belittle  the  power  of  the  English  sovereign, 
he  does  have  a  potent  influence  over  foreign  affairs  if 
he  proves  himself  to  possess  ability  and  a  strong  per- 
sonality. His  influence  is  to  a  certain  extent  intan- 
gible but  it  is  there.  He  can  advise  even  though  his 
advice  is  not  sought;  he  can  warn,  even  though  his 
warnings  pass  unheeded.  But  it  is  only  reasonable  to 
suppose  that  a  ministry,  whose  tenure  of  office  is  often 
short,  would  be  only  too  willing  to  regard  the  advice 
of  one,  whose  interest  in  the  country's  welfare  is  equal 
to  their  own,  and  whose  stable  position  gives  him  a 
viewpoint  of  vantage,  as  deserving  of  the  most  care- 
ful consideration. 

Queen  Victoria  died  in  January,  1901,  and  both  M. 
Delcasse  in  the  Senate,  and  M.  Waldeck-Rousseau  in 
the  Chamber,  voiced  the  regret  of  the  French  nation. 
France  remembered  that  Louis  Philippe  had  been  an 
honored  guest  of  the  deceased  queen,  and  that  the 
friendship  between  the  two  countries  under  his  reign 
had  become  an  alliance  under  his  successors.  France 
also  remembered  that  in  the  dark  period  following  the 
Franco-German  War  Queen  Victoria  had  joined  her  in- 


108  FRENCH  FOEEIGN  POLICY 

fluence  with  Alexander  II  to  foil  the  plans  of  Bismark 
to  crush  France  again.  Yet  in  her  later  years,  Victoria 
had  unquestionably  leaned  towards  Germany  rather 
than  towards  France;  and  to  those  who  were  looking 
towards  an  era  of  better  feeling  between  the  two  coun- 
tries, the  advent  of  King  Edward  gave  promise  of  a 
realization  of  their  hopes.  As  the  Prince  of  Wales, 
he  had  always  been  very  popular  on  the  continent ;  and 
in  France,  even  when  the  tide  of  hostility  towards  Eng- 
land was  at  flood,  an  exception  was  made  of  Prince 
Edward.20 

Another  equally  important  factor  was  the  change 
which  took  place  in  January,  1902,  in  the  British  cab- 
inet, bringing  Lord  Lansdowne  into  Lord  Salisbury's 
place  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Although  Lord 
Salisbury  was  not  exactly  antagonistic  to  France,  like 
M.  Hanotaux  he  played  the  game  of  Germany  uncon- 
sciously, and  he  was  ever  pessimistic  regarding  an  un- 
derstanding. His  attitude  was  clearly  expressed  by 
his  own  phrase:  "C'est  de  I'utopie." 21  With  the 
advent  of  Lord  Lansdowne,  a  change  of  attitude  be- 
came noticeable  almost  immediately,  and  Sir  Thomas 
Barclay  declares  that  two  months  before  Lord  Salis- 
bury's resignation,  Lord  Lansdowne  had  written  him 
expressing  hearty  concurrence  in  his  efforts  to  bring 
about  an  arbitration  treaty  between  the  two  countries.22 
In  this  connection  the  untiring  efforts  of  Sir  Thomas 
Barclay  himself  must  not  be  overlooked.    At  a  time 

20  Mr.  E.  A.  Vizetelly  thus  characterizes  the  French  attitude  towards 
the  Prince  of  Wales:  "Le  Prince  de  Galles?  Oh,  lui,  c'est  bien  differ- 
ent. II  nous  aime.  Mais  vous  autres,  vous  ne  nous  aimez  pas." 
Republican  France,  p.  462. 

21  Barclay,  "Thirty  Years  Anglo-French  Reminiscences,"  p.  210. 

22  Barclay,  op.  cit.,  p.  212. 


THE  ENTENTE  CORDIALS  109 

when  the  hostility  between  France  and  Great  Britain 
was  like  a  black  cloud  that  no  friendly  sunbeam  of 
mutual  appreciation  could  pierce,  Mr.  Barclay  em- 
ployed the  argwmentu/m  ad  Jiominem  method,  and  as 
one  of  the  leaders  of  the  British  Chamber  of  Commerce 
in  Paris,  urged  the  advantages  which  the  Paris  Exposi- 
tion gave  for  holding  the  annual  meeting  of  the  Asso- 
ciated Chambers  of  Commerce  of  Great  Britain  in 
Paris  that  year  (1900).  It  proved  to  be  a  record  meet- 
ing, and  also  seemed  to  act  as  an  entering  wedge  for  a 
steady  influx  of  visitors  from  across  the  channel.23 

Nor  was  M.  Delcasse  the  only  champion  of  a  rap- 
prochement across  the  Channel.  M.  Paul  Cambon,  who 
entered  upon  his  duties  as  ambassador  at  the  Court 
of  St.  James  in  November,  1898,  when  the  Fashoda 
Affair,  although  it  had  passed  its  most  dangerous 
phase,  rendered  the  relations  between  the  two  nations 
exceedingly  bitter,  deserves  little  less  credit  than  his 
chief.  "If  M.  Delcasse  and  after  him  M.  Pichon  have 
turned  the  ensemble  of  French  policy  in  the  direction 
of  England,  it  is  M.  Paul  Cambon,  who  has  arranged 
the  details  of  the  relations  between  London  and  Paris 
with  a  cleverness  and  a  skill  to  which  one  cannot  give 
too  much  credit. ' ' 24    An  able  coadjutor  of  Sir  Thomas 

23  Ibid.,  Chap  XVT ;  also  Jaray,  "La  Politique  Franco-  Anglaise,"  pp. 
24-25. 

24  Lemonon,  "L'Europe  et  la  Politique  Britannique,"  p.  348 ;  the 
London  Times  thus  expressed  its  views  editorially:  "M.  Delcasse's  whole 
conduct  of  French  foreign  affairs  has  been  conspicuous,  at  once  for  en- 
lightened perception  of  the  true  interests  of  his  own  country  and  for 
moderate  and  courteous  treatment  of  the  claims  of  others.  .  .  .  He  has 
been  ably  seconded  by  M.  Cambon,  whose  interpretation  of  French 
policy  has  undoubtedly  been  a  potent  factor  in  bringing  about  that  in- 
creased cordiality  of  relations  in  which  all  lovers  of  peace  now  rejoice." 
July  8,  1903. 


110  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Barclay  in  his  efforts  towards  better  relations,  and  an 
ardent  believer  in  arbitration  as  the  means  of  accom- 
plishing it,  was  M.  d'Estournelles  de  Constant. 
Finally  there  were  men  like  M.  Jaures,  who  favored 
a  union  between  democratic  powers  such  as  England, 
France,  and  Italy,  because  they  considered  "this  triple 
union  as  the  three  first  stones  of  the  hearth  of  uni- 
versal democracy  and  universal  peace ' ' ; 25  and  others 
like  M.  de  Pressense,  who  considered  that  ' '  the  equilib- 
rium of  the  world  was  supremely  unstable  so  long  as 
a  great  system  of  alliances — that  of  the  Triplice — ex- 
isted, and  the  balance  would  only  be  obtained  the  day 
that  a  second  should  be  organized, ' ' 26  and  in  the 
opinion  of  M.  Pressense  the  Russian  Alliance  did  not 
meet  the  demand. 

At  last  the  stage  was  set,  and  the  players  were  both 
able  and  willing  to  play  their  roles.  The  two  great 
nations,  both  democratic  and  liberal  in  their  tenden- 
cies and  in  their  government,  inspired  by  a  mutual  dis- 
like and  fear  of  Germany,  attracted  by  ever  improving 
commercial  relations,  could  not  be  kept  longer  apart. 
The  progress  was  rapid  and  in  many  directions.  On 
April  3,  1901  a  convention  was  signed  submitting  to 
arbitration  both  the  Waima  Affair,  a  quarrel  on  the 
Sierra  Leone  frontier  in  which  officers  and  soldiers  on 
both  sides  had  been  killed,27  and  the  Sergeant  Mala- 
mine  incident,  the  loss  of  a  French  steamboat  in  a  trip 
up  the  Niger.    In  July,  1902  a  satisfactory  award  was 

25  Jaray,  op.  cit.,  p.  35. 

z«  Report  on  Budget  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Doc. 
Pari.,  Vol.  64ii,  p.  1520,  Annexe  No.  1196. 
27  Lavisse,  "France  et  Angleterre,"  Revue  da  Paris,  Feb.  1,  1899. 


THE  ENTENTE  CORDIALE  111 

made.28  Immediately  following  the  meeting  of  the  As- 
sociation of  British  Chambers  of  Commerce  in  Paris, 
Sir  Thomas  Barclay  commenced  an  intensive  campaign 
to  bring  about  a  general  arbitration  treaty  between 
the  two  countries,  and  on  September  14,  1901  resolu- 
tions to  this  effect  were  passed  by  the  British  organ- 
izations.29 In  January,  1902,  the  modus  Vivendi  in 
regard  to  New  Foundland  was  renewed,  and  in  the 
same  month  M.  Delcasse  refused  to  interfere  in  the 
Boer  War  by  an  offer  of  mediation  although  urged 
by  a  deputy  in  the  Chamber  to  do  so.30  Nothing  was  to 
be  allowed  to  jeopardize  his  policy  of  conciliation. 

In  February,  1903,  we  have  the  first  public  indica- 
tion of  the  rapid  trend  towards  a  definite  agreement. 
The  "London  Times"  declared  that  towards  the  end 
of  the  preceding  summer,  M.  Delcasse  presented  to 
Lord  Lansdowne  certain  complete  and  business-like 
proposals  which  would  have  had  not  merely  North 
African,  but  European  consequences.  The  essential 
part  of  these  proposals  was  that  France  and  England 
should  settle  the  Moroccan  question  in  connection  with 
Egypt.  In  compensation  for  French  recognition  of 
British  occupation  of  Egypt,  France  was  to  be  allowed 
a  free  hand  in  dealing  with  Moroccan  territory  save 
on  the  North  African  coast  line.31  The  governments 
were  not  yet  ready,  however,  to  concede  that  matters 
had  proceeded  thus  far,  and  on  March  11,  in  reply  to  a 
definite  question  on  the  subject  by  M.  Deloncle,  M. 

28  Lemonon,  "L'Europe  et  la  Politique  Britannique,"  p.  350. 

29  Andre  Tardieu,  "France  and  the  Alliances,"  p.  59 ;  also  Barclay, 
op.  cit.,  Chap.  XVII. 

so  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  66i,  p.  80. 
si  London  Times,  Feb.  2,  1903. 


112  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Delcasse  replied  that  if  he  had  made  any  such  arrange- 
ment it  must  have  been  in  his  sleep — "ce  serait  en  dor- 
mant." M.  Ribot  wittily  intervened  with  a  quotation: 
"Nous  Vavons,  en  dormant,  madame  echappe  belle!" 
and  M.  Delcasse  allowed  the  matter  to  rest.32 

In  the  meantime  other  indications  of  better  feeling 
were  noted.  On  March  4,  1903,  M.  Paul  Cambon  was 
invited  to  speak  at  the  annual  meeting  of  the  British 
Chamber  of  Commerce  in  London,  and  he  declared  that 
he  looked  in  vain  for  any  essential  question  which 
could  divide  England  and  France ;  on  the  contrary  he 
saw  great  interests  which  could  and  should  unite  them, 
and  it  was  not  only  to  their  interests  to  be  on  good 
terms,  but  to  the  interests  of  the  whole  world.33 

The  movement  suddenly  received  great  impetus  by 
the  unexpected  visit  of  King  Edward  to  Paris.  The 
king  seemed  to  have  undertaken  this  visit,  not  only 
against  the  wishes  of  his  advisers,  but  even  contrary  to 
the  judgment  of  those  most  anxious  to  bring  about  bet- 
ter relations.  M.  Barclay  declared  that  he  had  misgiv- 
ings on  the  expediency  of  the  visit,  and  in  France 
"  embarrassments  and  anxiety  weighed  upon  the  pub- 
lic. ' ' 34  However,  King  Edward  knew  his  Paris  and  his 
confidence  was  not  misplaced.35    If  his  reception  was 

32  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  69ii,  p.  1350.  A  little  later  in  the 
same  speech  M.  Deloncle  maintained  that  it  did  appear  as  though 
M.  Delcasse'  had  conceived  the  idea  of  flirting  with  England.  M.  Del- 
caasg's  retort  was  immediate:  "ce  n'est  plus  de  mon  dge." 

83  London  Times,  March  5,  1903. 

3*  Tardieu,  "France  and  the  Alliances,"  p.  61. 

35  When  to  entertain  him  it  was  proposed  that  he  be  taken  to  the 
Opgra  he  is  said  to  have  remarked  in  a  manner  quite  Parisian:  "Dormez- 
moi  seulement  une  piece  au  TM&tre  Francais,  voyons,  je  ne  suis  pas  le 
schah  de  Perse." 


THE  ENTENTE  CORDIALE  113 

not  enthusiastic,  neither  were  there  any  signs  of  hos- 
tility. Even  the  ardent  Paul  Deroulede,  now  cooling 
his  heels  in  exile  at  San  Sebastian,  seemed  satisfied 
that  France  should  accept  the  friendship  of  Edward 
VII,  and  he  strongly  discountenanced  any  hostile 
demonstrations  on  the  part  of  his  Nationalist  follow- 
ers.36 The  toasts  between  the  King  and  President 
Loubet  were  courteous  but  formal,  since  the  King 
wished  to  indicate  that  the  visit  was  one  of  a  private 
nature.  However,  when  the  King  spoke  to  the  mem- 
bers of  the  English  Chamber  of  Commerce  in  Paris  he 
was  able  to  voice  his  true  sentiments : 

".  .  .  The  days  of  conflict  between  the  two  coun- 
tries are,  I  trust,  happily  over,  and  I  hope  that  future 
historians  in  alluding  to  Anglo-French  relations  in 
the  present  century,  may  be  able  to  record  only  a 
friendly  rivalry  in  the  commercial  and  industrial  do- 
main ;  I  hope  that  in  the  future  as  in  the  past,  France 
and  England  may  be  regarded  as  the  champions  and 
the  pioneers  of  civilization  and  peaceful  progress.  .  .  . 
I  trust  that  the  friendship  and  admiration  which  we  all 
feel  for  the  French  nation  and  their  glorious  traditions 
may  in  the  near  future  develop  into  a  sentiment  of 
the  warmest  affection  and  attachment  between  the  peo- 
ples of  the  two  countries. ' ' 37 

s«  Although  the  Patrie  and  a  few  other  Nationalist  journals  recalled 
Fashoda,  the  Transvaal,  and  even  Joan  of  Arc,  the  Petit  Journal,  their 
most  influential  newspaper  pointed  out  that  at  least  no  lost  provinces 
constituted  a  barrier  between  France  and  England.  The  Petit  Parisien, 
the  journal  of  the  working  classes,  and  the  more  conservative  news- 
papers such  as  the  Temps,  Figaro,  and  Journal  des  Debats,  all  welcomed 
the  king  in  a  most  cordial  manner. 

»7  London  Times,  May  2,  1903. 


114  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

The  king's  wishes  were  to  be  fulfilled  in  a  most 
speedy  and  satisfactory  manner,  and  well  did  he  de- 
serve the  epithet  of  "le  roi  pacificateur"  which  the 
French  bestowed  upon  him.88  President  Loubet  re- 
turned the  visit  two  months  later,  and  his  reception 
was  even  more  cordial.  This  time  while  King  Edward 
and  President  Loubet  were  publicly  giving  utterance 
to  affectionate  greetings  and  friendly  toasts,  Lord 
Lansdowne  and  M.  Delcasse  were  privately  engaged 
in  some  very  important  conversations.  As  the 
" Times"  put  it:  "M.  Loubet 's  visit  must  not  be  re- 
garded as  an  isolated  phenomenon,  a  mere  compli- 
mentary effort  standing  alone  and  liable  to  pass  as  a 
simple  incident  of  the  hour.  It  is  on  the  contrary 
the  logical  outcome  of  much  that  has  gone  on  before, 
and  the  crown  of  efforts  continuously  made  by  states- 
men on  both  sides  to  sweep  away  the  differences  be-, 
tween  two  great  powers  whose  common  task  is  to  carry 

ss  Mr.  Sydney  Lee  in  his  article  on  King  Edward  VII  in  the  Diction- 
ary of  National  Biography  (second  supplement),  is  inclined  to  question 
the  influence  which  the  French  attribute  to  King  Edward  in  bringing 
about  the  rapprochement.  Let  M.  Andre"  Tardieu,  whose  word  may  be 
considered  final  in  France,  state  the  French  view:  "The  English  King 
was  the  initiator  of  the  rapprochement.  He  it  was  who  both  con- 
ceived and  facilitated  it.  .  .  ."  Op.  cit.,  p.  60.  But  we  can  find 
authority  just  as  eminent  across  the  Channel.  Sir  Charles  Dilke  de- 
clared: "The  great  and  sudden  improvement  in  the  relations  between 
the  English  speaking  world  and  France  is  largely  due  to  the  wisdom 
and  courtesy  with  which  the  King  made  clear  to  France  that  there 
was  no  ground  for  the  suspicions  which  prevailed."  Life  of  Sir.  Chas. 
Dilke,  Vol.  II,  p.  501.  Mr.  Balfour  is  even  more  emphatic:  "King 
Edward  was  a  great  monarch.  He  did  that  which  no  minister,  no 
cabinet,  no  ambassadors,  neither  treaties,  nor  protocols,  nor  under- 
standings, which  no  debates,  no  banquets,  no  speeches  were  able  to 
perform.  He  by  his  personality  alone  brought  home  to  the  minds  of 
millions  on  the  Continent,  as  nothing  we  could  have  done  could  have 
brought  it  home  to  them,  the  friendly  feelings  of  the  country  over  which 
King  Edward  ruled."    Pari.  Debates,  Vol.  17,  p.  799  (5th  series). 


THE  ENTENTE  CORDIALE  115 

forward  civilization,  and  to  uphold  the  banner  of  con- 
stitutional liberties." 89 

In  fact  almost  immediately  after  King  Edward's 
visit  M.  Cambon  brought  up  the  question  of  an  arbi- 
tration treaty  between  the  two  countries,  using  as  a 
basis  M.  Delcasse's  formula  that  arbitration  should  be 
used  in  settling  differences  based  upon  the  judicial 
interpretation  of  conventions  already  existing  between 
the  two  nations.  Lord  Lansdowne  agreed  that  this 
might  be  a  satisfactory  basis  for  an  agreement. 
Shortly  afterwards  M.  Delcasse  submitted  a  definite 
proposal  that  differences  falling  under  the  application 
of  Article  16  of  the  Hague  convention  for  the  peaceful 
settlement  of  international  disputes,  i.  e.,  differences 
of  a  justiciable  character,  and  particularly  those  re- 
lating to  difficulties  in  the  interpretation  of  existing 
conventions,  providing  they  did  not  concern  the  vital 
interest  or  honor  of  either  party,  should  be  submitted 
to  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration.  The  British 
government  was  willing  to  accept  this  formula  and  on 
October  14,  1903,  the  Treaty  of  Arbitration  was 
signed.40' 

Although  it  was  recognized  that  such  a  treaty  was 
worthless  as  a  means  of  avoiding  war  if  either  side 
wished  for  an  excuse,  still  it  clearly  indicated  the 
changed  attitude  of  the  two  powers,  and  it  was  note- 
worthy as  being  the  first  treaty  of  its  kind  among  the 
great  European  nations,  the  only  other  such  pact  be- 
ing the  one  between  Holland  and  Portugal  signed  July 
5, 1894.    As  M.  Paul  Deschanel  phrased  it,  in  the  mag- 

3»  London  Times,  July  8,  1903. 

40  Doc.  Dip.,  Convention  <T Arbitrage  avec  L'Angleterre,  1903. 


116  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

nificent  speech  which  he  made  in  favor  of  the  treaty 
when  it  came  before  the  Chamber  for  ratification: 
"The  recent  treaty  of  arbitration  indicates  the  mutual 
dispositions  of  the  two  countries.  Thinking  people 
of  both  nations  are  agreed  that  a  hostile  policy  between 
the  two  great  liberal  nations,  between  the  country  of 
the  Habeas  Corpus  and  the  country  of  the  Declaration 
of  the  Rights  of  Man  would  be  a  crime  against  civiliza- 
tion."41 

This  was  but  the  prologue  of  the  piece  which  was  to 
follow.  So  long  as  the  various  colonial  questions  re- 
mained unsettled  there  could  be  no  agreement  worthy 
of  the  name.  Now  it  was  that  M.  Delcasse  showed  his 
greatest  statesmanship.  His  opportunity  had  come 
and  he  was  ready  for  it.  He  had  played  the  game  care- 
fully, for  he  realized  very  well  that  the  future  of 
France  was  the  stake.  The  time  had  come  to  show  his 
cards  and  he  laid  them  all  on  the  table.  It  had  taken 
almost  six  long  years  to  accomplish  his  purpose,  but 
the  success  which  crowned  his  efforts  was  complete. 
The  Accord  signed  on  April  8,  1904,  made  a  complete 
and  final  settlement  of  all  the  important  outstanding 
differences  between  the  two  nations,  and  they  had  at 
last  joined  hands  in  the  Entente  Cordiale.42 

The  Anglo-French  agreement  was  composed  of  three 
distinct  instruments,  viz.,  a  declaration  concerning 
Egypt  and  Morocco,  a  declaration  concerning  Siam, 
Madagascar  and  the  New  Hebrides,  and  a  convention 
concerning  Newfoundland  and  Africa.     The  first  was, 

4iAnnales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  71i,  p.  600. 

*2  For  a  complete  account  of  Franco-British  relations  from  the  six- 
teenth century  down  to  the  present,  see  J.  L.  de  Lanessan,  "Histoire 
do  l'Entente  Cordiale,"  Paris,  1916. 


THE  ENTENTE  CORDIALE  117 

from  a  diplomatic  standpoint,  of  greatest  interest.  In 
his  Depeche  aux  Ambassadeurs,  a  commentary  on  and 
detailed  explanation  of  the  agreement,  sent  to  the  vari- 
ous ambassadors  of  the  Republic,43  M.  Delcasse  said: 
1 '  The  principal  part  of  the  arrangement  just  concluded 
relates  to  Morocco.-  Of  all  the  questions  in  which  the 
interests  of  France  are  engaged,  none  has  an  impor- 
tance comparable  to  the  Moroccan  question;  it  is  evi- 
dent that  from  its  solution  depends  the  solidity  and 
development  of  our  African  empire,  and  the  future  it- 
self of  our  situation  in  the  Mediterranean." 

The  declaration  concerning  Egypt  and  Morocco  con- 
sisted of  nine  articles,  the  sum  and  substance  of  which 
was  a  recognition  of  the  paramount  interests  of  France 
in  Morocco  by  Great  Britain,  in  return  for  a  like  recog- 
nition by  France  of  the  preponderant  interests  of 
Great  Britain  in  Egypt.44  As  regards  Egypt,  Great 
Britain  declared  that  she  had  no  intention  of  altering 
its  political  status,  and  France  engaged  herself  neither 
to  demand  any  time  limit  to  British  occupation  nor  to 
interfere  in  any  other  way.  In  regard  to  the  public 
debt  a  substantial  change  was  made  in  giving  greater 
flexibility  in  its  administration,  and  in  the  employment 
of  the  surplus  remaining  after  the  interest  to  the  cred- 
itors had  been  paid.  This  concession  was  of  real  value 
to  both  Great  Britain  and  Egypt,  and  was  in  no  way 
prejudicial  to  the  financial  interests  of  the  French  and 
Russian  investors.    In  other  respects  the  conditions 

43  Doc.  Dip.,  "Accords  entre  la  France  et  l'Angleterre,"  No.  1. 

■**  For  text  of  the  entire  agreement  see  Doc.  Dip.,  "Accords  entre 
la  France  et  l'Angleterre,"  No.  2;  or  Pari.  Papers  1905,  Vol.  103 
(cd2384)  ;  for  detailed  discussion  see  Ren6  Moulin,  "Une  Annee  de 
Politique  Exteneure,"  Paris,  1905,  Chap.  I;  also  Victor  Berard, 
"L'Affaire  Morocaine,"  Paris,  Chap.  III. 


118  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

remained  the  same — a  French  savant  continued  to  ex- 
ercise direction  of  the  Egyptian  antiquities,  the  French 
schools  continued  to  enjoy  the  same  liberty  as  formerly, 
all  rights  enjoyed  by  the  French  through  treaties,  con- 
ventions, and  customs,  including  the  privilege  of  en- 
gaging in  the  coasting  trade  between  Egyptian  ports, 
were  to  be  respected,  liberty  of  commerce  was  guaran- 
teed for  thirty  years  with  privilege  of  renewal,  and 
finally,  Great  Britain  promised  to  adhere  to  the  stipula- 
tions of  the  Treaty  of  1888  relative  to  the  neutrality  of 
the  Suez  Canal. 

In  return,  Great  Britain  agreed  not  to  interfere  with 
the  action  of  France  in  Morocco,  recognizing  that  it 
belonged  to  France  as  a  nation  whose  dominions  are 
coterminous  for  a  great  distance  with  those  of  Mo- 
rocco to  keep  the  peace  there,  and  to  lend  its  assistance 
in  bringing  about  such  administrative,  economic,  finan- 
cial, and  military  reforms  as  should  prove  necessary. 
France  also  declared  she  had  no  intention  of  changing 
the  political  status  of  the  country,  and  the  clause  in- 
suring commercial  liberty  for  thirty  years  was  in- 
serted. In  order  to  assure  the  free  passage  of  the 
Straits  of  Gibraltar,  it  was  agreed  not  to  erect  forti- 
fications on  the  coast  of  Morocco  between  Melilla  and 
the  heights  of  dominating  the  right  bank  of  the  Sebu, 
although  this  clause  should  not  apply  to  the  points  ac- 
tually held  by  Spain  on  the  Moroccan  shore  of  the  Med- 
iterranean. Provision  was  also  made,  considering  the 
geographical  position  of  Spain  and  its  interests  on 
the  Moroccan  coast  of  the  Mediterranean,  that  France 
should  come  to  an  understanding  with  Spain  and  com- 
municate this  accord  when  made  to  Great  Britain.    The 


THE  ENTENTE  CORDIALE  119 

last  article  provided  that  the  two  governments  should 
afford  each  other  their  diplomatic  support  to  secure 
the  execution  of  this  declaration  relative  to  Egypt  and 
Morocco. 

This  was  the  declaration  as  published,  but  in  reality 
there  were  five  more  articles  which  were  kept  secret 
until  1911,  when  the  crisis  of  Agadir  brought  about 
their  publication.  The  first  of  these  secret  articles 
provided  that  in  case  either  government  found  them- 
selves constrained  to  modify  their  policy  in  respect 
to  Egypt  or  Morocco,  the  economic,  commercial,  and 
strategical  engagements  as  provided  for  in  the  open 
declaration  should  remain  intact.  The  second  de- 
clared that  Great  Britain  had  no  present  intention  of 
making  any  changes  in  the  capitulations  or  judicial 
organization  of  Egypt,  but  provided  that  if  it  should 
be  considered  desirable,  France  would  not  refuse  to 
entertain  such  proposals,  on  the  understanding  that 
Great  Britain  would  entertain  similar  proposals  on 
the  part  of  France  regarding  Morocco.  The  third 
article  definitely  specified  that  part  of  Morocco  which 
should  come  under  Spanish  influence  if  the  Sultan 
should  cease  to  exercise  authority  over  it.  This  ces- 
sion was  to  include  the  territory  adjacent  to  Melilla, 
Ceuta,  and  other  presidios  as  far  as,  but  not  including, 
the  bank  of  the  Sebu.  Spain  however  must  undertake 
not  to  alienate  the  whole  or  a  part  of  the  territories 
placed  under  her  jurisdiction.  The  next  article  pro- 
vided that  even  if  Spain  declined  to  enter  into  the  ar- 
rangement, it  was  none  the  less  binding  upon  Great 
Britain  and  France;  and  the  last  was  merely  a  refer- 
ence to  the  terms  of  the  repayment  of  the  Egyptian 


120  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

debt  in  case  the  other  powers  refused  to  accept  the  ar- 
rangements. In  other  words,  Great  Britain  was  will- 
ing that  France  should  exercise  a  protectorate  over 
Morocco  upon  three  conditions:  the  principle  of  com- 
mercial liberty  must  be  guaranteed;  Spain,  a  weak 
power  must  control  all  the  territory  facing  the  Straits 
of  Gibraltar,  thus  protecting  Great  Britain's  entrance 
to  the  Mediterranean ;  and  finally  France  must  permit  a 
British  protectorate  over  Egypt  whenever  Great  Brit- 
ain deemed  such  a  change  desirable.  A  perfectly  fair 
arrangement  as  far  as  Great  Britain  and  France  were 
concerned  and  even  Spain's  legitimate  interests  were 
safeguarded.  However,  Spain  might  prefer  to  be  con- 
sulted in  advance,  the  Sultan  might  object  to  even  the 
possibility  of  a  protectorate,  and  Germany  might 
imagine  that  her  interests  were  being  jeopardized;  so 
it  was  decided  inexpedient  to  publish  these  articles 
with  the  rest  of  the  declaration.45 

The  published  declaration  was  subject  to  consider- 
able criticism  in  France,  on  the  ground  that  although 
Great  Britain  by  the  arrangement  practically  came  into 
possession  of  Egypt,  France  still  had  Morocco  to  ac- 
quire. As  M.  Paul  Doumer,  Chairman  of  the  Budget 
Committee  of  the  Chamber  put  it :  "France  has  given 
a  draft  payable  at  sight  and  has  received  one  which 
cannot  be  cashed  till  it  matures."46  Neither  could 
France  give  up  without  regret  the  historic  land  of 
the  Pharaoh.  "Egypt!  How  many  glorious  souv- 
enirs this  name  evokes  in  us,  from  Saint  Louis  to  Riche- 
lieu, from  Richelieu  to  Bonaparte,  from  Bonaparte  to 

«Text  of  Secret  Articles:  Pari.  Papers,  1911,  Vol.  103  (cd5969). 
«•  "The  Anglo-French  Agreement,"  National  Review,  June,  1904. 


THE  ENTENTE  COEDIALE  121 

Ferdinand  de  Lesseps !  Egypt,  this  ancestress  of  na- 
tions which  the  great  Mehemet  Ali  called  'the  little 
sister  of  France'  .  .  ,"47  But  as  another  writer  put 
it:  "a  policy  is  not  determined  by  sentiments  and 
souvenirs,  but  by  material  and  brutal  facts."  48  Great 
Britain  had  fought  one  war  to  obtain  her  claim,  and 
had  shown  herself  ready,  if  need  be,  to  fight  another 
to  maintain  it.  Even  M.  Bene  Millet,  a  consistent  critic 
of  the  policy  of  M.  Delcasse,  conceded  that  it  was  not 
the  fault  of  a  general,  if  mistakes  made  twenty-five 
years  ago  made  a  retreat  inevitable — "  there  only  re- 
mained to  us  on  the  banks  of  the  Nile  a  broken  sword, 
or  to  be  more  exact  a  magnificent  saber  of  wood,  since 
it  has  never  been  of  any  use.  ...  In  exchanging  this 
outworn  object  for  freedom  of  action  in  Morocco  we 
have  made  a  good  bargain.  .  .  ."  49 

The  second  declaration,  relative  to  Siam,  Madagas- 
car, and  the  New  Hebrides,  was  the  least  important  of 
the  three  arrangements,  and  provoked  the  least  dis- 
cussion, but  it  was  to  the  advantage  of  both  nations  to 
minister  to  those  sore  places  which  were  so  likely  to 
produce  serious  troubles  if  they  were  not  given  treat- 
ment. The  agreement  concerning  Siam  was  simply  a 
continuation  and  a  completion  of  the  Declaration  of 
January  15,  1896.  France  conceded  to  Great  Britain 
freedom  of  action  to  the  west  of  the  valley  of  the 
Menam,  and  received  like  freedom  of  action  in  the  east, 
thus  creating  the  Menam  Valley  as  a  sort  of  buffer  state 

*7  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  74i,  p.  242. 

48  Rene  Goblet,  "L'Arrangement  Franco-Anglais,"  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari., 
May,  1904. 

4»  Rene"  Millet,  "La  Lutte  Pacifique  entre  la  France  et  l'Angleterre," 
Revue  de  Deux  Mondes,  June  15,  1904;  also  appears  as  Chap.  V  in  his 
volume,  "Notre  Politique  Exterieure,  1898-1905." 


122  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

between  the  two  spheres  of  influence.  Both  parties 
while  putting  aside  any  idea  of  annexing  Siamese  ter- 
ritory or  violating  existing  treaties,  reserved  for  them- 
selves complete  freedom  of  action  in  the  two  spheres 
of  influence  thus  defined.  This  clause  was  especially 
timely  for  France,  as  it  gave  her  additional  leverage 
to  force  execution  by  Siam  of  the  Treaty  of  February 
14,  1904,  now  that  Siam  could  count  no  longer  upon 
English  support.  "We  have  already  shown  the  results 
of  this  "freedom  of  action"  clause  for  France  in  the 
treaty  of  March  23, 1907.  Great  Britain  profited  by  it 
later  to  gain  a  substantial  rectification  of  frontiers  to 
her  advantage  in  the  Malay  Peninsula.50 

In  regard  to  Madagascar,  Great  Britain  conceded 
to  France  the  right  of  maintaining  the  customs  duties 
imposed  after  annexing  the  island  in  1896,  an  arrange- 
ment which  she  had  hitherto  opposed.  In  return, 
France  made  similar  concessions  to  Great  Britain  in 
Zanzibar.  In  the  New  Hebrides  both  countries  agreed 
to  prepare  an  arrangement  to  settle  the  difficulties 
arising  from  the  lack  of  jurisdiction  over  the  natives, 
and  through  the  acquisition  of  land  by  French  and 
English  nationals.  These  islands,  which  had  been 
colonized  by  French  from  New  Caledonia,  and  by  Eng- 
lish from  Australia,  had  been  under  the  general  con- 
trol of  a  mixed  naval  commission  since  1887  with  very 
unsatisfactory  results.  Although  the  accord  in  this 
case  was  merely  a  promise  to  try  to  solve  the  question, 
it  at  least  gave  promise  of  better  things.    An  arrange- 

50  Mr.  H.  A.  Gibbons  in  his  "New  Map  of  Asia,"  Cbap.  V,  gives  a 
very  clear  picture  of  the  dealings  of  the  foreign  powers  with  Siam, 
and  the  case  which  he  presents  is  a  severe  but  just  arraignment  of  their 
methods. 


THE  ENTENTE  CORDIALE  123 

ment  was  finally  arrived  at  in  February,  1906,  which 
provided  for  a  carefully  worked  out  condominium  giv- 
ing each  nation  equal  rights,  and  confirming  the  status 
quo  in  regard  to  all  property  rights  definitely  estab- 
lished in  accordance  with  the  rules  laid  down.  The 
government  was  to  consist  of  two  high  commissioners, 
one  French,  the  other  English,  who  were  to  have  a 
force  of  police  of  two  equal  sections  to  carry  out  their 
orders.  The  mixed  naval  commission  was  retained,  to 
be  called  upon  in  case  of  need  to  cooperate  in  the 
maintenance  of  order.  A  mixed  tribunal  of  three 
judges  was  also  provided  for,  each  government  naming 
one,  and  the  King  of  Spain  the  third.51  The  experi- 
ment although  interesting,  was  not  wholly  successful, 
and  came  up  again  for  readjustment  in  May,  1914,  but 
was  pushed  into  the  background  by  the  outbreak  of 
the  war.52 

The  convention  concerning  Newfoundland  and 
Africa  was  the  one  which  provoked  the  greatest  hos- 
tility in  France,  because  by  this  convention  France 
was  surrendering  very  definite  valuable  rights,  dating 
back  to  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  over  a  long  stretch  of 
coast,  valuable  both  as  a  fishing  ground,  and  as  a  train- 
ing school  for  future  entrance  into  the  French  navy 
and  merchant  marine,  for  certain  territories  in  Africa 
whose  value  seemed  of  a  very  problematical  sort.  This 
question  had  long  been  a  thorny  one.     The  Treaty  of 

si  For  a  detailed  description  of  the  condominium  see  the  article  by 
H.  Berth£l6my,  "Convention  Franco-Anglaise  relative  aux  Nouvellea 
Hebrides,"  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  Feb.  1907. 

62  M.  Robt.  de  Caix  brings  the  subject  up  to  this  point  in  his  article 
appearing  in  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.,  June  16,  1914,  entitled  "Question  des 
Nouvelles  Hebrides." 


124  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Utrecht,  1713,  confirmed  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  1763, 
recognized  British  possession  of  Newfoundland,  but  in 
both  cases  reservation  was  made  granting  French  fish- 
ermen the  right  to  catch  and  dry  fish  along  a  limited 
stretch  of  coast  known  as  the  French  Shore.  The 
Treaty  of  Versailles,  1783,  defined  this  territory  as  ex- 
tending from  Cape  St.  John  to  Cape  Ray,  and  stipu- 
lated that  British  subjects  should  neither  interfere 
with  the  French  fishing  here  by  their  competition,  nor 
establish  drying  places  on  the  shore.  After  a  long 
period  of  bitterness  and  ill-feeling  between  French  and 
Canadian  fishermen,  a  convention  in  1857  gave  the  ex- 
clusive right  to  fish  to  the  French.  Newfoundland, 
now  enjoying  self-government,  refused  to  execute  the 
convention,  and  a  new  convention  in  1885  suffered  a 
similar  fate.  Two  years  later  the  Newfoundland  gov- 
ernment passed  the  Bait  Bill  prohibiting  the  sale  of 
bait  to  foreigners.  Although  this  was  aimed  at  the 
French  fishermen,  it  was  equally  destructive  to  the 
Newfoundland  bait-sellers,  and  was  repealed  in  1890. 
The  same  year,  since  the  French  fishermen  were  now 
also  taking  lobsters,  the  Canadians  decided  that  lob- 
sters were  not  fish,  and  the  French  could  not  catch 
them  even  on  the  French  shore.  A  modus  vivendi  was 
with  difficulty  arranged,  and  it  was  this  temporary  and 
unsatisfactory  solution  which  still  held.53 

The  Convention  of  April  8, 1904,  settled  the  difficulty 
decisively  by  taking  away  the  exclusive  privileges 
which  the  French  possessed  on  the  French  shore,  and 
putting  the  French  fishermen  upon  an  equality  with  the 

63  A  very  clear  outline  of  this  whole  controversy  is  given  by  "A  Dip- 
lomat" in  the  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  April,  1899,  under  the  title,  "La  Ques- 
tion de  Terre  Neuve." 


THE  ENTENTE  COEDIALE  125 

British,  both  in  taking  fish  and  crustaceous  animals. 
Thus  although  France  gave  up  the  right  of  drying 
fish,  their  fishing  rights  in  the  territorial  waters  re- 
mained intact,  and  the  right  included  the  catching  of 
lobsters  as  well  as  fish.  They  were  also  guaranteed 
the  right  to  obtain  supplies  or  bait  on  the  same  condi- 
tions as  the  inhabitants  of  Newfoundland.  Article  III 
provided  that  any  French  citizens  obliged  either  to 
abandon  their  establishments  on  the  French  shore,  or 
to  give  up  their  occupation  because  of  this  convention, 
should  be  awarded  a  pecuniary  indemnity.  "Thus," 
as  M.  Delcasse  explained  in  his  Depeche  aux  ambas- 
sadeurs,  "in  order  to  avoid  the  risk  of  conflicts  which 
threatened  to  become  serious,  we  only  abandon  in  New- 
foundland privileges  defended  with  difficulty,  and  in 
no  way  necessary,  since  we  preserve  the  essential  thing, 
that  is  the  right  to  fish  in  the  territorial  waters,  and 
in  addition  we  guarantee  for  the  future  the  precious 
right  of  either  fishing  for  bait  or  buying  it  freely 
throughout  the  whole  extent  of  the  French  shore. ' ' 

As  additional  compensation  for  the  surrender  of  her 
privilege  on  the  French  shore,  France  received  cer- 
tain territorial  concessions  in  Africa.  In  French  West 
Africa  the  frontier  between  Senegambia  and  the  Brit- 
ish colony  of  Gambia,  was  so  modified  as  to  give  to 
France  Yarbutenda,  thus  allowing  France  an  approach 
by  water  to  her  territories  drained  by  the  Upper  Gam- 
bia which  is  not  navigable.  This  concession  was  of 
considerable  economic  importance  in  the  future  de- 
velopment of  Southern  Senegal.  Great  Britain  also 
ceded  to  France  the  group  known  as  the  lies  de  Los 
commanding  the  city  of  Konakry,  the  flourishing  capi- 


126  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

tal  of  French  Guinea.  These  islands  although  very 
small,64  and  worthless  from  a  commercial  viewpoint, 
possessed  considerable  strategic  importance,  since  they 
provided  all  the  necessary  requirements  for  a  strong 
naval  base.  "With  these  islands  in  the  hands  of  a  for- 
eign power,  Konakry  was  utterly  defenseless.  Finally, 
and  this  arrangement  was  of  the  utmost  importance 
to  France,  a  rectification  was  made  in  the  frontier  be- 
tween Nigeria  and  the  Sudan,  giving  France  a  prac- 
ticable route  from  the  Niger  to  Lake  Chad.  The 
Declaration  of  August  5,  1890,  had  limited  the  South- 
ern border  of  the  French  sphere  of  influence  to  a  line 
between  Say  on  the  Niger,  and  Barroua  on  Lake  Chad. 
The  Convention  of  June  14,  1898,  which  aimed  to  give 
France  a  route  between  the  two  points  with  Linder  as 
the  central  point  was  disastrous  for  France.  After 
two  years  spent  in  exploring  all  possible  roads  between 
Say  and  Linder  on  the  one  side,  and  Linder  and  Bar- 
roua on  the  other,  France  realized  that  Great  Britain 
had  indeed  given  her  "the  sand  and  the  bush  and  the 
waterless  wastes."  France  must  either  obtain  a  rec- 
tification of  the  frontier  or  give  up  Linder  and  all  hopes 
of  a  road  connecting  the  Niger  with  Lake  Chad.65  The 
Convention  of  1904,  in  addition  to  giving  France  a 
considerable  increase  in  territory  at  the  expense  of 
Nigeria,  gave  her  a  practicable  route  between  the  Niger 

s*  In  the  discussion  in  the  Chamber,  Nov.  7,  1904,  M.  Suchetet  ob- 
served for  the  benefit  of  his  colleagues,  lest  they  might  think  that  M. 
Delcasse"  was  speaking  of  small  continents,  that  the  largest  of  the 
islands  was  less  than  two  miles  square.  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol. 
74i,  p.  325. 

65  M.  Eugene  Etienne  exposes  the  French  side  of  these  questions 
in  a  very  able  fashion  in  his  article:  "Colonial  Litigations  Between 
France  and  England,"  National  Review,  July  1,  1903. 


THE  ENTENTE  CORDIALE  127 

and  Lake  Chad  which  had  already  been  explored  and 
proved  entirely  satisfactory.  "Thus  thanks  to  a  mu- 
tual good  will  we  have  succeeded  in  settling  the  various 
questions  which  too  long  have  weighed  upon  the  rela- 
tions between  France  and  England."56  M.  Delcasse 
had  successfully  completed  his  great  work ;  the  Entente 
Cordiale  had  taken  its  place  beside  the  Dual  Alliance, 
and  the  weakened  Triple  Alliance  could  with  difficulty 
maintain  the  European  balance  of  power. 

3.     THE  RATIFICATION  OP  THE  FRANCO-BRITISH  ACCORD 

On  the  whole  the  arrangement  was  received  with 
greater  cordiality  and  less  criticism  in  England  than 
in  France.  When  it  came  up  for  a  vote  in  the  House 
of  Commons  it  passed  unanimously,  and  Mr.  Balfour 
voiced  the  general  opinion  when  he  declared  that  "this 
great  instrument  will  be  looked  back  upon  as  the  be- 
ginning of  a  new  and  happier  era  in  our  international 
relations. ' ' 57  Sir  Edward  Grey  declared  that  the  im- 
portant part  of  the  agreement  was  the  spirit  of  good 
will  upon  which  it  reposed.  He  also  pointed  out  that 
Article  9  of  the  Declaration  regarding  Egypt  and 
Morocco,  in  which  the  two  governments  agreed  to  af- 
ford one  another  their  diplomatic  support,  in  order  to 
obtain  the  execution  of  the  present  declaration,  was  so 
vaguely  worded  that  great  opportunities  were  given 
to  the  two  countries  of  drawing  closer  to  each  other. 
In  conclusion,  he  declared  that  the  agreement  arrived 
at  was  so  simple  that  the  question  might  naturally  be 
asked — why  has  it  not  been  arrived  at  before!  58    The 

56  M.  Delcasse'  in  "Dgpeche  aux  Ambassadors,"  op.  cit.,  supra. 

"Pari.  Debates,  Vol.  135   (fourth  series),  p.  575. 

ss  Ibid.,  p.  516.    Mr.  Gibson  Bowles  who  also  believed  it  well  that 


128  FEENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

opinion  of  the  Press  was  well  expressed  by  Dr.  E.  J. 
Dillon :  "All  friends  of  peace  and  civilization  will  hail 
with  joy  the  Anglo-French  Convention  which  has 
drawn  the  sponge  over  some  of  the  most  irritating  sub- 
jects of  dispute  between  the  two  nations  of  Europe 
whose  desire  for  peaceful  progress  is  strongest  and 
most  sincere. ' ' 59 

Across  the  Channel,  although  the  prevailing  note 
was  one  of  approval,  yet  some  voices  were  raised  in  bit- 
ter opposition.  M.  Rene  Millet  saw  in  the  arrange- 
ment the  last  lap  of  what  one  might  call  the  policy  of 
liquidation,  and  although  France  might  be  cutting  a 
fine  figure  in  Europe  it  was  at  the  expense  of  her 
patrimony.  He  preferred  a  policy  of  a  Gambetta  or 
a  Ferry  to  that  of  a  Delcasse.60  The  political  enemies 
of  M.  Delcasse  were  still  more  harsh.  In  a  little  vol- 
ume entitled  "Le  conflit  Franco- Allemand, ' '  two  mem- 
bers of  the  Chamber  were  almost  abusive  in  their  de- 
nunciations: "M.  d'Estournelles  de  Constant  is  not 
the  most  dangerous  of  the  pacifists.  The  most  danger- 
ous is  M.  Delcasse  with  his  policy  of  culpable  credulity, 
foolish  illusions,  and  vain  mirages."61  However,  it 
remained  for  M.  Archdeacon  in  the  Chamber,  to  give 
the  arrangement  its  most  bitter  characterization: 
"this  is  the  worst  treaty  that  France  has  signed  since 

England  and  France  should  stand  together,  waxed  somewhat  sarcastic 
at  the  provisions  of  the  agreement:  "The  dispute  between  England  and 
France  was  not  how  little  they  could  concede  to  one  another;  no,  it 
was  how  much  belonging  to  somebody  else  they  could  concede  to  one 
another."     Ibid.,  p.  524. 

69  "Our  Friends,  Our  Allies,  Our  Rivals,"  Contemporary  Review, 
May,  1904. 

eo  "La  Politique  de  Liquidation,"  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  Nov.  1904. 

«i  Guibert  et  Ferrette,  "Le  Conflit  Franco-allemand  en  1905,"  p.  50. 


THE  ENTENTE  CORDIALE  129 

the  one  by  which  Louis  XV  consecrated  the  abandon- 
ment of  India  and  of  Canada  to  the  English."  62 

Happily  these  voices  were  in  the  minority.  M.  le 
comte  de  Castellane  in  the  ' '  Gaulois, ' '  M.  de  Coubertin 
in  the  "Figaro,"  M.  Humbert  in  the  "Eclair,"  M.  Rene 
Henry  in  the  "Republique  Francaise,"  M.  Andre  Tar- 
dieu  in  "le  Temps,"  all  were  able  to  echo  the  sentiment 
of  M.  Ebray  in  the  "Journal  des  Debats,"  in  declaring 
that  "France  surrenders  nothing  of  importance  but  ob- 
tains most  momentous  concessions. ' ' 63  When  the  Con- 
vention came  up  for  discussion  in  the  Chamber,  al- 
though strong  criticism  was  directed  at  some  parts, 
especially  that  part  of  the  agreement  relating  to  New- 
foundland, the  sentiment  was  for  the  most  part  friendly. 
M.  Deloncle,  who  regretted  so  keenly  the  loss  of  Egypt, 
conceded  that  the  happy  results  were  of  such  a  nature 
as  to  make  one  forget  the  bitterness  of  the  painful  sac- 
rifices necessary  to  their  attainment.64  M.  Etienne, 
whose  authority  on  colonial  matters  was  unquestioned 
in  the  Chamber,  discussed  the  arrangements  at  great 
length,  and  pointing  out  that  Egypt  had  been  lost  for 
twenty-two  years,  he  declared  that  not  a  single  French 
statesman  would  be  willing  to  ask  of  England  that  she 
withdraw  from  there.  He  considered  the  cession  of 
the  islands  of  Los  a  real  advantage  to  France,  and  de- 
clared that  the  right  of  landing  on  the  Gambia  River, 
and  the  new  delimitation  of  frontiers  between  Senegal 
and  Nigeria,  both  gave  great  satisfaction.    In  conclu- 

62  Annates  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  74i,  p.  242. 

63  M.  G.  L.  Jaray  gives  a  full  summary  of  the  sentiments  expressed 
in  England  and  France  in  his  article,  "L' Accord  entre  la  France  et 
l'Angleterre,"  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.,  Nov.  16,  1904. 

«*  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  74i,  p.  242. 


130  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

sion,  he  asserted  that  the  arrangement  procured  France 
very  appreciable  advantages  for  the  present,  but  even 
greater  might  be  hoped  for  the  future.65  M.  de  Pres- 
sense  pointed  out  that  although  France  had  very  defi- 
nite rights  in  Newfoundland  conceded  by  former 
treaties,  the  population  had  increased  from  some  five 
or  six  thousand  inhabitants  to  over  two  hundred  thou- 
sand, and  it  was  hardly  possible  to  keep  such  a  number 
"pressed  in  the  strait  jacket  of  the  diplomacy  of  former 
centuries.' '  As  for  Egypt,  no  magic  wand  would 
bring  back  the  conditions  of  1879,  and  it  was  hardly 
fitting  for  a  great  nation  like  France  to  remain  in  an 
attitude  of  pouting.66  M.  Denys  Cochin  considered  it 
"a  treaty  made  for  peace,  a  rapprochement  in  which 
we  renounce  what  has  been  called  a  *  policy  of  pin 
pricks'  although  all  the  pin  pricks  didn't  come  from 
this  side  of  the  Channel. ' ' 67  Even  before  M.  Delcasse 
arose  to  speak  in  behalf  of  the  arrangement,  it  was 
clear  that  it  would  have  little  difficulty  in  passing.  His 
presentation  of  the  real  advantages  that  France  would 
gain  was  clear  and  convincing.  As  the  Convention 
concerning  Newfoundland  seemed  to  be  the  principal 
stumbling  block,  he  was  especially  careful  to  make  it 
clear  that  France  still  retained  the  right  to  fish  there, 
all  that  she  surrendered  was  the  drying  privilege  on 
the  shore,  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  most  of  that  in  recent 
years  had  been  carried  on  at  St.  Pierre  and  Miquelon, 
or  in  France.  In  1903  only  five  fishing  stations  out  of 
two  hundred  and  eight  had  been  in  use  on  the  French 
shore;  while  the  population  of  Newfoundland  had  in- 

es  Ibid.,  p.  346. 
6«  Ibid.,  p.  388. 
"Ibid.,  p..  393. 


THE  ENTENTE  CORDIALE  131 

creased  forty-two  times,  the  French  fisherman  had 
almost  deserted  this  coast.  In  Egypt  he  showed  that 
bond  holders'  interests  had  been  carefully  guarded, 
commercial  liberty  guaranteed,  French  schools  and  in- 
stitutions protected,  and  in  return  for  an  attitude  bien- 
veillante  in  Egypt,  England  had  given  way  to  France 
in  Morocco,  the  keystone  of  the  French  African  em- 
pire. In  conclusion  he  declared:  "the  convention  is 
equally  advantageous  to  the  two  nations,  in  that  each 
one  of  them  obtains  satisfaction  upon  the  points  which 
concern  them  most.  And  it  is  very  fortunate  that  it 
should  be  thus,  since  this  arrangement  instead  of  being 
a  nest  for  quarrels,  has  had  for  its  object  the  intent  to 
wipe  away  everything  which  might  counterbalance  the 
superior  reasons  and  powerful  interests  which  com- 
mand England  and  France  to  live  in  confidence  and  in 
good  understanding. ' ' 68 

M.  Delcasse  had  won  his  case,  the  Convention  con- 
cerning Newfoundland  and  Africa  passed  443  to  105, 
the  agreement  as  a  whole  passing  436  to  94,  although 
M.  Delcasse  accepted  the  ordre  du  jour  of  M.  Paul 
Deschanel  which  looked  to  early  negotiations  with  the 
British  government  regarding  certain  changes  to  be 
made  in  the  clauses  relating  to  Newfoundland.  The 
two  great  democratic  nations  of  Europe  had  joined 
hands  across  the  Channel,  the  hatchet  of  colonial  riv- 
alry had  been  buried,  and  France  was  given  free  hand 
to  proceed  in  Morocco  with  no  further  interference 
from  Great  Britain.  There  still  remained  a  settle- 
ment to  be  made  with  Spain,  and  although  France  did 
not  yet  seem  to  realize  it,  a  still  more  serious  one  with 

es  Ibid.,  p.  404. 


132  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Germany.  However,  these  were  problems  for  the  fu- 
ture, a  more  urgent  one  of  the  present  had  already 
forced  itself  upon  the  attention  of  the  two  powers. 

4.  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR 

Dark  clouds  had  long  been  gathering  in  the  Eastern 
sky  betokening  a  storm  in  the  Orient.  The  Slavic 
Goliath  was  already  girding  up  his  loins  to  conquer  the 
Mongolian  David,  when  his  smaller  opponent  had 
struck  and  had  struck  hard.  The  important  question 
was  whether  the  struggle  would  remain  a  duel  between 
the  two,  or  whether  the  allies  of  each  would  be  drawn 
in.  The  rapprochement  between  Great  Britain  and 
France  had  already  advanced  so  far,  that  it  was  evi- 
dent that  neither  would  find  a  casus  foederis  unless  it 
was  forced  upon  their  attention.  Besides,  the  en- 
trance of  one  would  be  followed  immediately  by  the 
entrance  of  the  other,  thus  neutralizing  their  respective 
efforts.  Another  factor  which  tended  to  keep  France 
neutral  was  the  influence  of  M.  Jaures  and  the  Socialist 
party,  whose  attitude  had  been  consistently  hostile  to 
the  Dual  Alliance,  in  so  far  as  it  necessitated  involving 
France  in  the  imperialistic  schemes  of  her  ally  in  the 
Far  East.  M.  Jaures  had  made  his  sentiments  known 
all  over  Europe  in  the  famous  letter  which  he  wrote  to 
M.  Andrea  Costa,  President  of  the  Italian  Socialist 
Congress,  in  which  he  expressed  his  approval  of  the 
Triple  Alliance  as  a  "  contre-poids  necessaire  a  notre 
chauvinisme  et  aux  fantaisies  franco-russes."  69  In 
order  that  it  might  be  known  that  his  opinions  had 
not  changed,  directly  upon  the  outbreak  of  the  Russo- 

«»  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  Oct.  1902. 


THE  ENTENTE  CORDIALE  133 

Japanese  War,  he  published  an  article  in  the  "  Revue 
Socialiste, ' '  urging  France  to  do  nothing  which  might 
provoke  either  England  or  Japan,  and  as  soon  as  the 
trouble  should  be  over,  "to  relax  the  bonds  of  an  ex- 
clusive and  imprudent  alliance  which  has  ceased  to  be 
a  safeguard,  if  it  ever  has  been  one,  and  has  now  be- 
come a  danger  and  a  menace. ' ' 70 

Under  these  circumstances  France  which  as  a  whole 
still  stood  firmly  by  the  alliance  was  somewhat  dubious 
over  the  reception  which  Russian  public  opinion  would 
give  to  the  news  of  the  entente  with  England.  As 
might  have  been  expected  it  did  not  provoke  any  en- 
thusiasm. The  "Novoie  Vremia,,,  one  of  the  most 
influential  organs,  declared  that  a  glacial  breath  had 
crossed  the  atmosphere  of  the  Franco-Russian  rela- 
tions.71 However,  it  was  very  soon  evident  that 
officially  Russia  intended  to  accept  the  agreement.  In 
a  long  interview  given  to  M.  Tardieu,  as  a  representa- 
tive of  "Le  Temps,"  M.  Nelidof,  Russian  ambassador 
at  Paris,  declared  that  the  happy  outcome  of  the 
negotiations  would  provoke  keen  satisfaction  in  St. 

to  Je  veux  bien  que  la  diplomatie  francaise  ne  se  degage  pas  brutale- 
ment  d'une  politique  ou  elle  est  £tourdiment  engagee.  Je  veux  bien 
qu'elle  continue  a  prater  a  la  Russie  pour  le  reglement  du  conflit  sea 
bons  offices,  mais  du  moins  ne  faisons  rien  qui  provoque  le  Japon,  ne 
faisons  rien  que  provoque  l'Angleterre,  et  lorsque  cette  tourmente  sera 
passed  nous  pourrons  peu  a  peu  relficher  les  liens  d'une  alliance 
exclusive  et  imprudente,  qui  a  cessS  d'entre  une  sauvegarde,  si  elle 
l'a  jamais  et§,  pour  devenir  un  danger  et  un  menace."  Rev.  Socialiste, 
Marcb,  1904. 

M.  Allard  went  even  further.  Speaking  in  the  Chamber,  January  27, 
1905,  he  declared:  "I  have  been  astonished  that  any  one  has  dared 
to  speak  again  before  a  French  parliament  of  an  alliance  or  any  sort 
of  relations  with  a  government  of  assassins."  He  was  supported  by 
M.  Jaures  and  other  members  of  his  party  and  M.  Delcasse"  was  barely 
able  to  make  his  protests  heard.     Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol-  75i,  p.  91. 

7i  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  June,  1904. 


134  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Petersburg.  They  rejoiced  first  because  the  arrange- 
ment freed  France  from  certain  difficulties,  "and, 
then,"  added  the  ambassador  smiling,  "is  there  not 
a  proverb  which  says:  'The  friends  of  our  friends 
become  our  friends'?  Who  knows  if  once  more  it  may 
not  be  verified?"72 

Three  years  later  his  joking  inference  became  an 
established  reality,  but  not  before  the  two  countries 
came  to  the  very  brink  of  war  over  the  Dogger  Bank 
affair ;  and  they  were  only  saved  from  this  catastrophe 
by  the  prompt  intervention  of  France,  who  urged  that 
the  facts  be  determined  by  a  Commission  of  Inquest 
in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  the  Hague  Conference. 
An  agreement  was  finally  signed,  November  25,  by 
Count  Lamsdorff  and  Sir  Charles  Hardinge,  stating 
that  comformably  to  Articles  IX  to  XIV  of  the  Hague 
Convention  for  the  Pacific  Settlement  of  International 
Disputes,  a  commission  of  five  should  be  entrusted  with 
elucidating  the  facts  connected  with  the  incident  by 
means  of  an  impartial  and  conscientious  investiga- 
tion.73 

A  very  interesting  example  of  the  tortuous  ways  of 
secret  diplomacy  may  be  cited  in  connection  with  the 
choosing  of  the  commission.  In  accordance  with 
Article  I  of  the  formal  agreement,  two  of  the  members 
of  the  commission  were  to  be  officers  of  high  rank  in 
the  British  and  Russian  navies,  France  and  the  United 
States  were  each  to  designate  one  of  their  high  naval 
officers,  and  these  four  together  to  decide  upon  the 

72  Andre-  Tardieu,  "Questions  Diplomatiques  de  l'Annee,  1904,"  p.  31. 

73  A  clear  and  comprehensive  account  of  the  Dogger  Bank  Affair  may 
be  found  in  Stowell  and  Munro,  "International  Cases,"  Vol.  I,  pp.  98- 
106. 


THE  ENTENTE  CORDIALE  135 

fifth  member,  but  failing  to  agree,  the  choice  was  to 
be  made  by  the  Emperor  of  Austria.  The  Kaiser 
was  very  anxious  that  a  German  naval  officer  should 
be  chosen  for  the  fifth  member.  As  such  an  arrange- 
ment would  have  been  very  satisfactory  to  Russia,  and 
the  United  States  would  have  no  reason  to  object,  it 
would  only  be  necessary  to  secure  the  adhesion  of 
France.  The  Kaiser,  thereupon,  became  very  prodigal 
of  his  favors  towards  France,  but  in  vain,  for  in  the 
very  first  meeting  of  the  admirals,  they  decided  to  ask 
the  Emperor  of  Austria  to  make  a  choice  as  was  pro- 
vided for  in  the  agreement.  Vice-Admiral  Fournier 
attributes  to  this  incident  the  beginning  of  the  hostility 
which  the  Kaiser  came  to  feel  towards  M.  Delcasse, 
attributing  to  him  the  failure  of  his  little  scheme.74 

The  report  of  the  International  Commission  showed 
that  Admiral  Rodjestvensky  was  wholly  unjustified  in 
firing  upon  the  English  fishing  boats,  and  as  Russia  had 

i*  Vice- Admiral  Fournier,  who  was  the  French  member  of  the  com- 
mission, recounts  this  incident  in  his  book,  "La  Politique  Navale,"  pp. 
42-46.  In  the  Willy-Nicky  Correspondence  further  light  is  thrown 
upon  the  Kaiser's  diplomacy  during  the  Russo-Japanese  war.  In  No. 
13,  Oct.  27,  the  Kaiser  suggests  that  Germany  and  Eussia  join  against 
England  if  she  refuses  to  allow  Germany  to  coal  Russian  ships.  They 
could  force  France  in  with  them  because  even  "though  Delcasse'  is  an 
Anglophile  enragS  he  will  be  wise  enough  to  understand  that  the  British 
fleet  is  utterly  unable  to  save  Paris.  In  this  way  a  powerful  combina- 
tion of  three  of  the  strongest  Continent  Powers  would  be  formed,  to 
attack  whom  the  Anglo-Japanese  group  would  think  twice  before  act- 
ing." In  No.  14  dated  Oct.  28,  the  Czar,  after  expressing  his  indigna- 
tion at  England's  conduct,  declares  that  "the  only  way,  as  you  say, 
would  be  that  Germany,  Russia  and  France  should  at  once  unite  upon 
an  arrangement  to  abolish  Anglo-Japanese  arrogance  and  insolence. 
Would  you  like  to  lay  down  and  frame  the  outlines  of  such  a  treaty 
and  let  me  know  it?  As  soon  as  accepted  by  us,  France  is  bound  to 
join  her  ally."  The  Kaiser  was  only  too  willing  to  proceed,  but  when 
he  found  that  Nicholas  was  determined  to  inform  France  before  going 
ahead,  William  decided  to  let  the  matter  drop  for  the  moment. 


136  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

already  expressed  her  regrets,  it  was  decided  that 
upon  the  payment  by  Russia  of  a  suitable  indemnity 
(£65,000)  the  incident  might  be  considered  closed.  It 
can  hardly  be  doubted  that  if  it  had  not  been  possible 
for  France,  under  the  guidance  of  M.  Delcasse,  to  use 
her  influence  as  the  true  friend  of  both  nations,  a 
European  war  might  have  resulted,  by  which  both 
Russia  and  France  would  have  been  crippled,  and 
Great  Britain  terribly  weakened.  Who  could  under- 
stand better  than  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II  the  advantages 
of  such  a  possibility  to  Germany !  The  rapprochement 
of  France  with  Italy  had  weakened  the  Triple  Alliance, 
the  entente  with  Great  Britain  had  strengthened  both 
France  and  Great  Britain,  Germany's  two  greatest 
potential  enemies,  and  within  six  months  after  its  pro- 
mulgation it  had  borne  fruit  in  the  settlement  of  the 
Dogger  Bank  Affair.  It  is  hardly  surprising  that  the 
Kaiser  decided  that  he  must  strike  at  France,  and  he 
could  best  strike  through  M.  Delcasse.75  Alea  jacta 
est,  and  the  results  were  Tangier,  Algeciras,  Agadir 
and  Serajevo. 

75  It  was  told  about  Berlin  after  the  signing  of  the  Anglo-French 
Convention  that  M.  Delcasse'  had  remarked  to  a  group  of  intimate 
friends:  "Je  viens  de  rouler  Radolin,  il  ne  me  reste  plus  qu'a  rouler 
Vempereur  d'Allemangne."  When  the  Kaiser  heard  of  the  remark  he 
replied:  "Le  marichal  Soult  avait  donn6  a  M.  Thiers,  qui  par  la  stature, 
mais  par  la  stature  seulement  6tait  Vigal  de  M.  DelcassS,  le  plaisant, 
surnom  de  Foutriquet,  et  il  avait  coutume  de  dire:  Foutriquet  ne  mourra 
que  d'un  coup  de  pied  .  .  .  J'en  dis  autant  de  M.  Delcass6,  et  soyez 
tranquille,  avant  un  an,  de  coup  de  pied  sera  donne"."  Guibert  et  Fer- 
rette,  op.  cit.,  p.  83. 


CHAPTER  VI 
EUROPEAN  RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO 

1.     THE    INTERNAL  CONDITION  OP  MOROCCO 

IT  will  be  remembered  that  in  the  convention  signed 
with  Great  Britain  April  8, 1904,  relating  to  Egypt 
and  Morocco,  it  had  been  agreed  that  France  should 
come  to  an  understanding  with  the  Spanish  Govern- 
ment, and  then  communicate  the  arrangement  to  Great 
Britain.  It  was  recognized  that  "the  interests  which 
that  country  derives  from  her  geographical  position, 
and  from  her  territorial  possessions  on  the  Moorish 
coast  of  the  Mediterranean,"  entitled  her  to  special 
consideration.1  In  order  to  understand  clearly  the 
agreement  entered  into  by  France  and  Spain  regard- 
ing Morocco,  as  well  as  the  events  which  followed  it, 
it  seems  advisable  at  this  point  to  give  a  brief  con- 
sideration of  Morocco  in  its  relation  to  the  great 
Powers. 

As  one  writer  has  put  it,  "Although  but  two  days' 
journey  by  sea  from  the  coast  of  Provence,  a  few  hours 
from  Gibraltar  and  from  Cadiz,  Morocco  remains  at 
the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  a  political 
anachronism,  a  remnant  of  the  Moslem  middle  ages. ' '  2 
Its  government  was  that  of  a  feudal  state,  the  Sultan 
possessing  a  nominal  authority  over  the  people  of  the 

i  Doc.  Dip.,  "Accords  entre  la  France  et  rAngleterre,"  No.  2,  Art.  VIII. 
2  Henri  Lorin,  "La  Question  du  Maroc,"  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  July,  1901. 

137 


138  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

cities,  towns,  and  plains  through  the  kaids  appointed 
by  him,  while  the  mountain  tribes  were  practically  free. 
As  the  Sultan's  revenues  depended  upon  the  amount 
of  taxes  raised  in  the  districts  under  control,  his  repu- 
tation as  a  ruler  depended  to  a  great  degree  upon 
the  success  with  which  he  protected  these  districts 
already  under  his  sovereignty  and  increased  their 
extent.  An  additional  incentive  for  him  to  try  and 
keep  the  border  tribes  in  order  was  the  knowledge  that 
if  he  was  unable  to  do  it,  the  Powers  were  always  ready 
to  assist  him  in  his  task. 

The  Powers  that  were  most  interested  in  preserving 
the  independence  of  the  Shereefian  Empire — through 
mutual  jealousy  rather  than  through  any  desire  to 
respect  the  authority  of  the  Sultan — were  France, 
Great  Britain,  Spain,  and  Germany.  Of  these,  Spain 
had  the  oldest  and  least  dangerous  claims.  After  four 
centuries  of  struggle  she  held  merely  a  few  presidios 
along  the  Mediterranean  coast,  the  two  principal  ones 
being  Ceuta  and  Melilla.  France  could  date  her  inter- 
ests back  to  1533,  when  the  Sultan  of  Fez  granted  to 
Francis  I  the  right  to  navigate  freely  upon  the  shores 
of  his  states,  and  during  the  seventeenth  century  the 
influence  of  France  in  Morocco  was  supreme.  Her  su- 
premacy in  the  Moorish  Empire  ended  in  1713,  when 
the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  gave  Gibraltar  to  the  English. 
Great  Britain  also  could  claim  an  ancient  lineage  in  her 
Moroccan  interests,  as  Charles  II  by  his  marriage  to 
Catherine  of  Braganza,  inherited  Tangier  from  Portu- 
gal in  1662.  It  was  found  to  be  a  dower  of  doubtful 
value  and  after  twenty  years'  sojourn  there,  the  Eng- 
lish found  that  they  would  be  better  off  without  it. 


EUROPEAN  RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO     139 

Napoleon  succeeded  in  reestablishing  French  influence 
in  Morocco  for  a  short  time,  but  after  Waterloo, 
English  influence  at  the  court  of  the  Sultan  reigned 
supreme.  The  French  conquest  of  Algeria,  definitely 
completed  in  1848,  only  made  the  Sultan  the  more 
wary  of  his  unwelcome  neighbors.  Last  of  all  came 
the  Germans,  their  explorers  Lenz  and  Rohlfs  in  the 
van,  ready  and  eager  to  substitute  their  trade  mark 
for  that  of  the  English.  The  Conference  of  Madrid 
in  1880  internationalized  Morocco,  and  with  the  able 
Sultan,  Mouley  Hassan  on  the  throne,  the  Powers  had 
no  further  excuse  to  intervene. 

Mouley  Hassan's  successor,  Abdul  Aziz,  who  came 
to  the  throne  in  1894,  was  a  well  meaning  and  intelli- 
gent youth,  but  wholly  inexperienced,  and  all  too  ready 
to  follow  any  advice  offered  him.  During  the  first  six 
years  of  his  reign,  his  Grand  Vizier,  Si  Ahmed,  who 
put  him  on  the  throne  as  being  more  docile  than  his 
elder  brother,  ruled  both  the  country  and  the  young 
Shereef  with  a  rod  of  iron.  At  the  death  of  his  Vizier 
in  1900,  Abdul  Aziz,  then  only  twenty-two  years  of  age, 
came  into  absolute  power.  Si  Ahmed,  in  order  to  con- 
trol more  easily  the  political  situation,  had  taught  the 
young  Sultan  that  his  only  mission  in  life  was  to  amuse 
himself.  Now  that  he  was  ruler  in  fact  as  well  as 
name,  Abdul  Aziz  proceeded  to  carry  out  this  program 
in  the  latest  European  fashion.  Telephones,  automo- 
biles, moving  pictures,  were  soon  commonplaces  at  his 
capital,  to  the  great  disgust  of  the  zealous  Moham- 
medans, who  resented  keenly  his  apparent  yielding  to 
the  cursed  inventions  of  the  Christans.  The  greater 
the  innovation  the  more  anxious  he  was  to  procure  it, 


140  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

and  always  in  large  quantities.  Miniature  railways, 
captive  balloons,  Steinway  grands  cost  money,  and 
while  the  Berbers  and  Moors  were  paying  the  bills,  a 
hated  Scottish  adventurer,  MacLean,  who  had  become 
the  young  Sultan's  chief  adviser,  was  becoming  rich 
and  powerful.3 

Even  these  innovations  and  costly  luxuries  might 
have  provoked  no  serious  difficulties  if  the  Sultan  had 
respected  the  religious  fanaticism  of  his  subjects.  As  a 
direct  descendant  from  Mohammed,  through  his  daugh- 
ter Fatima,  one  of  his  chief  duties  was  to  compel  observ- 
ance of  the  religious  laws.  In  fact  all  the  tribes  accept 
the  Sultan's  spiritual  authority  even  when  they  disre- 
gard his  temporal  rule.  They  will  pay  taxes  only  if  he  is 
strong  enough  to  make  them,  but  they  will  rally  to  his 
call  as  Commander  of  the  Faithful  to  carry  on  a  djehad, 
or  Holy  War,  with  a  zeal  and  ardor  which  leaves  noth- 
ing to  be  desired.4  But  the  young  Sultan  seemed 
wholly  oblivious  of  the  hostility  he  was  provoking 
among  the  fanatical  Berbers.  His  first  fundamental 
mistake  was  in  attempting  to  make  a  change  in  the 
levy  and  collection  of  the  taxes — a  much  needed  reform 
it  is  true — but  going  counter  to  the  ancient  customs  of 

s  Rene"  Pinon  in  his  "L'Empire  de  la  Mediterranee,"  Chap.  Ill,  gives 
a  vivid  picture  of  the  young  Sultan  and  his  surroundings.  A  pathetic 
touch  is  given  by  the  young  Sultan's  excuse  for  his.  extravagance  when 
it  had  cost  him  his  throne.  "They  have  accused  me  of  buying  hundreds 
of  objects  of  which  I  had  no  need  but  how  did  I  know  .  .  .  when  I 
wished  a  piano  they  told  me  that  pianos  sold  by  the  dozen  and  I  got  a 
dozen.  Automobiles,  according  to  my  informers,  were  also  sold  by  the 
dozen  and  bicycles  by  the  hundred.  The  merchants  leagued  with  my 
ministers  have  exploited  me  shamelessly.  .  .  ."  Interview  with  Abdul 
Aziz,  quoted  in  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.,  Aug.  1,  1908. 

*  For  an  excellent  account  of  the  religious  question  in  Morocco  see 
Edmond  Doutte,  "Le  Sultanat  Marocain,"  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  Sept.,  1909. 


EUROPEAN  RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO     141 

Morocco,  and  in  direct  violation  of  the  Koran.  His 
second  was  to  allow  English  troops  to  seize  a  true 
believer  who  had  taken  refuge  in  the  inviolable  sanctu- 
ary of  the  most  holy  mosque  of  Fez,  after  having  shot 
down  a  dog  of  an  unbeliever,  a  mere  Christian  mis- 
sionary. In  a  state  like  Morocco,  where  three  fourths 
of  the  country  is  practically  independent  of  the  sove- 
reign, and  where  a  leader  is  found  for  every  passing 
discontent,  it  was  to  be  expected  that  in  a  case  like 
the  present,  some  sort  of  an  uprising  would  follow. 
All  that  was  needed  was  a  leader  and  he  quickly  ap- 
peared. A  certain  Bu-Hamara,  a  false  prophet  claim- 
ing to  be  the  older  brother  who  had  been  dispossessed 
of  his  kingdom,  started  a  revolt  against  Abdul  Aziz 
in  the  autumn  of  1902,  an  insurrection  which  finally  pro- 
voked European  intervention  and  came  little  short  of 
starting  a  European  conflagration. 

Of  the  four  countries  particularly  interested  in  Mo- 
rocco, France  had  the  strongest  reason  to  desire  its 
tranquillity.  With  her  possessions  and  spheres  of 
influence  completely  surrounding  it,  with  almost  a 
thousand  miles  of  her  Algerian  frontier  exposed  to 
the  depredations  of  its  lawless  tribes,  well  might  she 
look  with  anxiety  upon  a  serious  insurrection.  Ac- 
cording to  Article  IV  of  the  Treaty  of  Lalla-Marnia, 
signed  in  1845,  and  delimiting  the  boundaries  between 
Algeria  and  Morocco,  it  was  recognized  that  no  terri- 
torial limits  could  be  established  between  the  two 
countries  in  the  desert,  so  a  delimitation  was  made  on  a 
tribal,  rather  than  a  geographical  basis.  The  unfortu- 
nate part  of  this  method  was  that  certain  tribes  handed 
over  to  the  Sultan  of  Morocco  were  Algerian,  and  had 


142  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

their  abodes  in  territory  definitely  named  as  Algerian. 
Nor  was  there  much  hope  of  fixing  a  definite  frontier 
in  a  country  where  the  tribes  were  nomad,  and  as  the 
treaty  put  it  "la  terre  ne  se  laboure  pas."  5  On  vari- 
ous occasions  attempts  were  made  to  trace  an  exact 
frontier,  the  policing  was  difficult,  and  the  French  felt 
that  certain  spots  like  the  oasis  of  Figuig  rightfully 
belonged  within  their  sphere  of  influence.  But  noth- 
ing came  of  them,  and  M.  Etienne  could  truthfully  say : 
"Our  policy  as  regards  our  Moroccan  frontier  exhibits 
one  remarkable  character — it  furnishes  the  rare  ex- 
ample of  a  common  frontier  between  a  powerful  Eu- 
ropean state  and  a  feeble  Mussulman  state  remaining 
unchanged  after  sixty  years  of  voisinage."  6 

In  point  of  fact,  a  slight  change  had  occurred  in 
1900,  when  the  French  after  repulsing  an  attack  made 
upon  a  scientific  expedition  took  possession  of  the 
oasis  of  Twat.7  To  prevent  or  anticipate  further 
changes,  on  March  18, 1901,  M.  Revoil,  French  minister 
at  Tangier,  had  at  the  request  of  M.  Delcasse,  given  a 
warning  to  the  Shereefian  government  because  of  cer- 
tain other  attacks  which  had  been  made  on  French 
caravans  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Sahara  oases.8  ^Less 
than  a  month  later,  a  Frenchman,  M.  Pouzet  of  Oran, 
was  assassinated  on  the  Riff  coast.  On  this  occasion 
M.  Delcasse  sent  an  ultimatum  to  the  Sultan  and  two 
war-ships  to  enforce  it.9  This  seemed  to  be  rather 
strong  action  for  the  death  of  a  single  citizen,  Cape- 
ts Ren6  Pinon,  op.  cit.,  Chap.  IV,  pt.  1. 

e  "Notre  Politique  Africaine-Algerie  et  Maroc,"  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col., 
June  15,  '03. 

*  Rene  Pinon,  op.  cit.,  Chap.  V. 

s  Doc.  Dip.,  "Affaires  du  Maroc"  (1901-1905),  No.  2  annexe. 

»  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  Nos.  6,  7. 


EUROPEAN  RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO     143 

cially  since  the  Sultan  had  given  no  indication  that 
he  would  refuse  reparation.  Perhaps  the  underlying 
cause  was  the  information  that  the  Shereefian  Govern- 
ment intended  to  send  a  mission  to  London,  and  then 
have  it  proceed  to  Berlin.10  At  any  rate  at  the  arrival 
of  the  war-ship,  the  Sultan  acceded  to  all  the  demands 
made  by  the  French  Government,  and  also  authorized 
a  mission  to  proceed  to  Paris.  The  result  of  the  mis- 
sion to  London  was  a  memorandum  of  no  political  im- 
portance, while  the  one  to  Paris  produced  a  protocol 
pertaining  to  the  application  and  execution  of  the 
Treaty  of  1845. 

Taking  as  a  base  the  maintenance  of  the  integrity 
of  the  Shereefian  Empire,  and  an  improvement  in  the 
neighborly  relations,  the  two  governments  decided  to 
settle  some  of  the  difficulties  arising  from  the  untrace- 
able frontier.  The  protocol  even  went  so  far  as  to 
allow  the  Sultan  to  establish  frontier  posts  at  the 
extremity  of  the  territory  of  the  tribes  belonging  to  his 
empire,  giving  the  tribes  on  the  border  the  right  to 
choose  the  government  under  whose  authority  they 
preferred  to  roam.11  Commissions  were  to  be  sent  by 
both  governments  to  inform  the  tribes  of  the  new 
arrangement,  and  in  the  future  commissioners  were  to 
be  appointed  annually  by  each  government  to  remain 
on  the  ground  and  settle  the  disputes  which  might 
arise.12    In  his  letter  explanatory  of  the  protocol  to 

10  Ibid.,  No.  5. 

ii  M.  Victor  Bgrard  thus  characterizes  this  attempt :  "Imagine  that 
in  a  difficulty  between  Norway  and  Great  Britain  in  regard  to  the 
North  Sea,  fished  in  by  the  fishermen  of  both  countries,  it  was  decided 
to  establish  a  fixed  frontier  at  the  extremity  of  the  waves  frequented 
by  the  herrings  claimed  by  each.  .  .  ."     "L'Affaire  Marocaine,"  p.  74. 

12  For  text  see  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  20  annexe. 


144  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

M.  Saint  Rene  Taillandier,  the  new  minister  at  Tangier, 
M.  Delcasse  declared  that  by  this  treaty  France  had 
obtained  the  Algerian  boulevard  which  she  had  long 
needed.13  He  was  to  learn  that  a  boulevard  of  sand 
made  a  very  shifting  frontier. 

Early  in  1902  the  two  commissions  set  out  to  estab- 
lish the  frontier  and  to  give  notice  to  the  tribes  of  the 
new  arrangement.  The  very  day  the  commission  ar- 
rived, two  French  captains  who  happened  to  ride  out 
without  an  escort,  were  shot  down  and  stripped  by 
mountain  marauders.  The  Moroccan  government  ex- 
pressed regret  for  the  act,  but  confessed  itself  power- 
less. It  was  soon  perceived  that  if  any  satisfactory 
solution  was  to  be  reached,  French  authority  backed  by 
French  troops  must  be  added  to  the  very  nominal 
authority  exercised  by  the  Sultan.  Thereupon  two 
new  accords  were  signed,  April  20,  and  May  7,  1902, 
at  Algiers,  by  the  chiefs  of  the  two  missions,  outlining 
a  complete  program  of  political,  economic,  and  military 
collaboration  between  France  and  Morocco.14  Unfor- 
tunately this  policy  of  peaceful  penetration,  whereby 
France  by  clearly  recognizing  the  sovereignty  of  the 
Sultan  and  reinforcing  his  authority, — the  policy  out- 
lined by  M.  Revoil  and  supported  by  M.  Delcasse* — 
was  never  to  be  put  into  effect.  The  assassination  of 
the  English  missionary,  Mr.  Cooper,  followed  by  the 
summary  execution  of  his  murderers,  aroused  such 
excitement  in  the  Moroccan  capital  that  the  Sultan  felt 
it  best  to  quit  Fez.  Almost  immediately  came  news  of 
the  insurrection  near  Taza,  under  the  leadership  of 

is  Doc.  Dip.,  "Affaires  du  Maroc"  (1901-1905),  No.  21. 
i*Ibid.,  No.  27  annexe  and  No.  28  annexe. 


EUROPEAN  RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO     145 

Bu-Hamara,  "he  who  makes  a  Holy  War  in  the  name 
of  God,"  and  was  known  by  the  title  " Father  of  the 
She-Ass. ' ' 15  Morocco  had  drawn  the  attention  of 
Europe. 

2.     THE  FRANCO-SPANISH  ARRANGEMENT  OF  OCTOBER  3,  1904 

Even  now  if  France  had  come  out  openly  before  the 
Powers,  giving  notice  of  her  intention  to  respect  the 
independence  of  Morocco  while  cooperating  effectively 
with  the  Sultan  to  put  down  the  revolt,  all  might  have 
been  well.  But  M.  Delcasse  realized  well  enough  that 
the  real  solution  of  the  question  of  Morocco  lay  first 
of  all  in  Europe.  Since  the  Conference  of  Madrid  in 
1880  had  given  the  Maghreb  an  international  status, 
only  the  European  Powers  could  make  a  final  settle- 
ment. Yet  a  settlement  by  the  Powers  was  the  one 
method  which  France  was  unwilling  to  bring  about,  at 
any  rate  until  she  had  strengthened  her  position  in 
Morocco  economically  and  strategically  to  such  an  ex- 
tent that  her  interests  would  be  overwhelmingly 
superior  to  those  of  any  other  nation,  or  until  she  had 
strengthened  her  position  in  Europe  by  a  series  of 
understandings. 

M.  Delcasse  attempted  to  pursue  both  of  these 
methods  simultaneously.  After  the  arrangement  made 
with  Italy,  giving  France  a  free  hand  in  Morocco  in 
return  for  similar  treatment  for  Italy  in  Tripoli,  M. 
Delcasse  turned  towards  Spain.  Although  the  official 
documents  regarding  their  proposals  have  never  been 
published,  it  is  not  difficult  to  outline  the  negotiations. 
Realizing  that  Spain,  both  through  her  geographical 

15  Ibid.,  No.  33. 


146  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

situation  and  her  possession  of  the  presidios,  had  the 
first  right  to  consideration,  if  a  change  were  to  be  made 
in  the  status  quo  of  Morocco,  M.  Delcasse  suggested  a 
partition  of  their  respective  spheres  of  influence,  Spain 
taking  the  northern  part,  the  ancient  realm  of  Fez, 
while  France  should  have  the  ancient  realm  of  Mar- 
rakech.  The  negotiations  started  in  1901,  continued 
throughout  1902,  and  then  fell  through.  The  reasons 
given  were  that  the  Spanish  government  feared  lest 
Great  Britain  take  umbrage  at  an  arrangement  con- 
cluded without  her  participation.  M.  Paul  Cambon, 
French  ambassador  at  London,  shared  in  her  misgiv- 
ings.16 That  very  cordial  relations  still  existed  be- 
tween the  two  governments  after  the  definite  rupture 
of  negotiations  (February  1,  1903)  is  shown  by  the 
speech  in  the  Cortes,  July  17,  1903,  of  Senor  Silvela, 
whose  government  had  been  responsible  for  breaking 
off  the  negotiations.  He  declared  that  "an  intimate 
union  attaches  us  to  our  neighbor,  the  French  Republic, 
and  the  union  of  our  interests  and  our  aspirations  for 
the  conservation  of  the  status  quo  in  Morocco,  as  long 
as  it  can  materially  endure,  urges  us  to  maintain  a 
complete  friendship  and  a  harmony  of  thoughts  with 
this  country,  our  brother  by  race  and  united  by  so 
many  bonds  of  interest  and  association. ' ' 17  This 
speech  further  makes  it  clear  that  Spain  realized  that 
the  status  quo  would  not  always  endure,  and  that  Spain 

is  The  nearest  approach  to  an  official  account  of  the  negotiations  ia 
in  the  article  by  M.  Andr6  Tardieu,  "France  et  Espagne,"  Revue  de 
Deux  Mondes,  Dec.  1,  1912.  See  also:  Rene"  Millet,  "L'Accord  Franco- 
Espagnol,"  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  Nov.  1904;  "Notre  Politique  au  Maroc," 
ibid.,  July,  1904;  E.  D.  Morel,  "Morocco  in  Diplomacy,"  Chap.  IX. 

it  Quoted  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  Aug.  1903. 


EUROPEAN  RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO     147 

must  come  to  an  agreement  with  France  when  a  change 
was  made. 

Spain  had  been  given  her  opportunity,  there  still 
remained  Great  Britain  and  Germany.  There  is  no 
question  that  France  would  have  attempted  to  settle 
the  question  of  Morocco  with  Great  Britain,  whether 
an  arrangement  was  concluded  with  Spain  or  not.  It 
is  hardly  conceivable  that  M.  Delcasse  could  have  ever 
entertained  the  idea  that  the  power  which  controlled 
Gibraltar,  and  whose  trade  with  Morocco  was  consider- 
ably greater  than  any  other  power,  would  sit  by  and 
see  any  change  in  the  status  quo  without  her  consent. 
But  to  treat  with  Spain  was  a  far  easier  proposition 
than  to  treat  with  Great  Britain,  so  it  seems  perfectly 
logical  on  his  part  to  have  attempted  first  to  make  a 
settlement  with  Spain,  and  to  follow  that  by  one  with 
Great  Britain.  Finding  that  to  be  impossible,  he 
turned  towards  Great  Britain,  and  we  have  already 
seen  with  what  success. 

As  for  Germany,  who  also  had  been  a  signatory  of 
the  Treaty  of  Madrid  in  1880,  her  sole  interest  in 
Morocco  seemed  to  be  commercial,  and  even  in  that 
respect  her  interests  were  far  inferior  to  those  of 
France  and  Great  Britain.  We  have  already  indicated 
Herr  von  Billow's  attitude  with  regard  to  the  Italian 
tour  de  valse,  and  his  statement  that  Germany's  only 
interest  in  Morocco  was  the  maintenance  of  the  open 
door.  Early  in  1902  in  an  interview  with  a  corre- 
spondent of  the  ' '  Figaro ' '  he  was  even  more  explicit : 

1  'Morocco  touches  us  even  less  than  China  because 
our  interests  there  are  even  smaller.  .  .  .  We  rejoice 
that  France  and  Italy,  who  have  large  and  important 


148  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

interests  in  the  Mediterranean,  have  come  to  an  under- 
standing in  regard  to  them.  We  do  not  pursue  an 
active  policy  in  that  sea."  18 

Prince  Radolin,  German  ambassador  to  Paris,  on  the 
occasion  of  the  arrival  of  the  Moroccan  embassy  at 
Paris  in  June,  1901,  had  informed  M.  Delcasse  that 
everyone  recognized  that  France  had  a  situation  apart 
in  Morocco.19  Although  this  may  have  represented 
the  feelings  of  the  German  government  at  the  time, 
it  did  not  fairly  represent  German  public  opinion.  In 
September,  1902,  a  leading  German  newspaper  asked : 
"Why  does  not  Germany  associate  herself  in  the  work 
of  opening  Morocco  to  economic  exploitation?  .  .  . 
Seeing  that  quite  recently  Count  Biilow  has  known  how 
to  protect  in  a  just  measure  the  German  interests  in 
China,  we  hope  that  in  the  question  of  Morocco  Ger- 
many has  not  yet  said  her  last  word. ' ' 20 

Thus  it  was  that  the  insurrection  started  by  Bu- 
Hamara  in  the  autumn  of  1902,  came  at  a  most  inoppor- 
tune time  for  France.  No  satisfactory  arrangement 
had  been  reached  with  Spain,  an  arrangement  with 
Great  Britain  remained  still  in  the  offing,  and  Germany 
might  be  expected  to  look  upon  any  interference  in 
Moroccan  affairs  by  a  single  nation  as  detrimental  to 
her  commercial  rights.  Under  these  circumstances  it 
is  not  surprising  that  the  Moroccan  policy  of  France 
throughout  1903  was  vacillating  in  the  extreme. 
Starting  with  the  apparent  intention  of  supporting  the 
Sultan  in  putting  down  the  rebellion  and  of  helping 
him  out  of  his  financial  difficulties,  the  French  govern- 

isLaloy,  "La  Politique  de  Guillaume  II,"  p.  121. 

is  Doc.  Dip.,  "Affaires  du  Maroc"  (1901-1905),  No.  18. 

20  Quoted  from  Post,  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.,  Sept.  15,  1902. 


EUROPEAN  RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO     149 

ment  went  so  far  as  to  arrange  for  a  visit  to  Algeria  by 
President  Loubet.21  Thereupon  Sidi  Mohammed 
Guebbas,  Moroccan  commissioner  to  Algeria,  arranged 
to  have  the  French  President  met  at  Algiers  by  a 
special  commission.  But  when  Guebbas  suggested  that 
President  Loubet  give  a  formal  assurance  that  France 
intended  to  guarantee  the  independence  of  Morocco, 
and  to  support  the  Sultan  in  accordance  with  the 
regime  prescribed  in  the  accords  of  1902,  it  was  found 
inexpedient  to  comply.  As  M.  Victor  Berard  sums  up 
the  situation:  "the  two  friends,  France  and  Maghzen, 
are  not  yet  bound  to  each  other  by  definite  and  public 
words,  by  engagements  taken  in  the  face  of  Europe 
with  the  knowledge  and  in  the  sight  of  the  Powers ;  a 
third  when  he  comes  will  be  able  to  join  in  our  tete-a- 
tete,  and  it  is  William  II  who  will  come  to  proclaim 
himself  the  friend,  the  defender  and  the  only  faithful 
ally  of  Morocco."  22 

Then  followed  one  mistake  after  another.  M.  Revoil, 
whose  experience  was  almost  invaluable  in  the  critical 
situation,  was  allowed  to  resign.  M.  Jonnart,  the  new 
governor-general  of  Algeria,  commemorated  his  ar- 
rival by  ordering  General  O'Connor  to  bombard  the 
hsour  of  Figuig,  an  error  from  many  points  of  view. 
True  enough,  melinite  was  far  more  persuasive  than 
kind  words,  but  any  possible  advantage  gained  was 
destroyed  by  the  ill-advised  speech  of  General  O'Con- 
nor, when  he  declared  that  France  was  not  upholding 
the  authority  of  the  Sultan  as  against  the  Pretender.23 

21  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  50. 

22  Berard,  "L' Affaire  Marocaine,"  p.  90. 

23  Rene"  Pinon,  "L'Empire  de  la  Mediterranee,"  P-  75;  see  also 
Berard,  op.  cit.,  p.  91. 


150  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Yet  if  not  upholding  the  Sultan's  authority  by  what 
right  were  French  forces  fighting  on  Moorish  soil? 
Well  might  an  English  journalist  just  returned  from 
the  Sultan's  domains  assert  that  the  whole  affair  was  a 
tragi-comedy  stage-managed  by  General  O'Connor. 
Then  he  pertinently  inquired  how  France  could  explain 
the  building  of  a  railway  on  Moorish  territory  at  Beni- 
Ourif  the  southernmost  oasis  of  the  Figuig  group.24 
Instead  of  improving  conditions,  the  attack  provoked  a 
continuous  guerilla  warfare  directed  against  the  French 
by  the  tribes  of  the  Southwest.  While  M.  Delcasse  was 
declaring  that  "the  anarchy  which  now  exists  in  the 
Shereefian  Empire  should  not  be  attributed  to  the 
Shereef,  who  is  in  no  way  responsible  for  these  acts 
committed  for  the  most  part  by  natives  wholly  outside 
the  imperial  authority, "  25  M.  Jonnart  was  declaring 
that  in  his  opinion  "the  responsibility  of  the  Moroccan 
Government  is  directly  engaged  in  these  recent  inci- 
dents."26 That  conditions  were  such  that  they  could 
not  possibly  continue,  is  indicated  by  Mr.  W.  B.  Harris, 
the  "Times"  correspondent,  whose  position  at  the 
Shereefian  court  rivaled  that  of  the  Kaid  MacLean. 
After  describing  the  anarchy  existing  in  the  country, 
the  bankruptcy  of  the  government,  Mr.  Harris,  who 
had  always  been  accused  of  Franco-phobe  tendencies, 
declared  that  there  was  no  other  choice  but  this :  ' '  the 
intervention  of  France — the  only  Power  who  would 
undertake  the  task — or  a  state  of  anarchy  impossible 
to  imagine,  in  which  the  young  Sultan,  who  never  ceased 

24Bensusan,  "Great  Britain,  France  and  the  Moorish  Empire,"  Con. 
Rev.,  Nov.  1903. 
25  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  132. 
ze  Ibid.,  No.  125. 


EUROPEAN  RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO     151 

to  desire  improvement  and  reform,  would  disap- 
pear." 27  And  this  was  written  at  least  six  months  be- 
fore the  accords  between  Great  Britain  and  France 
were  signed. 

To  one  other  cause,  also,  must  be  attributed  the  lack 
of  decision  evident  in  French  policy  in  Morocco,  and 
that  was  the  opposition  of  the  Socialist  party.  While 
both  the  colonial  party  and  the  Socialists  believed  in 
a  policy  of  peaceful  penetration,  their  ideas  of  what 
constituted  peaceful  penetration  were  far  different. 
While  the  government  wished  to  support  the  Maghzen 
in  putting  down  the  insurrection,  M.  Jaures  insisted 
upon  making  agreements  with  the  various  tribes  sepa- 
rately. He  thought  that  if  the  tribes  could  be  shown 
that  France  had  no  intention  of  exploiting  them,  if  by 
the  construction  of  schools,  hospitals,  railways,  reserve 
depots  of  food  in  case  of  famine,  France  would  amelio- 
rate their  condition,  the  tribes  would  quickly  appreciate 
the  benefits  of  civilization.28  M.  Sabatier  wanted  to 
know  if  peaceful  penetration  consisted  in  constructing 
railways  and  then  being  forced  to  send  troops  to  pro- 
tect them  and  permit  their  functioning;  or  did  it  con- 
sist in  constructing  markets  and  hospitals  on  the 
Algerian  frontier,  as  France  had  been  doing  for  the 
past  sixty  years?  Either  Morocco  would  remain  a  hot- 
bed of  anarchy,  famine,  and  typhus,  utterly  lost  to 
humanity,  or  it  must  come  under  the  protection  of 
France.29 

27  W.  B.  Harris,  "England,  France  and  Morocco,"  Nat.   Rev.,  Nov. 
1903. 

28  For  a  complete  exposition  of  the  views  of  M.  Jaures  on  Moroccan 
policy  see  Rene  Moulin,  "Une  Annee  de  Politique  Exterieure,"  Chap.  II. 

29  Camille   Sabatier,   "La  Penetration   Pacifique  et  le  Maroc,"  Rev. 
Pol.  et  Pari.,  Jan.  1904. 


152  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

It  is  evident  that  the  Moroccan  policy  was  subservi- 
ent to  the  diplomatic  situation  in  Europe.  France 
proposed  to  allow  Morocco  to  stew  in  its  own  juice, 
until  the  table  in  Europe  had  been  cleared.  But  there 
was  need  of  haste,  for  Europe  could  not  endure  for- 
ever a  nuisance  on  her  very  door-yard.  What  France 
continued  to  look  upon  as  an  Algerian  question,  might 
very  rapidly  develop  into  a  question  for  Europe. 
But  with  the  signing  of  the  Accords  of  April  8,  1904, 
with  Great  Britain,  France  might  well  consider  that 
the  crucial  phase  of  the  situation  had  been  passed. 
It  still  remained  to  come  to  an  agreement  with  Spain, 
also  to  have  the  Sultan  recognize  the  validity  of  these 
engagements  made  without  his  permission  or  his  cog- 
nizance. But  these  tasks  might  well  seem  insignificant 
compared  with  the  one  already  achieved. 

Spain  had  already  refused  to  enter  into  an  agree- 
ment with  France  regarding  Morocco,  lest  Great 
Britain  should  take  offence.  Great  Britain  had  not 
carried  her  scruples  quite  so  far ;  yet  as  we  have  seen 
in  the  secret  articles  of  the  Accord  of  April  8,  she  had 
taken  care  to  safeguard  what  she  considered  Spain's 
legitimate  interests,  especially  since  they  corresponded 
very  closely  to  her  own.  In  the  picturesque  phrase  of 
a  French  writer,  "With  France  excluded  from  Tan- 
gier, the  British  Government  becomes  the  only  porter 
of  the  pillars  of  Hercules  as  she  is  already  that  of  the 
Suez  Canal. ' ' 80  The  next  question  was  whether  Spain 
would  be  willing  to  accept  an  arrangement  which  had 
apportioned  out  her  sphere  of  influence  without  inviting 

so  Ren€  Millet,  "L'Accord  Franco-Espagnol,"  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  Nov. 
1904. 


EUROPEAN  RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO     153 

her  into  the  discussion.    The  Spanish-American  war 
had  been  a  terrific  blow  to  the  prestige  of  Spain,  and 
the  pride  of  Castille  and  Aragon  must  not  be  trailed  in 
the  dust.    When  the  question  was  raised  in  the  Cortez 
strenuous  opposition  was  raised  to  submitting  to  any 
such  arrangement.    Sefior  Nocedal  declared  that  Spain 
alone  possessed  rights  in  Morocco,  Sefior  Villaneuva 
found  the  Franco-English  accord  extremely  prejudicial 
to  Spanish  interests  in  Morocco.    Fortunately  for  the 
success  of  the  negotiations,  Sefior  Maura,  President 
of  the  Council,  was  not  moved  by  the  opposition.    In 
a  lengthy  speech  he  asserted  that  the  idea,  fostered  by 
the  press,  that  Spain's  interests  had  been  disregarded 
and  her  prestige  lowered  by  the  Franco-English  accord 
was  contrary  to  the  facts.    Spain  must  realize  that 
Charles  V.  was  no  longer  on  the  throne,  and  that  the 
country  which  had  performed  the  arduous  task  of  con- 
quering Algeria,  must  necessarily  have  certain  inter- 
ests in  the  country  bordering  its  western  frontier. 
"We  have  a  sacred  historic  right  but  not  the  only 
one.     The  government  is  maintaining  the  rights  of  the 
Spanish  nation  and  taking  care  to  assure  its  future 
expansion.    Our  influence  in  Morocco  will  perhaps  be 
increased  by  the  present  negotiations  but  in  no  case 
you  may  be  convinced  will  it  be  diminished. ' '  31 

Sefior  Maura  was  not  mis-stating  his  position. 
Spain's  rights  were  to  be  maintained,  and  it  was  only 
after  months  of  difficult  negotiations  that  France  was 
able  to  gain  her  ends.  Spain  had  the  whip-hand  and 
she  drove  a  hard  bargain.  The  agreement  finally 
reached,  October  3,  1904,  consisted  of  a  short  public 

*i  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.,  June  16,  1904.     See  also  Moulin,  op.  cit.,  p.  72. 


154  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

declaration,  and  a  secret  convention  comprising  sixteen 
articles.  The  terms  indicated  that  France  was  forced 
to  pay  dearly  for  the  offers  which  she  had  made  to 
Spain  in  1901  and  1902.  The  public  declaration  was  as 
enlightening  as  the  utterance  of  a  Delphic  oracle.  It 
simply  stated  that  the  two  governments  had  fixed  the 
extent  of  their  rights  and  the  guarantee  of  their  inter- 
ests in  Morocco;  Spain  adhered  to  the  Anglo-French 
Declaration  of  April  8,  1904;  and  both  again  main- 
tained their  attachment  to  the  integrity  of  the  Moorish 
Empire  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan.32  The 
secret  convention  was  far  from  being  ambiguous.  In 
fact  it  attempted  to  settle  the  Moroccan  question  as 
far  as  France  and  Spain  were  concerned  under  every 
possible  contingency.  It  is  not  essential  to  give  in 
detail  the  clauses  of  the  treaty,  but  it  is  very  necessary 
to  note  carefully  the  contents  of  certain  articles.33 

In  Article  I  Spain  again  stated  her  adherence  to  the 
Anglo-French  Declaration  of  April  8,  1904,  but  the  fol- 
lowing articles  indicated  that  this  adherence  was  rather 
to  the  secret  part  of  the  Anglo-French  Declaration 
than  to  the  clauses  published,  for  very  careful  provi- 
sion was  made  in  case  the  integrity  of  Morocco  under 
the  Sultan's  sovereignty  should  be  maintained,  ''owing 
to  the  weakness  of  that  government  and  to  its  con- 
tinued inability  to  uphold  law  and  order.  ..."  By 
the  secret  arrangement  Spain  not  only  obtained  the 
northern  territory  of  the  Riff,  from  the  Moulouya  to 
Larache,  but  also  a  long  stretch  of  the  Atlantic  coast 
and  its  hinterland  in  the  South,  extending  from  her 

82  Doc.  Dip.,  "Affaires  du  Maroc"  (1901-1905),  No.  187. 
33  Text  of  the  secret  articles  may  be  found  in  British  and  Foreign 
State  Papers,  Vol.  102,  p.  432. 


EUROPEAN  RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO     155 

Rio  de  Ora  possessions  as  far  as  the  "Wad  Sus,  just 
south  of  Agadir.  It  was  further  provided  that  so  long 
as  the  status  quo  continued,  each  might  have  certain 
privileges  in  its  respective  zone,  but  if  the  Sultan's 
sovereignty  should  disappear,  each  nation  might  con- 
sider the  territories  delimited  as  constituting  its  own 
sphere  of  influence.  It  was  further  complicated  by 
Spain  engaging  herself  for  the  period  of  fifteen  years 
not  to  exercise  her  rights  of  action  in  her  zone  of  influ- 
ence except  with  the  consent  of  France,  while  France 
had  full  powers  to  exercise  her  field  of  action  in  the 
zone  ascribed  to  Spain,  after  first  informing  the  King 
of  Spain  of  the  action  she  intended  to  take.  Thus 
each  nation  was  provided  for  in  case  Morocco  should 
cease  to  be  independent,  and  France  was  given  the 
privilege  of  maintaining  the  Sultan's  power  even  over 
the  Spanish  Zone,  if  she  deemed  this  course  of  action 
best.34  It  would  have  been  well  if  the  declaration  had 
ended  here,  but  by  Article  X  it  was  further  provided 
that  "so  long  as  the  present  political  status  lasts, 
schemes  for  public  works,  railways,  roads,  and  canals 
.  .  .  shall  be  executed  by  such  companies  as  may  be 
formed  by  Frenchmen  and  Spaniards."  It  was  not 
necessary  to  state  that  if  the  status  quo  changed  such 
undertakings  would  be  confined  exclusively  to  the  citi- 
zens of  their  respective  countries.  This  was  a  clear 
violation  of  the  open  door  policy.  Although  both 
France  and  Spain  subscribed  to  the  fourth  article  of 
the  Anglo-French  Accord,  which  maintained  the  prin- 
ciple of  commercial  liberty,  they  now  proceeded  to 

s*  For  a  comprehensive  survey  of  Franco-Spanish  relations,  1902-1912, 
see  Andre"  Tardieu,  "France  et  Espagne,"  Rev.  de  Deux  Mondes,  Dec. 
1,  1912, 


156  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

place  all  further  economic  undertakings  entirely  in 
their  own  hands.  Great  Britain  could  not  object  be- 
cause she  had  been  paid  her  price,  but  how  about  other 
nations  .  having  commercial  or  economic  interests 
there  ? 85  Evidently  they  might  object.  The  only  solu- 
tion was  secrecy,  a  nation  cannot  object  to  what  it  does 
not  know.  However,  if  a  secret  shared  is  no  longer  a 
secret,  a  secret  agreement  is  paradoxical;  better  an 
open  covenant  of  fraud  than  a  secret  covenant  of  faith. 
Nemesis  trails  with  ease  the  devious  paths  of  secret 
diplomacy,  but  let  us  not  anticipate  her  vengence. 

3.     GERMAN  ATTITUDE  TO  THE  FRENCH  POLICY  IN  MOROCCO 

At  last  France  could  turn  her  undivided  attention  to 
Morocco.  The  diplomatic  preparation  had  been  con- 
cluded. Italy,  Great  Britain  and  Spain  had  been 
brought  out,  it  remained  to  be  seen  whether  France 
might  profit  from  her  investment.  Conditions  in  Mo- 
rocco seemed  to  be  going  from  bad  to  worse.  Bu- 
Hamara  was  not  to  have  a  clear  field  in  his  attempt  to 
profit  through  the  chaotic  situation.  The  bandit  Rai- 
suli,  one  fine  May  morning  arrived  in  the  environs  of 
Tangier,  and  stopping  at  one  of  the  country  villas, 
seized  one  of  the  notables  of  the  foreign  colony,  Mr. 
Perdicaris,  a  naturalized  American,  and  his  son-in-law, 
Mr.  Varley,  a  British  subject,  and  held  them  for  ran- 
som.36 The  question  was  immediately  raised  in  France 
whether  the  United  States  would  recognize  the  para- 

35  It  is  essential  to  note  the  clear  distinction  made  by  France  between 
commercial  and  economic  liberty.  Note  also  that  these  secret  articles 
do  not  violate  the  Madrid  convention  if  we  regard  the  most  favored 
nation  clause  as  referring  essentially  to  commerce.  See  Oct.  18,  Madrid 
Convention.     Martens,  Recueil,  2d  series,  Vol.  VI,  p.  629. 

36  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  160. 


EUROPEAN  RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO     157 

mount  interest  of  France  in  Morocco  in  accordance  with 
the  recently  announced  agreement  with  Great  Britain, 
or  would  she  go  directly  to  the  Sultan.  The  sending 
of  a  naval  squadron  under  Admiral  Chadwick  looked 
ominous  at  first,  remembering  America's  traditional 
method  of  treating  with  Barbary  states,  but  at  the  same 
time  the  American  ambassador,  General  Porter,  asked 
M.  Delcasse  to  have  the  French  Government  use  its 
good  offices  in  the  affair.37  The  recognition  by  the 
United  States  of  the  new  condition  of  affairs  in  Mo- 
rocco was  regarded  as  a  diplomatic  victory  for  France, 
but  the  condition  which  made  it  necessary  for  America 
to  ask  for  her  good  offices  pointed  clearly  to  France 
the  necessity  for  her  immediate  intervention.  In  the 
meantime,  the  Sultan,  informed  by  both  Great  Britain 
and  France  that  he  would  be  held  responsible  for  the 
captives,  met  all  the  demands  of  the  bandit.  These  not 
only  included  a  large  monetary  indemnity,  but  the  dis- 
placement of  certain  officials,  the  surrender  of  numer- 
ous prisoners,  and  as  a  crowning  indignity,  the  appoint- 
ment of  Raisuli  as  the  governor  of  two  villages  in  the 
vicinity  of  Tangier.38 

Following  the  Raisuli  episode,  the  European  in- 
habitants of  Tangier  petitioned  the  diplomatic  corps 
that  immediate  measures  be  taken  to  safeguard  their 
lives  and  their  interests,  and  M.  Saint-Rene  Taillan- 
dier,  the  French  minister  at  Tangier,  informed  M. 
Delcasse  that  all  his  colleagues,  including  the  German 
representative,  wanted  to  know  what  measures  France 
intended  to  take  to  reestablish  security.39    France  had 

37  Ibid.,  No.  164. 
88  Ibid.,  No.  167. 
so  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  178. 


158  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY; 

already  notified  the  Maghzen  of  the  Franco-British 
agreement  concerning  Morocco,  assuring  the  Shereef 
of  "the  fundamental  interest  which  France  had  both 
in  the  independence  and  sovereignty  of  the  Morrocan 
Empire,  which  is  contiguous  to  its  African  posses- 
sions," and  the  desire  of  France  to  aid  the  Shereefian 
Government  to  inaugurate  the  necessary  reforms, 
under  conditions  favorable  to  the  interests  of  both 
countries.40  The  Sultan,  through  his  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  had  given  an  "implicit  acceptance' ' 
to  the  agreement.41  As  a  temporary  measure  France 
sent  two  cruisers  to  Tangier,  and  also  succeeded  in 
securing  the  permission  of  the  Sultan  to  put  a  French 
captain  in  charge  of  the  garrison  at  Tangier  with  a 
view  to  its  reorganization.42  France  had  also  taken 
up  the  question  of  financing  the  Moroccan  Government ; 
for  unless  this  were  done,  the  country  would  be  com- 
pletely bankrupt  before  reforms  could  be  introduced. 
On  June  12,  1904,  a  group  of  French  banks  agreed  to 
a  loan  of  sixty-two  and  one  half  million  francs  at  a  five 
per  cent,  rate  of  interest,  the  bonds  maturing  in  thirty- 
six  years.43  Finally  in  December,  1904,  M.  Taillandier 
was  authorized  to  go  to  Fez,  with  a  definite  program  of 
the  reforms  which  France  considered  essential.44  He 
had  hardly  received  his  instructions  before  a  letter 
from  the  Shereefian  Government  informed  him  that 
the  Sultan  had  given  orders  for  the  dismissal  of  all  the 
military  missions  at  Fez  and  at  Rabat,  with  a  view  to 

*oibid.,  No.  159  annexe. 
4i  Ibid.,  No.  177. 

42  Ibid.,  No.  183. 

43  Ibid.,  No.  170  and  annexes. 

44  Ibid.,  No.  208, 


EUROPEAN  RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO     159 

curtailing  expenses.45  At  the  same  time  it  was 
learned  that  two  ministers  of  the  government,  regarded 
as  being  favorable  to  the  French,  had  been  dismissed. 
As  the  officers  of  the  commissions  were  especially  those 
whom  France  had  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Sultan 
for  the  reorganization  of  his  army,  the  order  to  dismiss 
them  was  an  overt  act  of  hostility  towards  France. 
The  French  minister  immediately  threatened  a  sever- 
ance of  diplomatic  relations.46  The  threat  sufficed, 
and  His  Shereefian  Majesty  expressed  the  most  pro- 
found regret  that  his  policy  of  retrenchment  did  not 
find  favor  in  the  eyes  of  the  French  Government,  and 
urged  that  the  prospective  mission  to  Fez  be  des- 
patched without  delay,  that  His  Majesty  might  con- 
vince the  French  Government  of  his  most  favorable 
sentiments  towards  it.47  His  apologies  were  accepted, 
and  the  mission  proceeded  upon  its  way,  but  the  first 
indication  had  been  given  that  sinister  forces  were  at 
work  undermining  the  successful  prosecution  of  the 
new  French  policy  in  Morocco. 

If  France  were  unaware  both  of  the  extent  and  char- 
acter of  these  influences,  she  was  to  receive  a  most 
sudden  and  rude  awakening.  On  February  11,  1905, 
the  French  charge  d'affaires  at  Tangier  sent  the  follow- 
ing despatch  to  M.  Delcasse,  as  being  the  declarations 
made  to  him  by  his  German  colleague:  "After  the 
Franco-English  accord,"  said  Herr  von  Kuhlmann, 
"we  supposed  that  the  French  Government  was  wait- 
ing, in  order  to  inform  us  of  a  new  situation,  until  the 
Franco-Spanish  entente  provided  for  in  the  arrange- 

45  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  209. 
4e  Ibid.,  No.  213. 
« Ibid.,  No.  216. 


160  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

merit  of  April  8  should  be  effected.  But  to-day  every- 
thing being  definitely  concluded,  and  the  parliamentary 
ratifications  having  intervened,  we  perceive  that  we 
have  been  systematically  held  apart.  We  have  conse- 
quently fixed  our  attitude,  nor  am  I  tracing  a  line  of 
conduct  on  my  own  initiative.  In  presence  of  the  con- 
tradictory interpretations  of  our  newspapers,  I  be- 
lieved it  necessary  to  solicit  formal  instructions  from 
my  government.  Thereupon  Count  von  Biilow  in- 
formed me  that  the  Imperial  Government  was  wholly 
ignorant  of  the  accords  intervening  on  the  subject  of 
Morocco,  and  did  not  recognize  itself  as  bound  in  any 
manner  as  regards  this  question." 48 

Was  it  true  that  M.  Delcasse  had  left  Germany  wholly 
ignorant  of  these  accords,  which  were  to  give  France 
the  opportunity  so  long  desired,  of  completing  her 
North  African  empire?  Was  it  possible  that  a  man  as 
skilled  in  diplomacy  as  M.  Delcasse,  would  have  worked 
so  long  and  so  patiently  to  gain  the  adherence  of  Italy, 
Spain,  and  Great  Britain  to  the  colonial  projects  of 
France,  and  deliberately  ignore  the  one  power  which 
was  ever  watching,  ever  waiting,  across  the  Eastern 
frontier,  to  finish  the  work  begun  at  Sedan?  For  it 
was  not  enough  to  say  that  Germany  had  no  political 
interests  there,  that  her  interests  were  only  com- 
mercial, and  these  interests  had  been  safeguarded.  As 
a  signatory  of  the  Treaty  of  Madrid  in  1880,  and  as  a 
power  which  did  have  commercial  interests  there,  she 
surely  deserved  to  receive  at  least  official  notice  of  the 
new  situation.  This  was  very  well  recognized  in 
France.    As  far  back  as  November,  1902,  the  " Eclair" 

^s  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit,  No.  224. 


EUROPEAN  RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO     161 

published  an  interview  with  a  personage  closely  in 
touch  with  the  foreign  and  colonial  policy  of  France, 
in  which  he  declared:  "Above  all  do  not  forget  that 
for  the  solution  of  the  Moroccan  question,  we  must  take 
count  of  three  powers:  Great  Britain,  Germany,  and 
Spain.  We  shall  only  be  able  to  arrive  at  a  satisfac- 
tory result  if  we  succeed  in  coming  to  an  agreement 
with  all  three.  To  treat  with  one  of  the  three,  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  two  others,  would  be  the  most  serious 
fault  that  we  could  commit. ' ' 49  Surely  it  might  be  con- 
sidered almost  as  serious  to  treat  with  two  of  the 
powers  and  disregard  the  third,  especially  if  Germany 
should  be  the  third  power.  Had  M.  Delcasse  made 
such  an  inexcusable  diplomatic  faux  pas?  Had  Ger- 
many received  no  official  notification  I  Let  us  consider 
the  evidence. 

In  the  Yellow  Books  on  Morocco  we  find  that  on 
March  25,  1904,  M.  Bihourd,  French  ambassador  at 
Berlin,  informed  M.  Delcasse  that  on  March  20,  the 
Wurtemburg  Pan-Germans  had  urged  the  Imperial 
Government  to  profit  by  the  occasion  to  extend  its 
economic  interests  in  Morocco,  and  if  the  status  quo 
should  not  be  maintained,  that  Germany  be  ready  to 
take  the  western  region  and  occupy  Agadir.  In  the 
same  despatch,  however,  M.  Bihourd  quotes  the  North 
German  "Gazette"  to  the  fact  that  "by  reason  of  the 
reiterated  assurance,  and  given  officially  by  France, 
that  she  has  in  view  neither  conquest  nor  occupation, 
we  may  believe  that  the  German  commercial  interests 
in  Morocco  are  not  threatened,  therefore,  we  have  no 
reason  to  envisage  with  malevolent  eyes  the  Franco- 

<»  Quoted  in  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.,  Nov.  15,  1902. 


162  TRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

English  entente  in  preparation."50  In  his  reply  on 
March  27,  M.  Delcasse  informed  M.  Bihourd  of  a  con- 
versation which  he  had  recently  had  with  Prince  Rado- 
lin,  the  German  ambassador  to  Paris.  In  reply  to 
questions  concerning  the  projected  arrangement,  M. 
Delcasse  informed  Prince  Radolin  that  an  entente  was 
very  possible  between  Great  Britain  and  France  in 
regard  to  Morocco  and  other  questions,  but  France 
intended  to  maintain  both  the  political  and  territorial 
situation  unchanged,  and  commercial  liberty  would  be 
fully  respected.  M.  Delcasse  ended  with  these  words : 
"You  may  in  your  conversations  with  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  make  use  of  this  interview." 51  Thus, 
two  weeks  before  the  accord  with  Britain  was  signed, 
M.  Delcasse  had  authorized  the  regularly  accredited 
diplomatic  representative  of  the  French  Government 
at  Berlin,  to  acquaint  the  German  Government  of  the 
intended  arrangement,  and  to  promise  guarantees  of 
commercial  liberty. 

The  next  mention  of  the  subject  in  the  Yellow  Books 
is  a  despatch  from  M.  Bihourd,  dated  April  12,  1904, 
and  summarizing  the  attitude  of  the  German  press  on 
the  Accords  as  published.  A  few  editors  thought 
Russia  had  reason  to  object,  but  from"  the  German 
standpoint  there  was  nothing  in  the  arrangements 
detrimental  to  German  interests.52  M.  Delcasse  in  his 
next  despatch  to  Germany  wished  to  know  if  M. 
Bihourd  had  found  opportunity  to  utilize  his  telegram 
of  March  27.53    This  would  indicate  M.  Delcasse 's  de- 

50  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  141.  « 

si  Ibid.,  No.  142. 
62  Ibid.,  No.  145. 
58  Ibid.,  No.  147. 


EUROPEAN  RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO     163 

sire  to  be  certain  that  Germany  had  received  official 
notice.  That  Count  von  Biilow  was  not  ignorant  of  the 
arrangements  is  indicated  by  his  speech  in  the  Reichs- 
tag, April  12,  1904.  Replying  to  a  question  on  the 
subject  he  declared  that  Germany  had  no  objection  to 
make  from  the  viewpoint  of  German  interests,  their 
interests  in  Morocco  were  chiefly  commercial,  and  it 
was  to  their  advantage  that  peace  and  order  reign  at 
Morocco.54  Two  days  later  Herr  Bebel  raised  the 
question  of  Germany's  isolation,  and  Count  von  Re-., 
ventlow  wanted  to  know  why  Germany  allowed  other 
powers  to  take  precedence  in  Morocco.  To  the  first 
the  German  Chancellor  replied  that  Germany  was  still 
allied  to  two  great  powers,  in  friendly  alliance  with 
five  others,  on  friendly  terms  with  France,  and  in- 
tended to  remain  so.  To  von  Reventlow  he  sarcasti- 
cally replied  by  a  simple  question.  Would  the  Count 
have  a  great  country  like  Germany  make  such  a  demand 
without  being  ready  to  enforce  it,  and  would  he  be 
willing  to  plunge  the  country  in  such  an  adventure? 
At  a  time  when  the  Far  East  was  already  engulfed  in 
war  he  thought  a  policy  of  calm  and  reserve  most 
fitting.55 

On  April  18,  1904,  M.  Delcasse  again  authorized  M. 
Bihourd  to  repeat  to  the  Foreign  Secretary  (i.  e.,  Baron 
von  Richthofen)  the  declarations  already  made,  assur- 
ing him  that  the  arrangements  did  not  interfere  with 
the  existing  interests  of  any  power,56  and  on  April  27, 
M.  Bihourd  assured  M.  Delcasse  that  he  had  done  so.57 

s* Ibid.,  No.  150  (annexe)  or  "Fiirst  Biilows  Reden,"  Vol.  II,  p.  74. 
65  "Fiirst  Biilows  Reden."  Vol.  II,  pp.  80  and  90. 
ee  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  152. 
67  Ibid.,  No.  155. 


164  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Upon  the  signing  of  the  accord  with  Spain  M.  Delcasse 
sent  copies  of  the  Declaration  to  the  French  ambassa- 
dors accredited  at  the  various  capitals  including  Berlin, 
and  the  very  next  day  M.  Bihourd  notified  M.  Delcasse 
that  he  had  made  Baron  von  Richthofen  acquainted 
with  the  new  situation,  and  had  assured  him  that  com- 
mercial liberty  assured  by  the  Franco-English  accord 
had  been  again  guaranteed  by  this.58  However,  M. 
Delcasse  went  even  further.  On  October  12,  he  wrote 
to  M.  Bihourd  as  follows:  "The  declarations  that  I 
have  made  to  Prince  Radolin  last  March,  and  of  which 
I  have  informed  you,  have  kept  the  German  govern- 
ment in  touch  with  our  intentions  in  Morocco.  It  has 
had  from  that  moment  the  assurance  that  from  the 
point  of  view  of  commercial  transactions,  everyone 
would  benefit  from  the  new  order  to  be  established, 
and  that  commercial  liberty  would  be  vigorously  and 
entirely  respected.  ...  In  obtaining  the  adhesion  of 
the  Spanish  government  to  the  principle  of  commer- 
cial liberty  inscribed  in  the  Declaration  of  April  8, 
we  have  again  augmented  the  guarantees  which  inter- 
national commerce  will  enjoy  in  Morocco.  You  may 
declare  this  to  the  Baron  von  Richthofen  with  the 
greatest  clearness." 59  Again  M.  Bihourd  notified  the 
German  foreign  secretary,  and  again  he  was  assured 
that  Germany's  interest  in  Morocco  was  exclusively 
economic.60 

It  might  be  well  to  take  note  at  this  point  of  the  ex- 
act phraseology  of  M.  Delcasse 's  despatches  and  the 
German  replies.    In  every  case  M.  Delcasse  gave  as- 

68  Ibid.,  Nos.  187  and  189. 

69  Ibid.,  No.  191. 
eo  Ibid.,  No.  192. 


EUROPEAN  RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO     165 

surance  that  commercial  liberty  had  been  guaranteed, 
but  in  no  statement,  either  in  his  diplomatic  corre- 
spondence or  in  his  speeches  in  the  Chamber,  does  he 
mention  any  guarantee  of  economic  liberty.  Thus  he 
is  not  contradicting  the  secret  articles  of  either  ar- 
rangement, for  both  of  them  guarantee  commercial 
liberty,  but  neither  makes  any  pretense  of  guarantee- 
ing economic  liberty.  In  fact  as  we  have  already  in- 
dicated, the  secret  articles  of  the  Spanish  accord  baldly 
announce  that  economic  developments  are  to  be  con- 
fined to  French  and  Spanish  capital.  From  the  French 
point  of  view  this  distinction  is  vital,  because  of  what 
value  would  Morocco  be  to  France  if  she  took  upon 
herself  the  weighty  task  of  bringing  order  out  of  the 
chaos  existing  there — a  program  entailing  a  stupend- 
ous sacrifice  of  blood  and  treasure,  as  she  knew  to  her 
sorrow  from  her  experience  with  Algeria — unless  she 
had  as  compensation,  the  privilege  of  keeping  the 
economic  development  of  the  country  in  her  own  hands. 
In  the  German  utterances  the  same  distinction  does 
not  seem  to  be  made.  Count  von  Biilow  in  his  speech 
of  April  12,  1904,  before  the  Reichstag,  does  declare 
that  Germany's  interests  are  above  all  commercial 
(vor  allem  hommerzielle) ,  but  in  almost  the  same 
breath  he  speaks  of  their  interests  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, and  especially  in  Morocco,  as  being  for  the 
most  part  economic  {im  wesentlichen  wirtshaftlich)  .6l 
That  is,  Germany  not  only  wished  her  commercial  in- 
terests of  the  present  guaranteed,  but  also  her  economic 
interests  of  the  future. 
We  have  laid  special  stress  upon  the  many  occasions 

6i  "Fiirst  BQlows  Reden,"  Vol.  II,  p.  74. 


166  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

and  the  various  means  which  M.  Delcasse  employed 
to  make  sure  that  the  German  government  was  being 
kept  in  touch  with  the  arrangements  France  was  mak- 
ing in  regard  to  Morocco,  because  as  we  shall  see  later, 
he  was  accused  both  in  Germany  and  in  France  of  hav- 
ing kept  Germany  entirely  in  the  dark,  and  this  seemed 
to  be  regarded  as  his  principal  offense.  So  as  might 
have  been  expected,  when  M.  Delcasse  received  the 
startling  announcement  from  the  French  charge  d'af- 
faires at  Tangier,  that  the  Imperial  government  was 
wholly  ignorant  of  any  accords  concerning  Morocco, 
and  did  not  recognize  itself  bound  in  any  way  in  this 
question,  M.  Delcasse  immediately  telegraphed  M. 
Bihourd  at  Berlin,  asking  him  to  refresh  the  memory 
of  the  German  foreign  minister  with  a  detailed  enu- 
meration of  the  facts.62  When  M.  Bihourd  called  at 
the  Wilhelmstrasse,  the  foreign  secretary  was  not  to 
be  seen,  but  the  under  secretary,  Herr  von  Miihlberg 
replied  that  he  knew  nothing  of  the  statement  made  by 
the  German  representative  at  Tangier,  but  he  won- 
dered if  Herr  von  Kuhlmann  's  declarations  should  not 
be  interpreted  that  the  German  government,  being  a 
stranger  to  the  two  accords,  did  not  consider  itself 
bound  by  them.  M.  Bihourd  was  forced  to  content 
himself  with  this  interpretation ;  Germany  was  not  yet 
quite  ready  to  show  her  hand.63 

In  the  meantime  M.  Saint  Rene  Taillandier,  the 
French  plenipotentiary  to  Fez,  was  having  great  dif- 
ficulty in  his  atttempt  to  bring  to  the  Sultan's  atten- 
tion the  French  program  of  reforms.    Arriving  in  the 

62  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  225. 
«s  Ibid.,  No.  226. 


EUROPEAN  RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO     167 

middle  of  January,  1905,  he  found  the  Sultan  unex- 
pectedly unwilling  to  take  the  responsibility  of  con- 
senting to  his  demands  without  discussing  them  in 
Council,  a  most  exceptional  procedure.  Not  until  Feb- 
ruary 22  was  the  first  conference  held,  and  the  sit- 
tings dragged  along  through  the  month  of  March. 
While  M.  Saint  Rene  Taillandier  was  still  patiently 
expounding  his  program  of  remedies  for  the  evil  con- 
dition of  affairs  into  which  Morocco  had  fallen,  and 
informing  the  Sultan  that  the  Powers  particularly  in- 
terested in  Moroccan  affairs  had  not  only  recognized 
in  France  the  right,  but  imposed  upon  her  the  duty  of 
effecting  the  necessary  reforms,  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II, 
cruising  on  the  Mediterranean,  disembarked  at  Tangier 
March  31,  1904  and  played  the  role  of  a  veritable  deus 
ex  macliina.  Replying  to  the  address  of  welcome  de- 
livered by  the  Sultan's  uncle,  the  Kaiser  made  clear 
to  the  world  the  German  position  on  the  Moroccan 
question : 

"It  is  to  the  Sultan  in  his  position  of  an  independent 
sovereign  that  I  am  paying  my  visit  to-day.  I  hope 
that  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan,  a  free  Mo- 
rocco will  remain  open  to  the  peaceful  rivalry  of  all 
nations,  without  monopoly  or  annexation,  on  the  basis 
of  absolute  equality.  My  visit  to  Tangier  has  had  as 
its  object,  to  make  it  known  that  I  am  determined  to 
do  all  that  is  in  my  power  to  safeguard  efficaciously  the 
interests  of  Germany  in  Morocco,  since  I  consider  the 
Sultan  as  an  absolutely  independent  sovereign.  It  is 
with  him  that  I  wish  to  come  to  an  understanding  as 
to  the  proper  means  to  safeguard  these  interests.  As 
for  the  reforms  which  the  Sultan  intends  to  make,  it 


168  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

seems  to  me  that  it  is  necessary  to  proceed  with  great 
precaution,  having  regard  for  the  religious  sentiments 
of  the  population,  that  the  public  order  may  not  be  dis- 
turbed."64 

France  had  settled  the  Moroccan  question  to  the 
satisfaction  of  Great  Britain,  Spain  and  Italy,  but  not 
to  the  satisfaction  of  Germany.  Geographically,  Ger- 
many could  not  have  the  same  legitimate  interest  in 
Morocco,  which  all  three  of  the  other  powers  possessed 
who  had  colonial  interests  on  the  northern  coast  of 
Africa.  Politically,  she  had  repeatedly  declared  her 
complete  indifference.  Commercially,  her  trade  with 
Morocco  was  less  than  one-fourth  of  that  of  either 
Great  Britain  or  France,  and  her  commercial  liberty 
had  been  guaranteed  under  the  new  accords.  True 
enough,  she  had  been  a  signatory  of  the  Treaty  of 
Madrid,  but  so  had  the  United  States,  Belgium,  Por- 
tugal, Austria,  and  Scandinavian  states,  and  they 
found  no  complaint  with  the  new  Moroccan  policy  of 
France.  Why  then  had  Germany  changed  her  Mo- 
roccan policy,  since  Chancellor  von  Biilow  had  pub- 
licly declared  that  Germany  had  nothing  to  object  to 
in  these  accords?  Inasmuch  as  Herr  Bebel  asked  the 
same  question  in  the  Reichstag  just  two  days  before 
the  Kaiser's  speech  at  Tangier,  we  shall  let  Count  von 
Biilow  answer  it:  "Herr  Bebel  has  let  it  be  under- 
stood that  our  policy  towards  Morocco  has  changed 
since  a  year  ago.  I  must  first  recall  to  him  that  the 
language  and  attitude  of  diplomats  and  policies  change 
according  to  circumstances.  I  choose  the  moment 
which  I  consider  favorable  for  the  production  of  our 

e*  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  234. 


EUROPEAN  RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO     169 

interests.  As  a  matter  of  fact  nothing  has  changed 
in  the  tendencies  of  the  German  policy  on  this  point. 
He  who  looks  for  a  fait  nouveau  will  not  find  it  in  the 
German  policy. ' ' 65 

The  Chancellor  was  only  following  the  trail  blazed 
by  his  predecessors  in  German  diplomacy,  in  bending 
circumstances  to  his  ends.  When  Great  Britain  and 
France  had  signed  the  accords,  conditions  were  not 
suitable  for  a  protest  from  Germany.  A  year  later 
important  events  had  taken  place  both  in  Europe  and 
in  France  which  gave  Germany  her  opportunity  to 
strike.  The  fait  nouveau  was  not  in  the  German  policy, 
but  in  the  fact  that  the  German  policy  could  at  last 
come  out  in  the  open.  Going  back  once  more  to  Count 
von  Billow's  speech  of  April  12,  1904,  we  can  find  the 
clue  to  his  whole  subsequent  action.  Replying  to  the 
complaint  of  Count  von  Reventlow  that  he  should  not 
let  other  powers  obtain  greater  influence  in  Morocco 
than  Germany,  he  replied:  "If  you  wish  to  create 
surfaces  of  irritation  everywhere  you  do  not  cry  it 
from  the  housetops.  Frederic  the  Great  has  perhaps 
now  and  then  played  a  game  of  chess  in  politics  worthy 
of  Machiavelli,  but  not  until  after  he  had  written 
against  Machiavelli. ' ' 66  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether 
von  Billow's  Moroccan  policy  proved  itself  worthy  of 
either  Machiavelli  or  Frederic  the  Great. 

«s"Furst  Biilows  Reden,"  Vol.  II,  p.  209. 
ea  Ibid.,  II,  91. 


CHAPTER  VII 
THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE 

1.     PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  KAISERS  VISIT  TO  TANGIER 

VARIOUS  reasons  have  been  given  for  the 
Kaiser's  coup  de  theatre  at  Tangier,  and  also  for 
the  fact  that  a  year  was  allowed  to  elapse  between  the 
signing  of  the  accords  between  France  and  Great  Brit- 
ain and  the  descent  at  Tangier.  Chancellor  von 
Biilow,  who  confesses  that  it  was  in  pursuance  of  his 
advice  that  the  German  Emperor  gave  the  world  warn- 
ing that  Germany  had  important  interests  in  Morocco 
and  intended  to  protect  them,  in  a  communication  to 
Prince  Radolin,  German  ambassador  to  France,  dated 
April  11,  1905,  sums  up  the  situation  somewhat  as  fol- 
lows: Since  by  the  Anglo-French  convention  it  was 
provided  that  the  status  quo  should  be  maintained, 
Germany  made  no  move  until  the  French  minister  at 
Tangier  presented  a  program  of  reforms  which  were 
impossible  to  put  into  effect  without  upsetting  the 
status  quo.  When  M.  Saint  Rene  Taillandier  declared 
to  the  Maghzen  that  he  presented  this  program  as 
mandatory  of  the  European  Powers,  Germany  ob- 
jected, since  the  French  ambassador  had  most  cer- 
tainly not  received  a  mandate  from  Germany.  The 
German  viewpoint  was  that  this  attempt  of  France  in- 
jured the  interests  of  all  those  states  which  had  par- 
ticipated previously   in   Moroccan   conferences,    and 

170 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE  171 

which  France  had  neglected  to  consult.  England  and 
Spain  could  dispose  of  the  rights  of  their  own  subjects 
in  Morocco  if  they  wished,  but  they  could  not  pretend 
to  dispose  of  the  rights  of  Germans.  Germany  inter- 
vened to  protect  her  interests,  which  were  being  dis- 
regarded without  asking  her  consent.  The  importance 
of  these  interests  was  secondary ;  it  was  not  necessary 
to  prove  that  Germany  had  important  economic  inter- 
ests in  Morocco.  If  these  minor  interests  should  be 
abandoned  without  protest  the  world  would  think  that 
similar  action  would  be  permissible  where  larger  in- 
terests were  at  stake.  The  German  situation  was  well 
summed  up  in  a  French  phrase:  "Cet  animal  est  tres 
mechant,  quand  on  Vattaque  il  se  defend/' 1 

On  the  following  day,  in  a  despatch  to  the  German 
embassies  in  the  various  capitals  of  Europe,  von 
Biilow  made  M.  Delcasse  responsible  for  the  German 
action  and  indicated  that  the  German  plan  was  for  a 
new  conference:  "It  is  false  that  the  Franco-English 
convention  concerning  Morocco  has  been  brought  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  German  government  either  verbally 
or  by  writing.  M.  Delcasse,  it  is  true,  did  give  here 
and  there  to  the  Imperial  ambassador  some  general  al- 
lusions to  the  untenable  situation  in  Morocco,  and  to 
the  necessity  for  France  to  consider  the  security  of 
her  Algerian  frontier.  But  when  last  summer,  long 
after  the  Anglo-French  convention,  the  German  am- 
bassador addressed  to  M.  Delcasse  a  question  in  re- 
gard to  the  tenor  of  this  convention,  the  foreign  min- 
ister merely  replied:    'Sie  finden  das  alles  im  Gelb- 

i  The  original  text  of  the  German  White  Book  on  Morocco,  with  a 
French  translation  attached,  may  be  found  in  the  Archives  Diplo- 
matiques  1906,  Vol.  97,  p.  275  et  seq. 


172  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

buck.'  "  2  We  have  already  given  a  complete  enumera- 
tion of  the  various  ways  in  which  M.  Delcasse  did  bring 
the  matter  to  the  attention  of  the  German  government ; 
hence  it  is  not  necessary  to  point  out  the  false  impres- 
sion conveyed  by  the  Chancellor's  statement.  It  may 
be  worth  while  to  note,  however,  that  there  is  no  rule 
in  international  law,  nor  has  it  been  established  by 
diplomatic  usage,  that  a  convention  between  two  na- 
tions shall  be  communicated  either  in  writing  or 
verbally  to  all  other  nations  whose  interests  may  be 
touched  by  it.  All  rules  established  by  the  comity  of 
nations  will  have  been  complied  with  if  the  communi- 
cation is  made  in  any  way  recognized  by  diplomatic 
usage.  Surely  a  verbal  communication  by  a  regularly 
accredited  ambassador  would  more  than  meet  these 
requirements.  After  thus  attempting  to  make  M.  Del- 
casse responsible  for  Germany's  action,  the  Chancellor 
concluded  by  declaring  that  the  German  government 
did  not  expect  to  obtain  special  advantages  by  means 
of  a  particular  treaty,  but  considered  a  new  confer- 
ence of  the  contracting  states  as  the  best  means  of 
bringing  about  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  conflict  of 
interests.8 

In  neither  of  these  explanations  do  we  find  that  any 
claim  is  made  that  France  has  injured  German  inter- 
ests ;  the  one  and  only  reason  seemed  to  be  that  France 
had  dared  to  conclude  conventions  which  might  be 
detrimental  to  German  interests  in  Morocco.  In  his 
"Imperial  Germany,"  written  several  years  later, 
Prince  von  Bulow  gives  one  reason  which  may  have 

2  Ibid.,  p.  278. 

»  Arch.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  p.  279. 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE  173 

had  some  weight:  " There  was  a  fairly  widespread 
belief  in  Germany  that  France  would  meet  with  diffi- 
culties and  hindrances  in  Morocco  which  would  para- 
lyze her  military,  financial  and  political  striking  power 
in  Europe ;  but  this  theory  would  not  hold  water.  .  .  . 
It  was  much  more  probable  that  France  would  in 
course  of  time  considerably  reinforce  her  'black 
troops,'  her  army  of  native  Africans,  by  forming  new 
companies  and  squadrons  from  the  promising  material 
offered  by  Morocco. ' ' 4 

Unquestionably  both  of  these  reasons  had  some  in- 
fluence in  bringing  about  German  intervention,  but 
it  is  just  as  certain  that  there  were  many  other  and 
equally  important  reasons  which  do  not  appear  in 
the  explanations  given  by  the  German  Chancellor. 
Looking  back  over  the  course  of  French  foreign  policy 
since  M.  Delcasse  entered  the  Quai  d'Orsay  in  1898, 
we  find  a  continuous  series  of  checks  for  German  di- 
plomacy. First  it  was  the  affair  of  the  Portuguese 
colonies,  which  while  M.  Hanotaux  was  foreign  min- 
ister had  progressed  favorably,  but  which  came  to  a 
sudden  halt  when  M.  Delcasse  took  hold.  Germany 
was  checkmated  again  by  France  during  the  Boer  War, 
when  Russia  at  Germany's  request,  suggested  that 
France  join  with  them  to  intervene  in  favor  of  the 
Boers,  but  upon  the  basis  of  the  status  quo.  France 
next  proceeded  to  weaken  the  Triple  Alliance  by  draw- 
ing Italy  into  friendly  relations,  and  followed  that  up 
by  a  rapprochement  with  England.  Germany's  posi- 
tion as  arbiter  of  Europe,  which  Bismarck  had  so  clev- 
erly planned,  was  being  undermined  by  the  very  power 

*Von  Biilow,  "Imperial  Germany,"  p.  95. 


174  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY: 

against  which  he  had  reinsured  her  so  carefully.  At 
the  same  time  Germany  saw  the  gap  widening  between 
herself  and  Great  Britain.  The  Boer  War  had  made 
the  two  peoples  hostile;  the  interpretation  of  the  Ac- 
cord of  October  14,  1900,  in  regard  to  Manchuria,  had 
divided  the  governments.  Great  Britain  by  allying 
herself  with  Japan,  neutralized  still  further  the  weight 
of  the  Triplice.  The  Russo-Japanese  War,  in  which 
Japan,  the  ally  of  Great  Britain,  and  Russia,  the  ally 
of  France,  might  not  only  destroy  each  other,  but  drag 
in  their  respective  allies,  had  aroused  new  hopes  of  a 
situation  which  might  profit  Germany.  The  Kaiser 
did  all  in  his  power  to  encourage  the  Czar  to  fight  to 
the  end.5  The  Dogger  Bank  affair  seemed  to  be  the 
spark  needed  to  touch  off  the  powder  trains  leading  to 
France  and  Great  Britain.  But  the  newly  formed 
Entente  Cordicde  proved  itself  a  most  vigilant  fire 
warden,  and  the  threatened  explosion  got  no  further 
than  a  mere  flash  in  the  pan.  Germany  made  one  more 
effort  to  profit  through  the  war  in  the  Far  East. 
While  urging  the  Czar  to  sign  an  alliance  with  Ger- 
many against  Great  Britain  and  Japan, — with  a  view 
to  forcing  France  to  throw  over  either  the  Russian 
Alliance  or  the  Entente  with  England,6 — the  Kaiser  at 
the  same  time  informed  the  United  States  that  France, 
Great  Britain,  and  Russia  were  engineering  a  great 
plot  for  the  dismemberment  of  China,  declaring  that 
he  had  been  invited  to  join  but  had  refused  categor- 
ically.7   John  Hay  exploded  this  bubble  very  quickly, 

*  See  the   "Willy-Nicky   Correspondence"   for   a   clear   side   light   on 
William's  affectionate  interest  in  his  friend  Nicholas'  affairs. 

•  "Willy-Nicky  Correspondence,"  No.   13. 

t  W.  R.  Thayer,  "Life  of  John  Hay,"  Vol.  II,  384. 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE  175 

and  President  Koosevelt  interfered  further  with  the 
Kaiser's  plan  of  a  guerre  a  I'outrance  for  Enssia  and 
Japan,  by  bringing  the  two  combatants  together.  The 
Czar  had  spoiled  the  other  scheme  by  suggesting  that 
he  first  communicate  the  terms  of  the  projected  al- 
liance with  Germany  to  France. 

So  long  as  M.  Delcasse  was  able  to  combat  the 
diplomatic  manoeuvres  of  the  Wilhelmstrasse  on  fer- 
eign  fields  he  was  signally  successful,  but  commencing 
with  the  year  1905  Germany  brought  the  attack  to 
French  soil.  On  January  24,  M.  Combes  worn  out  by 
his  long  struggle  against  the  forces  of  clericalism,  re- 
signed, and  M.  Eouvier  was  asked  to  form  the  new 
cabinet.  We  have  already  encountered  M.  Rouvier 
in  connection  with  the  Bagdad  Railway.  At  that  time, 
in  his  anxiety  to  have  France  participate  in  this  under- 
taking, he  had  been  drawn  into  playing  Germany's 
game;  but  as  we  have  already  shown,  M.  Delcasse 
proved  himself  the  more  powerful,  and  the  shares  of 
the  Bagdad  Railway  did  not  appear  upon  the  Bourse  at 
Paris.  According  to  M.  Andre  Mevil,  even  during  the 
formation  of  the  Rouvier  cabinet  the  German  intrigues 
commenced  to  penetrate,  and  M.  Delcasse  was  warned 
concerning  them.  It  was  even  suggested  that  he  per- 
suade President  Loubet  to  try  some  other  ministerial 
combination.  In  the  newly  formed  Rouvier  cabinet 
M.  Delcasse  was  retained,  but  his  departure  from  the 
foreign  office  was  merely  a  question  of  time;  even  he 
could  not  successfully  cope  with  the  increasing  hostil- 
ity of  Germany,  without  backing  at  home.  One  French 
senator,  who  has  acted  as  secretary  of  the  Commission 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  gives  it  as  his  opinion  that  the 


176  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

secret  of  Germany's  attitude  was  that  she  found  in 
France  a  support  against  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, in  the  person  of  M.  Rouvier.8 

The  whole  internal  condition  of  France  at  this  time 
was  an  urgent  invitation  to  Germany  to  strike.  The 
virus  of  the  Dreyfus  Affair  had  destroyed  all  confi- 
dence in  the  army;  the  struggle  between  the  Church 
and  the  State  had  exhausted  every  energy  of  the  gov- 
ernment. Internationalism  and  anti-militarism  were 
rampant.  The  two  years'  service  law,  which  reduced 
the  length  of  service  in  the  army  from  three  to  two 
years,  and  which  had  been  under  discussion  by  the  gov- 
ernment for  three  years,  passed  in  its  final  form  just 
a  fortnight  before  the  Kaiser's  visit  to  Tangier.  Gen- 
eral Andre,  in  his  hostility  towards  clericalism,  had 
made  the  War  Office  a  branch  of  the  secret  service,  with 
the  Masonic  Order  as  his  chief  agent  for  spying  and 
making  delations.  M.  Pelletan  had  completely  wrecked 
the  morale  of  the  marine.  M.  Jaures  and  his  Socialist 
followers  had  become  so  strong  that  no  government 
could  exist  without  their  support;  M.  Jaures,  who  as 
M.  Pugliesi  Conti  declared  in  the  Chamber,  "had  re- 
cently sullied  this  tribune  by  the  most  abominable  sac- 
rilege against  our  French  sentiments,  he  whose  tardy 
and  obsequious  compliments  have  gone  to  awaken  in 
his  tomb  the  Gallophobe  Crispi,"9 — M.  Jaures,  who 

s  Georges  Eeynald,  "L'Oeuvre  de  M.  DelcasseV'  p.  39. 

o  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  69,  p.  210.  In  this  same  session,  Jan- 
uary 23,  1903  M.  Lasies  called  the  attention  of  the  Chamber  to  a 
brochure  distributed  to  the  new  recruits  in  the  army  by  the  Federa- 
tion des  bourses  de  travail,  an  organization  subventioned  by  the  gov- 
ernment and  supported  by  M.  Jaures,  quoting  as  follows:  "If  you 
do  not  feel  yourself  able  to  support  the  vexations,  the  insults,  the  im- 
becilities, the  punishment  and  all  the  shames  which  await  you  at  the 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE  177 

wished  to  found  the  Republic  Indestructible,  not  merely 
the  French  Republic,  but  the  Republic  of  Europe,  the 
Republic  of  Humanity.  M.  Lucien  Millevoye,  in  com- 
batting these  theories,  asked  the  Socialists  to  remem- 
ber that  while  they  were  attempting  to  inscribe  on  the 
conscience  of  the  universe  their  law  of  love  and  peace, 
others  were  maintaining  graven  on  the  threshold  of 
their  arsenals  and  barracks,  their  law  of  war  and  iron ; 
also  that  neither  Attila,  nor  Ghengis-Khan,  nor  Ba- 
jazet  could  throw  as  many  men  upon  the  world  as  are 
found  in  a  dozen  corps  of  the  German  army ;  and  that 
this  mass  of  flesh  and  steel,  with  the  most  speedy  and 
complete  means  of  invasion  at  its  disposal  was  at  the 
bidding  of  one  will,  one  order — one  flash  of  lightning 
and  there  would  follow  the  most  frightful  tempest  that 
had  ever  devastated  the  universe.10 

But  such  pleas  were  like  voices  crying  in  the  wilder- 
ness; it  seemed  as  though  France  had  to  be  brought 
to  the  very  brink  of  disaster  before  she  could  be  made 
to  realize  the  danger  of  her  course.  The  one  and  only 
fault  that  may  legitimately  be  found  with  the  policy 
of  M.  Delcasse  was  that  he  did  not  take  into  considera- 
tion the  internal  condition  of  France  in  connection  with 
its  foreign  relations.  M.  Combes  in  his  struggle  with 
the  forces  of  clericalism,  had  no  time  left  for  watching 
over  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs.  He  gave  M.  Del- 
casse a  free  rein.  But  M.  Delcasse  placed  too  much 
confidence  in  the  strength  of  his  diplomatic  props,  and 
paid  too  little  attention  to  the  weakness  of  the  military 

barracks,  desert!     This  is  far  better  than  to  serve  as  amusement  for 
the  alcoholic  executioners  and  the  mad  fools  that  take  care  of  you  in 
the  military  prisons." 
10  Ibid.,  Vol.  69ii,  p.  1311. 


178  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

and  naval  support  upon  which  he  must  depend.  He 
could  not  be  entirely  excused  when  he  said:  "I  do  my 
own  duty  and  presume  that  my  colleagues  do  theirs. ' ' 
In  the  words  of  M.  Andre  Tardieu,  M.  Delcasse  "be- 
lieved that  a  diplomatic  action  was  self-sufficing"  .  .  . 
being  aware  that  German  opposition  would  be  made, 
sooner  or  later,  not  to  his  Moroccan  but  to  his  general 
policy,  he,  however,  did  not  perceive  that  a  France  half- 
disarmed  both  materially  and  morally  was  fatally  con- 
demned to  yield.  He  willed  the  end  without  willing 
the  means.11  On  the  other  hand  with  the  Rouvier 
ministry  in  control,  M.  Delcasse  did  not  receive  the 
backing  that  he  had  a  right  to  expect;  his  carefully 
planned  work  was  being  undermined  from  within  even 
before  it  was  attacked  from  without. 

The  only  question  in  the  mind  of  Chancellor  von 
Biilow  was,  when  would  be  the  best  time  to  strike? 
Obviously  with  France's  ally  undertaking  a  war  in 
the  Far  East,  it  would  be  well  to  await  developments 
in  that  quarter.  The  initial  disasters  to  the  Russian 
Port  Arthur  and  Vladivostok  fleets  might  well  be  re- 
trieved. However  when  General  Kuropatkin,  early  in 
September,  lost  the  important  battle  of  Liao-Yang,  and 
was  forced  back  upon  Mukden,  it  was  quite  evident 
that  the  Japanese  were  superior  on  both  land  and  sea. 
Port  Arthur  fell  to  the  Japanese  on  January  2,  1905, 
and  in  the  same  month  it  was  reported  that  Herr  Kuhl- 
mann  had  remarked  to  a  member  of  the  French  lega- 
tion at  Tangier:  "You  are  making  a  mistake  not  to 
come  to  an  agreement  with  us.    The  Imperial  initia- 

"  "France  and  the  Alliances,"  p.  181. 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE  179 

tive  is  going  to  take  a  hand."  12  On  March  9  Kurd 
patkin  was  forced  to  withdraw  from  Mukden,  the  de, 
cisive  defeat  of  the  war  on  land ;  on  March  25,  Emperor 
William  embarked  for  his  trip  on  the  Mediterranean, 
and  on  March  29,  Chancellor  von  Biilow  made  the  an- 
swer to  Herr  Bebel  in  regard  to  the  change  in  German 
policy  which  we  have  already  quoted,  concluding  with 
the  statement  that  "if  any  attempt  should  be  made  to 
modify  the  international  situation  of  Morocco  or  to  es- 
tablish any  check  on  the  open  door  in  the  country's 
economic  development  it  is  our  intention  to  see  that 
our  economic  interests  are  not  endangered."13  The 
Kaiser's  visit  to  Tangier  completed  the  first  act  of 
the  Moroccan  drama,  with  the  Kaiser  in  the  role  of 
the  rescuing  hero,  preserving  the  Sultan  and  his  em- 
pire from  the  deep  laid  plots  of  M.  Delcasse.14 

2.     GERMANY  FORCES  THE  ISSUE 

Germany  had  made  her  move,  and  it  was  now  the 
turn  of  France.  On  the  same  day  that  the  Kaiser 
spoke  at  Tangier,  the  question  of  the  German  attitude 
on  the  Moroccan  question  was  raised  in  the  Senate. 
M.  Delcasse  was  in  the  more  difficult  position,  in  that 

12  Recouly,  "Le  Septenat  de  M.  DelcasseV'  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  June, 
1905. 

is  "Fiirst  Biilows  Reden,"  Vol.  II,  p.  210. 

i*  The  Kaiser  almost  wrecked  the  whole  scheme  by  a  sudden  deci- 
sion not  to  visit  Tangier.  When  his  sudden  change  of  mind  was  made 
known  in  Berlin  veritable  consternation  reigned  for  a  while.  Finally 
the  Chancellor  telegraphed  to  Lisbon  representing  to  the  Emperor  that 
the  affair  had  already  gone  so  far  that  it  was  impossible  to  recede 
without  completely  disavowing  his  advisers.  The  Kaiser  hesitated  no 
longer  and  carried  out  his  program.  Guibert  et  Ferrette,  "Le  Conflict 
Franco-allemand,"  p.  184. 


180  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Germany  had  made  no  opposition  to  the  French  policy, 
nor  was  it  as  yet  clear  just  what  she  wished.  In  re- 
ply to  the  question  of  M.  Decrais  concerning  the  hostile 
attitude  of  the  German  press,  he  replied:  "Nothing 
in  our  Moroccan  policy,  nothing  in  our  carrying  out  of 
the  accords  of  April  8,  and  October  3,  1904,  can  ex- 
plain the  agitation  in  the  press  mentioned  by  M.  De- 
crais.' '  He  then  declared  once  more  that  in  no  way 
whatsoever  had  the  economic  interests  of  any  third 
party  been  injured,  nor  would  they  be  injured  by 
France  in  putting  into  effect  the  administrative,  eco- 
nomic, financial,  and  commercial  reforms  of  which  Mo- 
rocco had  need.15  On  April  7,  1905,  a  despatch  to  the 
French  ambassadors  in  St.  Petersburg,  Madrid, 
Vienna,  London  and  Rome  from  M.  Delcasse  showed 
the  falsity  of  Germany 's  claim  that  she  had  received  no 
official  notification.16  Another  accusation  raised  by  the 
German  press  was  to  the  effect  that  M.  Saint  Rene 
Taillandier  had  asserted  that  France  had  received  a 
mandate  from  Europe  to  impose  her  program  of  re- 
forms upon  Morocco.  M.  Saint  Rene  Taillandier  has- 
tened to  deny  this  categorically,  and  informed  M.  Del- 
casse that  he  had  been  extremely  careful  to  state  that 
France  founded  her  right  to  counsel  the  Shereefian 
Government  on  her  own  situation,  which  had  been  re- 
cently consecrated  by  accords  concluded  with  the  pow- 
ers bordering  on  and  most  interested  in  the  affairs  of 
this  country.17  M.  Delcasse  thereupon  proceeded  to 
acquaint  Prince  Radolin  with  this  denial,  and  also 
called  his  attention  to  their  conversation  preceding  the 

is  Annales  du  Senate,  Vol.  67i,  p.  641. 
ie  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  236. 
« Ibid.,  No.  237. 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE  181 

Franco-English  Accord,  and  the  official  communication 
of  the  Franco-Spanish  Accord  to  the  German  govern- 
ment. In  conclusion  M.  Delcasse  declared  that  if  in 
spite  of  his  explanations  a  misunderstanding  still 
existed  he  would  be  very  willing  to  dissipate  it.18 

In  the  meantime  on  April  7,  in  reply  to  several  in- 
terpellations in  the  Chamber,  M.  Delcasse  repeated  his 
assertion,  that  France  intended  to  continue  her  task  in 
Morocco  in  such  a  manner  as  to  interfere  with  the 
rights  of  no  one,  and  that  if  after  these  formal  declara- 
tions there  still  remained  any  misunderstanding  she 
would  be  only  too  willing  to  dissipate  it.19  M.  Del- 
casse had  offered  to  discuss  the  matter  directly  with 
Germany  in  his  conference  with  Prince  Radolin,  he  had 
announced  his  willingness  from  the  rostrum  of  the 
Chamber,  he  now  authorized  M.  Bihourd  to  open  the 
discussion  in  Berlin.  It  was  all  in  vain.  Germany 
was  not  yet  ready  to  talk,  and  the  debacle  of  the  Rus- 
sian forces  in  the  Far  East  gave  her  confidence  in  her 
position.  Chancellor  von  Biilow  had  already  suggested 
the  idea  of  an  international  conference  in  his  despatch 
to  the  German  ambassadors,20  but  M.  Delcasse  al- 
though he  suspected  that  Germany  would  adopt  some 
such  attitude,  did  not  feel  that  France  could  affqrd  to 
submit  to  such  a  conference  at  the  command  of  Ger- 
many. He  therefore  acquainted  M.  Saint  Rene  Tail- 
landier  with  his  suspicions,  and  authorized  him  to 
make  it  clear  to  the  Sultan  that  any  such  plan  would 

is  German  Wiite  Book  No.  6,  Arch.  Dip.,  Vol.  97,  p.  281;  also  Doc. 
Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  243.  It  will  be  noted  that  Prince  Radolin  in  his 
report  of  this  conversation  as  given  in  the  German  White  Book  makes 
no  reference  to  M.  Delcasse's  offer  to  dissipate  the  misunderstanding. 

i»Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  75ii,  p.  1570. 

2»  Sea  p.  172. 


182  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

be  inimical  to  the  friendly  relations  existing  between 
France  and  the  Shereefian  Empire.21 

The  German  press  continued  to  grow  more  threaten- 
ing, and  public  opinion  in  France  became  restive. 
When  the  question  again  came  up  for  discussion  in 
the  Chamber  on  April  19,  a  torrent  of  abuse  descended 
upon  the  head  of  M.  Delcasse  for  bringing  France  into 
such  an  impasse.  The  Socialists  led  in  the  attack,  but 
all  parties  and  factions  joined  in  with  them.  Ger- 
cany's  accusations,  that  she  had  received  no  notice  of 
the  accords,  were  accepted  blindly.  Some  found  him 
guilty  of  changing  the  entente  with  Great  Britain  into 
a  weapon  of  offence,  although  he  had  declared  its  chief 
purpose  was  to  insure  peace;  others  asserted  he  was 
pulling  England's  chestnuts  out  of  the  fire;  some  ac- 
cused him  of  carrying  on  a  personal  policy  without 
any  regard  for  the  Chamber,  which  was  kept  wholly 
ignorant  until  it  was  too  late  to  interfere;  others 
blamed  him  for  ever  bringing  about  the  rapproche- 
ment with  Great  Britain;  all  united  in  censuring  him 
for  not  taking  Germany  into  consideration  before  at- 
tempting any  program  of  reforms  in  Morocco.  The 
11 Journal  Officiel"  reporting  this  day's  seance  of  the 
Chamber  must  have  been  very  pleasant  reading  in 
Germany.  Even  M.  Rouvier,  despite  his  antipathy  to 
M.  Delcasse,  was  forced  to  come  to  his  support  and 
take  the  responsibility  for  the  future  policy  of  the 
government.  M.  Delcasse  attempted  no  further  de- 
fence; he  simply  reiterated  that  France  was  willing 
to  dissipate  any  misunderstanding.22    He  then  offered 

21  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  238. 

22  Annates  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  75ii,  p.  1922. 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE  183 

his  resignation,  but  President  Loubet  refused  to  ac- 
cept it.  It  would  have  been  better  for  all  concerned 
if  M.  Delcasse  had  insisted,  although  it  was  entirely 
to  his  honor  that  he  was  unwilling  to  retreat  under  fire, 
even  though  the  fire  did  not  come  wholly  from  the 
enemy's  side.  But  it  was  now  merely  a  question  of 
time,  for  Germany  was  determined  to  force  him  out 
and  M.  Kouvier  was  only  too  willing  to  allow  her  to 
proceed.23 

M.  Bihourd  again  attempted  to  discuss  the  situation 
with  the  German  Foreign  Secretary,  going  so  far  as 
to  offer  the  text  of  the  various  conversations  which  M. 
Delcasse  had  held  with  Prince  Radolin,  but  his  offers 
were  declined  as  being  superfluous.24  In  a  despatch  to 
M.  Delcasse  dated  April  28,  at  Berlin,  M.  Bihourd 
summed  up  the  situation  as  follows:  "The  Imperial 
Government  is  in  no  haste  to  reply  to  the  question  that 
Your  Excellency  at  Paris,  and  I  at  Berlin,  have  put  to 
it.  This  silence  fits  in  well  with  the  policy  which  the 
Chancellor  has  proclaimed  at  the  Reichstag,  and  the 
Emperor  at  Tangier.  In  adopting  this  attitude,  it 
has  attempted  first  to  give  abundant  satisfaction  to  the 
national  amour-propre,  secondly  to  appease  by  a  de- 
mand for  consideration  the  complaints  of  representa- 
tives of  industry  and  commerce,  who  claim  to  have  been 
sacrificed  by  the  recent  treaties.  .  .  .  Direct  negotia- 
tions seem  impossible  at  this  time,  for  the  official 
declarations  repulse  them  or  impose  upon  our  initia- 

25  M.  Andre"  Mevil  declares :  "Our  adversaries  knew  that  M.  Del- 
casse had  many  enemies  in  Parliament  and  that  in  a  cabinet  composed 
exclusively  of  friends  of  M.  Rouvier  he  could  count  on  little  sympathy." 
"De  Frankfort  a  Alg£ciras,"  p.  232. 

24  Doc.  Dip.,  op  cit.,  Nos.  245,  246. 


184  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

tive  conditions  which  could  be  accepted  with  difficulty; 
but  the  indirect  way  is  not  closed  to  us. 

"The  idea  of  a  conference  has  been  launched,  it  is 
still,  in  spite  of  the  unfavorable  reception  which  it  has 
met  with  in  the  principal  cabinets,  stubbornly  defended 
by  the  Imperial  Chancellory,  which,  however,  recom- 
mends an  exchange  of  views  between  the  Powers  sig- 
natory of  the  Conference  of  Madrid  in  1880."  25  On 
the  very  day  that  M.  Bihourd  wrote  that  all  avenues  of 
direct  approach  seemed  to  be  closed,  Chancellor  von 
Biilow  was  writing  the  following  note  to  Prince  Rado- 
lin  in  Paris:  "Express  in  my  name  my  thanks  to 
the  President  of  the  Council  (M.  Rouvier)  for  his  con- 
ciliatory declarations.  I  am  led  to  believe  that  he  un- 
derstands the  situation  in  which  Germany  would  be 
placed  if  third  powers  disposed  of  German  interests 
without  consulting  with  us.  ...  I  believe  that  I  can 
conclude  from  the  overtures  which  the  President  of 
the  Council  has  made  to  your  Highness  that  the  thought 
of  a  unilateral  solution  of  the  question  under  discus- 
sion or  one  resting  upon  force  is  as  far  from  his  mind 
as  from  that  of  the  Emperor.  .  .  ."  26 

Thus  while  M.  Delcasse  was  still  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  and  was  trying  in  a  legitimate  manner  to  find 
a  way  out  of  the  difficulty  and  yet  maintain  the  honor 
of  France,  M.  Rouvier,  the  Prime  Minister,  without  his 
knowledge,  was  carrying  on  secret  negotiations  with 
the  German  government.  Germany  could  now  pro- 
ceed confidently  towards  the  attainment  of  the  two  ob- 
jects which  she  had  set  as  her  goal:  the  downfall  of 

25  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  248. 

2«  German  White  Book  No,  8,  Arch.  Dip.,  Vol.  97,  p.  284. 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE  185 

M.  Delcasse,  and  a  conference  of  the  Powers  to  settle 
the  Moroccan  question.  As  instruments  she  chose 
Prince  Henckel  von  Donnersmarck  who  was  to  pro- 
ceed to  Paris,  and  Count  von  Tattenbach  as  emissary 
to  Fez.  The  former  was  to  work  against  M.  Delcasse, 
the  latter  to  work  upon  the  Sultan.  Both  were  com- 
pletely successful. 

The  mission  of  Prince  Donnersmarck  was  revealed 
by  a  confidential  statement  made  by  himself  during  his 
visit  to  Paris,  and  published  June  17  by  the  Gaulois. 
A  few  sentences  quoted  from  his  statement  will  eluci- 
date the  plan  of  the  German  Foreign  Office:  "If  you 
are  of  the  opinion  that  your  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs has  engaged  your  country  in  too  adventurous  a 
course,  acknowledge  it  by  dispensing  with  his  services, 
and  especially  by  giving  a  new  direction  to  your  for- 
eign policy.  We  are  not  concerned  with  M.  Delcasse 's 
person;  but  his  policy  is  a  menace  to  Germany ;  and  you 
may  rest  assured  that  we  shall  not  wait  for  it  to  be 
realized.  .  .  .  Take  the  word  of  a  German  who  has 
always  had  great  sympathies  for  you.  Give  up  the 
minister  whose  only  aspiration  is  to  trouble  the  peace 
of  Europe ;  and  adopt  with  regard  to  Germany  a  loyal 
and  open  policy.  .  .  . ' ' 27  The  strangest  thing  of  all 
was  that  not  only  M.  Rouvier  and  his  friends,  but  all 
France  was  ready  to  accept  this  advice.  In  the  words 
of  a  leading  French  publicist,  "When  a  man  puts  his 
country  in  an  impasse,  the  best  way  to  get  out  is  to 
throw  him  overboard  and  then  take  stock  of  the  situa- 
tion."28 

27  Quoted   in   Ques.   Dip.   et  Col.   July    1,   '05;    also   Andre"   Tardieu, 
"France  and  the  Alliances,"   p.    183. 

2«  Millet,  "Penl  National,"  Rec.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  June.  1905. 


186  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

France  seemed  to  have  fallen  into  a  blue  funk.  The 
British  government  appeared  ready  to  back  her  in  any 
stand  she  might  take;  King  Edward  made  a  special 
trip  to  Paris  the  first  week  in  May  to  emphasize  the 
solidarity  of  feeling,  the  British  press  was  loud  in  its 
denunciation  of  Germany.  But  France  wanted  peace 
and  was  determined  to  have  it  at  any  price.29  While 
M.  Delcasse  continued  to  refuse  a  conference  and  au- 
thorized M.  Saint  Rene  Taillandier  to  inform  the  Sultan 
that  no  Powers  could  intervene  between  Morocco  and 
France,80  M.  Rouvier  continued  to  negotiate  secretly 
with  Germany  with  an  entirely  different  intent.  In  a 
despatch  from  Herr  von  Biilow  to  Prince  Radolin, 
dated  May  22,  1905,  we  have  conclusive  proof  of  this 
fact.  Replying  to  the  statement  made  by  the  French 
minister  at  Fez  that  M.  Delcasse  would  consider  any 
attempt  to  communicate  proposals  of  reforms  to  the 
signatory  Powers  as  detrimental  to  the  interests  of 
France,  he  (von  Biilow)  was  able  to  assert  that  declara- 
tions made  by  M.  Rouvier  authorized  him  to  admit  that 
the  President  of  the  Council  disapproved  of  this  mode 
of  action.31 

2»  M.  Leghait,  the  Belgian  minister  to  Paris  in  a  despatch  dated 
May  7,  1905  declared:  "The  presence  of  the  King  of  England  in  .Paris 
at  a  time  when  the  atmosphere  is  still  vibrating  with  the  events  of 
Tangier  has  a  significance  which  deserves  serious  attention  ...  it  is 
evidently  for  the  purpose  of  giving  to  France  at  this  moment  a  new 
proof  of  friendship  and  of  emphasizing  under  special  circumstances 
the  solidarity  existing  between  the  signatories  to  the  understanding  of 
April  8,  1904.  .  .  .  The  King  has,  however,  not  confined  himself  to 
expressing  his  sentiments  and  views  to  M.  Delcasse"  and  to  the  French 
politicians,  but  has  taken  care  that  the  court  at  Berlin  should  be  in- 
formed thereof.  .  .  ."  Belgian  Doc.  No.  4. 

so  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  251. 

si  German  White  Book  No.  12,  Arch.  Dip.  Vol.  97,  p.  361.  M.  Victor 
Berard  thus  characterizes  M.  Rouvier's  policy:     "This  treason  of  M. 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE  187 

In  the  meantime  Count  Tattenbach  the  Imperial 
Envoy  to  Fez  had  arrived,  and  had  his  first  interview 
with  the  Sultan,  May  13.  According  to  his  reports, 
the  Sultan  claimed  that  he  had  made  no  concessions  to 
the  French,  but  had  been  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the 
German  minister  before  reaching  any  decision.32 
Herr  Tattenbach  hastily  seized  the  opportunity  to  show 
the  falseness  of  the  French  position  and  the  advan- 
tage to  Morocco  of  submitting  the  question  to  a  con- 
ference of  the  Powers.  On  May  27,  he  had  won  his 
point,  and  the  Sultan  despatched  a  letter  to  M.  Saint 
Bene  Taillandier  informing  him  that  the  Notables, 
whom  he  had  summoned  to  consult  with  him  regarding 
the  program  of  reforms  submitted  by  France,  had  ad- 
vised him  not  to  consent  to  any  reform  without  first 
asking  for  an  International  Conference  of  the  Powers 
signatory  of  the  Conference  of  Madrid.33  Germany 
had  gained  one  of  her  objectives,  it  only  remained  to 
obtain  the  resignation  of  M.  Delcasse. 

A  veritable  avalanche  of  rumors  and  threats  de- 
scended upon  Paris.  M.  Barrere,  French  ambassador 
at  Rome  had  received  from  the  Italian  government  an 
alarming  communication  to  the  effect  that  France  had 
addressed  an  ultimatum  to  the  Sultan,  and  Germany 
had  informed  her  that  German  troops  would  cross  the 

Rouvier  (I  should  like  to  find  in  the  French  language  another  word; 
but  our  people,  ticklish  upon  questions  of  honor  and  good  faith,  desig- 
nate with  the  same  term  infidelity  to  friends,  comrades  or  colleagues, 
and  the  disregard  or  abandon  of  national  duty;  against  M.  Delcasse" 
and  against  the  policy  of  France  the  secret  intrigues  of  M.  Rouvier 
were  disloyal),  then  this  treason  of  M.  Rouvier  was  to  give  to  this 
Minister  of  Finances,  President  of  the  Council,  the  portfolio  of  Foreign 
Affairs."     "L' Affaire  Morocaine,"  p.  412. 

32  German  White  Book,  No.  10,  p.  359. 

33  Ibid.,  No.  14,  p.  363 ;  also  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  262. 


188  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Vosges  at  the  same  time  that  French  troops  crossed 
the  Moroccan  frontier.34  The  rumor  was  false  but  it 
served  its  purpose.  Paris  suddenly  learned  that  Ger- 
many was  arming,  that  movements  of  troops  had  been 
reported  in  Westphalia,  in  Wurtemberg,  on  the  frontier 
of  Baden  and  in  the  Rhine  provinces,  that  officers  of 
the  Royal  Prussian  Guard  had  been  ordered  to  hold 
themselves  in  readiness  for  immediate  service.  The 
fluctuations  on  the  Bourse  during  the  fourth  and  fifth 
of  June  gave  evidences  of  a  financial  panic.  The 
Chamber  experienced  the  same  emotions  as  during  the 
crisis  of  Fashoda.  In  the  words  of  one  of  its  mem- 
bers: "It  was  no  longer  England  who  threatened  us, 
but  Germany,  and  our  military  and  maritime  situa- 
tion was  certainly  worse  than  that  of  1898.  The  army, 
decapitated  in  its  staff  by  demagogic  distrust,  the 
corps  of  officers  decimated  by  the  delation  of  an  odious 
and  dominating  sect,  the  arsenals  in  disorder,  the  sup- 
ply stations  empty,  insubordination  and  desertion 
preached  openly  to  our  soldiers  by  agitators,  whose 
efforts  were  encouraged;  disorder  everywhere, 
strength  nowhere.     Such  was  the  situation."35 

On  June  5,  the  German  Chancellor  brought  matters 
to  a  climax  by  sending  a  note  to  all  the  signatory 
Powers  of  the  Madrid  Conference,  in  which  it  was 
stated  that,  since  the  Sultan  had  invited  the  signatory 
Powers  to  a  conference  at  Tangier  to  discuss  a  system 
of  reforms  for  Morocco,  the  Imperial  Government  be- 
lieved that  such  a  conference  afforded  the  best  means 
to  introduce  such  reforms,  and  for  this  reason  it  had 

s*  Georges  Reynald,  "Le  Diplomatic  Franchise,"  p.  41. 
ssGuibert  etFerrette,  "Le  Conflict  Franco- Allemand,"  p.  263. 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE  189 

accepted  the  Sultan's  invitation.  The  note  also  de- 
clared that  the  special  privileges  sought  by  France 
would  result  in  a  violation  of  the  Convention  of  Madrid, 
since  France  intended,  just  as  she  had  in  Tunis,  to 
take  over  the  administrative  machinery  of  the  coun- 
try, thus  putting  it  under  her  political  and  economic 
domination.36 

M.  Rouvier  called  a  meeting  of  the  Council  on  June 
6,  to  determine  the  policy  of  France.  In  the  stormy 
session  which  ensued,  M.  Delcasse  urged  that  France 
refuse  to  accept  the  proposal  for  a  conference.  He 
showed  that  Germany's  claims  that  she  had  not  been 
informed  were  false;  that  to  find  in  the  text  of  the 
Madrid  Convention,  which  merely  related  to  the  status 
of  the  European  consulates  in  Morocco,  the  right  to 
submit  the  Shereefian  Empire  to  a  European  con- 
dominium was  a  most  palpable  pretext, — finally  that 
Russia,  England,  Italy,  Spain  and  the  United  States 
declared  the  conference  useless  and  unnecessary, — why 
then,  should  France  accept?  The  whole  proposition 
was  bound  to  fall  through.  If  France  did  accept  the 
conference  called  by  the  Sultan  at  Germany's  behest, 
it  would  give  Germany  the  right  to  take  part  in  the 
affairs  of  North  Africa,  and  henceforth  France  would 
be  at  the  mercy  of  her  bluster  and  caprice.  ' '  What  did 
Germany  really  wish?  She  wished  to  sound  the  will 
of  France,  to  intervene  in  the  exercise  of  her  rights 
as  an  independent  nation,  dictate  her  conduct,  regu- 
late her  friendships,  and  subject  her  to  a  humiliating 
vasselage.  To  cede  to-day  would  be  to  cede  to-mor- 
row,   and    France    emerging   from   this    humiliation 

se  German  Wbite  Book,  No.  16. 


190  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

would  be  weaker  but  not  less  exposed. ' ' 37  He  assured 
them  that  Great  Britain  was  behind  them  in  case  of  an 
unprovoked  aggression,38  but  that  Germany  would  not 
attack,  it  was  only  a  case  of  bluff.  He  was  pleading 
before  a  jury  which  had  rendered  its  decision.  M. 
Rouvier  insisted  that  to  refuse  meant  war  and  they 
did  not  want  war.  Germany  had  won  her  second  point, 
M.  Delcasse  was  forced  to  resign,  and  this  time  it  was 
final.  "We  didn't  ask  for  his  head,  they  offered  it 
to  us,"  said  the  Princess  von  Biilow,  who  received  her 
new  title  as  a  direct  result  of  M.  Delcasse 's  fall. 
The  satisfaction  everywhere  evident  in  France  at 

87  Georges  Reynald,  "La  Diplomatic  Franchise,"  p.  45;  see  also 
Debidour,  "Histoire  Diplomatique  de  l'Europe"   (1904-1916),  p.  22. 

38  There  is  still  some  question  as  to  the  exact  extent  to  which  France 
could  count  upon  Great  Britain,  but  undoubtedly  some  promise  had 
been  made.  In  fact  the  Accords  of  1904  themselves  assured  France 
of  diplomatic  support  (Art.  9).  According  to  1A.  Andre"  Mevil,  "Eng- 
land did  not  hesitate  to  give  us  the  assurance  that  the  British  military 
forces  were  ready  to  march  with  us  against  Germany  if  this  power 
came  to  attack  us.  Better  still,  the  British  government,  the  principle 
of  an  Anglo-French  defensive  co-operation  once  admitted,  declared 
herself  ready  to  sign  without  delay  an  accord  which  would  establish 
definitely  this  co-operation.  .  .  ."  M.  Mevil  goes  so  far  as  to  intimate 
that  the  very  next  day  Berlin  knew  of  this  offer  through  the  intimate 
relations  existing  between  the  Rouvier  cabinet  and  Germany.  Mevil, 
op.  cit.,  p.  282. 

The  Matin  published  a  sensational  expose"  on  Oct.  5,  1905,  which  as- 
serted that  England  had  given  verbal  notice  to  France  that  if  France 
should  be  attacked  she  was  ready  to  mobolize  her  fleet,  seize  the  Kiel 
Canal,  and  disembark  100,000  men  in  Schleswig-Holstein.  She  was 
ready  furthermore  to  put  this  offer  in  writing  if  France  so  desired. 
On  October  13  both  the  Havas  and  Reuter  agencies  declared  these  re- 
ports to  be  inexact.  See  London  Times  Oct.  9,  1905;  also  Ques.  Dip. 
et  Col.,  Oct.  16,  1905. 

Editorially,  the  Times  declared  in  regard  to  M.  Delcasse's  statement 
that  England  was  ready  to  support  France  in  the  event  of  an  unex- 
pected act  of  oppression  directed  against  France:  "With  that  state- 
ment we  have  no  fault  to  find.  We  do  not  at  all  doubt  that  in  such 
a  contingency  the  English  Government  would  have  supported  France 
with  the  hearty  approval  of  the  nation." 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE  191 

the  downfall  of  M.  Delcasse  is  one  of  the  most  inex- 
plicable incidents  of  French  politics.  It  is  not  at  all 
surprising  that  he  was  forced  out  by  M.  Rouvier,  whose 
jealousy  and  hostility  towards  him  were  notorious. 
The  surprising  part  of  the  affair  is  that  a  foreign 
minister  who  had  for  seven  years,  through  four  dif- 
ferent ministries,  carried  on  the  foreign  policy  of 
France  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  great  majority,  should 
have  been  forced  out  individually,  with  not  even  the 
fall  of  the  ministry  to  save  the  appearance  of  the 
situation,  and  without  a  single  voice  of  protest  being 
raised  in  his  behalf.  Germany's  hand  in  the  affair 
must  have  been  evident  to  the  veriest  tyro  in  foreign 
politics!  As  a  brilliant  English  writer  has  put  it: 
"Any  stick  was  good  enough  to  beat  the  unfortunate 
M.  Delcasse  within  his  own  country,  any  stone  served 
for  pelting  him.  None  so  poor  for  the  time  being  to 
do  reverence  to  the  minister  ...  of  all  the  Paris 
newspapers,  only  the  'Debats'  had  the  decency,  at 
least,  to  give  him  one  consolatory  pat  on  the  back, 
when  he  was  kicked  out — for  kicked  out  he  was. 
Every  other  helped  in  the  kicking  with  shameless 
gusto.  The  Paris  press  has  hardly  ever  before  dur- 
ing the  Third  Republic  been  so  well  agreed  in  any  one 
purpose  as  it  was  in  rending  M.  Delcasse. ' ' 39 

Across  the  Rhine  joy  was  equally  great.  Chancellor 
von  Biilow  was  immediately  made  a  prince  by  the 
Kaiser,  and  the  newspapers  exulted  in  the  German 
victory.  The  Chancellor  himself,  writing  some  years 
later  says  that  "the  retirement  of  M.  Delcasse  proved 
to  be  no  transitory  triumph  for  us.     His  fall  weakened 

39  Laurence  Jerrold,  "The  Real  France,"  Chap.  VII. 


192  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

French  chauvinism  and  more  prudent  and  peaceful 
counsels  prevailed  again,  thereby  facilitating  our 
policy.  .  .  ."40  M.  Delcasse  found  some  consolation  in 
the  English  press  which  not  only  eulogised  his  record 
but  regretted  exceedingly  his  departue.  Even 
America  seemed  to  have  a  far  clearer  perception  of  the 
exact  situation  than  was  to  be  found  in  France.  John 
Hay  writing  to  Henry  Adams  the  day  following  M.  Del- 
casse's  resignation  very  cleverly  depicted  the  situa- 
tion :  "I  see  your  friend,  the  Kaiser,  has  at  last  taken 
the  scalp  of  Delcasse.  .  .  .  He  has  evidently  done  it 
out  of  sheer  wantonness,  to  let  people  know  there  is  a 
God  in  Israel.  Characteristic,  his  rushing  to  Billow's 
house  and  making  him  a  prince  on  the  spot  to  advertise 
his  scare.  Spring-Rice  turned  up  in  London  yester- 
day. He  says  he  does  not  think  the  Kaiser  means  or 
wishes  war  with  France.  He  merely  wants  to  insult 
her  publicly,  by  way  of  notifying  her  that  if  she  does 
not  want  him  to  do  it  again  she  had  better  make  friends 
with  him.  The  situation  is  not,  as  it  appears,  satisfac- 
tory to  any  one.  France  has  been  profoundly  humili- 
ated and  does  not  care  to  show  any  resentment.  Eng- 
land is  not  inclined  to  sympathize  with  her  as  she  seems 
unconscious  of  her  injury.  The  Bear  is  licking  his 
own  wounds  and  does  not  care  what  happens  to  the 
Cock  and  the  Lion.  It  was  a  good  time  for  the  Kaiser 
to  tread  the  stage  in  the  Ercles  vein."  41 

3.     M.  ROUVIER  AT  THE  QUAI  DORSAY 

If  M.  Rouvier  thought  that  with  M.  Delcasse  out  of 
the  way,  and  the  portfolio  of  foreign  affairs  as  well 

*o  Von  Billow,  "Imperial  Germany,"  p.  98. 

*i  Thayer,  "Life  and  Letters  of  John  Hay,"  Vol.  II,  p.  404. 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE  193 

as  the  premiership  in  his  own  hands,  Germany  would 
be  satisfied,  he  was  apprised  very  quickly  of  his  mis- 
take. On  June  10  in  a  conference  with  Prince  Radolin, 
he  showed  that  he  was  no  more  anxious  for  a  confer- 
ence than  M.  Delcasse  had  been.  He  declared  that 
France  could  not  consider  a  conference  without  a  pre- 
liminary agreement  with  Germany,  and  if  such  an 
agreement  was  reached  there  would  be  no  further  need 
of  a  conference.  In  fact  under  those  circumstances 
a  conference  would  be  a  complication  rather  than  a 
solution.  "Therefore,"  he  suggested,  "before  con- 
sidering the  question  further  we  must  know  Germany's 
attitude  towards  the  reforms."  The  brutally  frank 
response  of  the  German  ambassador  showed  that  per- 
sonal feelings  of  friendship  had  no  place  in  German 
diplomacy :  "We  insist  on  the  Conference.  If  it  does 
not  take  place,  the  status  quo  remains  and  you  must 
know  that  we  are  behind  Morocco."  42 

Prince  Radolin  was  merely  carrying  out  the  orders 
of  the  Chancellor,  and  in  his  notes  to  the  German  am- 
bassador, June  12  and  June  16,  Prince  von  Biilow  in- 
sisted that  before  any  preliminary  arrangements 
should  be  discussed,  France  must  submit  first  to  the 
idea  of  a  conference.43  M.  Eouvier  was  sure  there 
must  be  some  misunderstanding;  surely  Germany 
would  listen  to  his  explanation  even  though  she  had 
refused  the  same  request  when  made  by  M.  Delcasse. 

42  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  269.  M.  Andre"  Tardieu  declared  that  M. 
Rouvier  told  him  that  the  German  ambassador  added  that  they  were 
back  of  Morocco  "with  their  entire  strength."  "France  and  the  Al- 
liances," p.  187. 

« German  White  Book,  Nos.  18  and  19,  Arch.  Dip.,  Vol.  73,  p.  383, 
et  seq. 


194  FEENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Consequently  in  a  long  despatch  to  Prince  Radolin,  M. 
Rouvier  once  more  pointed  out  the  position  of  France, 
her  intention  of  maintaining  the  independence  of  the 
Sultan  and  the  crying  need  for  reforms.  As  to  a  con- 
ference, France  still  insists  that  it  would  be  danger- 
ous if  not  preceded  by  an  entente,  and  useless  if  it  fol- 
lowed one.  However  in  order  that  France  may  show 
her  conciliatory  spirit  she  does  not  categorically  refuse 
a  conference.  Nevertheless  she  would  like  to  know 
what  the  Imperial  Government  regarded  as  the  pre- 
cise points  to  be  treated  and  the  solutions  if  proposed.44 
That  there  might  be  no  mistake  about  its  reaching 
the  German  Chancellor,  M.  Rouvier  sent  a  copy  to  M. 
Bihourd  asking  that  he  transmit  it  to  the  Imperial 
Chancellor.  The  reply  to  this  note  left  no  further 
room  for  misunderstandings.  Prince  von  Biilow  in- 
formed M.  Bihourd  that  he  found  M.  Rouvier 's  note 
"a  surprise  and  a  deception,"  and  was  wholly  unac- 
ceptable. Furthermore,  he  advised  M.  Bihourd  that 
France  ought  not  to  allow  this  dangerous  question  to 
drag,  nor  ' '  ought  she  delay  upon  a  road  bordered  with 
precipices  and  even  with  abysses."  45  Two  days  later, 
on  June  25,  upon  the  occasion  of  another  interview  with 
the  French  ambassador,  the  German  Chancellor  again 
warned  him  that  France  must  hasten,  for  the  Sultan 
was  uneasy  and  was  multiplying  his  offers  to  Germany, 
and  his  demands  also,  and  "an  incident  might  arrive 
which  would  render  the  already  grave  situation 
fatal."46  ' 

<*  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit,  No.  272. 
« Ibid.,  No.  276. 

4«  Ibid.,  No.  278;  see  also  German  White  Book,  No.  21,  Arch.  Dip., 
Vol.  73,  p.  390. 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE  195 

M.  Rouvier  had  conceded  too  much  to  stop  now,  and 
on  July  8,  by  a  mutual  exchange  of  letters,  the  two 
governments  accepted  the  principle  of  an  international 
conference  upon  the  following  basis:  sovereignty  and 
independence  of  the  Sultan;  integrity  of  his  empire; 
economic  liberty  without  any  inequality;  need  of  re- 
forms both  financial  and  in  the  police,  their  introduc- 
tion to  be  regulated  by  an  international  agreement; 
and  recognition  of  the  special  situation  of  France  in 
Morocco  through  its  possession  of  Algeria.47  France 
might  take  such  comfort  as  she  could  out  of  the  last 
provision. 

Hardly  had  the  two  governments  come  to  an  agree- 
ment before  Germany  broke  faith.  In  the  discussions 
leading  up  the  exchange  of  letters  of  July  8,  it  was 
agreed  that  from  the  moment  that  a  conference  was 
accepted  both  sides  would  suspend  individual  nego- 
tiations with  the  Sultan.  Yet  on  July  12  M.  Rouvier 
received  a  letter  from  the  French  minister  at  Fez, 
stating  that  the  German  minister  was  on  the  point  of 
obtaining  certain  concessions  for  a  German  firm.48 
M.  Rouvier  protested,  but  later  he  learned  that  not 
only  had  a  contract  been  awarded  to  a  German  firm  for 
the  construction  of  a  mole  and  other  enterprises  at 
Tangier,  but  similar  advantages  were  being  sought  in 
other  ports.49  Another  protest  obtained  a  most  eva- 
sive reply.50  Then  reports  began  to  come  in  that  Ger- 
man bankers  were  negotiating  a  loan  to  the  Sultan, 
which  was   not  only  a  direct  violation  of   German 

« Ibid.,  No.  287. 

48  Ibid.,  No.  288. 

49  Ibid.,  No.  291, 
60  Ibid.,  No.  297. 


196  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

pledges,  but  a  direct  violation  by  the  Sultan  of  the 
clauses  of  his  contract  in  the  last  loan  which  he  had 
obtained  in  France.  The  German  reply  to  this  was 
that  the  Sultan  had  demanded  a  huge  loan  of  from 
two  to  three  million  pounds  sterling  from  British 
bankers,  who  since  they  were  unwilling  to  advance  it 
turned  it  over  to  German  bankers.  They  in  order  to 
safeguard  the  general  interests  of  Morocco  promised 
the  Sultan  a  small  loan  of  ten  million  marks,  simply  to 
relieve  his  present  critical  financial  situation.  In  or- 
der to  keep  faith  with  France  no  economic  concessions 
had  been  demanded  as  security.51  As  for  the  con- 
structions in  the  ports  of  Tangier,  the  concessions  had 
been  obtained  months  before  the  entente  with  France.52 
At  the  same  time  the  Sultan  relying  upon  his  new  al- 
lies, seized  one  of  the  Algerian  subjects  of  France, 
violating  thereby  both  his  agreements  with  France  and 
the  principles  embodied  in  the  Conference  of  Madrid.53 
This  was  more  than  even  the  prudent  banker  Rouvier 
was  willing  to  stand.  Apparently  Germany  was  pre- 
paring to  make  her  position  strong  in  Morocco  before 
the  conference  should  be  called.  As  for  the  difficulties 
which  France  might  have  over  her  Algerian  subjects, 
Germany  as  being  persona  gratissima  at  the  court  of 
the  Sultan,  was  unwilling  to  see  force  employed  at  this 
most  critical  time.  Curtly  disregarding  the  German 
interference,  M.  Rouvier  sent  an  ultimatum  to  the  Sul- 
tan which  soon  brought  that  worthy  to  reason,  when 
he  found  that  his  German  friends  were  much  less  in- 
terested in  supporting  the  Sultan's  interests  in  Mo 

8i  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  306,  annexe. 
62  Ibid.,  No.  310. 
o»  Ibid.,  No.  311. 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE  197 

rocco  than  they  were  in  supporting  their  own.54  Pro- 
testing again  at  the  lack  of  faith  shown  by  these  opera- 
tions in  Morocco,  M.  Bihourd  was  informed  by  Prince 
von  Btilow  that  these  enterprises  were  most  insigni- 
ficant, in  fact  that  of  the  port  was  one  of  the  Sultan's 
gifts  which  he  sought  to  refuse.  "In  your  place,  I 
should  force  him  to  make  me  a  similar  concession." 
M.  Bihourd  replied  that  the  French  did  not  intend  to 
disregard  their  reciprocal  engagements.55  The  Ger- 
man Chancellor  realizing  that  France  could  be  brow- 
beaten no  further,  ordered  Dr.  Rosen,  German  minister 
at  Tangier  to  proceed  to  Paris  and  come  to  an  agree- 
ment. Now  that  Germany  was  really  ready  to  treat, 
little  difficulty  was  found  in  coming  to  an  accord;  it 
was  signed  September  28,  1905,  and  merely  elaborated 
upon  the  program  adopted  in  the  exchange  of  letters 
of  July  8.  It  included:  organization  of  the  police; 
regulations  for  the  suppression  of  contraband  in  arms ; 
financial  reforms,  consisting  principally  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  State  Bank  and  the  study  of  a  better  col- 
lection of  imposts  and  the  creation  of  new  revenues; 
finally  the  fixing  of  certain  principles  destined  to  safe- 
guard economic  liberty.  As  to  the  frontier  region  be- 
tween Morocco  and  Algeria,  the  question  of  policing 
was  to  continue  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  France  and 
Morocco,  as  also  was  the  regulation  of  contraband  of 
arms  in  the  same  region.  Algeciras  was  chosen  as  the 
place  for  the  conference  if  Spain  was  willing.  As  re- 
gards the  German  loan,  it  was  to  be  regarded  simply  as 
a  short  time  advance  of  money,  and  the  French  banks 

64  Ibid.,  No.,  341,  annexe  2. 

65  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  338. 


198  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

were  to  share  in  it.  As  for  the  constructions  in  the 
port  of  Tangier,  France  conceded  the  Sultan's  right 
to  grant  these  concessions  to  German  interests,  unless 
the  French  company  which  had  also  been  asked  to 
make  a  survey,  could  show  titles  of  value  equal  to  those 
of  the  German  concern.66 

On  the  whole,  France  could  hardly  complain  of  this 
program  after  having  chosen  M.  Rouvier  to  draw  it 
up.  She  had  promised  that  the  independence  of  the 
Sultan  should  be  respected,  that  commercial  liberty 
should  be  guaranteed,  and  that  her  sole  purpose  in 
attempting  to  put  into  effect  a  program  of  reforms 
was  to  safeguard  her  own  interests  in  Algeria.  The 
conference  had  the  same  purpose,  and  it  was  recognized 
in  advance  that  her  situation  in  Algeria  gave  her  the 
right  to  special  consideration.  It  was  her  privilege 
to  show  in  the  conference  the  great  importance  of  these 
rights  and  interests.  As  M.  Rouvier  said  in  his  dec- 
laration before  the  Chamber  December  16, 1905,  in  pre- 
senting the  situation:  "the  recognition  of  a  special 
situation,  resulting  from  the  most  evident  facts,  ad- 
mitted by  the  Powers  most  interested,  inscribed  in 
the  last  accords  that  we  have  concluded  with  the  Im- 
perial Government  can  be  prejudicial  to  no  one.  .  .  . 
From  the  negotiations  which  have  resulted  in  the  Ac- 
cords of  July  8,  and  September  28,  our  rights  have 
come  forth  if  not  entirely  recognized,  at  least  entirely 
preserved.  .  .  .  We  calmly  await  the  results  of  the 
Conference. ' ' 57 

66  Ibid.,  Nos.  350,  351. 

67  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  77ii,  p.  1385.  It  is  surprising  to  note 
that  some  deputies  who  were  the  most  bitter  in  their  denunciations  of 
M.  DelcassG,  who  wished  to  resist  Germany,  now  excoriated  M.  Rouvier 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE  199 

The  European  situation  which  had  looked  so  gloomy 
to  France  at  the  fall  of  M.  Delcasse  was  rapidly  bright- 
ening. When  on  May  27,  Admiral  Togo  completely 
destroyed  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Rodjestvensky  in 
Tsushima  Bay,  Russia  realized  that  she  had  lost  the 
war.  The  Kaiser,  taking  advantage  of  the  despon- 
dency of  the  Czar,  finally  persuaded  him  to  sign  a  secret 
alliance  at  Bjorko  on  July  23.58  Although  the  meet- 
ing took  place  in  absolute  secrecy,  France  realized  that 
her  ally  was  much  less  cordial  than  she  had  reason  to 
expect.  When  M.  Witte  was  asked  to  explain  it  he  did 
not  mince  words :  "You  tell  me  that  they  have  the  im- 
pression of  a  Russo-German  rapprochement.  Why 
shouldn't  there  be  one?  The  German  Emperor 
throughout  the  whole  course  of  the  war  has  been  with 
regard  to  Russia  more  than  correct,  he  has  been 
friendly.  On  all  occasions  he  has  affirmed  and  proved 
his  desire  of  not  causing  us  any  embarrassment,  of 
aiding  us  as  far  as  was  in  his  power  and  keeping  us 
out  of  all  complications.    However,  the  essence  of  the 

as  follows :  "  M.  Rouvier  has  acted  not  as  a  diplomat,  but  as  a  banker 
who  wishes  to  avoid  a  complication,  an  emotion,  an  ennui  in  which  he 
sees  a  catastrophe.  He  has  opened  his  safe  saying,  'What  do  you  wish  V 
He  has  not  examined  whether  the  demand  was  excessive,  unreasonable 
or  insulting.  He  has  paid  with  his  cash-box  open  and  then  returned 
to  his  desk."  Guibert  et  Ferrette,  "Le  Conflict  Franco-Allemand," 
p.  287. 

58  "Willy-Nicky  Correspondence,"  No.  30,  et  seq.  A  further  con- 
firmation of  the  rapprochement  between  Germany  and  Russia  at  this 
time  was  given  by  Prof.  Schieman  in  the  Kreuzzeitung.  He  asserted 
that  if  the  Delcasse"  system  had  provoked  war  over  the  question  of 
Morocco,  Russia  would  have  refused  to  consider  the  situation  a  casus 
foederis.  He  added  in  conclusion:  "In  affirming  that  the  German  for- 
eign office  had  been  informed  concerning  this  point,  and  that  Emperor 
William  had  carefully  weighed  the  possible  consequences  when  he  dis- 
embarked at  Tangier,  we  make  more  than  a  simple  supposition."  Ques. 
Dip.  e.t  Col.  Feb.  16,  1906. 


200  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

relations  between  Russia  and  France  have  not 
changed." C9  With  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Ports- 
mouth, September  5,  Russia  had  opportunity  to  take 
stock  of  the  situation.  Germany  had  been  prodigal 
with  kind  words  but  France  had  furnished  her  funds,  - 
and  Great  Britain  had  cooperated  closely  with  the 
iUnited  States  in  bringing  Japan  to  make  very  reason- 
able terms.  She  was  also  given  to  understand  that  the 
London  money  market  which  had  always  remained 
closed  to  her  might  be  persuaded  to  open  its  golden 
doors.80  The  war  had  been  a  great  drain  upon  her 
financial  resources  and  it  would  have  been  almost  sui- 
cidal to  turn  her  back  upon  France  and  England. 
Germany  did  not  have  funds  to  loan  even  if  she  had 
been  willing  to  loan  them.  The  Czar  therefore  began 
to  wonder  whether  he  had  been  wise  to  tie  himself  up 
too  closely  with  the  Kaiser,  and  towards  the  close  of 
the  year  became  very  unwilling  to  attempt  to  bring 
France  into  the  secret  agreement  which  he  had  signed 
with  the  Kaiser.61    At  any  rate  it  would  be  well  to 

8»  Le  Temps,  Sept.  21,  1905. 

«o  Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  minister  at  Berlin  wrote  on  September  23, 
1905:  "In  spite  of  the  great  difficulties  that  are  in  the  way  of  a 
rapprochement  between  London  and  St.  Petersburg,  the  possibility 
thereof  is  no  longer  excluded  .  .  .  the  principal  cause  of  the  differences 
between  England  and  Russia  has  been  removed  for  the  time  being.  I 
mean  the  unhealthy  Russian  ambition  incessantly  to  extend  the  boundar- 
ies of  an  Empire  which  is  already  too  big.  .  .  .  They  have  been  grate- 
ful to  Germany  at  St.  Petersburg  for  her  benevolent  neutrality  which 
permitted  Russia  to  concentrate  all  the  forces  at  her  disposal  in  the 
Far  East;  but  neither  peoples  nor  governments  can  pride  themselves 
on  their  gratitude.  How  long  will  Russia's  gratitude  last  when  the 
danger  is  over?  Russia  is  always  in  straits;  she  has  flooded  France 
and  Germany  with  her  loans;  will  she  be  able  much  longer  to  resist  the 
temptation  to  open  a  new  financial  market  for  her  benefit?"  Belgian 
Doc,  No.  8. 

•i  Writing  in  November,   1905,  the  Czar  says:     "Our  alliance  with 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE  201 

await  the  results  of  the  Conference  of  Algeciras. 
France  also,  towards  the  close  of  1905,  began  to 
recover  from  the  nervous  tension  shown  after  the  resig- 
nation of  M.  Delcasse.  Another  secret  agreement  was 
signed  with  Spain  on  September  1, 1905,  which  clarified 
and  strengthened  the  secret  accord  of  October  3,  1904. 
It  provided  that  the  police  of  Morocco  should  be  of 
native  troops,  but  that  the  officers  in  Tetuan  and  Lar- 
ache  should  be  Spanish,  while  in  the  ports  of  Rabat  and 
Casablanca  they  should  be  French,  and  in  Tangier 
the  police  should  consist  of  a  Franco-Spanish  corps. 
It  was  also  provided  that  a  State  Bank  should  be  cre- 
ated with  the  presidency  reserved  for  France,  and 
again  reserved  future  economic  concessions  to  French 
and  Spanish  groups.  Article  IV  of  the  accord  was 
especially  important,  for  after  declaring  that  both 
Powers  would  attempt  by  pacific  action  with  the  Sultan 
to  insure  the  loyal  accomplishment  of  its  clauses,  it 
declared :  ' '  Spain,  having  formally  decided  to  endorse 
fully  the  action  of  France  in  the  course  of  the  delibera- 
tions of  the  projected  Conference,  and  France  agree- 
ing to  act  in  like  manner  with  Spain,  it  is  understood 
between  the  two  governments  that  they  will  mutually 
assist  each  other  and  proceed  in  accord  in  the  said 
deliberations  as  regards  the  stipulations  of  the  Con- 
vention of  October  3,  1904,  in  its  broadest  and  most 
friendly  interpretation  as  in  that  which  concerns  the 
different  objects  of  the  present  accord.  .  .  ."62 

France  is  a  defensive  one.     Think  the  declaration  I  sent  you  could  re- 
main in  force  until  France  accepts  our  new  agreement.     I  will  cer- 
tainly do  all  in  my  power  to  bring  the  Morocco  Conference  to  a  general 
understanding."     "Willy-Nicky  Correspondence,"  No.  53. 
62  For  text  see  Martens,  Recueil,  3d.,  Vol.  5,  p.  670. 


202  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

What  was  even  more  important,  France  now  began 
to  realize  that  a  nation  could  not  depend  wholly  upon 
agreements  with  other  nations  to  keep  her  out  of 
trouble.  Nor  was  it  enough  to  put  faith  wholly  in 
pacifist  doctrines  and  international  good-will,  when 
one  could  see  on  their  very  threshold  "the  resurrec- 
tion of  the  Holy  Empire  of  the  Germanic  nation,  no 
longer  in  phantom  state  and  dragging  along  in  the 
mantle  of  Charlemagne,  but  armed  with  modern  sci- 
ence, sustained  by  victorious  legions,  enriched  by  in- 
dustry, resting  with  one  hand  upon  the  Rhine  and  the 
other  upon  the  Danube  and  by  these  two  arteries 
master  of  the  commerce  of  Europe.  Compared  with 
this  formidable  power  what  would  be  the  vacillating 
Empire  of  a  Charles  V  or  even  the  Continental  Block- 
ade of  a  Napoleon?"63  The  result  was  that  France 
from  October  to  December  voted  two  loans,  one  for 
fifty  million  francs,  and  another  for  one  hundred  eleven 
millions,  for  immediate  equipment  of  arms,  stores  and 
munitions.  It  might  be  after  all  that  Morocco  was 
merely  an  excuse.  At  any  rate  a  new  spirit  of  confi- 
dence was  noticeable  both  in  the  press  and  in  the 
Chamber;  "ne  troubles  pas  Vagonie  de  la  France," 

63  Rene"  Millet,  "La  Conscience  Nationale,"  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  March, 
1905.  At  the  same  time  that  M.  Millet  was  thus  trying  to  arouse 
France  by  showing  the  danger  on  her  Eastern  frontier,  Herr  Schieman, 
a  close  friend  of  the  Kaiser  and  editor  of  the  Kreuzzeitung,  in  review- 
ing the  events  of  1905  declared  France  to  be  in  full  social  decomposition, 
and  profoundly  impregnated  with  the  revolutionary  spirit.  It  was 
shown  by  the  development  of  anti-militarism,  internationalism  and 
anti-clericalism.  He  sneeringly  pointed  out  that  the  Rouvier  cabinet, 
the  41st  of  the  Third  Republic,  contained  an  ex-salesman  of  produce, 
an  ex-reporter,  an  ex -broker,  a  journalist,  a  physician,  psychiatrist  and 
a  former  waiter  in  a  cafe\  See  article  by  Henri  Lechtenberger,  Rev.  Pol. 
et  Pari.,  March,  1906. 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE  203 

gave  way  to  '* aide-toi  et  le  del  t'aidera."  Further- 
more the  same  government  which  had  discounted  the 
assistance  which  Great  Britain  might  give  when  M. 
Delcasse  had  promised  it,  now  decided  it  had  best  re- 
ceive definite  assurances  upon  this  point.64  The  ques- 
tion was  asked  whether  if  the  Moroccan  crisis  devel- 
oped into  war  between  France  and  Germany,  England 
would  give  armed  support.  Sir  Edward  Grey  gave 
it  as  his  opinion  that  if  war  was  forced  upon  France 
over  the  question  of  Morocco,  public  opinion  in  Great 
Britain  would  rally  to  the  material  support  of  France. 
The  French  Government  then  asked:  "If  you  think 
it  possible  that  public  opinion  of  Great  Britain  might, 
should  a  sudden  crisis  arise,  justify  you  in  giving  to 
France  the  armed  support  which  you  cannot  promise 
in  advance,  you  will  not  be  able  to  give  that  support, 
even  if  you  wish  to  give  it,  when  the  time  comes,  un- 
less some  conversations  have  already  taken  place  be- 
tween naval  and  military  experts."  Sir  Edward  Grey 
acknowledged  the  force  of  the  statement  and  agreed. 
He  thereupon  authorized  these  conversations  to  take 
place,  with  the  distinct  understanding  that  nothing 
which  passed  between  military  or  naval  experts  should 
bind  either  government  or  restrict  in  any  way  their 
freedom  to  make  a  decision  as  to  whether  or  not  they 
would  give  that  support  when  the  time  came.65 

64  At  the  beginning  of  June,  1905,  when  the  assurance  had  come  that 
England  was  prepared  to  support  France  in  case  of  aggression,  M. 
Rouvier  had  cried :  "Que  ma  main  se  seche  plutot  que  de  signer  un  papier 
qui  d4chainerait  VAllemagne."  Now  he  himself  was  soliciting  the  re- 
newal of  these  accords.  Georges  Reynald,  "La  Diplomatic  Francaise," 
p.  48. 

es  Speech  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  the  House  of  Commons,  Aug.  3, 
1914.    Pari.  Debates,  Vol.  65,  p.  1812. 


204  FEENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

France  had  finally  awakened  to  the  German  menace. 
It  was  not  simply  M.  Delcasse,  or  the  policy  of  M.  Del- 
casse, that  Germany  found  hostile  to  her  interests; 
it  was  any  policy  that  threatened  the  hegemony  which 
the  German  Empire  had  so  long  enjoyed,  owing  to  the 
European  rivalries  which  she  had  carefully  fostered. 
But  Europe  had  begun  to  realize  its  mistake,  and  M. 
Delcasse  had  made  it  his  task  to  remedy  it  effectively. 
His  success  was  his  undoing.  Germany  waited  pa- 
tiently until  the  time  to  strike  had  come,  and  M.  Del- 
casse was  the  victim.  But  the  cause  was  not  entirely 
lost.  The  German  policy  of  bluster  and  intimidation 
over-reached  itself.  France  felt  that  perhaps  she  had 
made  a  mistake,  and  was  prepared  to  make  reparation. 
She  soon  found  that  she  had  been  needlessly  humili- 
ated, and  she  reacted  accordingly.  France  had  been 
forced  into  a  conference  against  her  wishes,  she  soon 
realized  that  all  Europe  was  in  the  same  position,  and 
she  hastened  to  profit  by  the  knowledge.  Germany 
might  have  easily  driven  a  very  hard  bargain  with 
France  alone,  but  she  wished  to  demonstrate  that  she 
could  do  equally  well  in  the  face  of  the  whole  world. 
M.  Rouvier  had  foolishly  believed  von  Billow's  pro- 
testations of  friendship,  and  that  Germany  wanted  a 
square  deal.  His  negotiations  with  von  Biilow,  and 
von  Tattenbach's  underhanded  operations  in  Morocco, 
quickly  convinced  him  of  his  error.  It  was  to  his 
credit  that  he  profited  by  the  lesson,  and  when  on  De- 
cember 1, 1905,  the  Sultan  sent  forth  his  invitations  for 
an  international  conference  to  be  held  in  Algeciras,  to 
discuss  the  necessary  reforms  to  be  effected  in  the 


THE  FALL  OF  DELCASSE  205 

Shereefian  Empire,  M.  Rouvier  had  strengthened 
France  sufficiently  to  be  able  to  say  with  confidence  to 
the  Chamber:  "We  await  with  calm  the  results  of 
the  Conference." 


CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  CONFERENCE  OF  ALGECIRAS 

1.     THE  DRAFTING  AND  SIGNING  OP  THE  ACT 

THE  Conference  of  Algeciras  convened  on  January 
16,  1906,  in  the  little  town  of  Algeciras  in  Spain, 
with  representatives  of  all  of  the  thirteen  Powers  sig- 
natory of  the  Conference  of  Madrid  present,  except 
Norway.  Furthermore,  Russia,  which  had  not  par- 
ticipated in  the  Conference  of  1880,  sent  representa- 
tives to  this  Congress.  The  majority  of  the  Powers 
sent  two  delegates,  though  strangely  enough  Great 
Britain  whose  commercial  interests  were  greatest  of 
all  sent  but  one,  Sir  Arthur  Nicolson.  The  French 
representatives  were  M.  Paul  Revoil  and  M.  Eugene 
Regnault.  The  former  was  especially  well  fitted  for 
his  task  both  by  temperament  and  by  training.  He 
had  been  minister  at  Tangier  and  Governor-general 
of  Algeria,  and  had  been  signally  successful  in  both 
capacities.  M.  Andre  Tardieu  thus  describes  his  quali- 
ties: "a  patriotism  active  and  worthy,  much  abnega- 
tion in  an  exhausting  struggle,  a  marvelous  richness 
of  invention  and  arguments,  a  meritorious  tenacity,  in- 
finitely gracious,  good  humored  and  of  perfect  upright- 
ness, the  last,  a  quality  which  was  to  gain  him  in  a  few 
weeks  the  confidence  of  even  those  who  arrived  at  Al- 

206 


THE  CONFERENCE  OF  ALGECIRAS     207 

geciras,  the  most  prejudiced  against  us. "  *  His  col- 
league, M.  Regnault,  was  also  thoroughly  familiar  with 
Morocco,  having  served  as  a  delegate  of  the  French  in- 
vestors in  Morocco.  The  German  delegation  consisted 
of  Herr  von  Radowitz,  the  ambassador  at  Madrid,  and 
Count  von  Tattenbach,  the  German  emissary  to  Fez, 
whose  operations  in  Morocco  have  already  been  men- 
tioned. Having  already  triumphed  over  France  once, 
his  attitude  was  one  of  "cordial  disdain,"  and  he  never 
faltered  in  his  belief  that  by  dictatorial  and  blustering 
tactics,  he  could  ride  rough  shod  over  the  rights  of 
France  and  any  other  nation  whose  interests  clashed 
with  those  of  Germany. 

At  the  opening  sitting,  the  Duke  d'Almodovar,  the 
first  Spanish  delegate,  was  unanimously  chosen  presi- 
dent of  the  Conference.2  As  a  precautionary  measure, 
the  delegates  decided  to  discuss  the  less  important 
projects  first,  so  that  from  January  16  to  February 
20,  the  Conference  debated  peacefully  enough  upon  the 
questions  of  contraband  in  arms,  and  reforms  in  the 
imposts  and  customs  duties.  The  two  most  impor- 
tant questions,  namely  the  State  Bank  and  the  organ- 
ization of  the  police  were  not  broached.  But  while 
the  public  discussions  were  proceeding  on  these  non- 
contentious  subjects,  private  conversations  were  going 
on  among  the  various  delegates.  Herr  von  Radowitz 
commenced  sounding  out  the  situation  on  January  23, 

i  Andr€  Tardieu,  "La  Conference  d'Algesiras,"  p.  84.  M.  Tardieu  as 
first  secretary  of  the  "ambassade  honoraire"  has  been  enabled  to  say 
the  last  word  in  the  Conference  of  Algeciras.  His  exhaustive  and  docu- 
mented treatment  of  the  affair  makes  his  work  the  primary  source  book 
on  the  subject. 

2  Doc.  Dip.,  "Protocoles  et  Comptes  Rend  us  de  la  Conference  d'Al- 
gesiras, No.  3. 


208  FEENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

when  he  approached  the  American  delegate,  Mr.  Henry- 
White,  and  the  Italian  delegate,  the  Marquis  Visconti- 
Venosta  regarding  the  organization  of  the  police,  but 
without  giving  any  clearer  statement  of  his  views  than 
that  France  should  not  be  given  this  mandate  alone  or 
in  connection  with  Spain.3  From  the  beginning  M. 
Revoil  took  the  position  that  since  Germany  had  called 
the  conference  it  was  up  to  her  to  make  definite  pro- 
posals. On  January  26,  Herr  von  Radowitz  had  his 
first  private  conference  with  M.  Revoil,  but  little  came 
of  it  seeing  that  Germany  was  determined  that  France 
should  not  have  charge  of  the  organization  of  the 
police,  the  one  prerogative  that  France  was  insistent 
upon.4  The  French  delegates  were  further  hampered 
in  their  stand  by  the  divided  sentiment  at  home,  since 
influential  personalities  like  M.  Clemenceau  in  the 
Aurore  and  M.  de  Lanessan  in  the  Siecle  demanded 
that  France  refuse  to  take  the  responsibility  for  the 
organization  of  the  police,5  in  direct  opposition  to  the 
Government's  position. 

Neither  were  M.  Regnault  and  the  Count  von  Tatten- 
bach  able  to  come  to  an  understanding  in  regard  to  a 
financial  arrangement.  The  German  delegate  proposed 
to  start  with  a  clean  slate,  wiping  out  completely  the 
preferential  rights  already  held  by  French  financiers, 
and  then  divide  up  the  shares  of  the  State  Bank  equally 
among  the  various  Powers,  putting  France  and  Spain 
upon  a  par  with  Holland  and  Sweden.6  Needless  to 
say  France  refused  even  to  consider  such  a  settlement. 

*Tardieu,  op.  cit.,  p.  138. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  141. 

»  Recouly,  "La  Conference  d'Algesiras,"  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari,  Feb.,  1906. 

«Tardieu,  op.  cit.,  p.  142. 


THE  CONFERENCE  OF  ALGECIRAS     209 

Germany's  next  attempt  was  to  break  the  bonds  be- 
tween France  and  the  nations  supporting  her,  by  mak- 
ing them  separate  offers  of  various  sorts.  Spain  was 
offered  the  mandate  of  policing  the  ports  alone,  but  she 
refused  to  consider  it.  Count  von  Tattenbach  then 
made  an  attempt  to  come  to  a  separate  understanding 
with  the  English  delegate,  but  here  he  met  with  a  more 
chilly  reception  than  in  his  proposals  to  Spain.7  The 
next  move  was  a  false  report  made  by  the  Wolff  Agency 
that  France  sought  to  police  the  whole  of  Morocco, 
and  thus  under  cover  of  a  European  mandate,  to 
"Tunisify"  Morocco.  It  was  for  this  reason  that 
Germany  found  it  necessary  to  reject  the  French  pro- 
posals. The  "Temps"  of  February  13,  was  able  to 
issue  a  categorical  denial  to  this  false  despatch.  In 
fact,  throughout  this  first  month  France  showed  such 
willingness  to  treat  upon  any  reasonable  grounds,  and 
Germany's  attitude  remained  so  uncompromising, 
that  gradually  the  support  of  the  neutral  powers  be- 
gan to  swing  towards  France. 

In  truth,  Germany's  dilatory  tactics  seemed  to  have 
more  effect  upon  the  internal  situation  in  France  than 
upon  the  delegates  of  the  various  Powers  at  the  Con- 
ference. The  situation  was  complicated  by  a  presi- 
dential election  in  February,  when  M.  Fallieres  was 
chosen  to  the  place  which  had  been  held  by  M.  Loubet. 
Although  M.  Rouvier  was  asked  to  continue  in  office, 
public  opinion  was  aroused  by  the  disquieting  rumors 
constantly  arriving  from  the  Conference.  The  ques- 
tion was  brought  up  in  the  Chamber  on  February  23, 
and  M.  Rouvier  was  very  severely  criticised  by  both 

i  Ibid.,  p.  148. 


210  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

M.  Jaures  and  M.  Cochin  for  refusing  to  discuss  the 
situation.  The  latter  went  so  far  as  to  assert  that 
although  M.  Rouvier  had  taken  charge  of  the  foreign 
office  because  he  wished  to  save  everything,  it  now 
appeared  as  though  all  that  he  wished  was  the  head  of 
his  predecessor.  M.  Delcasse  at  least  had  a  policy; 
M.  Rouvier  seemed  not  to  have  even  that.  The  condi- 
tion of  Morocco  also  appeared  more  chaotic  than  usual. 
Raids  across  the  Algerian  frontier  were  incessant,  the 
Pretender  was  rapidly  extending  his  operations ;  the 
bandit  Raisuli  was  becoming  bolder  than  ever  in  his 
exploits.  If  something  were  not  done  soon,  an  army 
rather  than  a  force  of  police  would  be  required. 

When  it  began  to  look  as  though  an  impasse  had 
been  reached,  since  Germany  seemed  to  have  no  definite 
program  of  her  own  and  would  not  assent  to  any  pro- 
posal acceptable  to  France,  Count  von  Tattenbach,  on 
February  19,  produced  a  complete  project  for  the  State 
Bank  which  he  presented  as  a  basis  of  discussion.  M. 
Revoil  had  another  proposal  ready;  so  that  when  the 
session  opened  on  February  20  for  the  discussion  of 
the  State  Bank,  the  delegates  had  two  projects  before 
them.8  The  German  project  entirely  disregarded  the 
rights  possessed  by  the  French  Syndicate  recognized 
by  the  Act  of  June  12, 1904.  It  provided  that  the  capi- 
tal should  be  divided  into  as  many  shares  as  there  were 
Powers  represented  at  the  Conference,  and  as  a  sop 
to  Spain  the  peseta  was  to  constitute  the  medium  of 
exchange.  The  State  Bank  was  to  receive  all  the 
revenues  of  the  Empire,  including  the  customs  duties 
which  had  already  been  guaranteed  to  the  French  loan. 

8  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  20  annexe. 


THE  CONFERENCE  OF  ALGECIRAS     211 

It  was  to  have  a  Conseil  d' 'administration  of  twenty- 
six  members  chosen  by  the  thirteen  Powers  represented 
at  the  Conference,  also  a  Conseil  de  surveillance,  con- 
sisting of  the  ministers  at  Tangier  of  the  signatory 
Powers,  and  finally,  a  directorate  chosen  by  the  Conseil 
d' administration.  This  unwieldy  organization  of  more 
than  forty  officials,  a  political  organization  rather  than 
a  financial  concern,  would  have  completely  destroyed 
that  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan  that  Germany  had  been 
so  intent  upon  preserving.  The  French  scheme  pro- 
posed that  the  capital  should  be  divided  into  fifteen 
shares  of  which  four  should  be  allocated  to  the  banks 
which  had  contracted  for  the  loan  of  1904,  in  return 
for  which  they  would  cede  to  the  Bank  their  prefer- 
ential rights  established  by  the  Act  of  June  12,  1904. 
Instead  of  a  Conseil  de  surveillance  of  the  diplomatic 
corps,  it  provided  for  a  Conseil  d'escompte,  sitting  at 
Tangier  consisting  of  representatives  from  the  foreign 
colony,  while  the  Conseil  d' administration  of  twenty- 
five  members  should  be  chosen  by  the  stockholders  of 
the  Bank,  and  should  choose  its  own  director.9 

The  discussion  of  these  two  proposals  occupied  the 
Conference  until  March  3,  and  at  that  time  no  indica- 
tion of  a  settlement  was  visible.  Seeing  that  no  imme- 
diate solution  was  possible  in  regard  to  the  State  Bank, 
M.  Revoil  asked  that  the  question  of  the  police  should 
be  brought  up  in  the  next  discussion.  Herr  von  Rado- 
witz  opposed  and  the  question  was  put  to  a  vote.  The 
result  was  ten  votes  in  favor  of  the  French  proposal 
and  three  against,  the  Austrian  and  Moroccan  dele- 
gates being  the  only  ones  willing  to  sustain  Germany 

•  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  20  annexe. 


212  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

in  her  efforts  to  drag  out  the  proceedings.  Although 
this  was  merely  a  vote  on  procedure,  it  showed  clearly- 
enough  that  Germany  had  completely  isolated  herself 
by  her  tactics,  and  the  sympathy  of  the  delegates  was 
now  with  France.  At  the  same  time,  other  influences 
were  at  work  for  the  French  cause  in  Europe.  Count 
Witte,  who  was  passing  through  Germany  on  his  re- 
turn from  America,  at  the  request  of  France  sought 
an  interview  with  the  Kaiser,  and  asked  that  he  show 
his  friendly  sentiments  towards  Russia  by  taking  a 
more  conciliatory  attitude  towards  her  ally,  France.10 
At  the  same  time  Baron  de  Courcel,  the  French  envoy 
to  the  funeral  ceremonies  of  King  Christian  IX  of 
Denmark,  while  passing  through  Berlin  on  his  return, 
was  given  an  audience  by  Prince  von  Biilow.11  Both 
the  Kaiser  and  Prince  von  Biilow  were  very  conciliatory 
in  tone,  but  the  concessions  they  were  willing  to  make 
would  have  separated  France  from  both  England  and 
Spain  by  tearing  up  her  accords  with  these  two  Powers. 
President  Roosevelt,  who  had  been  so  successful  in 
bringing  Russia  and  Japan  to  a  basis  of  compromise, 
now  decided  to  exert  his  influence  here.  Learning 
from  Mr.  White  that  France  was  willing  to  compromise 
upon  the  organization  of  the  police  by  accepting  a 
Franco-Spanish  Police,  checked  by  the  Italian  legation 
at  Tangier,  he  urged  a  German  acceptance  of  this  pro- 
posal. Emperor  William  refused  to  consider  this 
compromise,  nor  did  a  second  telegram  from  the  Presi- 
dent change  his  attitude.12    Nevertheless,  the  fact  that 

10  Tardieu,  op.  cit.,  p.  247,  et  seq.  nlbid.,  p.  241,  et  seq. 

12  Ibid.,  p.  249.  Mr.  J.  B.  Bishop  promises  to  show  in  his  forthcoming 
life  of  Roosevelt  that  the  President  played  a  leading  part  not  only  in 
arranging  the  Conference,  but  also  in  drawing  up  the  settlement  and 
compelling  the  Kaiser  to  assent.     See  Scribner's,  April,  1920. 


THE  CONFERENCE  OF  ALGECIRAS     213 

Germany  had  not  been  able  to  separate  either  Spain 
or  England  from  France,  that  Russia  persisted  in  sus- 
taining her  ally,  that  the  United  States  was  clearly 
sympathetic  to  France,  and  that  even  Italy  could  not 
be  counted  upon  to  support  her  partners,  began  to 
render  Germany  more  tractable.  The  vote  of  March  3 
was  a  clear  portent.13 

The  discussion  concerning  the  police,  the  most  im- 
portant and  the  most  thorny  question  before  the  Con- 
ference, opened  March  5.  M.  Bacheracht,  after 
pointing  out  the  inequality  of  the  European  interests 
in  Morocco  but  the  crying  need  for  protection  for  such 
interests  as  each  had,  declared  that  both  France  and 
Spain  were  especially  well  equipped  to  organize  and 
supervise  the  police  since  they  both  had  under-officers, 
Algerian  and  Riffian,  who  were  of  th*e  Mohammedan 
faith.  In  fact,  a  French  officer,  assisted  by  several 
subordinate  officers,  had  already  by  express  order  of 

is  It  was  just  at  this  time  that  King  Edward  VII  made  another  visit 
to  Paris,  where  he  not  only  exchanged  visits  with  President  Fallieres 
and  M.  Rouvier  and  the  Baron  de  Courcel,  who  had  just  returned  from 
Berlin,  but  also  received  M.  Loubet  and  M.  Delcasse  at  luncheon.  M. 
Leghait,  the  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris  writing  to  Baron  de  Favereau, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  March  6,  1906,  thus  characterized  this 
incident:  "This  mark  of  courtesy  towards  M.  Delcasse  at  this  moment 
is  very  much  discussed.  It  is  generally  considered  as  a  very  significant 
demonstration  which  is  disconcerting  on  account  of  the  extent  and 
gravity  of  the  consequences  which  it  may  have.  .  .  .  This  act  of  King 
Edward  is  regarded  almost  as  a  return  thrust  for  the  landing  of  Em- 
peror William  at  Tangier,  and  all  the  more  importance  is  attached  to 
this  step,  because  it  cannot  be  imagined  that  a  sovereign,  the  poise  of 
whose  mind  is  known  could  have  decided  in  favor  of  it  without  weigh- 
ing all  its  consequences  and  without  assuming  all  responsibility  for  it. 

"The  King,  so  it  seems,  wanted  to  show  that  the  policy  which  caused 
the  energetic  intervention  of  Germany  has  nevertheless,  remained  the 
same,  because  England  kept  firm  and  immutable  the  principles  which 
the  Agreement  of  April  8,  1904,  has  imposed  on  her."  Reports  of  Bel- 
gian Representatives,  No.  16. 


214  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

the  Sultan  begun  to  organize  the  police  at  Tangier.14 
M.  Revoil  in  outlining  the  French  plan,  declared  that 
for  all  the  eight  ports  hardly  more  than  from  two  thou- 
sand to  two  thousand  five  hundred  soldiers  would  be 
required,  under  the  direction  of  about  sixteen  officers. 
Furthermore,  the  Sultan  would  be  consulted  in  the 
appointment  of  these  officers,  and  the  police  would 
remain  under  the  command  of  the  Shereefian  authori- 
ties, the  officers'  role  being  limited  to  lending  to  these 
authorities  their  technical  assistance  in  the  exercise  of 
the  command  and  in  the  maintenance  of  discipline.15 
M.  Caballero  then  showed  the  weakness  of  the  German 
proposal  for  an  international  police,  and  declared  that 
he  could  not  see  how  the  assistance  of  Spain  and  France 
in  the  organization  of  the  police  would  be  a  danger  to 
economic  liberty.16  The  German  delegates  apparently 
felt  that  they  had  no  chance  of  succeeding  with  their 
project,  so  on  March  7,  the  Austrian  delegate  produced 
a  proposal  which  was  clearly  a  bridge  for  the  Germans 
to  get  back  upon.  Their  scheme  provided  French  in- 
structors for  the  police  at  Tangier,  Safi,  Rabat  and 
Tetouan,  Spanish  at  Mogador,  Larache,  Mazagan,  and 
Swiss,  Dutch  or  Belgian  at  Casablanca;  the  whole  to 
be  under  supervision  of  the  diplomatic  corps.17  The 
German  representatives  were  willing  to  subscribe  to 
this,  and  as  this  was  very  close  to  the  proposal  which 
the  French  presented,  it  at  last  appeared  as  though  the 
Conference  might  soon  reach  a  satisfactory  agreement 
on  all  questions  at  issue. 

i*Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  23,  annex  No.  1. 

is  Ibid.,  annexe  No.  3. 

is  Ibid.,  annexe  No.  4. 

it  Ibid.,  No.  25,  annexe  No.  4. 


THE  CONFEEENCE  OF  ALGECIRAS     215 

While  the  diplomatic  skies  were  clearing  at  Alge- 
ciras,  a  sudden  ministerial  storm  had  blown  np  in 
Paris,  and  before  it  calmed  down  the  Eouvier  cabinet 
had  fallen.  The  vote  of  censure  was  upon  a  domestic 
question — the  harsh  method  of  carrying  out  the  inven- 
tory of  church  property — but  the  result  might  well  have 
a  strong  repercussion  upon  the  foreign  policy.  The 
situation  was  made  the  worse  by  the  difficulty  in  form- 
ing a  new  cabinet,  and  it  was  almost  a  week  before  the 
new  Sarrien  ministry  received  a  vote  of  confidence. 
The  opportunity  was  too  good  for  Germany  to  let  pass. 
Although  Herr  von  Radowitz  had  publicly  asserted 
that  the  French  and  the  Austrian  proposals  might 
easily  be  reconciled,18  and  the  French  were  willing  to 
concede  inspection  of  the  police,  providing  the  Swiss 
or  Dutch  officers  who  should  be  given  this  authority 
should  make  their  report  to  the  Sultan  rather  than  to 
the  diplomatic  corps,19  on  March  11,  Herr  von  Rado- 
witz declared  that  his  government  had  said  its  last 
word, — that  it  was  the  Austrian  project  unchanged  or 
nothing.20  Herr  Tattenbach  became  equally  unyield- 
ing on  the  question  of  the  State  Bank.  The  French 
delegates  now  found  themselves  in  a  serious  dilemma. 
There  was  no  government  at  Paris  to  indicate  a  policy. 
The  representatives  of  the  Powers  could  not  fail  to  be 
influenced  by  the  fact  that  by  overthrowing  M.  Rouvier, 
the  French  Chamber  had  not  shown  itself  favorable 
to  its  foreign  policy.  Otherwise,  in  the  critical  situa- 
tion which  existed,  it  would  not  have  allowed  a  question 
of  domestic  policy  to  overturn  a  ministry  whose  head 

is  Ibid.,  No.  27. 
i^Tardieu,  op.  cit.,  p.  309. 
20  Ibid.,  p.  312. 


216  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

held  the  portfolio  of  foreign  affairs.  At  the  same  time 
the  German  press,  the  Kaiser,  and  the  German  dele- 
gates at  Algeciras,  began  a  violent  campaign  to  show 
that  France  was  isolated,  and  to  force  her  to  submit 
to  an  immediate  and  humiliating  settlement.  The 
"Lokal  Anzeiger"  even  went  so  far  as  to  declare  that 
"the  resistance  of  France  has  isolated  her  and  forced 
the  neutral  powers,  Russia,  Italy,  America,  and  even 
England  over  to  the  German  side."21  On  March  12, 
the  German  ambassadors  in  various  capitals  received 
a  circular  despatch  from  Berlin  declaring  that  the  ma- 
jority of  delegates  at  Algeciras  were  favorable  to 
Germany.22  On  the  same  day  the  German  Chancellor 
telegraphed  to  Count  Witte:  "Thanks  to  our  conces- 
sions everything  was  going  on  favorably  at  the  Con- 
ference when,  suddenly,  M.  Revoil  created  fresh  diffi- 
culties, to  the  surprise  of  all  the  other  plenipotentiaries, 
who  deem  his  pretensions  unwarranted,  and  who 
even  with  the  English,  incline  in  our  favor.  We  hope 
that  M.  Witte  will  make  his  influential  voice  heard  if 
he  desires  to  avoid  a  final  rupture."23  Finally  the 
Kaiser  himself  entered  the  lists  and  sent  three  per- 
sonal telegrams  to  President  Roosevelt.  The  first 
declared  that  England,  Spain,  and  Russia  approved  of 
the  Austrian  proposal  and  that  the  United  States 
should  add  their  influence ;  the  second  was  a  denuncia- 
tion of  the  whole  French  policy;  the  third  stated  that 
the  United  States  was  the  only  power  still  backing 
France.24    The  effect   of   these   telegrams  upon  the 

21  Quoted  in  the  Temps,  March  13,  1906;  Tardieu,  op.  cit.,  p.  316. 

22  Tardieu,  op.  cit.,  p.  318. 

23  Ibid.,  319. 

24  Ibid.,  p.  319  et  seq. 


THE  CONFERENCE  OF  ALGECIRAS     217 

American  Government  is  indicated  by  a  communication 
from  the  American  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Root,  to 
the  German  ambassador,  March  17,  the  date  of  the  last 
of  the  Kaiser's  telegrams.  The  communication  was 
in  regard  to  the  American  view  of  the  Austrian  pro- 
posal. M.  Root  declared:  "We  do  not  approve  that 
proposal.  We  regard  it  as  an  essential  departure  from 
the  principle  declared  by  Germany  and  adhered  to  by 
the  United  States,  that  all  commercial  nations  are  en- 
titled to  have  the  door  of  equal  commercial  opportunity 
in  Morocco  kept  open.  .  .  .  France  has  yielded  to  this 
view  of  international  right  to  the  extent  of  offering 
to  become  jointly,  with  Spain,  the  mandatory  of  all 
the  powers  for  the  purpose  of  at  once  maintaining 
order  and  preserving  equal  commercial  opportunities 
for  all  of  them.  .  .  .  This  arrangement  seemed  to  ac- 
complish the  desired  purpose."25  Needless  to  say, 
Germany's  misrepresentations  and  misstatements 
were  no  more  successful  in  the  other  countries  which 
were  behind  France  than  they  were  in  the  United 
States,26  and  when  the  Sarrien  ministry  was  at  length 
formed  on  March  13,  with  M.  Leon  Bourgeois  in  charge 
of  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  France  found  herself  in  a  stronger 
position  than  ever.  The  President  du  Conseil,  M.  Sar- 
rien, was  of  rather  colorless  personality,  but  his  lack 
of  forcefulness  was  immaterial  since  he  had  the  dyna- 
mic, driving  power  of  M.  Georges  Clemenceau,  the  new 
Minister  of  Interior,  behind  him.  With  this  tombeur 
de  ministeres  in  the  cabinet,  the  country  could  be  cer- 

25  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  1906,  Part  2,  p.  1481. 

26  Great  Britain  affirmed  her  intention  of  standing  back  of  France 
by  a  circular  dated  March  13,  Russia  followed  her  March  19.  See  the 
Temps,  March  20,  1906  for  texts  of  these  documents. 


218  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

tain  that  there  would  be  no  further  truckling  to  the 
bully  across  the  Rhine. 

In  his  ministerial  declaration  read  before  Parlia- 
ment on  March  14,  1906,  M.  Sarrien  made  it  evident 
that  France   had   fully   recovered   confidence   in   the 
justice  of  her  stand.     "Fully  conscious  of  the  rights 
and  vital  interests  which  our  diplomacy  must  safe- 
guard, we  are  convinced  that  the  exercise  of  these 
rights  and  the  normal  development  of  these  interests 
can  be  assured  without  interfering  with  those  of  any 
other  power;  as  our  predecessors  to  whom  we  must 
fully  render  justice,  we  hope  that  the  fairness  and  the 
clearness  of  this  attitude  will  permit  the  early  and 
definitive  settlement  of  the  outstanding  difficulties."  27 
France  had  made  her  last  concession  and  her  position 
was  clear  cut  and  final.     She  was  willing  to  allow  in- 
spection of  the  police,  but  she  insisted  absolutely  that 
Casablanca  be  included  with  the  other   seven  ports 
under  the  Franco-Spanish  police.     Germany  realized 
that  she  had  lost  and  that  any  further  opposition  would 
only  weaken  her  position  the  more.    At  the  plenary 
session  of  the  Conference  on  March  26,  the  Austrian 
delegate  conceded  that  Casablanca  should  be  included 
with  the  other  ports  under  the  Franco-Spanish  police, 
and  Count  von  Radowitz  expressed  himself  as  satis- 
fied with  his  colleague's  statement.28    There  still  re- 
mained the  question  of  the  nationality  of  the  inspector, 
and  the  subordination  of  the  police  to  the  control  of 
the  diplomatic  corps.    Austria  had  demanded  that  the 
inspector  be  Dutch  or  Swiss ;  France  insisted  upon  the 

27  Annates  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  78ii,  p.  1634. 

28  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  28 


THE  CONFERENCE  OF  ALGECIRAS     219 

latter,  and  was  finally  able  to  make  her  views  prevail, 
owing  to  the  diplomatic  manner  in  which  Sir  Arthur 
Nicolson  presented  the  proposition.29  As  to  the  con- 
trol by  the  diplomatic  corps,  it  was  finally  decided  that 
the  reports  of  the  inspector  should  be  sent  both  to  the 
Maghzen  and  to  the  Diplomatic  Corps,  also  that  the 
Diplomatic  Corps  could  demand  an  investigation  at 
any  time,  but  only  through  the  Sultan's  representative. 
France  had  been  successful  in  preventing  international 
control  of  the  police.30 

There  still  remained  the  question  of  the  apportion- 
ment of  the  ports  between  France  and  Spain.  Accord- 
ing to  the  secret  treaty  of  September  1,  1905,  it  had 
been  arranged  that  French  officers  should  be  in  charge 
of  the  police  in  Rabat  and  Casablanca,  while  Spain 
should  control  in  Tetuan  and  Larache,  Tangier  being 
under  a  Franco-Spanish  corps  commanded  by  a  French 
officer.31  Since  the  three  ports  to  be  newly  assigned, 
Mazagan,  Safi  and  Mogador,  were  within  the  French 
sphere  of  influence  France  took  it  for  granted  that  she 
would  receive  them.  Spain,  however,  was  unwilling 
that  French  influence  should  predominate  completely, 
and  insisted  upon  the  immediate  control  of  Tangier, 
which  according  to  treaty  would  only  be  hers  after  fif- 
teen years.  M.  Bourgeois  did  not  wish  to  offend 
Spain ;  nor  did  he  feel  justified  in  allowing  her  to  disre- 
gard the  treaty  which  she  had  so  recently  ratified.  As 
a  compromise,  he  suggested  that  Spain  share  the  con- 
trol in  Casablanca  as  well  as  in  Tangier.  Spain  was  at 
first  inclined  to  insist  upon  immediate  control  of  Tan- 

29  Ibid.,  No.  29. 

so  Doc.  Dip.,  No.  29  annexe. 

si  Martens,  "Recueil,"  3d  Ser.,  Vol.  5,  p.  670. 


220  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

gier,  and  it  was  only  after  a  long  struggle  that  France 
was  able  to  prevail.  Her  solution  was  presented  by  M. 
Bacheracht  in  the  session  of  March  31.32 

At  this  same  session  the  last  problems  outstanding 
in  the  question  of  the  State  Bank  were  also  settled. 
The  censors,  of  which  there  were  to  be  four,  were 
divided  equally  among  the  banks  of  France,  England, 
Spain  and  Germany.  As  for  the  capital,  it  was  finally 
agreed  that  an  equal  portion  be  attributed  to  each  of 
the  Powers  represented  at  the  Conference,  with  two  por- 
tions equal  to  those  reserved  to  each  of  the  subscribing 
groups,  assigned  to  the  syndicate  of  bank  signatories 
of  the  contract  of  June  12,  1904,  as  compensation  for 
the  cession  of  their  rights  to  the  State  Bank.83  With 
these  points  settled  it  only  remained  to  draw  up  the 
General  Act  and  submit  it  to  the  delegates  for  their 
signatures.  The  final  cession  took  place  on  April  7, 
and  with  the  signing  of  the  General  Act  by  the  dele- 
gates representing  the  thirteen  Powers,  the  Conference 
was  declared  adjourned.34 

2.     SIGNIFICANCE  AND  RATIFICATION  OF  THE  GENERAL  ACT 

The  General  Act  of  the  International  Conference  at 
Algeciras,  to  give  it  the  official  title,  consisted  of  one 
hundred  twenty-three  articles  divided  into  seven  sec- 
tions, covering  the  organization  of  the  police,  regula- 
tions for  the  suppression  of  the  illicit  trade  in  arms, 
the  State  Bank,  the  establishment  of  a  better  system 
of  taxes  and  revenue,  the  regulation  of  customs  and  the 
suppression  of  smuggling,  the  public  services  and  pub- 

32  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  31. 
as  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  31. 
34D)id.,  No.  36. 


THE  CONFERENCE  OF  ALGECIRAS     221 

lie  works,  and  finally  the  ratification  of  the  act,  which 
was  to  occur  not  later  than  December  31,  1906.35  The 
three  vital  principles  which  all  the  Powers  had  sub- 
scribed to,  namely  the  independence  of  the  Sultan,  the 
integrity  of  his  territory,  and  commercial  liberty,  had 
been  carefully  maintained.  The  two  most  pressing 
reforms:  an  organized  police,  and  a  self-supporting 
financial  system,  had  been  most  elaborately  provided 
for.  For  the  first,  provision  had  been  made  for  a  force 
of  from  two  thousand  to  two  thousand  five  hundred, 
to  be  recruited  by  the  Sultan  from  among  the  Moors, 
and  under  Moorish  chiefs,  and  distributed  among  the 
eight  ports ;  from  forty-six  to  sixty  French  and  Span- 
ish officers,  approved  by  the  Sultan  were  to  be  ap- 
pointed as  instructors,  under  the  general  control  of  a 
Swiss  Inspector-General  who  was  to  report  to  the 
Maghzen,  but  who  could  interfere  neither  in  the  com- 
mand nor  in  the  instruction  of  the  force.  For  the 
second,  a  Morocco  State  Bank  had  been  established, 
which  was  to  act  as  disbursing  Treasurer  for  the  Em- 
pire, its  capital  to  be  divided  into  fourteen  parts  (the 
United  States  did  not  subscribe)  of  which  twelve  were 
assigned  to  the  Powers  participating  and  two  to  the 
French  Syndicate.  The  Bank  was  given  the  power  to 
adopt  such  measures  as  it  should  deem  necessary  for 
ameliorating  the  monetary  situation  in  Morocco. 

The  majority  of  the  nations  of  the  civilized  world 
had  participated  in  a  conference  to  prepare  a  program 
of  reforms  which  was  to  put  an  end  to  the  anarchy 
existing  in  Morocco,  a  program  which  France  alone 
was  anxious  to  draw  up  and  put  into  effect.    All  the 

»6  Ibid.,  No.  37. 


222  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

world  except  Germany  seemed  willing  to  allow  her  to 
proceed.  Germany,  however,  wished  to  make  the 
world  realize  her  international  importance.  When 
questions  of  world  interest  were  to  be  decided,  Ger- 
many must  be  called  into  the  discussion,  otherwise  she 
could  and  would  challenge  the  settlement.  In  the  Con- 
ference of  Algeciras,  Germany  found  to  her  discom- 
fiture, that  it  was  easier  to  focus  the  world 's  attention 
upon  her,  than  to  force  the  world  to  pay  attention  to 
her  claims.  The  Powers  assembled  at  her  behest,  they 
listened  calmly  to  her  extravagant  claims,  they  were 
somewhat  dismayed  at  the  furor  Teutonicus,  but  they 
gave  their  decision  wholly  unmoved  by  her  bluster, 
and  in  direct  opposition  to  her  loudly  asserted  de- 
mands. France  had  been  keenly  humiliated  by  being 
forced  to  attend  the  Conference;  Germany  had  suf- 
fered a  humiliating  diplomatic  defeat  by  the  results 
of  the  Conference.  The  other  nations  had  little  inter- 
est in  the  whole  affair,  but  had  done  the  best  they  could 
under  the  circumstances.  It  remained  to  be  seen 
whether  a  conference  conceived  in  jealousy  and  held 
under  protest,  could  produce  an  arrangement  which 
would  function  smoothly  or  obtain  results. 

For  Germany,  the  result  of  the  Conference  was  a 
most  disagreeable  setback.  Instead  of  isolating 
France,  if  that  was  her  purpose,  she  found  herself 
ultimately  with  only  Austria  to  back  her.  Not  only 
did  she  fail  to  separate  France  from  her  newfound 
friends,  but  by  her  reprehensible  methods,  she  even 
forced  those  nations  which  wished  to  be  neutral  to  take 
sides  with  the  French.  Spain  and  Italy  remained 
faithful  to  their  pledges  of  friendship,  Russia  showed 


THE  CONFERENCE  OF  ALGECIRAS     223 

unexpected  vigor  in  her  championship  of  the  French 
cause,  while  one  might  say  of  the  Entente  Cordiale,  that 
at  Algeciras  "it  had  passed  from  the  static  to  the 
dynamic  state  and  that  its  power  had  correspondingly 
quickened."  Herr  Basserman,  a  Liberal  member  of 
the  Reichstag,  thus  summed  up  the  situation :  i '  To-day 
the  Triple  Alliance  has  no  further  practical  utility. 
The  Italian  press  and  population  lean  more  and  more 
towards  France.  Austria  has  been  too  much  praised 
for  this  role  of  *  brilliant  second'  which  she  herself  de- 
clined. The  Franco-Russian  Alliance  remains  intact, 
and  the  disposition  of  France  towards  us  is  less 
friendly  than  formerly.  .  .  .  We  live  at  an  epoch  of 
alliances  between  other  nations."  M  The  " Berliner 
Tageblatt"  conceded  that  " neither  Birmarck's  genius 
nor  Talleyrand's  subtlety  could  have  obtained  more, 
but  Bismarck  would  have  never  gone  to  Algeci- 
ras." 37 

Prince  von  Biilow  attempted  to  forestall  criticism 
by  bringing  the  question  up  in  the  Reichstag  on  April 
5,  two  days  before  the  signatures  of  the  delegates  were 
affixed  to  the  General  Act,  and  by  emphasizing  the 
point  that  Germany  had  neither  direct  political  inter- 
ests nor  political  aspirations  in  Morocco.  "We  have 
not  like  Spain  a  Mauritanian  post  of  several  centuries, 
and  we  have  not  like  France  a  common  frontier  of 
several  hundreds  of  kilometres  with  Morocco ;  we  have 
no  historic  rights  acquired  by  all  sorts  of  sacrifices 
as  have  these  two  civilizing  European  nations.  ..." 
From  the  tone  of  his  introduction  one  might  have  sup- 

seSten.   Ber.   v.    d.   Verhand   des   Reich.     Session    1905-06,   Vol.   V, 
p.  4238. 

3T  Quoted  by  Tardieu,  "France  and  the  Alliances,"  p.  206. 


224  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

posed  that  the  Chancellor  was  making  excuses  for  Ger- 
many for  not  raising  the  question,  rather  than  giving 
the  causes  which  led  her  to  force  the  Conference  upon 
an  unwilling  Europe.  However,  this  deprecatory  tone 
of  his  exordium  served  but  to  heighten  the  contrast 
when  he  came  to  recount  the  advantages  which  had 
accrued  to  Germany.  "We  wished  to  show  that  the 
German  Empire  does  not  allow  itself  to  be  treated  as 
a  negligible  quantity,  that  the  basis  of  an  international 
treaty  cannot  be  displaced  without  the  assent  of  the 
signatory  powers,  and  that  upon  a  territory  so  impor- 
tant from  the  economic  point  of  view,  which  is  inde- 
pendent, and  situated  upon  two  great  routes  of  the 
world's  commerce,  the  door  must  remain  open  to  as- 
sure the  liberty  of  foreign  competition."  There  is  no 
doubt  that  Germany  had  clearly  proved  to  Europe  that 
she  could  not  be  treated  as  a  negligible  quantity,  the 
Anglo-Russian  rapprochement  whose  base  was  laid  at 
the  Conference  gave  evidence  of  that ;  but  it  remained 
to  be  seen  whether  it  was  either  wise  or  advantageous 
for  her  to  arouse  the  world  to  the  Teuton  menace. 
But  of  the  other  two  points  upon  which  the  Chancellor 
rested  his  case,  the  first,  regarding  the  revising  of 
international  treaties,  was  wholly  irrelevant  here,  since 
France  had  no  intention  of  violating  any  of  the  clauses 
of  the  Treaty  of  Madrid,  and  as  for  the  second,  a  direct 
arrangement  with  France  would  have  been  far  more 
likely  to  safeguard  German  interests  than  the  elaborate 
international  arrangement  which  after  all  was  to  be 
put  into  effect  by  the  very  nations  which  Germany  had 
most  reason  to  fear.  In  concluding,  Prince  von  Biilow 
attempted  his  most  remarkable  tour  de  force:  "One 


THE  CONFERENCE  OF  ALGECIRAS     225 

cannot  easily  refuse  to  recognize  that  no  country  was 
more  capable,  by  reason  of  its  experience,  of  furnish- 
ing police  instructors  than  Spain  and  France,  countries 
which  are  neighbors  of  Morocco. ' ' 38  Even  the  mem 
bers  of  the  Reichstag  must  have  smiled  at  the  naivete 
of  this  statement,  when  they  recalled  that  it  was  Ger- 
many's refusal  to  recognize  this  fact  that  had  been  her 
principal  excuse  for  calling  the  Conference  together. 
Some  years  later  Prince  von  Bulow  expressed  far  more 
accurately  the  real  advantages  of  the  Conference  to 
Germany:  ''The  decisions  of  the  Algeciras  Conference 
.  .  .  provided  a  bell  we  could  ring  at  any  time  should 
France  show  any  similar  tendencies  again. ' ' s9 

The  Chancellor  had  one  more  opportunity  to  defend 
the  Act  before  it  came  before  the  Reichstag  for  ratifica- 
tion. On  November  14, 1906,  he  made  a  long  and  com- 
prehensive survey  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Empire, 
and  the  relations  with  France  were  given  special 
prominence.  On  this  occasion  his  tone  was  quite  pessi- 
mistic. He  declared  that  a  closer  relationship  with 
France  could  not  be  hoped  for,  seeing  that  past  events 
were  viewed  differently  by  their  neighbors  on  the  west, 
and  not  a  minister  or  a  deputy  had  defended  a  closer 
relationship  between  the  two  countries.  When  a  voice 
on  the  left  cried:  "How  about  JauresT'  von  Bulow 
countered :  ' '  One  swallow  does  n  't  make  a  summer. ' ' 40 
When  the  Act  came  up  for  a  vote  on  December  7,  some 
of  the  deputies  in  the  Reichstag  very  frankly  pointed 
out  why  Franco-German  relations  were  so  unsatisfac- 
tory.   Herr  Wiemer  declared  that  Germany  had  no 

»s  "Fiirst  BUlows  Reden,"  Vol.  II,  p.  303. 
8»  Von  BUlow,  "Imperial  Germany,"  p.  98. 
*o  "Fiirst  Billows  Reden,"  Vol   II,  p.  306. 


226  FEENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

reason  to  feel  satisfied  with  the  Conference  of  Alge- 
ciras.  The  hesitating  attitude  of  her  foreign  policy, 
its  useless  provocations,  its  misplaced  advances,  had 
conducted  it  to  a  diminution  of  its  diplomatic  pres- 
tige.41 Herr  Blumenthal  imagined  that  the  govern- 
ment was  about  as  pleased  at  the  results  of  the  Con- 
ference as  the  fox  of  La  Fontaine  was  at  the  grapes 
which  he  found  too  green.  There  had  been  too  much 
rattling  of  the  saber — too  much  force  to  produce  such 
an  unsatisfactory  result.  Since  the  Chancellor  had 
said  Germans  were  Russians  in  Bulgaria,  Austrians 
in  Servia,  why  not  be  French  in  Morocco  ? 42  The  Chan- 
cellor did  not  even  deign  to  appear  in  defence  of  the 
Act — the  opinion  of  the  Reichstag  counted  for  very 
little  in  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Empire.  After  the 
various  deputies  had  expressed  their  opinion  the  Act 
passed  by  a  show  of  hands. 

In  France  the  sentiment  regarding  the  results  of  the 
Act  was  divided.  The  bitterness  at  being  forced  into 
an  international  conference  against  her  will,  the  real- 
ization that  the  payments  she  had  made  to  Great 
Britain,  Spain  and  Italy  for  a  free  hand  had  gone  for 
naught,  the  knowledge  that  a  series  of  international 
barriers  had  been  raised  against  her  progress  in  a 
country  which  she  had  long  regarded  as  her  legitimate 
sphere  of  influence — all  these  factors  prevented  any 
manifestations  of  keen  satisfaction.  On  the  other 
hand,  she  had  strengthened  her  alliance  and  her  friend- 
ships, she  had  been  successful  in  maintaining  her  posi- 
tion on  every  point  which  she  considered  vital,  her  pres- 
et Sten.  Ber.  v.  d.  Verhand.  des  Reich.  Session  1905-06,  Vol.  V,  p. 
4237. 
« Ibid.,  p.  4238. 


THE  CONFEEENCE  OF  ALGECIEAS     227 

tige  had  been  increased  at  her  rival's  expense,  and  the 
whole  world  had  recognized  her  position  as  the  pre- 
dominant power  in  Morocco.  In  the  words  of  M.  Leon 
Bourgeois,  the  new  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  in  pre- 
senting the  Act  of  the  Conference  to  the  Chamber, 
April  12,  1906,  a  result  had  been  obtained  "in  terms 
absolutely  honorable  for  all,  and  without  anything,  as 
far  as  our  country  is  concerned,  having  been  aban- 
doned, either  the  fruit  of  its  past  efforts,  or  the  dignity 
of  its  present  situation,  or  the  safeguard  of  its 
future." 43  The  Act  was  not  voted  upon  until  Decem- 
ber 6,  but  the  discussion  then  centered  upon  the  methods 
to  be  employed  in  putting  the  Act  into  effect  rather 
than  upon  the  acceptance  of  the  Act.  When  the  vote 
was  taken  it  was  found  that  the  Chamber  had  accepted 
the  Act  unanimously. 

3.     THE  APPLICATION  OF  THE  ACT 

If  one  were  to  stop  with  the  ratification  of  the  Act, 
the  Conference  of  Algeciras  might  weil  be  called  suc- 
cessful. The  Powers  had  honestly  tried  to  draw  up 
a  program  of  reforms  which  would  put  an  end  to  the 
impossible  conditions  existing  in  Morocco,  and  to  do 
it  in  such  a  way  that  the  special  interests  of  the  Medi- 
terranean Powers  should  be  recognized,  and  at  the 
same  time  the  general  interests  of  the  world  safe- 
guarded. If  there  had  been  a  government  in  Morocco 
able  and  willing  to  cooperate  with  France  and  Spain 
to  put  an  end  to  anarchy,  if  France  and  Spain  had 
been  ready  to  provide  the  necessary  officers  to  drill 
the  police  directly  after  the  Act  was  signed,  the  Conf er- 

«  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  78ii,  p.  2182. 


228  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ence  might  still  have  been  called  successful.  But  inter- 
national machines  move  slowly  and  the  road  in  Mo- 
rocco was  exceedingly  rough.  The  Sultan  was  not 
particularly  anxious  to  provide  the  necessary  soldiers 
to  police  the  ports,  where  European  interests  were  for 
the  most  part  at  stake,  and  allow  the  rest  of  his  empire 
to  fall  apart  because  Europe  had  few  interests  there. 
The  whole  Conference  had  given  clear  evidence  to  the 
Sultan  that  Europe 's  interests  in  Morocco  were  wholly 
selfish.  Why  then  should  he  exert  himself  to  co- 
operate with  Europe  to  reduce  his  own  power?  The 
situation  was  rendered  the  more  difficult  by  a  series  of 
unfortunate  incidents. 

On  May  29  a  well  known  resident  of  Tangier,  a 
French  citizen,  M.  Charbonnier,  was  shot  down  in 
broad  daylight.  The  local  authorities  offered  no  ex- 
cuses and  made  no  efforts  to  apprehend  the  assassins ; 
and  the  European  colony,  aroused  by  the  affair,  de- 
manded that  an  immediate  end  be  put  to  such  condi- 
tions.44 The  bandit  Raisuli  had  become  more  power- 
ful than  ever,  and  the  Shereefian  troops  were  never  sent 
against  him.  It  was  even  suspected  that  the  Moroccan 
Government  was  using  him  as  a  means  to  stir  up 
trouble,  and  thus  check  to  some  extent  the  advance  of 
the  Europeans.  Hardly  had  France  obtained  the 
apologies  and  indemnity  demanded  from  the  Sultan 
and  a  promise  to  apprehend  the  murderers,  before 
there  was  a  new  outbreak  in  Tangier,  in  which  half 
a  dozen  Moors  were  killed.45  French  marines  landing 
to  obtain  fresh  water  were  fired  upon;  an  outbreak 

**  Doc.  Dip.,  "Affaires  du  Maroc,"  1906-07,  No.  10. 
45  Ibid.,  No.  37. 


THE  CONFERENCE  OF  ALGECIRAS     229 

against  the  Jews  was  staged  at  Mogador;  and  the 
French  government  was  constantly  in  receipt  of  re- 
ports concerning  the  unchecked  hostilities  of  the  Mo- 
roccan tribes  along  the  Algerian  frontier.  By  the  first 
of  November,  the  Act  had  not  yet  been  ratified  by  all 
the  Powers;  France,  Spain  and  Switzerland  had  not 
yet  decided  upon  their  officers  for  the  police ;  the  bandit 
Eaisuli  had  complete  control  of  the  village  of  Arzila 
in  the  vicinity  of  Tangier,  after  having  killed  some  of 
the  guards  and  chased  out  the  others;46  the  false 
prophet  Bu-Hamara  was  as  powerful  as  ever,  and  a 
new  contestant  for  the  throne  had  come  forth  in  the 
person  of  Hafid,  the  brother  of  Abdul  Aziz.  M.  Eeg- 
nault,  French  Minister  at  Tangier,  thus  summed  up 
the  situation  to  M.  Georges  Villiers  of  the  " Temps": 
"At  the  present  time  and  especially  at  Tangier,  the 
Maghzen's  authority  does  not  exist.  The  total  impo- 
tence and  abdication  of  power  has  profited  Raisuli, 
who  has  become  a  functionary  but  kept  his  habits  of  a 
brigand.  Since  no  government  exists,  the  police  estab- 
lished by  the  Conference  should  be  put  in  charge  as 
quickly  as  possible,  and  as  the  State  Bank  must  pay 
the  police  it  should  be  established  immediately.  There 
is  need  for  vigilance  and  vigor  on  the  frontier,  prompt 
organization  of  the  police  in  the  ports,  surveillance  and 
precaution  everywhere."47 

These  conditions  could  not  continue  much  longer, 
and  when  in  the  middle  of  October  M.  Sarrien  was 
forced  to  resign  because  of  ill  health,  and  M.  Georges 
Clemenceau  was  asked  to  form  the  new  cabinet,  more 

46  Ibid.,  No.  69. 

*t  Temps,  Nov.  10,  1906. 


230  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

vigorous  action  was  looked  for.  The  portfolio  of 
Foreign  Affairs  was  given  to  M.  Stephen  Pichon,  who 
had  creditably  won  his  spurs  in  the  Boxer  Rebellion. 
In  his  ministerial  declaration  made  before  the  Cham- 
ber November  5,  1906,  M.  Clemenceau  promised  to 
maintain  a  policy  of  peace,  but  it  must  be  a  peace  of 
dignity,  and  since  the  peace  of  the  civilized  world  was 
based  upon  the  strength  of  arms  it  could  not  be  ex- 
pected that  France  would  disarm  and  destroy  with  her 
own  hands  the  supreme  guarantee  of  her  independ- 
ence.48 Neither  Morocco,  nor  Franco-German  rela- 
tions were  mentioned,  but  in  an  interview  which  he 
gave  to  Herr  Wolff  of  the  " Berliner  Tageblatt"  the 
new  Premier  was  not  so  reticent.  "The  Germans  have 
one  fault,"  he  declared,  "that  of  treating  us  for  a  cer- 
tain time  with  an  exquisite  amiability  and  then  soon 
after  with  an  exaggerated  bruskness.  .  .  .  War  I  do 
not  wish;  when  one  doesn't  wish  war  he  wishes  good 
relations,  that  is  my  state  of  mind,  and  if  I  am  given 
opportunity  to  act  in  this  fashion  I  shall  rejoice.  But 
naturally  it  is  necessary  to  be  strong  and  it  is  necessary 
to  be  ready.  .  .  ."49  The  new  government's  attitude 
regarding  Morocco  was  plainly  stated  by  M.  Pichon  in 
the  Chamber,  November  29,  in  reply  to  an  interpella- 
tion by  M.  Jaures:  "Since  the  Act  of  Algeciras  has 
intervened  it  has  regulated  from  the  international 
point  of  view,  the  respective  status  of  all  the  Powers 
in  Morocco.  It  is  by  virtue  of  this  Act  that  we  con- 
sider ourselves  as  obliged  to-day  to  take  the  measures 
I  have  just  indicated  to  you.  It  is  absolutely  impos- 
es Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  80i,  p.  5. 
«  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.  Dec.  1,  1906. 


THE  CONFERENCE  OF  ALGECIRAS     231 

sible  for  us  to  leave  the  lives  of  our  citizens  at  the 
mercy  of  the  outlaws  who  threaten  to  become  masters 
in  the  city  of  Tangier.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to  allow 
another  power  the  opportunity  of  profiting  by  these 
circumstances,  to  substitute  itself  for  us  in  the  defence 
and  safeguard  of  French  citizens."60 

The  measures  which  M.  Pichon  had  taken  was  the 
sending  of  a  naval  expedition  to  Tangier,  after  notify- 
ing Spain  and  asking  her  cooperation.  Since  by  the 
terms  of  the  Act,  Tangier  was  to  be  policed  by  France 
and  Spain  jointly,  M.  Pichon  felt  that  the  responsibility 
was  already  theirs,  and  the  situation  was  such  as  to 
demand  urgent  action.51  Notice  was  also  sent  to  the 
Powers  that  the  expedition  was  being  sent  with  no 
intention  of  disembarking  unless  such  troubles  should 
arise  as  would  render  an  immediate  policing  impera- 
tive.52 This  was  followed  on  December  4  by  a  con- 
certed note  drawn  up  by  France  and  Spain,  declaring 
that  "the  recent  events  in  the  region  of  Tangier  and 
the  repeated  incidents  which  have  taken  place  in  that 
city  are  of  a  nature  to  make  it  feared  that  strangers 
no  longer  find  there  sufficient  guarantees  for  their 
security.  If  the  situation  should  give  rise  to  more 
serious  disorders,  the  institution  of  the  police  provided 
in  the  Act  of  Algeciras  would  appear  with  a  character 
of  urgent  necessity,  and  both  France  and  Spain  would 
have  to  take  measures  to  hasten  the  organization  on 
the  conditions  accepted  by  the  Powers  who  have  par- 
ticipated in  the  Conference.  It  is  in  this  spirit  that  the 
two  governments  have  decided  to  send  to  Tangier  naval 

50  Annates  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  80i,  p.  491. 
si  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  102. 
62  Ibid.,  No.  113. 


232  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

forces  capable  of  coping  with  any  eventuality."58 
The  arrival  of  the  naval  expedition  finally  aroused 
the  Sultan  to  action,  and  he  forthwith  despatched  his 
minister  of  war  in  personal  command  of  an  improvised 
army,  with  orders  to  place  the  city  of  Tangier  under 
"the  shadow  of  security,"  and  to  permit  the  execution 
of  the  reforms  of  Algeciras.54  Raisuli  seemed  little 
disturbed,  and  even  attempted  to  arrest  a  Frenchman 
while  the  Sultan's  troops  were  on  the  march.  Arriv- 
ing late  in  December,  El  Guebbas,  Minister  of  War, 
took  charge  of  the  town 's  protection,  read  a  decree  cen- 
suring Raisuli  and  depriving  him  of  his  rank  as  Kaid, 
while  the  populace  applauded  vigorously.  In  the 
meantime  Raisuli  had  left  Tangier  and  fortified  him- 
self at  Linat.  The  Sultan's  troops  decided  to  follow 
him,  but  when  they  arrived  Raisuli  had  departed.55 
As  evidence  had  now  been  given  that  the  Sultan  could 
police  Tangier,  there  seemed  no  further  reason  to  main- 
tain the  squadron  there,  and  it  withdrew  without  dis- 
embarking a  man  or  firing  a  gun.  Neither  Raisuli  nor 
his  band  had  been  taken,  the  murderers  of  M.  Char- 
bonnier  were  still  at  large,  but  M.  Jaures  and  his  fol- 
lowers were  determined  that  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the 
Act  should  be  carried  out  by  France  with  absolute 
fidelity.  Germany  was  not  to  be  given  another  oppor- 
tunity to  cry  "Wolf !" 

At  the  same  time  that  France  was  honestly  trying  to 
carry  out  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  Algeciras, — 
while  M.  Paul  Deschanel,  President  of  the  Commission 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  was  stating  publicly  in  the  Cham- 

«» Ibid.,  No.  123. 
«*  Ibid.,  No.  142. 
65  Ibid.,  No.  164. 


THE  CONFERENCE  OF  ALGECIRAS     233 

ber  that  "we  wish  neither  adventures,  nor  expedition, 
nor  conquest,  we  wish  to  fill  loyally  the  mandate  that 
Europe,  all  Europe,  has  confided  to  us  at  Algeciras,"  5(J 
— Germany  was  already  conniving  with  the  Sultan  to 
obtain  special  privileges  and  to  interfere  with  the 
policing.  Lieutenant  Wolff,  a  German  officer  and  also 
a  representative  of  Krupps,  was  engaged  as  an  in- 
structor for  the  Moroccan  cavalry;  Captain  von  Tshudi 
of  the  German  Corps  was  given  the  post  of  Chief 
Engineer  to  the  Sultan.57  Although  by  the  Act,  arms 
and  munitions  were  contraband,  German  steamships 
were  being  employed  regularly  to  carry  on  this  trade.58 
The  construction  work  of  the  German  firms  at  Tangier 
was  proceeding  rapidly  and  they  were  preparing  to 
begin  that  of  Larache.  France  began  to  realize  that 
Germany  was  playing  the  game  of  the  fait  accompli 
behind  the  smoke-screen  of  the  Act  of  Algeciras,  and 
already  it  was  becoming  evident  that  France  would 
have  to  come  to  some  agreement  with  Germany  before 
the  Act  would  be  effective. 

The  Sultan,  relying  upon  the  lack  of  unity  visible 
in  the  international  action,  became  indifferent  to 
French  demands.  Although  both  French  and  Spanish 
had  submitted  the  lists  of  officers  designated  for  the 
police  by  the  end  of  January,  1907,59  by  the  middle  of 
March  no  action  had  yet  been  taken.60  As  Abdul  Aziz 
became  more  dilatory,  his  subjects  became  more  openly 
hostile.    On  March  8,  at  Fez,  the  capital  of  Morocco, 

58  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  80i,  p.  729. 
67  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  172. 
B8  Ibid.,  Nos.  196,  204. 
6»  Ibid.,  No.  191. 
eo  Ibid.,  No.  209. 


234  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

a  French  engineer  was  attacked  by  the  populace  and 
very  seriously  injured  before  he  succeeded  in  making 
his  escape.61  On  March  19,  Dr.  Mauchamp,  an  eminent 
French  surgeon,  in  charge  of  the  French  dispensary 
in  Marrakesh,  was  murdered  by  a  mob  in  a  most  revolt- 
ing manner.62  If  such  outrages  were  to  continue, 
France  would  forever  lose  her  prestige  among  the 
bloody,  fanatical  Berbers,  who  attributed  inaction  to 
fear.  M.  Pichon  had  to  act  immediately  and  effec- 
tively. A  cruiser  was  despatched  to  Tangier,  and  on 
March  25,  the  Council  of  Ministers  decided  that  Al- 
gerian troops  should  occupy  Oudja  on  the  Moroccan 
frontier,  until  suitable  reparation  had  been  made.63 
When  it  was  learned  that  the  Governor  of  Marrakesh 
had  made  no  attempt  either  to  send  assistance  to  Dr. 
Mauchamp,  although  he  had  warning  of  the  excitement 
of  the  populace,  or  to  apprehend  those  guilty  of  the 
outrage  when  the  murder  was  reported,  France  de- 
manded his  dismissal  and  imprisonment,  in  addition 
to  an  indemnity  to  the  victim's  family. 

The  excellent  record  that  Dr.  Mauchamp  had 
achieved,  and  the  unselfish  nature  of  his  work,  made 
his  murder  seem  the  more  outrageous.  The  subject 
was  brought  up  in  the  Chamber,  and  some  of  his  friends 
excoriated  the  government  for  permitting  such  condi- 
tions to  continue  in  Morocco.  M.  Ribot,  although  not 
of  the  government,  came  to  its  defense  in  a  remarkably 

6i  Ibid.,  No.  212. 

ez  Ibid.,  No.  214.  Dr.  Mauchamp  had  served  with  great  distinction 
for  five  years  in  the  Holy  Land  at  a  time  when  epidemics  of  typhoid 
and  cholera  were  devastating  Syria  and  Palestine,  and  it  was  because 
of  this  enviable  record  that  he  had  been  given  this  most  difficult  post 
in  the  interior  of  Morocco. 

63  Ibid.,  No.  220. 


THE  CONFERENCE  OF  ALGECIKAS     235 

convincing  speech :  ' '  .  .  .  We  are  at  the  present  hour 
in  the  presence  of  an  aroused  excited  fanaticism,  and 
we  are  also  in  the  presence  of  all  that  has  happened 
during  the  last  two  years.  Europe  has  given  to  the 
Mussulman  world  the  spectacle  of  its  divisions,  and 
of  the  struggles  which  it  pursues  in  the  shadows.  It  is 
not  worthy  of  European  civilization,  that  the  great 
Powers — jealous  certainly  of  their  interests,  jealous  to 
defend  their  rights,  having  legitimate  ambitions — in- 
stead of  coming  to  an  understanding,  instead  of  con- 
ferring, try  to  strike  each  other  down  in  the  darkness. 
These  are  blows  aimed  at  civilization.  This  policy  of 
ambushes  must  cease.  We  must  confer.  I  know  well 
enough  that  to  confer  there  must  be  two.  It  must  be 
understood  that  we  seek  no  adventures  and  are  faithful 
to  our  word.  .  .  ."64  But  Germany  was  not  yet  ready 
to  confer,  nor  was  the  Moroccan  Government  ready 
to  establish  order;  the  fishing  was  still  good  in  the 
troubled  waters.  The  German  firm,  Renschhausen,  had 
just  signed  a  contract  for  the  construction  of  the  sewers 
of  Tangier,  and  a  boulevard  along  the  sea ;  the  German 
firm  of  Haessner  was  expecting  new  concessions  in  the 
port  of  Larache,  which  would  raise  the  value  of  its 
work  there  to  five  million  marks.65  Two  months  after 
the  murder  of  Dr.  Mauchamp,  the  Sultan  was  still 
debating  whether  he  would  have  to  make  reparation, 
and  whether  he  would  really  have  to  permit  the  organ- 
ization of  the  police.  M.  Pichon  might  well  remark: 
"Nous  restons  done  exposes  a  de  nouvelles  sur- 
prises." 

64Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  81,  p.  1029. 
65  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  253. 


236  FEENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

A  bit  of  humor  was  brought  into  the  situation  when 
the  Sultan  sent  his  Scottish  adviser,  MacLean,  to  bring 
the  bandit,  Raisuli,  to  terms.  The  canny  Scot  more 
than  met  his  match  in  the  wily  Moor.  Instead  of  treat- 
ing with  MacLean,  Raisuli  seized  him  as  a  hostage,  and 
declared  that  he  would  only  release  him  on  condition 
that  the  Sultan  should  reinstate  him  (Raisuli)  in  his 
former  position  of  authority.  All  thought  of  the  pre- 
dicament of  Scottish  Kaid  was  obliterated  by  the  news 
of  an  outbreak  in  Casablanca  July  31,  in  which  nine 
Europeans  were  massacred,  three  French,  three 
Italians,  two  Spaniards,  and  one  unidentified.66  Again 
France  was  forced  to  send  a  squadron,  and  this  time  it 
was  accompanied  by  a  landing  force  under  General 
Drude,  with  orders  to  seize  the  city  and  its  suburbs, 
reestablish  order  and  remain  until  the  police  should 
be  organized.  Spain  was  asked  to  cooperate  with  an 
equal  contingent.67  When  the  forces  attempted  to  land 
they  were  treacherously  attacked  and  six  were 
wounded,  one  an  officer.  The  war-ships  in  the  harbor 
thereupon  bombarded  the  town,  sparing  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, the  European  houses.68  Before  the  town  was 
completely  invested  the  French  troops  suffered  four- 
teen casualties.  The  French  then  turned  their  atten- 
tion to  the  organization  of  the  police,  but  when  assur- 
ances were  demanded  from  the  Moroccan  Minister  of 
War  that  these  officers  would  be  safe  from  assassina- 
tion at  the  hands  of  their  own  soldiers,  he  would  not 
give  it.  Thereupon  the  two  governments  decided  that 
a  temporary  police  must  be  organized  from  their  own 

««  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  334. 
«7lbid.,  No.  351. 
•sibid.,  No.  368. 


THE  CONFERENCE  OF  ALGECIRAS     237 

effectives,  and  the  Powers  signatory  of  the  Act  were 
notified  to  this  effect.69 

To  complicate  the  situation,  Mouley-Hafid,  the  elder 
brother  of  the  Sultan,  now  raised  the  banner  of  a  Holy 
War  and  some  of  the  western  tribes  immediately  en- 
rolled under  his  banner.  Before  the  end  of  August  he 
was  proclaimed  Sultan  in  Marrakesh,  the  ancient  capi- 
tal of  Morocco,  thus  giving  him  an  excellent  strategical 
position  to  work  from.  Abdul  Aziz,  becoming  worried 
at  the  progress  of  the  revolt,  removed  his  court  to 
Rabat,  where  he  might  be  able  to  call  upon  the  war- 
ships of  the  Powers  in  case  of  an  emergency.  Condi- 
tions in  Morocco  had  become  so  impossible  that  even 
Germany  conceded  the  right  of  France  to  intervene. 
The  "Berliner  Tageblatt"  declared  that  "the  bloody 
episode  of  Casablanca  is  only  the  prelude  of  other  acts 
of  the  Moroccan  tragedy  which  are  going  to  follow. 
We  Germans  have  committed  many  faults ;  for  example, 
only  the  obtuse  hatred  of  Herr  von  Holstein  and  his 
systematic  stubborness  would  have  repulsed  the  treaty 
which  M.  Rouvier  formerly  offered  to  Germany  after 
the  fall  of  M.  Delcasse.  France  has  occupied  Oudja, 
she  now  occupies  Casablanca  and  she  has  the  right  to 
do  so.  .  .  .,,7°  Chancellor  von  Biilow,  speaking  in  the 
Reichstag  November  29,  1907,  seemed  to  reproach 
France  by  intimating  that  the  sad  events  of  Casablanca 
might  never  have  occurred  if  the  police  provided  by 
the  Act  of  Algeciras  had  been  established.  But  since 
it  was  not,  France  could  not  do  otherwise  than  enforce 
justice  herself.71 

69  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  437. 

to  Quoted  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.  Aug.  16,  1907. 

7i  "Fiirst  Billows  Reden,"  Vol.  Ill,  p.  71. 


238  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Thus  at  the  close  of  1907,  a  year  and  a  half  after  the 
Act  of  Algeciras  was  signed,  the  work  of  the  Powers 
was  seen  to  be  a  failure.  This  diplomatic  effort  of 
Europe  to  establish  order  had  only  created  confusion 
and  tumult;  this  attempt  to  bring  peace  had  brought 
anarchy  and  war.  The  odious  role  of  policeman  which 
the  Act  had  imposed  upon  France  without  providing 
the  means  to  carry  it  out  properly  had  made  France 
the  object  of  a  blind  and  bitter  hatred  on  the  part  of 
the  Moors.  At  the  same  time,  it  gave  the  Kaiser  the 
opportunity  to  pose  as  the  champion  of  Islamism,  to 
the  corresponding  advantage  of  German  interests.72 
As  for  the  reforms :  the  police  existed  only  on  paper, 
trade  in  contraband  of  war  was  flourishing,  the  State 
Bank  could  not  even  provide  for  the  Sultan's  needs, 
the  reforms  in  the  revenue  had  not  been  attempted,  the 
collection  of  the  customs  was  being  carried  out  because 
that  was  the  easiest  way  to  obtain  money,  and  as  for 
the  public  works,  only  those  were  being  undertaken 
which  were  not  provided  for  by  the  Conference.  The 
results  were  just  what  the  French  had  forseen.  As  a 
French  diplomat  summed  up  the  situation:  "This  ad- 
mirable chart,  the  Act  of  Algeciras,  provided  for  every- 
thing except  that  which  happened.  The  architects  of 
Algeciras  have  built  upon  quicksands  and  have 
stretched  their  surveyor's  chains  over  chaos.  They 
have  disturbed  everything  without  accomplishing  any- 
thing, alarmed  the  Mussulmans  who  live  in  disorder, 
without  imposing  order,  excited  their  spirits  without 
mastering  their  wills,  and  there  is  nothing  more  dan- 

72  See  an  excellent  article  by  Camille  Sabatier  "L'Erreur  d'Algeciras," 
Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  Nov.,  1907. 


THE  CONFERENCE  OF  ALGECIRAS     239 

gerous  in  the  Orient  than  to  make  oneself  detested 
without  making  oneself  feared. ' ' 73 

If  France  had  been  able  to  carry  out  a  definite  policy 
of  reorganization  in  Morocco  at  this  time,  the  Moroccan 
question  might  have  been  settled  once  for  all.  The 
Sultan,  once  installed  in  Rabat,  turned  to  France  to 
help  him  against  his  brother;  General  Drude  with 
reinforcements  and  assisted  by  Spain,  could  have  put 
the  whole  coast  region  in  order,  while  General  Lyautey 
was  victoriously  proceeding  against  the  tribes  trou- 
bling the  Algerian  frontier.  All  Europe  seemed  will- 
ing that  France  should  put  an  end  to  the  chaotic  con- 
dition, and  Germany  seemed  to  expect  it.  But  once 
more  the  internal  condition  of  France  interfered  with 
her  foreign  policy.  From  its  very  inception  the 
Clemenceau  government  had  to  cope  with  a  number  of 
very  serious  strikes.  The  manifestations  during  the 
summer  of  1907  in  various  parts  of  the  South,  often 
resulted  in  bloody  clashes.  Many  of  the  regiments 
stationed  in  the  Midi  mutinied,  the  entire  administra- 
tion of  several  towns  resigned,  and  the  government  was 
hard  pressed  to  avert  a  civil  war.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances the  government's  foreign  policy  was  bound 
to  suffer,  and  its  policy  in  Morocco  was  vacillating  in 
the  extreme.  The  Act  of  Algeciras  had  been  pre- 
scribed as  the  proper  medicine  for  the  Moroccan  sick- 
ness, therefore  the  Act  must  be  applied.  But  as  to  the 
means  of  application,  no  decision  could  be  reached, 
and  the  Moroccan  question  was  destined  to  drag  along 
— the  bete  noire  of  the  French  Foreign  Office. 

73  Rene  Millet,  "Maroc  devant  l'Europe,"  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.  Nov., 
1907. 


CHAPTER  IX 

FRANCO-GERMAN  RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO, 
1907-1909 

1.  THE  SECOND  HAGUE  CONFERENCE  AND  THE  FRANCO- 
JAPANESE  ACCORD 

THE  idea  of  world  peace  has  ever  been  dear  to  the 
hearts  of  the  French.  The  Grand  Design  of 
Henri  IV  published  by  his  minister,  Sully,  the  Project 
put  forth  by  the  Abbe  Castel  de  St.  Pierre,  and  the 
judgment  upon  it  by  Jean  Jacques  Rousseau,  rank 
high  in  the  early  literature  of  the  subject.  Documen- 
tary evidence  has  even  been  produced  to  show  that 
Napoleon  was  only  conquering  the  world  in  order  ulti- 
mately to  give  it  perpetual  peace.  Some  of  the  earliest 
peace  congresses  also  made  a  strong  appeal  to  the 
French,  and  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  a  more  impas- 
sioned appeal  in  favor  of  world  peace  than  the  oration 
delivered  by  Victor  Hugo  in  1849  at  such  a  congress.1 

i  A  short  quotation  will  show  the  eloquence  of  the  poet-orator :  "A 
day  will  come  when  you  France,  you  Russia,  you  Italy,  you  England, 
you  Germany,  you,  nations  of  the  continent,  without  losing  your  dis- 
tinct qualities  and  your  glorious  individuality,  will  blend  yourselves 
closely  into  a  superior  unity,  and  you  will  constitute  the  European 
fraternity,  absolutely  as  Normandy,  Brittany,  Burgundy,  Alsace,  Lor- 
raine, all  our  provinces,  are  blended  into  France.  A  day  will  come 
when  there  will  be  no  other  battlefields  than  market-places  opening  to 
commerce  and  minds  opening  to  ideas.  A  day  will  come  when  the  bullets 
and  the  bombs  will  be  replaced  by  votes,  by  the  universal  suffrage  of 
peoples,  by  the  venerable  arbitration  of  a  great  sovereign  senate  which 
will  be  to  Europe  what  Parliament  is  to  Great  Britain,  what  the  Diet 
is  to  Germany,  what  the  Legislative  Assembly  is  to  France.  .  .  ." 

240 


RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO  1907-1909         241 

But  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  intervened  between 
Hugo's  eloquent  plea  for  world  peace  and  the  calling 
of  the  first  Hague  Conference.  Alsace  and  Lorraine 
were  no  longer  provinces  of  France  and  the  phrase: 
"Y  penser  tou jours,  n'en  parler  jamais,"  had  become 
a  parole  celebre.  Tangier  and  Algeciras  came  between 
the  first  and  second  Hague  Conferences;  and  almost 
simultaneously  with  the  Czar's  second  call,  the  Kaiser 
in  congratulating  the  Colonial  party  upon  its  victory 
over  the  Social  Democrats,  had  declared:  "What  do  we 
care  for  the  rules  according  to  which  the  enemy  fights 
if  he  is  beaten  in  the  fighting?  We  have  now  learned 
the  art  of  conquering  him  and  are  filled  with  the  desire 
to  practice  it  further. ' '  2  Under  these  circumstances  it 
could  hardly  be  expected  that  France  would  go  into  the 
second  Hague  Conference,  called  by  her  ally,  with  the 
idea  that  international  peace  and  friendship  were  soon 
to  be  achieved.  Even  if  M.  Jaures  or  M.  d'Estour- 
nelles  de  Constant  so  thought,  M.  Clemenceau  assuredly 
did  not. 

When  the  question  came  before  the  Chambre,  June 
7, 1907,  M.  Francis  de  Pressense  made  a  long  and  elo- 
quent appeal  in  favor  of  the  reduction  of  armaments, 
and  urged  that  the  French  delegation  should  be  author- 
ized to  support  such  a  proposal.  In  his  reply  M. 
Pichon  showed  that  since  Germany  had  already  given 
a  categorical  refusal  to  discuss  any  such  proposition, 
France  was  hardly  in  a  position  to  insist.  However, 
he  declared  that  France  was  willing  to  discuss  the  ques- 
tion with  those  Powers  that  understood  the  utility  and 
necessity  of  such  a  debate,  and  that  France  was  send- 

2  Gauss,  "The  German  Emperor,"  p.  258. 


242  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ing  her  delegates  with  the  hope  that  they  might  succeed 
"in  strengthening  the  idea  of  conciliation,  of  solidarity, 
of  justice,  in  diminishing  uncertainty  and  arbitrary 
methods,  in  weakening  as  far  as  possible  the  idea  that 
force  is  the  generatrix  of  right,  and  if  they  accom- 
plished the  task  set  for  them  they  would  render  a  sig- 
nal service  to  humanity. ' ' 8 

But  while  the  Clemenceau  government  was  willing 
that  M.  Leon  Bourgeois,  M.  d'Estournelles  de  Constant, 
and  M.  Louis  Renault  should  work  for  peace  at  the 
Hague,  both  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  Foreign  Secre- 
tary were  unwilling  to  let  any  opportunity  slip  whereby 
they  might  accomplish  the  same  result  by  strengthen- 
ing France.  The  Conference  of  Algeciras,  by  showing 
clearly  to  the  world  the  blustering,  quarrelsome,  brag- 
gadocio spirit  of  the  young  German  nation,  tended  to 
draw  the  other  nations  into  closer  relations  as  a  mere 
matter  of  self  protection.  France  and  Great  Britain, 
who  were  most  threatened  by  this  bellicose  attitude  of 
Germany,  profited  by  the  situation  to  strengthen  them- 
selves by  further  accords  and  agreements.  On  Decem- 
ber 13,  1906,  a  convention  was  signed  between  France, 
England  and  Italy  in  regard  to  Abyssinia.  The  polit- 
ical and  territorial  status  quo  of  Ethiopia  was  guar- 
anteed and  the  neighboring  territorial  interests  of  the 
three  Powers  were  set  forth  and  mutually  recognized. 
The  economic  sphere  of  influence  allotted  to  France  was 
the  hinterland  of  her  protectorate  over  the  Coast  of 
Somalis  including  the  zone  necessary  for  the  construc- 
tion of  a  railway  from  Djibouti  to  Adis  Abeba;  Italy 

„    "Annates  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  82i,  p.  410. 


EIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO  1907-1909        243 

obtained  Eritrea  and  Somaliland;  while  Great  Britain 
was  to  have  the  Nile  Basin.4 

On  May  16,  1907,  declarations  were  signed  at  Paris 
between  France  and  Spain,  and  on  the  same  day  notes 
were  exchanged  between  Spain  and  Great  Britain,  in 
regard  to  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  in  the 
Mediterranean.  The  three  governments  expressed 
their  intention  of  following  a  policy  having  for  its 
object  the  maintenance  of  the  territorial  status  quo. 
In  case  circumstances  should  arise  modifying  the  pres- 
ent situation  the  governments  were  to  communicate 
with  each  other  and  determine  what  measures  to  take 
in  common.5  At  first  glance  there  seemed  to  be  no 
particular  need  for  the  three  governments,  who  were 
already  bound  by  treaties  which  covered  exactly  the 
same  ground,  to  make  new  declarations  in  regard  to 
the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  in  the  Mediterranean. 
However,  much  water  had  gone  through  the  mill 
since  the  treaties  signed  in  1904;  the  German  Michel 
had  put  his  foot  on  the  shore  of  the  Latin  lake  and 
seemed  disposed  to  keep  it  there.  He  had  forced  the 
world  to  come  to  him  at  Algeciras,  and  had  proved  to 

*  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  Vol.  99,  p    486. 

s  Text  of  the  Franco-Spanish  Declaration,  British  and  Foreign  State 
Papers,  Vol.  100,  p.  933;  the  Anglo-Spanish  Accord,  Ibid.,  p.  570.  M. 
Pichon  speaking  in  the  Chamber  July  5,  1907,  regarding  the  Franco- 
Spanish  Accord  declared:  "Nothing  is  more  clear  and  more  pacific  in 
the  present  and  for  the  future  than  this  accord.  It  is  essentially  con- 
servative of  the  status  quo,  that  is  to  say  of  peace.  It  could  only  be 
disagreeable  to  those  who  dream  of  territorial  conquests  at  the  expense 
of  the  two  contracting  powers.  But  as  all  the  Powers  wish  peace,  as 
all  say  so,  they  must  be  reassured  by  the  reciprocal  guarantees  that 
France  and  Spain  on  the  one  side  and  Spain  and  England  on  the  other 
have  given  in  identical  terma."  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  82ii,  p. 
995. 


244  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

his  own  satisfaction  that  he  must  be  considered  in  the 
making  of  international  arrangements.  France  and 
Great  Britain  may  well  be  excused  for  this  bit  of  self- 
assertion,  this  salve  to  the  wounds  in  their  amour- 
propre  left  by  Algeciras.  They  still  considered  Ger- 
many a  quantite  negligible  in  questions  of  the  Medi- 
terranean and  they  took  this  means  of  showing  it. 
Incidentally  it  also  gave  them  another  opportunity 
of  proving  that  Germany  had  strengthened  rather  than 
weakened  their  mutual  friendship. 

A  month  after  the  announcement  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean understanding,  France  signed  another  accord 
of  a  more  surprising  nature — the  Franco-Japanese  Ac- 
cord of  June  10,  1907.  An  agreement  with  Japan  so 
soon  after  the  Russo-Japanese  War  was  the  more  un- 
expected because  of  the  bitter  hostility  aroused  in 
Japan  against  the  French,  through  numerous  alleged 
breaches  of  neutrality  on  the  part  of  France  during  the 
war.  In  fact  Admiral  Rojestvensky's  fleet  had  coaled 
at  Cherbourg,  had  anchored  off  the  coast  of  Madagas- 
car for  over  two  months  obtaining  both  coal  and  sup- 
plies, and  had  made  its  final  stop  of  ten  days  in 
Kamranh  Bay  in  French  Indo-China.6  The  indigna- 
tion aroused  in  Japan  was  intense,  and  Count  Hayashi 
conceded  that  if  the  Japanese  had  been  defeated  in  the 
Battle  of  Tsushima  Straights  their  hostility  would  have 
been  permanent.  But  the  Japanese  won  an  over- 
whelming victory,  and  "the  excitement  and  satisfaction 
of  the  Japanese  nation  entirely  overshadowed  any  re- 
sentment they  felt  against  France  on  account  of 
the  breaches  of  neutrality.    In  their  triumph  after  the 

«  Stowell  and  Munro,  "International  Cases,"  Vol.  II,  p.  295. 


EIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO  1907-1909        245 

war  they  entirely  forgot  the  affair."  7  The  Japanese 
were  now  very  eager  to  float  a  loan  on  the  Paris 
Bourse,  and  at  the  same  time  were  negotiating  with 
Russia  for  the  modification  of  a  few  unsatisfactory 
clauses  in  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth.  Therefore  an 
understanding  between  France  and  Japan  at  this  time 
would  facilitate  the  Russo-Japanese  negotiations, 
would  be  a  new  link  of  strength  to  the  Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance,  and  would  further  both  French  and  Japanese 
interests  in  the  Far  East. 

The  Franco-Japanese  Accord  consisted  of  two  parts, 
a  political  arrangement  and  a  commercial  declaration. 
The  first  specified  that  both  France  and  Japan  agreed 
to  respect  the  independence  and  integrity  of  China  as 
well  as  the  principle  of  the  "open  door."  The  two 
nations  also  agreed  to  support  each  other  in  assuring 
the  peace  and  security  of  those  regions  of  the  Chinese 
Empire  adjacent  to  the  territories  where  they  have 
the  rights  of  sovereignty,  protection,  or  occupation, 
with  a  view  to  maintaining  the  respective  situation  and 
the  territorial  rights  of  the  two  parties  in  the  continent 
of  Asia.  The  second  looked  to  the  signing  of  a  com- 
mercial treaty  whereby  the  most  favored  nation  treat- 
ment should  be  accorded  to  the  Japanese  in  French 
Indo-China  and  to  the  proteges  of  French  Indo-China 
in  Japan.8  The  following  month  a  similar  accord  was 
signed  between  Russia  and  Japan,  thus  bringing  to  an 
end  the  dangerous  rivalries  between  the  four  great 
nations  particularly  interested  in  the  Far  East.9  An- 
other stone  in  the  protective  wall  against  Germany  had 

7  "The  Secret  Memoirs  of  Count  Hayashi."  p.  214. 

8  For  text  see  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  Vol.  100,  p.  913. 
s  Ibid.,  Vol.  101,  p.  443  and  p.  463. 


246  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

been  laid,  and  again  without  her  participation  or  per- 
mission. The  culmination  of  the  accords  of  1907  was 
the  Anglo-Russian  treaty  of  August  30,  1907,  by  which 
the  ally  and  the  friend  of  France  settled  their  out- 
standing differences  in  Persia,  Afghanistan  and  Thibet 
and  brought  into  being  the  Triple  Entente.10  At  last 
a  counter-weight  to  the  Triple  Alliance  had  been  formed 
which  brought  the  European  balance  of  power  to  a 
stable  equilibrium  whereby  peace  was  assured  so  long 
as  both  sides  willed  it.  M.  Delcasse's  policy  had  been 
crowned  with  success.  Neither  Germany  nor  France 
herself  could  withstand  the  forces  which  he  had  set 
in  motion.  Gambetta's  dream  had  triumphed  over 
Bismarck's  purpose.  "To  improve  ceaselessly,  to 
fortify  ceaselessly,  unceasingly  to  extend  the  inter- 
national situation  of  France  ...  to  dissipate  the  at- 
mosphere of  defiance  and  suspicion,  to  solve  equitably 
the  existing  differences,  to  consolidate  the  work  accom- 
plished. .  .  ."X1  Thus  only  could  France  rise  from 
Sedan  to  make  ready  for  the  Marne. 

2.     THE  TWO   SULTANS  OP  MOROCCO 

At  the  close  of  1907,  Sultan  Abdul  Aziz  had  come  to 
a  realization  of  the  fact  that  without  the  support  of 
France  his  brother  Mouley  Hafid  would  soon  be  the 
real  Sultan  of  the  Shereefian  Empire.  Consequently 
when  M.  Regnault  came  on  a  mission  to  demand  the 
immediate  application  of  the  reforms,  and  also  recog- 
nition for  the  responsibility  of  the  Moroccan  Govern- 

io  Ibid.,  Vol.  100,  p.  555. 

n  On  January  24,  1908,  M.  Delcasse  made  a  remarkable  speech  in  the 
Chamber,  the  first  since  his  fall  in  1005,  proving  the  wisdom  and  pa- 
cific nature  of  his  policy.     Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  84,  p.  128. 


RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO  1907-1909        247 

ment  in  the  events  of  Casablanca,  the  Sultan  yielded  all 
along  the  line.  The  order  for  the  immediate  organiza- 
tion of  the  police  in  the  towns  still  under  his  supervi- 
sion was  given;  France  and  Spain,  in  his  name,  were 
authorized  to  repress  the  trade  in  contraband,  and 
permission  was  given  to  start  on  the  progressive  exe- 
cution of  public  work  in  the  ports.12  But  while  Abdul 
Aziz  was  making  up  his  mind  in  Rabat,  his  brother 
was  having  himself  declared  Sultan  in  Fez.13  Being 
thus  proclaimed  Sultan  even  in  his  absence,  with  the 
adhesion  of  the  notables,  and  in  accordance  with  the 
Koran,  Mouley  Hafid  was  in  an  excellent  strategic 
position  to  wrest  the  power  from  his  brother,  unless 
the  French  should  come  to  the  support  of  Abdul  Aziz 
in  a  whole-hearted  manner.  As  Mouley  Hafid  was 
making  his  reputation  by  his  hostility  to  the  French, 
and  by  the  proclamation  of  a  Holy  War,  but  one  course 
seemed  left  open  to  France,  namely,  to  put  Abdul 
Aziz  back  on  the  throne  and,  if  need  be,  keep  him 
there.  The  small  French  force  in  Morocco  under  the 
desultory  leadership  of  General  Drude,  Fabius  Drudus 
Cunctator,  as  he  was  called,  was  wholly  unequal  to  any 
such  program. 

But  the  Government  neither  wished  nor  dared  to 
follow  any  such  definite  policy.  M.  Jaures  and  his 
cohorts  were  ever  on  hand  with  the  cry  pas  d'aven- 
tures.1*    M.  Pichon  could  hardly  do  otherwise  than  re- 

12  Doc.  Dip.,  "Affaires  du  Maroc,"  (1907-1908),  No.  60. 

is  Ibid.,  No.  82. 

i*  In  his  speech  in  the  Chamber,  January  24,  1908,  M.  Jaures  vio- 
lently denounced  any  attempt  of  France  to  support  Abdul  Aziz:  "It 
is  ridiculous,  it  is  humiliating  for  France  to  associate  herself  in  the 
discomfiture  of  this  operatic  Ismacl,  and  I  ask  you  why  you  lead  around 
this  shadow  of  the  Shereefian  majority  as  if  you  yourselves  were  no 


248  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

fuse  to  intervene  between  the  rival  sultans,  he  could 
only  follow  out  a  policy  of  " watchful  waiting,"  while 
"the  Chamber,  resolved  to  apply  the  Act  of  Algeciras 
and  to  assure  the  defense  of  French  rights  and  inter- 
ests in  Morocco  without  intervention  in  the  internal 
politics  of  the  Shereefian  Empire,  .  .  .  passes  to  the 
order  of  the  day."15  However,  even  to  maintain  a 
neutral  policy  required  an  increase  in  effectives  and 
an  increase  in  funds.  General  d'Amade  was  given  the 
command  in  the  place  of  General  Drude,  and  early  in 
March  it  was  decided  to  send  reinforcements  to  the 
number  of  three  thousand  men.16  More  money  also 
was  required  before  the  necessary  contingents  could 
be  hired  to  police  the  ports,  and  the  Conseil  d' 'Adminis- 
tration of  the  State  Bank  authorized  an  advance  of 
two  and  one-half  million  francs  to  be  used  exclusively 
for  the  payment  of  the  coast  garrisons.17 

Mouley  Hand  continued  to  make  decisive  gains,  nor 
did  he  confine  his  operations  to  the  battlefield.  Real- 
izing the  advantage  that  would  accrue  to  him  by  play- 
ing off  the  Germans  against  the  French,  he  carried 

more  than  a  shadow  of  a  government  in  Morocco.  .  .  .  Break  this  cap- 
tious net  in  which  you  struggle,  in  which  you  vainly  exhaust  yourself. 
Do  not  permit  the  great  soul  of  France  to  remain  longer  captive  of  the 
Moroccan  imbroglio."     Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  84,  p.  117. 

is  Ibid.,  p.  179.  M.  Robert  de  Caix  commenting  upon  these  inter- 
pellations declared  that  not  only  did  it  require  "a  certain  effort  to 
extract  coherent  and  thought-out  ideas,  but  any  ideas  at  all  in  the 
parliamentary  rubbish  of  the  last  Moroccan  interpellations.  .  .  .  M. 
Jaures  serves  as  a  sounding-box  for  all  the  objections  which  can  arise 
among  foreigners  to  our  Moroccan  action.  He  does  it  with  a  constancy 
which  would  be  revolting  as  treason,  if  one  did  not  easily  see  in  it  tho 
result  of  the  enormous  candor  of  a  man  in  whom  verbal  virtuosity 
leaves  no  place  for  the  exercise  of  any  other  faculty.  .  .  ."  Ques.  Dip. 
et  Col.,  Feb.  16,  1908. 

i«  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  177. 

it  Jbid.,  No.  162. 


RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO  1907-1909        249 

on  a  constant  intrigue  with  the  former.  He  even  con- 
ceded that  the  Germans  were  blood  relatives  of  the 
Berbers  through  their  common  ancestors,  the  Vandals. 
He  also  sent  a  mission  to  Europe  to  plead  his  cause, 
and  although  assurances  were  given  to  the  French 
Government  that  the  envoys  would  not  be  received  at 
either  Rome  or  Vienna  in  case  they  should  come,  they 
were  received  in  Berlin.18  This,  coming  at  a  time 
when  France  was  supporting  Abdul  Aziz  with  both 
forces  and  treasure  to  protect  European  interests  in 
the  coast  towns,  showed  that  Germany  was  still  willing 
to  make  trouble  for  France.  At  the  same  time  the 
German  authorities  maintained  a  continuous  cam- 
paign of  recriminations  against  French  action  in  Mo- 
rocco. Exorbitant  claims  were  made  for  alleged 
damages  to  German  interests  through  the  shelling  of 
Casablanca,  complaints  were  made  that  German  steam- 
ships could  not  obtain  tenders  or  docking  facilities, 
numerous  acts  of  violence  towards  German  proteges 
were  alleged  against  French  troops,  none  of  which 
withstood  a  searching  investigation.19 

With  the  entrance  of  Mouley  Hand  into  the  holy 
city  of  Fez  on  June  7, 1908,  he  ceased  to  be  a  pretender. 
His  position  was  now  stronger  than  that  of  his  brother, 
and  he  demonstrated  his  cleverness  by  the  methods 
which  he  employed  to  strengthen  it.  By  immediately 
visiting  the  sacred  mosque  of  Mouley-Idris,  he  ap- 
pealed to  the  religious  devotion  of  the  zealous  Mo- 
hammedans; his  next  move  was  to  consign  to  a  huge 
bonfire  all  the  European  gew  gaws  and  contraptions 

is  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  279. 

19  Ibid.,  see  especially  Nos.  298,  306,  including  annexes  I- VII  and 
381. 


250  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

so  dear  to  the  heart  of  his  brother,  thus  proving  his 
antagonism  to  foreign  influences;  as  a  final  proof  of 
his  political  sagacity  he  revived  the  taxes  upon  goods 
entering  the  city,  and  the  typically  Berber  custom  of 
beheading  those  who  did  not  promptly  obey.  Abdul 
Aziz  could  no  longer  afford  to  remain  inactive  at  Rabat 
and  allow  his  brother  to  get  control  of  all  his  kingdom 
except  the  coast.  Speedy  action  was  imperative  if  he 
was  to  hold  his  throne.  His  best  move  was  to  get  his 
forces  together  and  march  directly  to  Marrakesh,  and 
from  there  extend  his  sovereignty  over  the  southern 
part  of  Morocco.  France  now  carried  her  neutrality 
to  the  point  of  preventing  Abdul  Aziz  from  crossing 
Chaouia,  the  district  lying  to  the  east  and  south  of 
Casablanca  which  General  d'Amade  had  pacified  and 
was  still  holding  under  his  control.  The  Sultan  left 
Rabat  with  his  mehalla  on  July  12  on  his  way  to  Mar- 
rakesh, and  as  new  additions  kept  joining  themselves 
under  his  banner,  the  journey  seemed  almost  like  a 
triumphal  march.  His  uncle,  however,  seemed  by  no 
means  so  confident  of  victory,  and  early  in  August  he 
sought  a  personal  interview  with  General  d'Amade  and 
besought  his  support  to  assure  the  success  of  the  ex- 
pedition, pointing  out  that  Abdul  Aziz  had  abandoned 
everything  to  follow  the  counsels  and  serve  the  inter- 
ests of  France.20  Arriving  at  the  outskirts  of  Mer- 
rakesh,  either  through  treachery  or  through  a  sudden 
panic,  the  Sultan's  army  suddenly  changed  into  a  dis- 
organized mob  and  fled  without  striking  a  blow.21  The 
cause  of  Abdul  Aziz  was  irrevocably  lost,  and  before 

20  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  372. 

21  Ibid.,  No.  385. 


RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO  1907-1909        251 

the  first  of  September  Mouley  Hafid  had  been  recog- 
nized in  practically  all  the  towns  along  the  coast. 

The  question  now  came  up  as  to  the  terms  under 
which  the  Powers  should  recognize  the  new  Sultan,  and 
on  August  26,  M.  Pichon  consulted  with  the  Spanish 
ambassador  regarding  the  guarantees  which  should 
be  demanded  of  Mouley  Hafid.22  On  September  1, 
M.  Pichon  notified  the  diplomatic  representatives  of 
France  in  the  various  capitals,  that  France  and  Spain 
were  prepared  to  draw  up  a  program  of  the  guaran- 
tees considered  essential,  and  submit  it  to  the  Cabinets 
of  the  various  signatory  Powers  for  their  approval.23 
On  the  same  day  Herr  von  Lanken,  the  German  charge 
d'affaires  at  Paris,  made  the  following  verbal  com- 
munication to  the  Quai  d'Orsay:  "  Considering  the 
situation  created  by  the  recent  events  in  Morocco,  the 
Imperial  Government  believes  it  should  call  the  atten- 
tion of  the  Powers  to  the  necessity  of  proceeding  to 
the  recognition  of  Mouley  Hafid,  with  the  effect  of 
leading  finally  to  the  pacification  of  the  Shereefian 
Empire,  of  establishing  peace  in  a  definite  manner,  and 
returning  to  the  obligations  assumed  at  Algeciras."  2i 
M.  Pichon  called  the  attention  of  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment to  the  fact  that  the  Powers  had  already  been  in- 
formed that  France  and  Spain  were  at  that  very  mo- 
ment formulating  the  terms  of  a  note  to  be  submitted 
to  them  in  regard  to  the  guarantees  to  be  demanded 
from  the  new  Sultan  as  a  condition  to  his  recognition, 
and  as  for  "  returning  to  the  obligations  assumed  at 
Algeciras"  the  Government  of  France  was  not  aware 

22  Ibid.,  No.  403. 

23  Ibid.,  No.  418. 
2*  Ibid.,  No.  419. 


252  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

that  any  departure  had  been  made  from  these  obliga- 
tions.25 The  position  of  Germany  was  the  more  equi- 
vocal in  that  Dr.  Vassel,  the  German  consul,  left  Casa- 
blanca immediately  for  his  post  at  Fez  upon  news  of 
the  disastrous  defeat  of  the  army  of  Abdul  Aziz.  The 
German  press  itself  recognized  the  ill-advised  action 
of  Germany  in  thus  attempting  to  force  recognition 
of  Mouley  Hafid  by  independent  action :  ' '  We  would 
prefer  to  assume  that  the  action  of  the  German  Gov- 
ernment represents  another  of  those  sudden  impulses 
of  German  policy,  which  make  a  terrific  noise,  but 
afterwards  vanish,  leaving  not  a  wrack  behind.  The 
only  harm  they  do  is  that  German  policy  has  once  more 
shown  itself  to  be  incalculable,  untrustworthy,  and 
therefore  disturbing.  But  this  unfortunately  is  harm 
enough. ' ' 26 

The  joint  note  drawn  up  by  France  and  Spain  an- 
nouncing the  terms  upon  which  the  new  Sultan  would 
be  recognized  by  the  Powers  was  issued  on  September 
14,  1908.  The  guarantees  were  as  follows:  confirma- 
tion of  all  former  treaties  and  engagements  entered 
into  by  the  Maghzen  with  foreign  states,  including  a 
general  adherence  to  the  Act  of  Algeciras ;  acceptance 
of  responsibility  for  all  debts  contracted  by  the  former 
Sultan;  payment  of  the  Casablanca  indemnities; 
formal  and  public  disavowal  of  the  Holy  War ;  and  im- 
mediate adoption  of  measures  necessary  to  assure  se- 
curity in  the  ports  and  upon  the  principal  routes  of 
the  interior.  The  note  also  called  attention  to  the 
position  of  France  and  Spain,  granting  to  them  the 

25  Ibid.,  No.  422. 

2«  Frankfurter  Zeitung,  Sept.  3,  1908. 


RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO  1907-1909        253 

surveillance  of  the  sea  to  prevent  the  illicit  importa- 
tion of  arms,  granting  them  reimbursement  for  their 
particular  expenses  caused  by  the  recent  expeditions, 
as  well  as  payment  of  indemnities  for  the  murder  of 
their  citizens.  In  conclusion  the  note  asked  that  hon- 
orable treatment  be  accorded  to  Abdul  Aziz  and  the 
functionaries  who  had  served  under  him.27  The 
Powers,  including  Germany,  accepted  the  principles  of 
this  note,  the  only  suggestions  made  by  Germany  be- 
ing that  the  new  Sultan  should  be  given  a  certain  free- 
dom of  action  to  allay  the  fanaticism  which  had  been 
aroused,  and  that  France  and  Spain  should  take  into 
consideration  the  financial  condition  of  Morocco  and 
not  aggravate  the  situation  by  undue  pressure.28  A 
new  note  was  thereupon  drawn  up  and  this  time  no 
mention  was  made  of  disavowing  the  Holy  War,  the 
Sultan  merely  being  asked  to  inform  his  subjects  that 
he  wished  to  maintain  with  all  countries  and  their 
citizens  relations  in  conformity  with  international 
law.29  This  note  was  approved  by  the  Powers  and 
presented  by  the  doyen  of  the  Diplomatic  Corps  at 
Tangier  to  the  representative  of  the  Sultan  on  No- 
vember 19,  1908.  An  official  acceptance  from  Mouley 
Hand  was  received  December  5,  and  one  month  later 
the  Powers  officially  announced  their  acceptance  of 
Mouley  Hand  as  Sultan  of  Morocco.30 

3.     THE  DESERTERS  OF  CASABLANCA 

France  had  supported  the  wrong  Sultan,  or,  to  be 

2T  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  443,  annexe. 

28  Ibid.,  No.  460,  annexe. 

29  Ibid.,  No.  469,  annexe. 

so  Doc.  Dip.,  "Affaires  du  Maroc"   (1008-1910)  No.  81. 


254  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

more  exact,  she  had  failed  to  support  the  right  one,  and 
with  the  recognition  of  Mouley  Hand  by  the  Powers 
she  found  herself  in  a  very  difficult  position.  The 
new  Sultan  was  cruel,  vindictive  and  subtle;  he  hated 
all  Europeans  and  the  French  most  of  all.31  Having 
made  himself  Sultan  in  spite  of  the  benevolent  atti- 
tude of  France  towards  his  brother,  he  was  not  only 
hostile  but  disdainful  towards  her  representatives. 
Furthermore,  and  this  was  far  more  important,  Mouley 
Hafid  was  the  candidate  of  Germany,  and  his  success 
was  bruited  about  both  in  Europe  and  Morocco  as  a 
victory  for  Germany.  France  had  found  it  hitherto 
impossible  to  put  the  Act  of  Algeciras  into  effect, 
chiefly  through  the  weakness  of  the  Sultan  and  the  op- 
position of  Germany.  Was  it  going  to  be  any  easier 
with  a  strong  Sultan  on  the  throne,  when  that  Sultan 
was  tacitly  pledged  to  support  Germany?  There 
seemed  to  be  but  one  solution, — an  agreement  must  be 
reached  with  Germany.  Back  in  July,  1907,  Baron 
von  Langwerth,  at  that  time  charge  at  Tangier,  had 
made  a  proposal  for  a  Franco-German  consortium  of 
all  the  banks  and  establishments  interested  in  Morocco 
and  an  accord  to  this  effect  was  concluded  at  Tangier, 
August  22,  1907.  France  immediately  approved  and 
it  was  to  be  expected  that  Germany  would  agree,  since 
the  proposal  had  come  from  their  side.  But  with  the 
massacre  of  Casablanca  and  the  consequent  occupa- 

3i  To  a  representative  of  the  Journal  he  declared:  "I  know  nothing 
of  your  country  save  the  sound  of  its  guns.  France  has  always  been 
hostile  to  me  in  sustaining  my  brother.  She  has  fought  me  with  all  her 
power,  with  her  money  which  is  abundant,  with  her  soldiers  who  are 
brave  and  with  her  bullets  which  go  far.  ...  I  am  mistrustful  of 
France.  .  .  ."  Quoted  in  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.,  Nov.  1,  1908. 


EIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO  1907-1909        255 

tion  of  Chaouia  Germany  became  hostile  again  and 
all  immediate  hopes  of  an  accord  disappeared.32  How- 
ever, again  in  May,  1908,  Dr.  Rosen  suggested  that  an 
arrangement  be  made  whereby  firms  of  the  two  na- 
tions might  participate  on  an  equal  footing  in  the  con- 
struction of  the  sewers  at  Tangier  and  the  public  works 
in  the  port  of  Larache.  Again  an  agreement  was 
reached  only  to  fall  through  on  a  sudden  and  inex- 
plicable change  of  front  shown  by  the  German  inter- 
ests.33 

Undoubtedly  the  real  reason  for  the  failure  on  both 
occasions  was  the  futility  of  attempting  to  construct 
a  commercial  edifice  without  the  foundation  of  a  po- 
litical understanding.  The  financial  interests  of  both 
parties  wished  to  agree,  and  it  was  to  their  interests 
to  do  so.  But  the  year  1908  was.  an  especially  trouble- 
some one  for  the  Wilhelmstrasse,34  and  the  Imperial 
Government  may  well  be  excused  for  being  unable  to 
maintain  a  consistent  policy.  The  month  of  May, 
le  mois  de  V Entente  Cordiale,  as  it  was  called,  was 
especially  painful  to  those  who  saw  in  the  friendly  re- 
lations between  Great  Britain  and  France,  strengthened 
by  the  adherence  of  Russia,  the  forging  of  an  iron  ring 
around  Germany.  M.  Clemenceau  visited  London,  on 
the  occasion  of  the  funeral  of  Sir  Henry  Campbell- 
Bannerman  and  he  was  followed  shortly  afterwards 
by  M.  Cruppi,  Minister  of  Commerce,  M.  Ruau,  Min- 

82  Laloy,  "La  Diplomatie  de  Guillaume  II,"  p.  80. 

33  Doc.  Dip.,  "Affaires  du  Maroc"   (1907-1908),  No.  442. 

s*  David  Jayne  Hill  in  his  "Impressions  of  the  Kaiser"  says:  "The 
annus  mirabilis  of  1908  as  it  has  been  called,  brought  sore  trials  to  the 
Kaiser.  In  the  twenty  years  of  his  reign  he  had  never  attempted  so 
much,  never  succeeded  in  so  little,  and  was  never  so  distrusted." 


256  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ister  of  Agriculture,  and  M.  Viviani,  Minister  of  La- 
bor, in  connection  with  the  Franco-British  Exposition. 
Finally  President  Fallieres  visited  London  towards 
the  end  of  the  month,  and  in  receiving  him  at  Bucking- 
ham Palace,  King  Edward  expressed  the  hope  that 
the  entente  might  prove  permanent.  At  the  same  time 
it  was  announced  that  King  Edward  intended  to  visit 
the  Czar  at  Reval  early  in  June.  The  simultaneous 
encounter  of  these  three  great  ships  of  state  produced 
a  backwash  of  fury  in  the  North  Sea.  The  "Ham- 
burger Nachrichten"  voiced  the  German  sentiment: 
1  'The  President's  visit  to  London  and  the  King's  visit 
to  St.  Petersburg  announce  to  the  whole  world  that 
they  have  succeeded  in  uniting  England,  France,  and 
Russia  into  an  entente  directed  against  the  Triplice, 
or  more  exactly  against  Germany. 

"Italy  does  not  enter  into  the  case  and  one  cannot 
count  upon  her.  It  is  the  attitude  of  the  Wilhelmstrasse 
during  the  Moroccan  affair  which  has  permitted  Eng- 
land to  awaken  French  suspicions  against  us.  .  .  .  King 
Edward  knew  how  to  profit  by  the  occasion  and  he 
struck  while  the  iron  was  hot.  .  .  .  Let  us  henceforth 
abstain  from  any  further  attempt  at  reconciliation  with 
France,  it  is  useless  .  .  .  but  let  us  become  strong 
enough  to  support  a  war,  but  upon  two  fronts  ...  let 
us  put  our  hand  on  our  sword  and  await  confidently 
trusting  in  our  good  star  the  outcome  of  the  situa- 
tion."85 

The  Kaiser  became  extremely  restive  during  this 
period.  In  his  famous  letter  to  Lord  Tweedmouth 
written  in  February,  1908,  he  criticized  severely  Eng- 

3»  Quoted  in  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.  June  1,  1908. 


EIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO  1907-1909        257 

land's  attitude  toward  the  increase  in  the  German 
navy;  he  declared  that  Lord  Esther,  who  had  written  a 
letter  to  the  press  advocating  an  increase  in  armament 
to  meet  the  German  increase,  would  do  better  to  con- 
cern himself  with  the  supervision  of  his  drain  pipes 
at  Windsor  than  with  battleships  of  which  he  knew 
nothing.36  While  King  Edward  VII  was  at  Reval, 
the  Kaiser  at  the  conclusion  of  a  cavalry  inspection  at 
Doberitz  said  to  his  officers:  ''It  seems  in  truth,  that 
they  wish  to  encircle  and  provoke  us.  We  shall  be  able 
to  support  it.  The  German  has  never  fought  better 
than  when  he  had  to  defend  himself  on  all  sides.  Let 
them  come  against  us,  then.  We  shall  be  ready. ' ' 3T 
On  September  11,  the  Kaiser  came  within  one  kilometer 
of  the  French  frontier  and  proposed  to  the  French 
that  he  be  allowed  to  ascend  the  Hohneck  from  their 
territory.  Instead  of  making  difficulties  about  it  and 
giving  an  opportunity  for  further  rattling  of  the  saber, 
the  French  officers  consented  willingly  and  even  of- 
fered the  Kaiser  a  bodyguard  to  ascend  with  him.  An 
"incident"  being  prevented,  the  Kaiser  changed  his 
mind  suddenly  and  left  for  Colmar.38 

If  either  nation  was  desirous  of  war,  an  excellent 
opportunity  was  given  them  by  an  incident  in  Morocco. 
On  September  25,  1908,  six  members  of  the  French 
Foreign  Legion  of  whom  three  were  Germans,  deserted 
and  attempted  to  take  passage  on  a  German  vessel  ly- 
ing in  the  harbor,  bound  for  Hamburg.  They  were 
under  the  protection  of  an  employee  of  the  German 
consulate,  and  when  they  were  recognized  and  seized 

as  London  Times,  March  6,  1908. 

37  David  Jayne  Hill,  "Impressions  of  the  Kaiser,"  p.  108. 

38  Ibid.,  p.  109. 


258  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

by  the  French  a  scuffle  ensued,  blows  were  exchanged, 
and  the  German  official  was  arrested  with  the  men. 
The  agent  was  released  on  giving  proof  of  his  identity, 
but  the  French  refused  to  surrender  the  deserters  at 
the  demand  of  the  German  consul,  who  insisted  that  he 
had  the  right  to  give  them  safe  conduct  by  virtue  of 
his  consular  authority  under  the  capitulations.  There- 
upon the  affair  was  taken  up  by  the  home  governments 
and  on  October  10,  Germany  demanded  the  liberation 
of  the  deserters  and  an  apology  for  injury  to  the  con- 
sular prerogatives.  Germany  was  wholly  unjustified  in 
her  demands  and  France  refused  to  discuss  the  mat- 
ter upon  any  such  basis.  Thereupon  Herr  von  Schoen 
suggested  to  M.  Jules  Cambon,  the  French  Ambassa- 
dor at  Berlin,  that  the  two  governments  have  recourse 
to  arbitration.  France  accepted  this  solution  will- 
ingly enough  until  Germany  demanded  as  a  prelimin- 
ary step,  that  France  express  regret  for  the  injury 
committed  by  French  agents  to  the  prerogatives  of  the 
German  consul,  and  in  return  Germany  would  express 
regret  for  the  incorrect  attitude  of  her  consul,  and 
for  giving  passports  to  individuals  who  were  not  Ger- 
man citizens.  Since  three  of  the  deserters  were  non- 
Germans  it  was  conceded  that  the  German  official  had 
been  guilty  of  an  abuse  of  power  in  extending  his  pro- 
tection to  them.  By  accepting  such  a  statement, 
France  would  be  conceding  in  advance  that  the  German 
consul  did  have  the  right  to  grant  safe  conduct  to  the 
three  Germans,  and  France  maintained  that  this  con- 
tention was  the  very  bone  of  the  argument.  Her  posi- 
tion was  that  the  incident  should  be  considered  as  a 
whole,  that  no  expression  of  regret  for  any  part  of  it 


RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO  1907-1909        259 

be  made  by  either  side  which  might. prejudice  the  ques- 
tion submitted  to  the  arbitrators. 

The  German  Government,  confident  in  its  power  to 
browbeat  France  into  compliance  with  its  wishes,  was 
obdurate,  but  the  French  were  no  longer  hampered  by 
the  temporizing  Rouvier.  M.  Georges  Clemenceau,  the 
Tiger  of  France,  was  in  power  and  the  country  was 
behind  him.  France  had  made  every  concession 
which  she  could  honorably  make;  to  concede  further 
would  be  to  yield  once  more  to  German  might.  Move- 
ments of  troops  were  reported  on  both  sides,  and  rela- 
tions daily  became  more  strained.  The  Kaiser  took 
advantage  of  the  situation  to  permit  the  publication 
of  his  famous  interview  in  the  " Daily  Telegraph," 
thinking  thus  to  crystallize  English  opinion  in  favor 
of  Germany.39  This  startling  example  of  personal 
diplomacy  had  the  effect  of  crystallizing  English 
opinion,  but  not  in  favor  of  the  Kaiser.    M.  Clemen- 

39  In  this  interview  the  Kaiser  admitted  that  during  the  Boer  War 
German  opinion  had  been  hostile  to  Great  Britain,  "bitterly  hostile," 
but  not  so  official  Germany.  He  had  refused  to  receive  the  Boer  dele- 
gates at  Berlin,  "where  the  German  people  would  have  crowned  them 
with  flowers."  Being  asked  by  France  and  Russia  to  join  with  them 
to  call  upon  England  to  put  an  end  to  the  war  he  had  replied :  "far  from 
Germany  joining  in  any  concerted  European  action  to  put  pressure 
upon  England  and  bring  about  her  downfall,  Germany  would  always 
keep  aloof  from  politics  that  could  bring  her  into  complications  with 
a  sea  power  like  England.  Englishmen  who  now  insult  me  by  doubt- 
ing my  word  should  know  what  were  my  actions  in  the  hour  of  their 
adversity." 

The  Kaiser  then  went  on  to  tell  that  in  answer  to  a  sorrowful  let- 
ter from  Queen  Victoria  written  in  December,  1899,  when  the  situa- 
tion was  very  dark  he  worked  out  what  he  considered  to  be  the  best 
plan  of  campaign,  submitted  it  to  his  General  Staff  for  criticism  and 
then  despatched  it  to  England.  And  it  was  a  campaign  formulated 
on  these  very  lines  which  Lord  Roberts  had  carried  into  successful 
operation.     London  Times,  October  29,  1908. 


260  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ceau,  who  had  always  been  on  extremely  cordial  terms 
with  England,  knew  that  he  could  count  upon  her  as- 
sistance if  it  should  be  required;  he  also  knew  that 
Count  von  Aehrenthal  after  his  audacious  coup  in  de- 
claring the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  to 
Austria,  following  King  Ferdinand's  proclamation  of 
the  independence  of  Bulgaria  on  October  5, 1908,  would 
be  in  no  position  to  support  Germany  in  a  war  without 
justification.  The  time  had  come  to  call  Germany's 
bluff,  and  M .  Clemenceau  did  it  most  effectively. 
When  the  time  had  come  for  him  to  play  his  last  card, 
the  German  ambassador  presented  himself  to  the 
President  du  Conseil  and  said:  " Monsieur  le  Presi- 
dent, if  complete  satisfaction  is  not  given  to  my  Gov- 
ernment, I  am  forced  by  order  of  his  Majesty  the  Em- 
peror to  ask  for  my  passports.  ..."  "The  best  train 
for  Cologne  leaves  at  nine  o'clock,"  replied  M.  Clemen- 
ceau after  consulting  his  watch.  "Monsieur  l'Am- 
bassadeur,  if  you  don't  wish  to  miss  your  train  you  '11 
have  to  hurry."40 

The  German  ambassador  did  not  ask  for  his  pass- 
ports, and  on  November  10,  Germany  accepted  the 
French  formula,  which  stated  that  "each  of  the  two 
governments  agree  to  express  its  regrets  for  the  acts 
of  its  agents  in  accordance  with  the  award  to  be  ren- 
dered by  the  arbitrators  upon  the  facts  and  upon  the 
question  of  law."41    A  compromis  was  then  signed 

40  Georges  Lecomte  "Clemenceau,"  p.  87. 

4i  For  an  exhaustive  and  fully  documented  treatment  of  the  affair 
giving  the  memoires  of  both  sides,  the  debates  of  the  tribunal  and  the 
award  see  Gilbert  Gidel,  "L'Arbitrage  de  Casablanca,"  Rev.  Gen.  de 
Droit  Int.  Public,  Vol.  17,  pp.  326-407.  See  Stowell  and  Munro,  "In- 
ternational Cases,"  Vol.  I,  p.  377  for  an  excellent  summary. 


EIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO  1907-1909        261 

fixing  the  rules  of  the  arbitral  procedure  and  stating 
that  the  tribunal  should  consist  of  five  arbitrators 
chosen  from  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  at 
The  Hague.  The  decision  handed  down  May  22,  1909, 
although  a  compromise,  was  really  a  victory  for 
France.  She  did  not  have  to  surrender  the  deserters, 
"the  German  Consulate  did  not  under  the  circum- 
stances have  the  right  to  grant  its  protection  to  the 
deserters  of  German  nationality. ' ' 42  The  press  on 
both  sides  received  the  award  favorably,  and  the 
"Temps"  declared  that  it  was  a  verdict  acceptable  to 
all,  one  "which  had  furnished  an  honorable  solution 
to  a  dispute  which  however  trivial  was  its  origin,  had 
almost  set  Europe  on  fire. ' ' 43 

4.     THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  ACCORD  OF  1909 

The  storm  of  condemnation  aroused  in  Germany  at 
the  publication  of  the  Kaiser's  Daily  Telegraph  inter- 
view had  a  moderating  effect  upon  the  over-aggressive 
foreign  policy  of  the  Imperial  Government.  The 
critical  situation  in  the  Near  East  resulting  from  the 
Young  Turk  Revolution,  and  the  annexation  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  by  Austria  in  direct  defiance  to  the 
clauses  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  was  even  more  condu- 
cive to  a  period  of  clear,  calm  thinking  on  the  part  of 
the  Wilhelmstrasse.  Not  that  Germany  feared  trouble 
from  Russia.  All  Europe  realized  that  protest  as 
Russia  might  against  the  blow  at  the  Pan-Slavic  hopes 
she  was  nourishing,  the  war  with  Japan  and  the  seri- 
ous internal  troubles  which  had  followed,  had  left  her 

«  Gidel,  op.  cit.,  p.  400. 
« Le  Temps,  May  24,  1909. 


262  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

in  a  hopeless  position  to  make  her  protest  effective. 
Germany's  fear  was  rather  for  her  relations  with 
Turkey  and  the  preservation  of  her  Bagdad  Railway 
scheme.  Turkey  had  even  greater  reason  to  resent 
the  rape  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  than  did  Russia. 
The  problem  which  Germany  had  to  face  was:  how 
could  she  support  Austria  as  she  must  in  her  spoliation 
of  Young  Turkey,  and  yet  prove  to  the  Turks  that  she 
was  backing  the  new  regime  just  as  strongly  as  she 
had  formerly  supported  Abdul  Hamid?  Austria  re- 
turned the  Sandjak  of  Novi  Bazar  at  her  instigation 
but  Turkey  was  still  far  from  being  placated.  It  still 
remained  to  be  seen  also  to  what  extent  France  and 
Great  Britain  were  prepared  to  back  Russia  in  any  pro- 
test that  she  might  make.  The  German  Foreign  Of- 
fice perceived  very  clearly  that  the  time  was  not  suit- 
able for  a  politique  d'aventures  in  Morocco.44 

Germany  gave  the  first  indication  of  her  apprecia- 
tion of  the  new  situation  in  Europe  by  her  concession 
in  regard  to  the  affair  of  Casablanca.  In  his  speech 
before  the  Reichstag,  December  7,  Prince  von  Biilow 
gave  further  indications  of  Germany's  new  policy  of 
friendly  understandings.  .  .  .  "Here  as  elsewhere 
there  is  an  excessive  estimation  of  what  is  called 
Prestige  politik  ...  let  us  seek  our  advantage,  let  us 
seek  our  honor  in  the  maintenance  of  the  foundations 
of  the  German  power,  and  in  the  preservation  of  the 

**  Germany  may  also  have  been  influenced  by  the  friendly  disposition 
towards  France  exhibited  by  Austria  at  this  time.  The  Ballplatz  had 
shown  great  willingness  to  accept  the  Franco-Spanish  note  in  regard 
to  the  recognition  of  Mouley-Hafld,  and  in  the  Casablanca  incident,  al- 
though one  of  the  deserters  was  an  Austrian,  the  Austrian  ambassador 
hastened  to  tell  M.  Pichon  that  he  did  n't  claim  his  deserter — "je  ne 
riclame  pas  mon  diserteur." 


RIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO  1907-1909        263 

future  of  the  German  people,  but  not  in  vanity  and 
glitter.  ...  In  the  examination  of  situations  and  in 
regard  to  several  diplomatic  demarches  the  German 
and  French  governments  have  shown  that  they  know 
how  to  appreciate  this  favorable  attitude."45 

France  had  an  opportunity  to  test  out  the  sincerity 
of  this  new  attitude  early  in  January,  1909.  The 
agreement  which  gave  France  and  Spain  the  right  to 
patrol  for  contraband  expired  at  the  close  of  1908,  and 
it  was  necessary  to  obtain  the  consent  of  the  Powers  to 
have  it  renewed  for  another  year.46  When  the  request 
was  brought  to  the  German  government,  instead  of 
seizing  the  opportunity  to  make  difficulties  it  raised  no 
objection  to  the  renewal.47  A  few  days  later  Herr  von 
Kiderlen  engaged  in  a  long  parley  with  M.  Jules  Cam- 
bon  in  regard  to  an  arrangement  between  France  and 
Germany  in  regard  to  Morocco.  He  assured  M.  Cam- 
bon  that  Germany's  interests  there  were  purely 
economic.  M.  Cambon  replied  that  if  Germany  had 
no  intention  of  interfering  with  the  political  interests 
of  France  and  would  recognize  her  special  situation 
in  Morocco,  the  two  Governments  might  express  their 
common  intention  of  pursuing  no  economic  privilege 
and  the  desire  to  see  their  nationals  become  associated 
in  enterprises  of  an  economic  order.48  Both  M.  Pichon 
and  Herr  von  Schoen  approved  this  statement  as  the 
basis  of  an  accord,  and  a  declaration  to  this  effect  was 
signed  at  Berlin  on  February  9, 1909.  As  this  declara- 
tion was  to  remain  the  basis  of  all  future  Franco-Ger- 

45  "Furst  Billows  Reden,"  Vol.  Ill,  p.  160. 

46  Doc.  Dip.  "Affaires  du  Maroc"  (1908-1910)  No.  84. 
*t  Ibid.,  No.  94,  annexe. 

48  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  114,  annexe. 


264  FEENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

man  relations  in  Morocco  it  will  be  well  to  give  the 
complete  text: 

"The  Government  of  the  French  Republic  and  the 
Imperial  German  Government,  animated  by  an  equal 
desire  to  facilitate  the  execution  of  the  Act  of  Alge- 
ciras,  have  agreed  to  define  the  meaning  that  they  at- 
tach to  its  clauses,  in  order  to  avoid  all  cause  of  mis- 
understanding between  them  in  the  future. 

"In  consequence, 

"the  Government  of  the  French  Republic,  entirely 
attached  to  the  maintenance  of  the  integrity  and  in- 
dependence of  the  Moorish  Empire,  resolved  to  safe- 
guard their  economic  equality  and  consequently  not  to 
hinder  their  German  commercial  and  industrial  inter- 
ests, 

"and  the  Imperial  German  Government  pursuing 
only  economic  interests  in  Morocco,  recognizing  on  the 
other  hand  that  the  particular  political  interests  of 
France  there  are  closely  bound  up  with  the  consolida- 
tion of  order  and  internal  peace,  and  decided  not  to 
impede  these  interests, 

"declare  that  they  will  not  pursue  nor  encourage  any 
measure  of  a  nature  to  create  in  their  favor  or  in  the 
favor  of  any  other  Power  an  economic  privilege,  and 
that  they  will  endeavor  to  associate  their  citizens  in  the 
affairs  for  which  they  may  obtain  concessions."49 

A  profound,  feeling  of  satisfaction  was  manifested 
on  both  sides  of  the  frontier  at  this  amicable  solution 
of  the  Moroccan  difficulty.  The  declaration  seemed 
to  cover  every  contingency.  By  recognizing  the  Act 
of  Algeciras  as  the  basis  of  the  accord  the  other  Powers 

«»Ibid.,  No.  114,  annexe. 


EIVALRY  IN  MOROCCO  1907-1909        265 

could  hardly  object;  it  was  a  victory  for  France  in 
that  her  particular  political  rights  were  recognized 
by  the  only  power  that  had  any  interest  in  interfering 
with  their  maintenance,  and  who  by  her  friendly  rela- 
tions with  the  new  Sultan  was  in  a  strategic  position 
to  make  her  interference  most  troublesome;  finally  it 
was  eminently  satisfactory  to  Germany  since  she  not 
only  secured  economic  equality,  but  the  privilege  of 
associating  with  France  in  all  the  concessions  which 
might  be  obtained.  At  the  time  France  failed  to  real- 
ize fully  the  sinister  possibilities  of  the  last  phrase.50 
Neither  did  she  appreciate  the  hostility  that  it  was 
bound  to  provoke  in  Spain,  who  could  not  reconcile 
this  Declaration  with  the  secret  agreements  which 
France  had  already  signed  with  her.  France  accepted 
the  arrangement  at  its  face  value  as  "one  which  dis- 
simulated nothing  and  which  implied  no  clandestine 
concession,  and  which  on  the  part  of  Germany  was  the 
abandonment  of  her  policy  of  chicanery  and  the  in- 
auguration of  a  policy  of  conciliation."  51  The  Kaiser 
telegraphed  to  Prince  Radolin,  the  German  Ambassa- 
dor at  Paris,  his  expressions  of  satisfaction,  and  the 
French  Government  conferred  the  Grand  Cross  of  the 

so  That  she  did  recognize  to  a  certain  extent  that  danger  lurked 
under  too  broad  an  extension  or  interpretation  of  this  phrase  is  shown 
by  the  fact  that  M.  Cambon  demanded  that  an  explanatory  letter 
should  follow  the  declaration,  but  agreed  to  withhold  its  publication  as 
a  favor  to  the  German  Government,  which  was  unwilling  to  appear 
before  the  German  people  as  giving  up  too  much.  This  letter  stated 
first,  that  Germany  was  disinterested  politically  in  Morocco,  and  sec- 
ondly, that  "in  the  economic  affairs  tohich  admitted  an  association  of 
French  and  German  interests,  account  should  be  taken  as  far  as  pos- 
sible of  the  fact  that  French  interests  in  Morocco  are  superior  to  Ger- 
man interests."     Andre"  Mevil  in  L'Echo  de  Paris,  Dec.  8,  1911. 

si  Auguste  Gauvain,  "I'Accord  Franco- Allemand  sur  le  Maroc," 
Journal  des  Debats,  Feb.  9,  1909. 


266  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Legion  of  Honor  upon  Prince  Radolin  and  Baron  von 
Schoen.  If  France  required  any  further  proof  of  Ger- 
many's changed  attitude  in  the  Moroccan  question  it 
was  given  by  Chancellor  von  Biilow  the  day  after  the 
accord  was  signed.  Receiving  M.  Cambon  in  a  most 
gracious  manner  he  said  to  him:  "Now,  Morocco  is 
a  fruit  which  is  ripening  for  you  and  you  are  sure  of 
picking  it ;  we  only  ask  one  thing  of  you,  that  is  to  be 
patient  and  to  have  regard  for  German  public  opin- 
ion."52 

One  of  the  chief  advantages  accruing  to  France  from 
the  accord  was  the  immediate  effect  which  it  had  in  in- 
creasing the  prestige  of  France  in  Morocco.  In  his 
exhaustive  report  before  the  Senate  on  the  whole  Mo- 
roccan question  January  25,  1912,  M.  Pierre  Baudin 
says:  "It  proved  to  the  Sultan  and  the  chiefs  of  the 
tribes  that  they  had  nothing  further  to  hope  for  from 
the  antagonism  between  France  and  Germany.  In 
every  Mohammedan  country  in  Africa  it  created  a  pro- 
found impression.  It  destroyed  the  effect  of  the 
propoganda  cleverly  organized,  which  since  the  events 
of  Tangier  in  1905  had  been  attempting  to  persuade 
the  natives  that  France  would  soon  cede  her  place  to 
the  German  Empire." 53  With  the  Kaiser  appeased 
and  the  Sultan  cowed,  France  saw  the  last  of  the  ob- 
stacles in  her  Moroccan  pathway  removed.  The  sit- 
uation appeared  so  promising  that  one  deputy  was  led 
to  remark:  "Que  va  devenir  M.  Jaures?"  The  re- 
tort was  exceedingly  prescient:  "Timeo  Danaos  dona 
ferentes." 

62  Reng  Pinon,  "France  et  Allemagne,"  p.  187. 
88  Annates  du  Senat,  Doc.  Pari.,  Vol.  56,  p.  263. 


CHAPTEE  X 
EESULTS  OF  THE  ACCORD  OF  1909 

THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ENTENTE 

ALTHOUGH  the  Quai  d'Orsay  played  a  very  minor 
role  in  the  crisis  resulting  from  the  seizure  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  by  Austria,  the  whole  Euro- 
pean situation  Was  so  profoundly  affected  by  this 
sequel  to  the  Young  Turk  Revolution,  that  some  atten- 
tion must  be  given  to  it.  The  mere  annexation  by 
Austria  of  the  two  provinces,  which  she  had  admin- 
istered for  thirty  years  under  a  virtual  mandate  of 
the  Powers,  was  of  vital  interest  to  none  but  Turkey 
and  Serbia.  Of  the  two,  Serbia,  who  saw  her  long  sus- 
tained hope  of  a  free  outlet  to  the  sea  dashed,  had  more 
reason  to  complain  than  Turkey,  whose  chief  interest 
was  the  amount  of  compensation  that  she  could  obtain. 
If  this  had  been  the  only  side  of  the  situation  to  be 
considered,  no  nation  in  Europe  would  have  protested, 
save  perhaps  Russia  as  the  protector  of  Slavic  inter- 
ests in  the  Balkans.  The  serious  side  from  the  Euro- 
pean point  of  view  was  the  fact  that  Austria  had  de- 
liberately torn  up  a  pact  concluded  with  the  other 
Powers  of  Europe,  although  she  had  been  one  of  the 
signatory  Powers  to  the  Declaration  of  London  which 
stated  specifically  that  "contracting  Powers  could  rid 
themselves  of  their  treaty  engagements  only  by  an 
understanding  with  their  co-signatories."    Russia  had 

267 


268  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

attempted  to  free  herself  from  the  Treaty  of  Paris 
during  the  Franco-Russia  War  and  had  been  forced 
to  sign  the  Declaration  of  London  as  a  result ;  she  now 
intended  to  see  to  it  that  the  Powers  should  show  no 
partiality  to  Austria. 

M.  Isvolsky,  Russian  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
who  happened  to  be  in  Paris  at  the  time,  added  his  pro- 
test to  those  of  Turkey,  Italy,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro, 
and  demanded  that  a  conference  of  the  Powers  signa- 
tory of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  be  called  to  deliberate  on 
the  various  questions  involved.  Proceeding  to  Lon- 
don, he  drew  up  with  Sir  Edward  Grey  a  program  for 
the  proposed  conference  in  which  a  complete  identity 
of  views  between  the  two  powers  was  shown.1  Both 
France  and  Great  Britain  were  ready  to  support  Rus- 
sia vigorously  in  her  just  demands.  A  conference  of 
the  Powers  was  the  last  thing  desired  by  Austria,  and 
Baron  von  Aehrenthal  showed  himself  to  be  a  second 
Talleyrand  in  his  method  of  procedure.  His  first  move 
was  to  placate  Turkey,  and  he  attempted  this  by  prom- 
ising to  turn  back  to  her  immediately  the  Sandjak  of 
Novi  Bazar.  This  by  no  means  satisfied  the  Turks  but 
it  opened  the  way  to  a  solution.  Austria's  negotia- 
tions with  Turkey  were  facilitated  through  the  assist- 
ance of  Baron  Marschall  von  Bieber stein,  the  German 
ambassador  at  Constantinople,  one  of  the  most  able 
members  of  the  German  diplomatic  corps  and  ex- 
tremely popular  with  the  Turks.  Having  paved  the 
way  for  an  understanding  with  Turkey,  Austria  now 
declared  that  the  question  was  wholly  between  herself 
and  the  Porte,  neither  Servia  nor  Montenegro  having 

i  For  text  of  the  Program  see  London  Times,  Oct.  16,  1908. 


RESULTS  OF  THE  ACCORD  OF  1909     269 

any  right  to  object,  since  their  legal  or  territorial  rights 
had  not  been  violated. 

Baron  von  Aehrenthal  had  informed  both  Germany 
and  Italy  of  his  annexation  project,  but  without  indi- 
cating the  time  or  manner  of  the  seizure,2  and  although 
neither  was  in  sympathy  with  it,  he  now  looked  for 
support  to  Germany.  Von  Biilow,  although  realizing 
Italy's  hostility,  did  not  dare  refuse  his  support,  and 
his  first  plan  was  to  separate  France  and  Great  Britain 
from  Russia.  The  interests  of  these  two  powers  in 
the  Balkans  were  negligible,  and  it  was  considered 
that  France  might  be  willing  to  withdraw  her  support 
from  Russia  for  a  free  hand  in  Morocco.  A  sugges- 
tion was  thereupon  made  to  the  Quai  d'Orsay  that  the 
question  of  Morocco  be  joined  to  the  Eastern  question. 
M.  Pichon,  however,  refused  to  be  drawn  into  any 
such  discussion.3  We  have  already  seen  the  disastrous 
results  of  the  Kaiser's  attempt  to  win  over  the  Brit- 
ish by  the  publication  of  the  Daily  Telegraph  inter- 
view. He  failed  not  only  in  improving  the  Anglo- 
German  relations,  but  even  more  so  in  attempting  to 
embroil  England  with  France  and  Russia.  The  irri- 
tation produced  by  these  two  failures  resulted  in  the 
short  period  of  blustering  bellicosity  manifested  in  the 
Casablanca  incident,  but  as  has  already  been  seen,  this 

2  Von  Reventlow,  "Deutschlands  Auswiirtige  Politik,"  p.  326. 

3  On  this  point  M.  Deschanel,  Reporter  of  the  Budget  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, speaking  in  the  Chamber  Nov.  26  had  this  to  say:  "At  no 
moment  I  am  sure  has  our  diplomacy  linked  the  question  of  Morocco 
to  the  Eastern  question.  If  it  should  have  done  so  it  will  have  com- 
mitted an  irreparable  blunder,  it  would  risk  being  the  dupe  and  victim 
of  one  of  those  illusions  which  have  cost  so  dear  to  Napoleon  III  when 
he  allowed  himself  to  be  drawn,  with  regard  to  Belgium  and  Luxem- 
bourg into  those  perilous  bargainings  which  brought  about  for  him 
such  cruel  results."    Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  86ii,  p.  1197. 


270  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

policy  was  very  short  lived.  The  increasing  hostility 
manifested  by  Italy  towards  the  Balkan  policy  of  her 
ally  may  have  helped  to  bring  Germany  to  the  realiza- 
tion that  the  position  of  the  Triple  Alliance  was  a  deli- 
cate one.4  Austria  must  be  sustained  at  all  hazards; 
and  in  concluding  his  speech  before  the  Reichstag  De- 
cember 10,  1908,  the  German  Chancellor  made  Ger- 
many's position  abundantly  clear:  "We  stand  be- 
side Austria-Hungary.  And  we  believe  also  that  the 
cause  of  peace  is  best  served  by  allowing  no  doubt  to 
arise  concerning  the  stable  character  of  our  alliance 
and  the  seriousness  with  which  we  look  upon  our  duty 
as  ally."5 

At  the  same  time  there  is  little  doubt  that  Germany 
pointed  out  to  her  ally  that  certain  concessions  must 
be  made  if  a  conference  was  to  be  avoided.  After  Al- 
geciras,  Germany  had  little  more  faith  in  conferences 
than  her  ally.  The  first  indication  of  a  more  concili- 
atory policy  on  the  part  of  Austria  came  a  few  days 
after  the  Chancellor's  speech,  when  the  Cabinet  at 
Vienna  put  forth  the  tentative  proposal  that  a  conces- 
sion might  be  granted  for  a  railway  across  Bosnia,  join- 
ing Serbia  with  Montenegro,  as  a  compensation  to  the 
two  Balkan  states.  At  the  same  time  direct  negotia- 
tions were  entered  into  with  Russia  as  a  means  of  de- 
laying or  avoiding  a  conference  of  the  Powers.  This 
was  followed  by  the  offer  of  an  indemnity  to  Turkey 

*  Signor  Fortis,  former  prime  minister  speaking  in  the  Italian  Cham- 
ber Dec.  3,  1908,  declared:  "There  is  only  one  power  with  whom  Italy 
is  accustomed  to  envisage  the  possibility  of  a  conflict.  This  power,  I 
regret  to  say,  is  our  ally  Austria."  Quoted  by  Gauvain,  "L'Europe  au 
Jour  le  Jour,"  Vol.  I,  p.  199. 

*  "Fiirgt  Billows  Reden,"  Vol.  Ill,  p.  165. 


RESULTS  OF  THE  ACCORD  OF  1909     271 

for  the  two  provinces  she  had  lost.  With  the  accept- 
ance of  her  offer  by  Turkey,  Austria  felt  that  she  need 
fear  no  longer  that  the  Powers  would  make  the  annexa- 
tion a  casus  belli.  If  Turkey  were  satisfied,  the  Powers 
had  few  further  grounds  for  complaint.  As  for  Ser- 
bia, Austria  would  welcome  an  opportunity  to  put  her 
in  her  proper  place  if  the  conflict  could  be  localized. 

In  the  meantime  Germany  was  strengthening  her 
position  by  friendly  advances  to  both  France  and 
Great  Britain.  The  Accord  of  February  8  with  France 
in  regard  to  Morocco,  and  the  cordial  reception  given 
to  King  Edward  VII  on  his  visit  to  Berlin  at  almost 
the  same  time,  were  evidences  of  the  new  spirit  of  con- 
ciliation. Russia's  motion  for  a  conference  of  the 
Powers  seemed  to  have  been  laid  on  the  table,  for  the 
time  being  at  least,  and  France  and  Great  Britain  were 
perfectly  willing  to  subordinate  their  Balkan  policy 
to  that  of  Russia.  Serbia  alone  was  unwilling  to  al- 
low the  matter  to  rest,  and  Austria  appeared  just  as 
unwilling  to  grant  her  any  compensation.  The  Aus- 
trian press  seemed  eager  to  force  an  immediate  is- 
sue. The  "Neue  Freie  Presse"  on  February  13,  so- 
licited for  Austra-Hungary  "a  mandate  from  Europe 
to  occupy  Serbia  temporarily,"  and  on  February  26, 
the  very  day  on  which  Turkey  signed  an  accord  ac- 
cepting an  indemnity  to  the  amount  of  fifty-seven  mil- 
lion francs  for  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  the  "Dunzers 
Armee  Zeitung"  declared  that  Serbia  was  a  virulent 
abscess  which  should  be  operated  upon  immediately; 
"we  shall  chastise  Serbia,  we  shall  conquer  her,  we 
shall  keep  her ;  if  this  displeases  any  one  let  him  come 


272  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

on.  .  .  ."6  The  Entente  Powers,  having  thus  far 
striven  successfully  to  prevent  war,  did  not  intend  to 
surrender  at  this  stage  without  a  valiant  effort.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  and  M.  Pichon  thought  that  the  best 
way  out  of  the  situation  was  a  direct  appeal  to  the 
two  Powers  concerned  to  make  a  clear  statement  of 
their  position.  Austria,  urged  on  in  her  course  by  a 
chauvinistic  public  opinion,  curtly  refused  to  consider 
such  a  proposal,  demanding  that  the  appeal  be  made  to 
Serbia  alone,  since  the  latter  alone  was  at  fault. 
France  and  Great  Britain  were  willing  to  go  that  far, 
providing  they  could  associate  Russia  with  them  in 
their  demarche.  Russia  expressed  her  willingness,  but 
immediately  upon  her  assent  being  known,  the  Aus- 
trian press  raised  a  shout  of  victory,  claiming  that 
"thanks  to  the  Franco-German  Accord,  to  the  fidelity 
of  Berlin  and  the  complaisance  of  Paris,  Serbia  was 
at  last  going  to  be  brought  to  reason."  7  The  Entente 
proposal  went  no  farther,  but  Russia,  acting  alone, 
seized  the  occasion  to  urge  the  Government  at  Bel- 
grade to  maintain  a  pacific  attitude,  to  cease  demand- 
ing territorial  compensation,  and  to  put  her  case  in 
the  hands  of  the  Powers.8  Serbia  very  wisely  as- 
sented, and  in  a  note  dated  March  10,  1909,  replied: 
".  .  .  Considering  that  the  question  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  is  a  European  question  .  .  .  Serbia,  con- 
fiding in  the  wisdom  and  justice  of  the  Powers,  places 
her  case  unreservedly  in  the  hands  of  the  Powers  as 
being  a  competent  tribunal,  and  consequently  at  this 

«  Quoted  Debidour,  "Histoire  Diplomatique  de  1'Europe"  (1904-1916), 
p.  121. 

t  Gauvain,  "L'Europe  au  Jour  le  Jour,"  Vol.  I,  p.  394. 
« Ibid.,  p.  398. 


EESULTS  OF  THE  ACCORD  OF  1909     273 

time  demands  from  Austria-Hungary  no  compensation, 
neither  territorial,  political  or  economic."9 

This  might  have  been  satisfactory  to  Austria  if  she 
had  been  willing  to  submit  her  case  to  a  conference  of 
the  Powers.  But  she  had  no  such  intention.  She  had 
already  partially  mobilized,  and  she  proposed  to  force 
Serbia  to  recognize  the  annexation  unconditionally  and 
without  any  recourse  to  the  Powers.  There  were  but 
two  obstacles  to  a  decisive  victory  on  these  lines: 
Russia  and  Italy.  Russia  might  be  willing  to  support 
the  Serbs,  even  to  the  extent  of  going  to  war  in  their 
behalf;  while  Italy,  who  had  looked • askance  at  the 
whole  proceeding,  was  now  reiterating  the  suggestion 
of  a  general  conference.10  Once  more  the  occasion  was 
ripe  for  the  entrance  of  the  Deus  ex  machina  in  the  per- 
son of  the  German  war  lord.  On  March  21,  the  Kaiser 
ordered  the  German  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  to 
inform  M.  Isvolsky  that  if  Russia  should  sustain 
Serbia,  Germany  would  be  back  of  Austria  to  the  full 
extent  of  her  forces.11  The  threat  prevailed,  and 
Serbia,  forsaken  by  Russia,  was  obliged  to  renounce 
her  attitude  of  protest  and  to  promise  to  maintain 
more  agreeable  relations  with  her  neighbor  in  the  fu- 
ture. Serbia's  humiliation  was  bitter,  but  scarcely 
less  so  than  that  of  Russia.    France  and  Great  Britain, 

e  Ibid.,  p.  421. 

io  Since  the  war,  Signor  Tommaso  Tittoni  has  shown  how  he  pro- 
posed a  conference  upon  a  new  program  which  was  received  as  a  satis- 
factory basis  for  negotiations  by  all  the  Powers,  including  Austria  and 
Germany.  But  at  the  same  time,  without  taking  Italy  into  their  con- 
fidence, Prince  von  Bulow  and  Baron  von  Aehrenthal  had  determined 
upon  the  coup  which  was  to  result  in  such  a  brilliant  success  for  the 
Triple  Alliance.  Tittoni,  "La  Responsabilite  de  la  Guerre,"  Pages 
Actuelles  (1914-1916)  No.  96,  p.  87. 

ii  Debidour,  op.  cit.,  p.  123. 


274  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

who  had  subordinated  their  policy  to  hers,  were  silent 
partners  in  her  defeat.  In  spite  of  the  recalcitrance 
of  one  of  its  members,  the  Triple  Alliance  had  gained 
a  brilliant  diplomatic  victory  and  had  increased  its 
prestige  at  the  expense  of  the  Entente.  In  Germany 's 
eyes  the  iron  ring  of  King  Edward  VII  had  been 
broken;  "the  group  of  Powers  whose  influence  had 
been  so  much  overestimated  at  Algeciras,  fell  to  pieces 
when  faced  with  the  tough  problems  of  Continental 
policy.  .  .  .  The  ingenious  encirclement  of  Germany, 
for  some  time  the  terror  of  timid  souls,  proved  to  be 
a  diplomatic  illusion  devoid  of  political  actuality."12 

2.     THE  FALL  OP  CLEMENCEAU  AND  FURTHER  DIFFICULTIES  IN 

MOROCCO 

With  the  passing  of  the  Bosnian  crisis  there  still  re- 
mained a  few  vexatious  questions  for  Europe  to  set- 
tle. The  Armenian  question  seemed  destined  to  en- 
dure as  long  as  there  were  Turks  and  Armenians ;  the 
recognition  of  Bulgaria  by  the  Powers  had  not  yet 
formally  taken  place,  and  hardly  had  the  four  Powers 
responsible  for  the  maintenance  of  order  in  Crete 
withdrawn  their  last  contingents  before  the  Greek  flag 
was  raised  again,  and  since  the  Cretan  Government 
did  not  dare  to  pull  it  down,  the  Powers  were  forced 
to  send  another  landing  party  to  do  it  for  them.  As 
one  of  the  French  deputies  remarked,  it  was  impossible 
to  prevent  Crete  and  Greece  making  love  to  each  other, 
but  it  would  have  to  be  amour  libre,  since  the  Powers 
refused  to  give  their  consent  to  their  union.18    But  in 

12  Von  Btllow,  "Imperial  Germany,"  p.  57. 

i«  M.  Denys  Cochin,  Speech  of  July  5,  1006,  on  the  Cretan  situation, 
Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  88ii,  p.  079. 


RESULTS  OF  THE  ACCORD  OF  1909     275 

France  all  interest  in  foreign  policy  once  more  turned 
towards  Morocco;  and  with  Germany  favorably  dis- 
posed, and  the  strong  Government  of  M.  Clemenceau 
in  office  there  was  excellent  reason  to  hope  for  a  pro- 
gressive amelioration  of  the  still  chaotic  situation  in 
the  Shereefian  Empire. 

In  any  country  save  France  such  a  hope  might  have 
been  reasonable;  but  in  the  Third  Republic  any  ex- 
pectation based  upon  the  premise  that  a  ministry  will 
remain  in  office  so  long  as  its  policy  is  satisfactory  to  the 
people  is  very  liable  to  prove  unfounded.  The  Clemen- 
ceau ministry  had  not  been  particularly  successful  in 
its  handling  of  the  labor  uprisings,  but  in  the  Casa- 
blanca Affair  it  had  taken  a  fearless  stand  which  had 
gone  far  to  restore  the  prestige  compromised  by  Fa- 
shoda  and  Algeciras.  Yet,  paradoxical  as  it  seems,  the 
mention  of  this  very  fact  caused  the  downfall  of  the 
ministry.  The  man  who  wanted  to  defy  Germany 
but  had  failed,  now  brought  down  the  minister  who 
had  defied  Germany  and  succeeded.  In  a  session  when 
the  discussion  was  completely  divorced  from  foreign 
affairs,  when  M.  Delcasse  was  making  a  report  on  the 
cause  of  the  explosion  of  the  Jena,  a  thrust  was  made 
that  stirred  the  Tiger 's  ire.  Forgetting  that  in  bring- 
ing up  the  humiliation  of  Algeciras  he  was  striking  at 
the  pride  of  France  as  well  as  at  M.  Delcasse,  M.  Clem- 
enceau baited  his  own  trap.  "I  have  never  humiliated 
France  and  I  say  that  M.  Delcasse  had  done  so."  The 
allusion  was  unfair  and  wholly  unworthy  of  M.  Clemen- 
ceau. His  only  excuse  was  the  bitter  and  unprovoked 
attack  by  M.  Delcasse.  But  that  a  retort  made  in 
anger,  and  almost  excusable  under  the  circumstances, 


276  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

should  have  caused  the  downfall  of  the  ministry,  might 
well  be  considered  ridiculous,  if  at  the  same  time  it 
were  not  so  tragic.  M.  Delcasse  had  his  revenge,  the 
Chambre  satisfied  its  amour  propre,  and  France  paid 
the  penalty.14 

M.  Clemenceau's  downfall  did  not  elevate  M.  Del- 
casse. M.  Briand,  socialist,  "an  anarchist  who  had 
adapted  himself"  became  the  President  du  Conseil. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  domestic  policy,  M.  Fai- 
lures could  not  have  made  a  happier  choice ;  responsi- 
bility made  M.  Briand  a  most  conservative  socialist. 
But  from  the  point  of  view  of  foreign  policy,  espe- 
cially when  France  was  about  to  enter  into  partnership 
with  Germany  in  Morocco,  the  choice  was  hardly  one 
that  would  discourage  Germany  from  attempting  to 
run  the  firm  in  the  interest  of  the  junior  partner.15 
M.  Pichon  was  retained  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  but  the 
Wilhelmstrasse  was  more  interested  in  the  fact  that 
M.  Briand  had  replaced  M.  Clemenceau. 

Before  any  hopes  could  be  entertained  by  either 
France  or  Germany  of  profiting  by  economic  conces- 
sions in  Morocco,  it  was  essential  both  that  the  country 
be  pacified  and  that  France  and  Spain  come  to  some 

i*  This  memorable  session  occurred  July  20,  1909.  For  the  debate 
see  Amiales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  88ii,  p.  1520.  For  a  brilliant  analysis 
of  the  psychology  of  the  affair  see  Lawrence  Jerrold,  "The  Real  France," 
chap.  IX. 

is  As  an  example  of  the  German  viewpoint  towards  French  Social- 
ism the  following  quotation  is  interesting:  "We  shall  perhaps  think 
of  making  war  upon  you  when  your  pacifists,  your  internationalists, 
your  anti-militarists  and  other  imbeciles  of  that  sort  will  have  suffi- 
ciently weakened  you,  and  destroyed  in  your  souls  the  idea  of  patrie 
which  makes  us  so  strong.  .  .  .  We  shall  merely  wait — and  we  shall 
not  have  to  wait  long  until  your  divisions  and  your  anarchy  have  made 
you  incapable  of  self-defence."  Quoted  by  Fullerton,  "Problems  of 
Power,"  p.  116,  note. 


EESULTS  OF  THE  ACCORD  OF  1909     277 

sort  of  an  agreement  with  Mouley  Hand.  It  was 
hoped  that  now  that  Europe  presented  a  united  front, 
the  new  Sultan  would  recognize  that  it  was  to  his  ad- 
vantage to  cooperate  with  the  European  representa- 
tives. M.  Regnault  was  sent  as  a  special  plenipoten- 
tiary to  Fez  at  the  end  of  January,  1909,  with  instruc- 
tions to  arrange  for  putting  into  effect  the  terms  of 
the  Franco-Spanish  note,  and  to  assist  in  the  reor- 
ganization of  the  Shereefian  Empire.16  The  Sultan, 
however,  was  more  interested  in  obtaining  the  with- 
drawal of  French  forces  from  Chaouia  than  in  obtain- 
ing the  cooperation  of  the  French  and  Spanish  police 
and  in  repaying  the  cost  of  the  occupation.  But  when 
he  learned  of  the  Franco-German  Accord  he  showed 
a  much  greater  willingness  to  negotiate,  and  he  also 
signified  his  desire  to  send  a  mission  to  Paris  to  con- 
sider the  question  of  Moroccan  finances.17  Even  the 
bandit  Raisuli  who  had  only  been  persuaded  to  sur- 
render the  Kaid  McLean  upon  the  payment  of  half  a 
million  francs,  now  visited  the  French  charge  d'affaires 
at  Tangier  and  gave  assurances  of  his  good  will. 

The  Moroccan  mission  sent  to  Paris  under  the  di- 
rection of  El  Mokri  received  a  favorable  reception,  and 
in  a  statement  given  to  a  representative  of  the 
"Temps,"  El  Mokri  declared  that  the  situation  in 
Morocco  was  as  satisfactory  as  could  be  expected,  con- 
sidering the  long  period  of  anarchy.  He  claimed  that 
Mouley  Hafid  was  the  only  recognized  Sultan,  and  if 
sufficient  financial  backing  could  be  secured,  the  Sul- 
tan could  pay  his  troops,  reestablish  peace  and  secur- 

ie  Doc.  Dip.,  "Affaires  du  Maroc"   (1908-1910)  No.  112. 
it  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  138,  annexe. 


278  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ity,  collect  the  taxes,  and  enter  upon  a  program  of 
general  economic  development  of  the  country.  He  as- 
sured the  French  that  the  Sultan  was  firmly  decided  to 
respect  the  Act  of  Algeciras  and  to  do  all  in  his  power 
to  strengthen  the  bonds  of  friendship  now  attaching 
Morocco  to  France.18  But  however  willing  El  Mokri 
was  to  negotiate,  he  saw  no  need  of  haste,  and  not  un- 
til the  middle  of  August  was  a  note  finally  signed  stat- 
ing the  conditions  upon  which  France  would  withdraw 
from  the  Chouia,  and  the  methods  whereby  Morocco 
could  pay  her  debts  and  establish  a  sound  financial 
foundation.19  It  still  remained  necessary  to  obtain 
the  Sultan's  signature  to  this  agreement. 

While  these  negotiations  were  dragging  along,  Spain, 
whose  resentment  had  been  smoldering  ever  since  she 
had  been  refused  participation  in  the  Franco-German 
Accord,20  saw  an  opportunity  to  show  that  she  still 
had  important  interests  in  Morocco  and  intended  to 
protect  them.  Early  in  July  several  Spanish  work- 
men on  the  outskirts  of  Melilla  in  the  Riff  were  killed 
in  a  skirmish  with  the  natives.  Reinforcements  were 
immediately  sent  and,  being  drawn  into  an  ambush,  a 
large  number  of  Spanish  soldiers  were  killed.  Spain 
now  determined  to  send  over  a  large  force;  but  in 
order  to  obtain  the  forty  thousand  troops  considered 

is  Le  Temps,  May  26,  1909. 

i»  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  249,  annexe. 

20  On  February  9,  the  very  day  that  the  declaration  was  signed,  the 
Spanish  ambassador  at  Paris  said:  "The  mandate  that  we  hold  in 
Morocco  should  allow  us  certainly  to  participate  in  a  manner  to  be 
determined  in  the  Franco-German  conversation  whose  result  M.  Pichon 
has  communicated  to  me."  M  Tardieu  asserts  that  it  was  at  this  time 
that  Spain  made  her  decision  to  follow  out  her  own  independent 
Moroccan  policy.  Tardieu,  "France  et  Espagne,"  Rev.  de  Deux  Mondes, 
Dec.  1,  1912. 


EESULTS  OF  THE  ACCORD  OF  1909     279 

necessary,  she  was  compelled  to  call  out  her  reservists, 
and  as  a  result  riots  broke  out  in  Barcelona  and  mar- 
tial law  had  to  be  declared  throughout  the  country. 
The  Sultan  protested  vigorously  against  this  great 
expedition  and  notified  the  Powers  that  Morocco  would 
not  bear  the  expense.21  As  these  warlike  measures 
continued,  France  also  commenced  to  look  askance, 
and  General  d'Amade  issued  a  statement  in  one  of 
the  French  newspapers,  in  which  he  expressed  the 
opinion  that  Spain  was  nourishing  ambitious  projects 
in  Morocco,  and  if  France  did  not  intervene  shortly 
she  would  find  Spain  firmly  entrenched  in  her  sphere 
of  influence.22  He  was  relieved  of  his  command  for  his 
undiplomatic  utterance,  but  when  the  Moroccan  ques- 
tion came  up  in  the  Chamber  the  deputies  were  even 
more  outspoken  in  their  criticisms.  M.  Merle  asserted 
the  whole  Spanish  expedition  to  be  a  violation  of  the 
Act  of  Algeciras,  and  quoted  a  Spanish  senator  to  the 
effect  that  Spain  was  not  limiting  her  ambitions  to 
Ceuta  but  would  go  to  Taza  and  perhaps  even  to  Fez. 
M.  Merle  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  the  Spanish  were 
strengthened  in  their  ambitious  projects  by  the  belief 
that  they  would  have  German  support,  since  it  was  no- 
torious that  Germany  much  preferred  to  see  a  weak 
nation  like  Spain  the  predominant  power  in  Morocco.23 
M.  Jaures  in  a  long  and  brilliant  speech,  thereupon 
urged  a  complete  and  immediate  withdrawal  as  the  only 
satisfactory  way  out  of  the  Moroccan  wasps'  nest.24 
M.  Pichon  showed  that  the  situation  was  not  quite  as 

21  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  247. 

«2  Le  Matin,  Oct.  7,  1009. 

28  Annates  de  la  Ohambre,  Vol.  89i,  p.  688. 

8*  Ibid.,  p.  695. 


280  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

hopeless  as  it  was  pictured,  that  France  and  Spain 
were  still  cooperating,  that  Spain  had  affirmed  on 
numerous  occasions  that  her  expedition  was  only  tem- 
porary, and  that  to  withdraw  from  Morocco  just  at  the 
time  when  conditions  were  commencing  to  improve  was 
utterly  preposterous.25 

Mouley  Hafid  was  not  slow  to  perceive  that  the 
European  bogey  was  not  so  frightful  after  all,  and  he 
continued  his  dilatory  tactics  in  coming  to  a  final  agree- 
ment with  France.  To  impress  his  subjects  with  his 
independence  of  the  Powers,  he  proceeded  to  torture 
the  followers  of  the  Pretender  Bu  Hamara  whom  he 
caught,  in  direct  violation  of  the  Powers'  protests. 
He  increased  his  prestige  greatly  by  finally  capturing 
Bu  Hamara  himself.  As  Bu  Hamara  had  taken  sanc- 
tuary, Mouley  Hafid  had  him  smoked  out,  put  in  an 
iron  cage  and  led  in  triumph  to  Fez.  The  Pretender 
was  then  crucified,  mutilated,  and  finally  shot  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  directions  given  in  the  Koran  for 
those  who  wage  war  against  God  and  his  earthly  repre- 
sentative. The  Sultan  then  sent  a  long  note  to  the 
representatives  of  the  Powers  extolling  the  benefits 
and  sacredness  of  torture.26  As  his  influence  increased 
among  the  fanatical  Berbers  Mouley  Hafid 's  disdain 
for  the  Powers,  and  for  France  in  particular,  in- 
creased, and  in  a  note  to  M.  Pichon,  October  23,  1909, 
he  demanded  immediate  evacuation  of  Casablanca  and 
Chaouia,  complete  control  on  the  frontier,  and  refused 
the  loan  which  was  to  pay  the  cost  of  the  military  ex- 
pedition.27   El  Mokri,  who  remained  in  Paris,  was 

25  Ibid.,  p.  735. 

ze  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  300,  annexe. 

27  Ibid.,  No.  333. 


KESULTS  OF  THE  ACCORD  OF  1909     281 

finally  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  coming  to  an  agree- 
ment with  France,  and  in  December  he  arranged  for 
a  loan  of  eighty  million  francs,  part  to  go  for  liquida- 
tion of  the  cost  of  the  expedition,  and  part  for  the 
expenses  of  administration.28  Although  El  Mokri 
signed  this  as  a  delegate  with  full  powers,  and  un- 
doubtedly with  the  consent  and  approval  of  his  master, 
when  the  arrangement  was  submitted  to  the  Sultan 
he  flew  into  a  rage  and  would  have  none  of  it.  M. 
Pichon  thereupon  sent  an  ultimatum  giving  the  Sultan 
forty-eight  hours  to  sign  the  agreement  as  concluded 
by  his  representative  in  Paris,  covering  the  loan,  the 
instruction  to  be  given  by  French  officers  to  Moroccan 
troops,  and  the  naming  of  the  high  commissioner  for  the 
Algerian  frontier.29  He  followed  this  by  a  demand 
that  the  murderers  of  M.  Charbonnier  and  Dr.  Mau- 
champ  be  punished  and  that  the  further  reparation 
agreed  upon  be  effected.30  If  these  demands  were  not 
met  within  the  specified  time,  the  French  colony  and 
officials  would  leave  Fez,  and  the  French  government 
would  immediately  take  such  measures  as  it  should 
deem  necessary.  The  Sultan's  representative  realized 
that  the  time  for  speedy  action  had  come,  and  on  Feb- 
ruary 21,  El  Mokri  announced  to  M.  Pichon  that 
Mouley  Hand  had  ratified  the  accords.31  The  ulti- 
matum, however,  had  already  been  sent,  and  it  was 
not  considered  advisable  to  withdraw  it  without  full 
concession  on  the  part  of  Mouley  Hafid  himself.  His 
first  reply  was  equivocal,  but  he  finally  gave  way  on 

28  Ibid.,  No.  355,  annexe. 

29  Ibid.,  No.  396,  annexe  I. 
so  Ibid.,  No.  399,  annexe  II. 
si  Ibid.,  No.  412. 


282  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

all  points,  and  the  accord  was  signed  at  Paris,  March 
4,  1910. 

After  fifteen  months  of  struggle  France  had  suc- 
ceeded in  taking  a  first  step,  but  her  position  was  still 
far  from  encouraging.  In  the  words  of  M.  Tardieu: 
"France  had  granted  to  the  Sultan  a  loan  which  would 
allow  him  to  liquidate  the  past  but  not  to  organize  the 
future.  She  had  gained  her  points  that  the  chief  of  the 
military  mission  should  become  the  chief  of  all  the  in- 
structors; that  a  French  engineer  should  be  placed  at 
the  head  of  the  Shereefian  administration  of  public 
works.  .  .  .  But  in  order  to  translate  into  acts  these 
promises,  she  had  before  her  a  Sultan  of  rebellious 
character  and  full  of  surprises,  who  saw  in  this  accord 
neither  the  proof  of  power  to  injure  him  or  to  aid  him. 
Our  effort  had  been  used  up  in  obtaining  his  signature. 
France  was  for  him  a  convenient  banker  rather  than 
an  indispensable  and  redoubtable  associate."82  The 
loan  was  not  guaranteed  by  France,  it  created  neither 
resources  nor  new  income  for  Morocco,  and  it  left  the 
Sultan  without  means  to  create  an  army.  But  with- 
out an  army  there  was  no  way  to  collect  taxes;  so  in 
November  El  Mokri  reappeared  in  Paris  seeking  an- 
other loan,  and  this  time  it  was  to  cover  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  army  and  police  and  the  construction  of 
public  works,  as  well  as  for  the  payment  of  debts.  He 
was  able  to  obtain  neither  the  full  sum  nor  the  guaran- 
tee of  France;  the  Government  seemed  afraid  to  give 
the  loan  that  political  significance  which  the  Accord  of 
1909  with  Germany  expressly  permitted.    The  result 

32  Tardieu,  "Le  Mystere  d'Agadir,"  p.  100.  This  volume  is  the  most 
complete  and  authoritative  treatment  of  the  subject,  a  worthy  com- 
panion of  the  author's  volume  on  the  Conference  of  Algeciras. 


RESULTS  OF  THE  ACCORD  OF  1909     283 

was  that  the  army  was  not  organized,  anarchy  con- 
tinued, and  France  was  finally  forced  once  more  to  in- 
tervene with  a  military  expedition. 

3.     FAILURE  OP  THE  ACCORD  OF  1909 

With  the  signing  of  the  Accord  of  April  8, 1909,  gen- 
eral satisfaction  was  manifest  in  both  France  and 
Germany  and  there  is  little  doubt  that  both  countries, 
for  the  time  being  at  least,  intended  to  fulfill  their  en- 
gagements loyally.  The  unfortunate  part  of  the  ar- 
rangement lay  in  the  fact  that  its  vagueness  allowed 
each  side  to  interpret  it  to  its  own  advantage.  For 
Germany  it  was  merely  a  quid  pro  quo  arrangement, 
a  sort  of  condominium  whereby  her  commercial  and 
industrial  enterprises  might  profit  in  spite  of  the  Act 
of  Algeciras.  The  only  clause  of  the  arrangement  to 
which  she  attached  great  importance  was  the  last, 
which  stated  that  the  two  nations  would  endeavor  to 
associate  their  nationals  on  such  concessions  as  might 
be  obtained.  This  was  the  foundation — indeed,  the 
raison  d'etre, — of  the  accord.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
French  regarded  this  last  clause  as  a  polite  formula, 
significant  of  the  new  amicable  spirit  which  was  to 
prevail  between  the  two  countries,  but  of  no  particular 
importance.  Had  not  the  Wilhelmstrasse  declared  in 
the  confidential  letter  accompanying  the  declaration 
that  it  realized  that  French  interests  were  superior, 
but  that  German  public  opinion  must  be  considered? 
Therefore  they  fixed  their  attention  on  the  clause  recog- 
nizing the  special  political  interests  of  France  in  Mo- 
rocco, which  gave  them  the  right  to  establish  peace  and 
order  without  further  opposition  on  the  part  of  Ger- 


284  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

many.  They  had  found  out  by  experience  that  the  Act 
of  Algeciras  was  an  impossible  program  so  long  as 
Germany  opposed  its  execution.  The  new  agreement 
withdrew  this  opposition ;  henceforth  France  was  free 
to  put  the  Act  of  Algeciras  into  effect.33 

If  Germany  was  willing  to  interpret  the  accord  in 
any  such  self-denying  manner  while  the  Bosnian  crisis 
held  the  chancellories  of  Europe  in  suspense,  the  bril- 
liant diplomatic  victory  gained  by  the  Triple  Entente 
speedily  brought  about  a  change  of  intention.  Lupus 
pilum  mutat,  non  mentem,  the  wolf  changes  his  coat 
but  not  his  disposition.  Immediately  after  the  signing 
of  the  accord  Germany  suggested  an  exchange  of  views 
in  regard  to  the  economic  questions  at  issue,  and  M. 
Guiot,  member  of  the  administrative  council  of  the 
Moroccan  State  Bank,  was  sent  to  Berlin  to  discuss 
the  situation.34  France  was  willing  enough  to  discuss 
the  financial  and  economic  condition;  a  new  loan  had 
to  be  made,  and  this  was  a  good  time  to  settle  some  of 
the  disputed  points  in  regard  to  certain  German  con- 
cessions which  had  already  solicited  French  financial 
cooperation.  The  result  of  the  conferences,  which  be- 
gan March  24  and  lasted  a  week,  was  a  memorandum 
from  the  German  government  dated  June  2.35  Accord- 
ing to  its  clauses  a  veritable  Franco-German  condo- 
minium would  be  established  in  Morocco  whereby  all 
concessions,  "to  avoid  sterile  and  harmful  competi- 

33  The  first  clause  of  the  Accord  of  1909,  which  explicitly  stated  that 
the  basis  of  the  agreement  was  the  desire  of  the  two  Governments  to 
facilitate  the  execution  of  the  Act,  surely  gave  ground  for  this  in- 
terpretation. 

34  For  a  complete  account  of  the  Guiot  mission  see  Rapport  Baudin, 
op.  cit.,  p.  263. 

35  Doc  Dip.,  "Affairs  du  Maroc  (1908-1910)  No.  206  annexe  I. 


EESULTS  OF  THE  ACCORD  OF  1909     285 

tion,"  were  to  be  limited  practically  to  groups  repre- 
senting the  financial  interests  of  the  two  countries. 
In  order  that  Article  107  of  the  Act  of  Algeciras,  which 
definitely  stated  that  the  validity  of  concessions  should 
be  subject  to  the  principle  of  public  awards,  should  not 
be  violated,  France  might  share  her  half  with  Eng- 
land and  Spain.  Germany  further  stipulated  that 
the  two  concessions  already  possessed  by  German 
firms,  the  mole  and  sewers  of  Tangier,  and  the  harbor 
construction  at  Larache  were  to  receive  priority  of 
payment.  "Germany  had  arrived  late  at  the  Moroc- 
can feast  with  a  formidable  appetite  and  without  any 
regard  for  the  guests  who  had  been  invited  before 
her."38 

The  French  Government  found  it  very  difficult  to 
frame  a  satisfactory  reply  to  these  most  unsatisfactory 
proposals.  To  accede  meant  to  disregard  the  Act  of 
Algeciras,  to  the  detriment  of  the  very  Powers  which 
had  supported  her  against  Germany  in  the  drawing 
up  of  the  Act.  Nor  was  a  complete  refusal  possible 
under  the  circumstances  without  endangering  the  new 
rapprochement  which  seemingly  promised  such  a  satis- 
factory solution.  Although  an  early  reply  was  re- 
quested, it  was  not  until  four  months  later,  October 
14,  that  M.  Pichon  sent  his  response,  a  masterpiece 
of  ambiguity  and  circumlocution,  which  while  conced- 
ing the  principle  of  an  association  of  French  and  Ger- 
man groups,  did  not  fail  to  point  out  that  Article 
107  of  the  Act  must  be  taken  into  account. 
Where  the  German  note  specified  French  and  Ger- 
man groups,  the  French  reply  spoke  of  entrepreneurs 

36  Tardieu,  "Le  Mystfcre  d'Agadir,"  p.  36. 


286  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

of  various  nationalities.  Thus  at  the  first  exchange 
of  views  a  fundamental  divergence  of  intention  was 
evident.  France  still  intended  to  associate  with  Ger- 
many only  so  far  as  was  permissible  under  the  Act  of 
Algeciras,  while  Germany  cast  overboard  all  her  much 
vaunted  demands  for  economic  liberty  just  as  soon 
as  she  was  in  a  position  to  profit  by  an  opposite 
policy. 

Nevertheless,  negotiations  were  continued,  and  a 
serious  effort  was  made  to  come  to  an  agreement  in 
various  enterprises.  The  Union  des  Mines,  an  inter- 
national mining  concern  of  which  France  possessed  50 
per  cent,  of  the  stock,  attempted  to  combine  with  <the 
Mannesman  Brothers,  a  German  enterprise  which 
claimed  to  have  very  important  mining  concessions. 
For  the  construction  of  public  works  it  was  proposed 
to  form  a  large  company  in  which  France  and  Germany 
would  have  the  most  stock,  but  to  which  Great  Britain, 
Spain,  and  Austria,  and  the  smaller  Powers  were  to  be 
invited  to  participate.37  As  to  railways,  considering 
their  strategic  value,  France  thought  that  she  should 
have  complete  control,  but  Germany  asked  that  the  con- 
struction be  put  in  the  hands  of  the  same  company 
that  was  to  have  charge  of  the  public  works,  and  she 
further  demanded  the  right  of  appointing  a  certain 
number  of  the  personnel.  Innumerable  proposals  were 
made  by  both  sides,  and  conferences  were  held,  but 
on  none  of  the  three  questions  was  a  real  accord 
reached.    In  the  case  of  the  mines  the  Mannesmans 

37  The  shares  were  distributed  as  follows :  France  50  per  cent., 
Germany  26  per  cent.,  England  6%  per  cent.,  Spain  5  per  cent.,  Austria 
4  per  cent.,  Italy,  Belgium  and  Sweden  each  2%  per  cent.,  Portugal  1% 
per  cent. 


RESULTS  OF  THE  ACCORD  OF  1909     287 

would  accept  no  proposals  which  were  not  overwhelm- 
ingly in  their  favor.  For  public  works,  a  large  com- 
pany was  organized,  the  Societe  marocaine  des  travaux 
publics,  with  a  capital  of  two  million  francs,  which 
made  a  number  of  proposals  to  the  Moroccan  Govern- 
ment for  the  construction  of  street  car  lines,  water 
works,  port  improvements  and  other  profitable  public 
works ;  but  it  was  prevented  from  accomplishing  any- 
thing by  the  jealousy  of  the  French  and  German  inter- 
ests, by  the  hostility  of  the  English  (who  felt  that  they 
had  not  received  fair  treatment  in  the  percentage  of 
stock  offered  them)  and  by  the  hopeless  condition  in 
which  Morocco  remained  financially.  As  to  the  rail- 
ways, Great  Britain  did  not  look  with  favor  upon  giv- 
ing this  enterprise  to  the  company  in  charge  of  the  pub- 
lic works,  while  France  seriously  objected  to  German 
station  agents  in  Morocco.38 

"The  wind  of  concord  blew  even  outside  of  the  limits 
of  Morocco,"  and  the  French  Government  decided  to 
make  a  clean  sweep  of  all  the  economic  difficulties 
between  the  two  countries  while  the  occasion  was  so 
favorable.  A  dispute  of  long  standing  existed  between 
the  rival  groups  of  concessionaires  in  the  German 
Cameroons  and  the  French  Congo,  a  dispute  which 
both  the  French  Foreign  Office  and  the  Colonial  Office 
had  found  extremely  wearisome.  An  inquest  con- 
ducted by  Captain  Cottes  in  1906  showed  conclusively 
that  the  French  company,  the  Ngoko-Sangha,  had  well- 
founded  claims  for  damages  against  the  German 
Cameroon  Company.    M.  Millies-Lacroix,  French  Min- 

ss  The  best  discussion  of  the  efforts  to  establish  these  joint  enter- 
prises is  found  in  Tardieu,  op.  cit.,  Chap.  I.  The  "Rapport  Baudin," 
op.  cit.,  p.  264  gives  a  very  complete  summary. 


288  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ister  of  the  colonies  during  1907  and  1908,  was  willing 
to  support  the  French  company  in  its  claims,  but  M. 
Pichon  was  unwilling  to  introduce  further  causes  of 
dispute  into  Franco-German  relations  at  a  time  when 
the  strain  was  already  so  great.  Since  the  French 
Government  refused  to  support  them  in  their  just 
claims  for  damages  against  Germany,  the  Ngoko- 
Sangha  Company  thereupon  demanded  an  indemnity 
from  France.  Their  request  was  laid  before  the  Cham- 
ber, and  the  Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs  recom- 
mended that  an  equitable  settlement  be  made,  consider- 
ing that  "  equity  commanded  an  indemnification  for 
the  victim  of  the  carelessness,  apathy  and  weakness 
of  the  government."  30  Neither  the  Colonial  Minister 
nor  the  Foreign  Minister  was  willing  to  act  in  accord- 
ance with  this  suggestion,  but  under  the  mellowing 
influence  of  the  Accord  of  1909  it  was  hoped  that  a 
settlement  might  be  arrived  at.  M.  Pichon  therefore 
suggested  to  Berlin  that  a  Franco-German  consortium 
be  constituted  which  should  jointly  exploit  the  conces- 
sions on  the  Congo-Cameroon  frontier.40 

39  This  whole  question  was  discussed  in  a  very  frank  manner  in  the 
Chamber  April  5  and  6,  1911.  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol  93ii,  pp. 
2215  et  seq.  See  also  Tardieu  op.  cit.,  Part  11,  Chap.  I,  and  Pierre 
Albin,  "Le  Coup  d'Agadir,"  p.  131  ff. 

*o  M.  Pichon  in  testifying  before  the  Budget  Commission,  Dec.  14, 
1910,  thus  outlined  the  need  for  such  an  agreement:  "The  troubles 
caused  in  this  region  by  the  prolonged  struggle  of  rival  colonists  are 
still  felt  among  the  natives  even  after  a  definite  accord  has  intervened 
between  France  and  Germany;  it  has  seemed  opportune  to  the  French 
administration  to  assure  completely  the  pacification,  the  calm  and  the 
security  by  realizing  in  a  concrete  manner  in  the  eyes  of  the  local 
tribes  the  union  of  these  elements  of  civilization. 

"The  formation  of  the  Franco-German  consortium  which  would  put 
an  end  to  the  regrettable  struggles  between  the  South  Cameroon  Com- 
pany and  the  Ngoko-Sangha  Company  will  have  the  double  advantage 
of  preventing  the  return  of  incidents  whose  diplomatic  effects  might 


EESULTS  OF  THE  ACCORD  OF  1909     289 

When  the  proposal  was  submitted  to  the  two  com- 
panies, the  German  group  accepted  without  reserva- 
tions; the  Ngoko-Sangha  accepted,  but  on  condition 
that  they  first  receive  the  indemnity  from  the  French 
government  which  had  been  fixed  at  something  over 
two  million  francs.  It  was  this  indemnity  that  was 
to  prove  the  stumbling-block.  Although  it  had  been 
awarded  by  an  arbitration  tribunal,  and  accepted  by 
the  government,  the  budget  committee  showed  itself 
hostile  to  the  idea  and  did  all  in  its  power  to  impede 
payment.  As  a  result,  although  the  basis  for  the  new 
company  was  established  by  a  convention  in  June, 
1910,  it  was  not  until  December  that  the  arrangements 
were  definitely  determined  upon  by  the  two  govern- 
ments, and  it  remained  to  be  seen  whether  the  indem- 
nity would  be  paid.  An  opinion  given  by  the  eminent 
jurist,  M.  Renault,  that  the  payment  was  illegal  de- 
stroyed the  last  hope  of  a  settlement,  and  the  Briand 
cabinet,  worn  out  with  the  constantly  increasing  oppo- 
sition, resigned.41 

The  Monis  cabinet  was  constituted  March  3,  1911, 
with  M.  Cruppi,  a  man  wholly  inexperienced  in  foreign 
relations,  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.42  With  M. 
Caillaux,  Minister  of  Finances,  one  of  the  most  ardent 
opponents  of  the  consortium,  and  with  M.  Messimy, 
Minister  of  Colonies,  who  had  also  been  unfavorably 

have  grave  consequences  and  to  facilitate  on  the  spot  the  civilizing  work 
of  our  colonial  administration." 

4i  "They  wish  the  power,"  he  said  to  his  friends,  in  speaking  of  the 
organizers  of  the  campaign  of  violence  against  him,  "well,  let  them 
have  it.  They  will  soon  see  the  difficulties  that  they  will  run  into." 
Albin,  "Le  Coup  d'Agadir,"  p.  140. 

•*2  M.  Monis  had  invited  MM.  Ribot,  Deschanel,  Cambon  and  Barrere 
to  take  the  portfolio  of  Foreign  Affairs  without  success. 


290  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

disposed  towards  the  project,  the  government  was  not 
slow  in  stating  its  position  on  this  question.  M.  Mes- 
simy  declared  to  the  Budget  Commission  that  the  in- 
demnity would  not  be  paid  nor  the  consortium  consti- 
tuted.43 One  more  project  of  cooperation  between  the 
two  countries  had  failed,  and  this  time  the  blame 
rested  wholly  upon  the  French.  Their  policy  in  this 
project  was  a  mixture  of  friendly  advances  and  timid 
retreats,  a  policy  of  vacillation  inexcusable  in  dealing 
with  a  distrustful  and  powerful  neighbor,  who  knew 
what  she  wanted  and  was  not  particular  over  the  means 
employed  in  getting  it.  A  final  effort  was  made  to  sub- 
stitute the  idea  of  a  Congo-Cameroon  railway  for  the 
consortium  scheme,  but  it  fared  no  better  than  the  other 
proposals.  After  two  years  of  negotiations  for  par- 
ticipation in  almost  every  sort  of  business  enterprise, 
for  the  exploitation  of  mining  interests,  for  the  con- 
struction of  railways,  for  a  monopoly  of  tobacco,  for 
engaging  in  all  sorts  of  public  utility  projects,  for  the 
gathering  of  rubber  and  ivory,  not  a  single  enterprise 
had  been  satisfactorily  established.  In  some  instances, 
such  as  the  Mannesman  claims,  and  in  the  projects  for 
military  railways  in  Morocco,  Germany's  demands 
were  wholly  out  of  reason,  but  in  the  Ngoko-Sangha- 
Cameroon  Company  project  the  policy  of  France  was 
both  weak  and  reprehensible.  The  Senatorial  Com- 
mission of  Foreign  Affairs  had  a  very  clear  apprecia- 
tion of  the  situation:  "In  a  general  fashion  Germany 
seems  disposed  to  conclude  from  these  facts  that  a  suc- 
cessful association  of  economic  interests  with  France 
is  impossible."  44 

*3  Tardieu,  op.  cit.,  p.  346. 

**  Ren6  Pinon  "France  et  Allemagne,"  p.  210. 


RESULTS  OF  THE  ACCORD  OF  1909     291 

The  German  Government  had  given  numerous  indi- 
cations that  it  was  exceedingly  desirous  that  success 
should  crown  these  enterprises  of  economic  coopera- 
tion. While  M.  Pichon  was  in  London  to  attend  the 
funeral  of  King  Edward  VIII  in  May,  1910,  the  Kaiser 
approached  him  and  said:  "I  should  be  very  glad  to 
see  this  Moroccan  question  finally  settled.  I  should 
also  be  glad  if  you  can  come  to  an  understanding  with 
the  Mannesman  brothers."  45  In  a  note  dated  Febru- 
ary 3,  1911,  M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  ambassador  at 
Berlin,  declared  that  Germany  was  much  interested  in 
the  project  of  the  Moroccan  railways  and  thought  that 
in  the  future  it  would  have  a  great  importance.46  A 
month  later  he  was  more  explicit  in  his  opinion:  "It 
would  be  very  inconvenient  in  my  opinion  if  the  accord 
relative  to  the  Moroccan  railways  should  not  be  signed. 
.  .  .  Permit  me  to  remark  to  Your  Excellency  that  the 
object  that  was  pursued  in  forming  the  Moroccan  Com- 
pany was  precisely  to  do  away  with  German  competi- 
tion in  Morocco  in  the  future  by  giving  her  a  limited 
satisfaction.47  M.  Conty,  Under  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  in  a  note  to  M.  Cruppi,  dated  March  13,  relat- 
ing to  the  Congo-Cameroon  Consortium,  was  even  more 
outspoken  in  his  views :  "In  the  actual  state  of  Franco- 
German  relations,  the  abandonment  of  the  Consortium 
will  risk  provoking  at  our  expense  another  one  of 
those  disagreeable  manifestations  so  habitual  to  Ger- 
many."48 With  the  complete  failure  of  the  Consor- 
tium through  the  deliberate  action  of  the  Monis  govern- 

«  Tardieu,  op.  cit.,  p.  48. 

«  Doc.  Dip.,  "Affaires  du  Maroc"   (1910-1912)  No.  57. 

47  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  85. 

*»  Pinon,  "France  et  Allemagne,"  p.  209. 


292  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ment,  Germany  realized  that  France  did  not  mean  to 
spend  her  blood  and  treasure  to  police  Morocco  and 
then  permit  Germany  to  participate  equally  in  any 
benefits  which  might  be  derived.  When  Baron  von 
Schoen,  the  German  ambassador,  next  saw  M.  Cruppi 
his  remark  was  a  covert  threat:  "You  have  put  aside 
the  Ngoko-Sangha.  I  understand  perfectly,  for  you 
would  not  have  had  a  half  dozen  votes  in  the  Chamber, 
but  we  have  from  your  predecessor  an  engagement 
which  implies  the  carrying  out  of  a  project  relating  to 
the  Ngoko-Sangha,  so  that  to-day  we  have  Herr  Sem- 
ler  on  our  back,  which  is  very  serious,  for  he  has  all 
Hamburg  behind  him.  .  .  .  You  should  try  to  show 
that  you  are  not  disposed  to  prevent  all  business  ar- 
rangements between  French  and  Germans."49  These 
were  all  straws  indicating  clearly  enough  the  direction 
of  the  wind,  but  the  cabinet  in  power  was  fitted  neither 
to  avoid  difficulties  nor  to  meet  them  when  they  came. 
Germany  had  only  to  await  a  suitable  occasion  and 
then  force  the  issue.  The  internal  situation  of  Mo- 
rocco gave  indication  that  she  would  not  have  long  to 
wait. 

4.     THE  FEZ  EXPEDITION 

Although  the  Accord  of  1909  had  given  France  full 
opportunity  to  bolster  up  the  authority  of  the  Sultan 
with  whatever  forces  should  be  deemed  necessary  to 
put  an  end  to  the  recurrent  tribal  uprisings,  at  the 
beginning  of  1911  the  situation  was  practically  as  bad 
as  ever.  On  November  20,  1910,  Mouley  Hand  had 
asked  for  new  instructors  for  the  police,  and  on  De- 

<»  Tardieu,  op.  cit.,  p.  352. 


EESULTS  OF  THE  ACCOKD  OF  1909     293 

cember  12  the  French  charge  d'affaires  sent  an  urgent 
request  for  at  least  thirty  officers,  and  with  the  least 
possible  delay.  Two  months  later  the  Minister  of  War 
designated  ten  officers  to  carry  out  the  mission ! 50 
In  the  meantime  the  situation  of  Mouley  Hand  was 
becoming  more  and  more  precarious.  Insurrections 
became  more  prevalent  and  more  serious.  In  January 
a  small  detachment  of  French  troops  was  led  into  an 
ambush  and  massacred,  and  General  Moinier,  the  head 
of  the  expeditionary  force  in  the  Chaouia,  asked  for 
reinforcements.  The  Briand  Cabinet,  ready  to  resign, 
took  no  action;  but  the  Monis  Cabinet,  realizing  the 
danger  of  allowing  the  situation  to  develop,  granted  a 
small  increase.61  Germany  was  immediately  informed 
of  the  situation,  and  although  Herr  von  Kiderlen- 
Waechter  conceded  that  the  guilty  must  be  punished, 
he  observed  that  it  was  very  easy  to  be  drawn  on  little 
by  little  by  progressive  military  actions  until  the  Act 
of  Algeciras  should  be  annulled.52 

Hardly  had  the  Government  decided  to  increase  its 
forces  before  news  of  a  new  uprising  reached  Paris, 
and  this  time  in  the  vicinity  of  Fez.  More  urgent 
measures  were  now  demanded,  and  again  M.  Cambon 
outlined  the  situation  to  the  German  Foreign  Secre- 
tary, and  showed  the  responsibility  of  France  to  pro- 
tect the  Europeans  in  Fez.  Herr  von  Kiderlen  seemed 
far  more  interested  in  the  state  of  mind  manifested 
by  the  German  people  in  regard  to  the  expedition  than 
he  did  in  the  situation  of  such  Europeans  as  happened 

so  Rapport  Baudin,  op.  cit.,  p.  266. 

si  See  the  speech  of  M.  Cruppi,  March  24,   1911,  for  a  detailed  ex- 
planation, Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  03ii,  p.  1805. 
62  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  102. 


294  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY! 

to  be  at  Fez.63  The  instructions  given  to  General 
Monier  were  such  as  to  prevent  any  misconception  of 
the  purpose  of  the  expedition.  He  was  ordered  not  to 
lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  France  intended  to  do  noth- 
ing which  might  injure  the  independence  of  the  Sultan 
or  diminish  the  prestige  of  his  sovereignty,  that  there 
was  to  be  no  new  occupation  of  territory,  and  that  the 
operations  of  the  expeditionary  force  were  to  be  as 
restricted  as  possible  and  terminated  in  the  shortest 
possible  time.54  That  the  French  Government  realized 
the  delicacy  of  its  situation,  was  shown  by  the  debate 
in  the  Senate  on  April  6  and  7.  M.  Ribot  pointed  out 
that  although  France  had  assumed  the  positive  charge 
of  maintaining  order  in  the  ports  where  she  had  forces, 
she  had  not  asked  for  the  right  to  do  so  in  every 
Moroccan  city  where  Europeans  were  found.  To  do 
so  implied  a  complete  conquest  of  Morocco.  After 
succoring  the  Europeans  in  Fez  they  could  not  be  aban- 
doned, thus  sufficient  troops  for  their  protection  would 
have  to  be  left  and  it  was  difficult  to  see  just  where  the 
matter  would  end.65  Yet  the  justice  of  M.  Cruppi's 
attitude  could  not  be  gainsaid,  "if  the  security  of 
foreigners,  of  the  European  colonies  of  Fez  is  menaced, 
it  is  our  duty  to  try  to  aid  them  .  .  .  this  attitude  is 
forced  upon  the  government  first  by  the  most  elemen- 
tary sentiment  of  humanity,  and  secondly  by  the  special 
interest  that  we  have  in  maintaining  order  in  Mo- 
rocco.' ' 56 
By  the  middle  of  April  the  tribal  uprisings  around 

83  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  166  annexe  II. 
B4  Ibid.,  No.  292. 

55  Annales  du  Stoat  Vol.  79i,  p.  463. 
e«  Ibid.,  p.  470. 


RESULTS  OF  THE  ACCORD  OF  1909     295 

Fez  had  become  so  general  that  the  situation  of  the 
European  colonies  in  the  Moroccan  capital  had  grown 
serious,  and  on  April  17  the  French  Government  de- 
cided to  send  further  reinforcements.  Once  more  the 
German  Government  was  notified.  This  time  the  reply 
was  even  more  reserved:  "I  do  not  say  no,  neither  do 
I  encourage  you.  You  know  the  German  opinion  con- 
cerning Morocco.  .  .  .  You  tell  us:  'if  we  go  to  Fez  it 
will  only  be  temporarily  to  reestablish  the  authority  of 
the  Sultan  and  to  prevent  anarchy. '  But  once  at  Fez, 
will  you  be  able  to  withdraw?  I  can  only  advise  the 
need  for  observing  the  Act  of  Algeciras,  for  once  the 
French  troops  are  at  Fez  the  difficulties  will  com- 
mence.',57  By  the  end  of  April  the  city  was  com- 
pletely blockaded ;  the  Sultan  urged  the  French  troops 
to  advance,  and  on  May  21  the  French  column  arrived 
under  the  walls  of  Fez.  By  the  end  of  June  complete 
security  was  established  in  the  immediate  surround- 
ings of  Fez ;  but  even  before  this  time,  on  June  20,  the 
order  had  been  given  to  begin  the  retreat.58  To  pre- 
vent any  complications,  M.  Cruppi  was  careful  to  keep 
the  Powers  informed  of  the  progress  made;  and  he 
promised  that  the  French  troops  would  withdraw  just 
as  soon  as  the  Sultan's  troops  could  be  reorganized.59 
These  assurances  satisfied  all  the  Powers  except  Ger- 
many. The  German  newspapers  engaged  in  a  cam- 
paign of  threats  and  innuendoes,60  and  Herr  von  Kider- 

57  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  200. 

58  Tardieu,  op.  cit.,  pp.  365-377. 

59  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  Nos.  219,  255,  308,  360. 

so  The  Nord  Deutche  Gazette  expressed  the  general  attitude :  "It 
is  hoped  that  events  will  permit  the  French  government  to  observe  its 
program.  If  it  should  pass  it,  it  would  cease  to  be  in  accord  with  the 
Act  of  Algeciras  of  which  one  of  the  essential  elements  is  an  inde- 


296  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

len-Waechter  became  more  and  more  dubious  in  his 
replies  to  M.  Cambon.  On  April  28  he  declared  that 
if  the  French  should  be  forced  to  remain  at  Fez  it  would 
be  a  complicated  situation,  for  the  whole  Act  of  Alge- 
ciras  would  be  at  stake,  each  power  regaining  its 
liberty.61  M.  Cambon  refused  to  subscribe  to  any  such 
eventuality,  but  the  German  Foreign  Secretary  re- 
mained unconvinced.  Rendered  uneasy  by  this  enig- 
matic attitude  assumed  by  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  M. 
Cruppi  ordered  M.  Cambon  to  find  out  definitely  the 
attitude  of  the  German  Government  upon  the  Fez  ex- 
pedition. On  June  10  M.  Cambon  had  an  interview 
with  Herr  Zimmerman,  Under  Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  and  the  next  day  with  Chancellor  von  Bethman- 
Hollweg,  but  in  neither  interview  did  he  receive  any 
satisfaction.  The  Chancellor  finally  advised  him  to 
see  von  Kiderlen  at  Kissingen.62 

The  first  clue  to  the  German  attitude  came  most 
unexpectedly.  Meeting  the  Crown  Prince  at  the  races 
at  Grunewald,  June  12,  M.  Cambon  was  complimented 
on  the  progress  of  the  French  in  Morocco:  "Well,  my 
dear  ambassador,  here  you  are  at  Fez.  Accept  my 
compliments.  Morocco  is  a  fine  bit  of  territory.  We 
won 't  speak  of  it  any  more  now,  but  you  fix  it  up  with 
us  and  it  will  be  all  right."  63    The  interview  at  Kis- 

pendent  sovereign  in  an  independent  Morocco.  An  infraction  of  one 
of  the  essential  clauses  of  the  Act  of  Algeciras,  even  if  it  should  be 
provoked  by  force  of  circumstances  and  contrary  to  the  wish  of  the 
power  so  acting,  would  give  back  to  all  the  other  powers  their  full 
liberty  of  action  and  might  provoke  consequences  which  cannot  be 
foreseen  for  the  moment."  Quoted,  Albin,  "Le  Coup  d'Agadir,"  p.  156. 
6i  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  239. 

62  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  Nos.  361,  366. 

63  Tardieu,  op.  cit.,  p.  385. 


EESULTS  OF  THE  ACCOED  OF  1909     297 

singen  was  even  more  enlightening.  Herr  von  Kider- 
len  detailed  the  various  instances  in  which  France  had 
failed  to  act  in  the  spirit  of  the  Accord  of  1909, — the 
Ngoko-Sangha  Consortium,  the  Moroccan  railways, 
and  others — and  asserted  that  the  Fez  expedition  was 
a  clear  violation  of  the  Act  of  Algeciras.  M.  Cambon 
pointed  out  the  straightforward  program  of  France, 
and  Germany's  promise  of  political  disinterestedness. 
Herr  Kiderlen  refused  to  concede  the  need  of  the  ex- 
pedition and  finally  declared  that  further  plastering 
up  in  Morocco  was  impossible.  When  M.  Cambon  sug- 
gested that  compensation  be  sought  elsewhere,  Herr 
von  Kiderlen  replied:  "Go  to  Paris  and  bring  us  back 
an  offer."64 

M.  Cambon  returned  to  Paris  as  was  suggested,  and 
found  the  political  situation  in  hopeless  confusion. 
The  disorders  in  the  Champagne  vineyards  had  com- 
pletely unnerved  the  government :  ' '  The  Prime  Minis- 
ter sat  like  Belshazzar  at  the  feast,  gazing  with  dismay 
at  the  awful  lettering  on  the  midnight  sky,  while  the 
deputies  wrung  their  hands  like  a  Greek  chorus."65 
Nemesis  seemed  to  dog  the  government's  footsteps. 
At  the  occasion  of  the  Paris-Madrid  aeroplane  race 
one  of  the  machines  got  out  of  control,  and  from  the 
great  multitude  assembled  one  person  was  killed  and 
one  seriously  injured — M.  Berteaux,  Minister  of  War, 
was  the  one  killed,  and  M.  Monis,  the  Prime  Minister, 
was  the  one  injured.  To  make  matters  worse,  Spain 
now  decided  to  act  in  an  unfriendly  manner,  and  in 
direct  opposition  to  a  request  from  France  that  no 

64  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  399. 

65  Fullerton,  "Problems  of  Power,"  p.  102. 


298  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

military  action  be  taken,  despatched  troops  to  El  Ksar 
and  Larache.  She  claimed  as  justification,  that  such 
action  was  essential  to  protect  those  interests  which 
had  been  granted  to  her  by  the  secret  agreement  made 
in  1904  in  connection  with  the  Anglo-French  Entente.66 
M.  Jaures  rose  to  the  occasion  by  urging  a  complete 
withdrawal  from  Morocco,  thus  only,  he  declared,  could 
France  be  assured  of  the  sympathy  of  Spain  and  Ger- 
many.67 To  the  whole  Chamber  at  this  time  the  inde- 
pendent action  of  Spain  seemed  of  much  more  impor- 
tance than  the  covert  hostility  of  Germany.  Even  such 
a  close  student  of  foreign  affairs  as  M.  Gabriel  Hano- 
taux,  writing  in  June,  1911,  on  the  diplomatic  situation, 
said:  " Germany  after  having  shown  her  claws  at  the 
beginning  of  the  affair  has  hidden  them  for  the  mo- 
ment; she  waits,  her  eyes  half  closed,  ready  to  profit 
by  the  slightest  fault.  Without  believing  that  she  has 
entirely  renounced  her  ambitions  I  do  not  accuse  her 
of  evil  designs.  ...  To  push  her  demands  to  the  ex- 
treme did  not  succeed  at  the  Conference  of  Algeciras. 
She  would  find  herself  in  an  analogous  position,  if  by 
a  hazardous  manoeuver  she  should  try  to  force  her 
fortune,  and  should  put  the  other  Powers  on  guard. 
Let  us  say  that  her  diplomacy  is  keeping  an  eye  upon 
us ;  if  she  can  slip  into  the  play  without  compromising 

6«  Tardieu,  op.  cit.,  p.  392.  M.  Cruppi  authorized  the  French  am- 
bassador to  protest  vigorously  against  this  action.  "Give  notice  to 
the  Foreign  Minister  in  a  friendly  but  clear  fashion  that  the  measures 
taken  by  the  Royal  Government — measures  which  have  not  been  the 
result  of  any  preliminary  accord  between  France  and  Spain, — and  of 
which  we  have  been  informed  only  after  their  realization,  cannot  have 
our  assent."     Quoted  Tardieu,  p.  393. 

at  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  94,  p.  321. 


RESULTS  OF  THE  ACCORD  OF  1909     299 

herself  too  far,  she  will  enter  you  may  be  sure  of 
that."68 

M.  Hanotaux  was  only  half  right.  Germany  was 
watching,  she  was  watching  very  closely;  but  her 
method  was  not  to  slip  in ;  if  a  suitable  occasion  should 
show  itself  she  was  ready  to  batter  down  the  doors. 
If  she  had  learned  a  lesson  at  Algeciras,  it  was  to  strike 
at  France  alone,  rather  than  at  all  Europe.  It  was 
France  that  furnished  the  occasion.  The  Monis  gov- 
ernment, weak  at  best,  fell  on  a  question  of  domestic 
policy,  June  23,  and  M.  Fallieres  asked  M.  Caillaux, 
Minister  of  Finances  in  the  former  cabinet,  to  form  the 
new  ministry.  Not  as  much  was  known  concerning  the 
character  of  M.  Caillaux  as  is  known  to-day,  but  the 
little  that  was  known  was  not  such  as  to  inspire  much 
hope.  He  was  a  recognized  authority  on  finances, 
author  of  an  excellent  treatise  on  the  subject,  Impots 
en  France,  and  he  had  served  as  Minister  of  Finances 
in  the  Waldeck-Rousseau,  Clemenceau,  Briand,  and 
Monis  cabinets.  But  in  a  period  when  the  storm 
clouds  were  everywhere  visible  on  the  horizon  of 
foreign  relations,  the  wisdom  of  his  choice  seemed 
problematical.  It  was  at  least  hoped  that  M.  Caillaux 
would  choose  an  experienced  statesman  to  take  the  all 
important  position  of  Foreign  Minister.  He  chose  M. 
de  Selves,  for  the  past  fifteen  years  Prefect  of  the 
Seine,  and  before  that  Director-General  of  Posts  and 
Telegraphs.  Even  Germany  manifested  its  surprise 
at  the  strange  appointments  which  M.  Caillaux  made. 
The  "Lokal  Anzeiger"  said:  ''It  is  astonishing  that  M. 

es  Gabriel  Hanotaux,  "La  Politique  d'Equilibre,"  p.  335. 


300  FEENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Caillaux  should  have  entrusted  the  portfolio  of  War 
to  M.  Messimy,  whose  competence  appears  doubtful, 
and  that  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  M.  de  Selves,  at  the 
very  moment  when  his  bad  administration  of  Paris  has 
brought  down  upon  his  head  the  censure  of  the  munic- 
ipal council.  M.  de  Selves,  who  during  fifteen  years 
has  been  unable  to  clean,  pave,  or  light  the  capital,  as 
a  recompense  is  put  at  the  head  of  Foreign  Affairs  of 
his  country."  69  To  official  Germany  the  time  seemed 
suitable  to  reopen  the  Moroccan  question,  and  four 
days  after  the  formation  of  the  Caillaux  Cabinet  the 
German  gun-boat,  Panther,  appeared  in  the  harbor  of 
Agadir. 

eo  Quoted  Le  Matin,  June  29,  1911.  Further  light  is  thrown  upon 
the  Caillaux  ministry  by  this  extract  from  a  despatch  sent  by  Baron 
Guillaume,  the  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  his  chief  the  day  after  the 
despatch  of  the  Panther:  "When  forming  his  Cabinet,  M.  Caillaux 
avoided  offering  a  portfolio  to  M.  Etienne,  who  is  an  interested  par- 
tisan in  the  Moroccan  adventure.  He  chose  M.  de  Selves  as  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affaires  who,  I  am  told,  wishes  to  put  an  end  to  that  affair 
and  wants  the  French  to  leave  Fez.  That  is  the  moment  which  the 
German  Government  chose  to  gain  a  footing  in  Morocco!  Was  the 
German  Government  badly  informed  ...  or  did  it  fear  lest  France 
draw  back  and  thus  deprive  it  of  a  suitable  pretext?"  Belgian  Doc, 
No.  73. 


CHAPTER  XI 
AGADIR 

1.     THE  GERMAN  DEMANDS 

THE  portfolio  of  Foreign  Affairs  is  often  a  lourd 
heritage,  and  hardly  had  M.  de  Selves  left  the 
Hotel  de  Ville  for  the  Quai  d'Orsay  before  he  realized 
this  fact.  Simultaneously  with  the  sending  of  the 
Panther  to  Agadir,  the  German  ambassador  at  Paris 
informed  the  new  Foreign  Secretary  that  certain  Ger- 
man firms,  alarmed  at  the  troubled  situation  in  Mo- 
rocco, had  appealed  to  the  Imperial  Government  for 
protection,  and  it  was  in  pursuance  of  their  request 
that  Germany  had  dispatched  a  war-ship  charged  with 
the  task  of  lending  aid  in  case  of  need.  As  soon  as 
peace  should  be  reestablished  in  this  region  the  gun- 
boat had  orders  to  leave  Agadir.1  Even  the  inex- 
perienced Foreign  Secretary  realized  that  the  excuse 
for  sending  a  war-ship  to  Agadir  was  a  most  palpable 
pretext.  In  the  first  place,  Agadir  was  a  closed  port 
where  no  power  had  the  right  to  exercise  police  duty, 
secondly  there  was  practically  no  European  commerce 
there,  and  Germany  had  none  at  all.  Finally  there 
had  been  no  troubles  recently  in  this  particular  region. 
Herr  Zimmerman,  in  commenting  on  the  affair  to  the 
French  charge  d'affaires  at  Berlin,  was  somewhat  more 
frank.    For  his  first  reason  he,  too,  mentioned  the  pro- 

iDoc.  Dip.,  "Affaires  du  Maroc"  (1910-1912)  No.  418. 

301 


302  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

tection  of  German  interests,  but  his  second  was  more 
truthful:  " public  opinion  in  Germany  is  such  that  the 
Imperial  Government  can  no  longer  seem  to  disinterest 
itself  in  Moroccan  affairs  at  a  moment  when  France 
and  Spain  no  longer  seem  willing  to  abide  by  the  Act 
of  Algeciras."  2  But  considering  the  fact  that  the  Fez 
expedition  had  already  received  orders  to  withdraw, 
that  Herr  von  Kiderlen  had  invited  M.  Cambon  to 
make  an  offer,  and  that  the  French  ambassador  was 
in  Paris  for  that  very  purpose,  it  was  not  clear  why 
Germany  should  seize  this  moment — when  France  had 
shown  herself  most  willing  to  negotiate — to  provoke 
an  international  crisis.  In  the  words  of  M.  Pierre 
Albin,  "A  conversation  was  being  held.  Bruskly  dur- 
ing an  interruption  one  of  the  two  interlocutors  placed 
a  revolver  upon  the  table,  then  invited  the  other  to 
renew  the  discussion."  3 

The  answer  was,  after  all,  very  simple.  Under  the 
Act  of  Algeciras  it  was  clear  that  France  and  Spain 
would  ultimately  become  masters  of  Morocco.  Time 
was  working  for  them,  and  the  chaotic  condition  exist- 
ing there  was  bound  to  bring  about  a  protectorate 
sooner  or  later.  The  Accord  of  1909  was  an  attempt 
on  the  part  of  Germany  to  recoup  commercially  what 
she  had  lost  politically.  It  is  possible  that  at  first 
she  fully  intended  to  disinterest  herself  gradually  in 
Morocco,  but  Vappetit  vient  en  mangeant,  and  as 
numerous  profitable  ventures  suggested  themselves 
her  subjects  became  more  insistent  in  their  demands 
for  equal  participation  with  the  French.    When  it  was 

*Ibid.,  No.  419. 

*  "Le  Coup  d'Agadir,"  p.  28. 


AGADIB  303 

seen  that  cooperation  was  impossible,  the  idea  of  a 
partition  or  compensation  took  its  place.  The  Pan- 
Germans  had  long  been  demanding  an  Atlantic  port, 
and  the  idea  finally  developed  into  the  desire  for  a 
stretch  of  the  coast  with  the  hinterland  included.4  The 
march  to  Fez  had  given  the  Wilhelmstrasse  the  ex- 
cuse to  protest  against  a  violation  of  the  Act,  and  the 
weakened  internal  situation  of  France,  which  put  the 
inexperienced  Caillaux  ministry  in  power,  gave  it  the 
opportunity  to  make  the  protest  effective.  Herr  von 
Kiderlen-Waechter  gave  a  very  frank  outline  of  the 
situation  to  Baron  Beyens,  the  Belgian  ambassador : 

"When  I  first  came  to  the  Wilhelmstrasse  I  wit- 
nessed, without  being  able  to  raise  any  protests,  the 
successive  encroachments  of  France  in  Morocco,  which 
assuredly  were  breaches  of  the  Algeciras  Act.  ...  If 
the  Republican  Government  had  continued  to  show 
prudence  and  to  advance  at  a  leisurely  pace,  we  should 
have  been  compelled  to  put  up  with  its  pretensions 
and  to  champ  our  bit  in  silence.  .  .  .  The  invasion 
would  have  crept  on  slowly  like  a  sheet  of  oil.  I 
thanked  Heaven  when  I  learnt  of  the  march  on  Fez, 
a  flagrant  violation  of  the  Algeciras  Act.  This  drastic 
proceeding  which  the  position  of  Europeans  in  the  Mo- 
roccan capital  did  not  justify,  restored  to  us  our  free- 
dom of  action.  .  .  .  We  admitted  that  it  was  out  of 
the  question  to  make  France  draw  back  and  conform 
to  the  Algeciras  treaty.  We  consented  to  give  up 
Morocco  to  her,  but  we  demanded  in  return  a  cession 

*  Herr  Theobald  Fischer  expressed  the  Pan-German  view:  "Ger- 
many's minimum  demands  should  include  the  part  of  Morocco  situated 
between  the  Atlas  Mountains  and  the  Atlantic,  the  territory  south  of 
Rabat  including  the  Sous."     Tardieu,  op.  cit.,  p.  428. 


304  FRENCH  FOEEIGN  POLICY 

of  territory  in  Africa.  Since  this  friendly  conversa- 
tion led  to  no  result,  just  as  our  proposals  in  accordance 
with  the  1909  agreement  ...  we  decided  to  send  the 
Panther  to  Agadir. ' ' 5 

This  was  a  sufficiently  bald  statement  of  the  case 
from  the  German  viewpoint.  But  inadvertently  the 
Germans  have  given  us  a  clearer  and  more  brutal 
exposition  of  their  intentions.  In  a  political  libel  suit 
in  which  the  editor  of  the  "Rheinisch-Westfalische 
Zeitung"  was  implicated,  he  made  the  following  declar- 
ations on  oath  in  the  court,  January  9, 1912 : 

"Herr  Klass,  the  President  of  the  Pan-Germanic 
League,  is  prepared  to  state  upon  oath  before  this 
Court  that  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
Herr  von  Kiderlen-Waechter,  writing  to  him  from 
Kissingen,  requested  Herr  Klass  to  meet  him  at  the 
Hotel  Pfalzer  Hof  in  Mannheim.  During  the  inter- 
view, which  occupied  several  hours,  Herr  von  Kiderlen 
stated:  "The  Pan-Germanic  demand  for  the  posses- 
sion of  Morocco  is  absolutely  justified.  You  can  abso- 
lutely rely  upon  it  that  the  government  will  stick  to 
Morocco.  M.  Cambon  is  wriggling  before  me  like  a 
worm.  The  German  Government  is  in  a  splendid  posi- 
tion. You  can  rely  on  me  and  you  will  be  very  pleased 
with  our  Morocco  policy." 

Herr  Klass  called  at  the  Wilhelmstrasse  July  1, 
and  as  the  Foreign  Secretary  was  not  in,  he  was  re- 
ceived by  Herr  Zimmerman,   the   Under  Secretary. 

6  Beyens,  "Germany  Before  the  War,"  p.  230.  It  is  rather  difficult 
to  reconcile  this  statement  with  the  actual  facts.  Not  only  do  we 
find  the  French  representative  in  Fez  begging  for  aid,  but  the  Sultan 
himself  is  equally  insistent  upon  French  intervention  as  the  only  pos- 
sible means  of  putting  down  the  insurrection.  See  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit., 
passim,  for  reports  on  the  situation. 


AGADIR  305 

Herr  Zimmerman  was  unable  to  restrain  his  enthusi- 
asm: "You  come  at  an  historic  hour.  To-day  the 
Panther  appears  before  Agadir,  and  at  this  moment 
the  Foreign  Cabinets  are  being  informed  of  its  mission. 
The  German  Government  has  sent  two  agents  provo- 
cateurs to  Agadir,  and  these  have  done  their  duty  very 
well.  German  firms  have  been  induced  to  make  com- 
plaints and  to  call  upon  the  government  in  Berlin  for 
protection.  It  is  the  government's  intention  to  seize 
the  district,  and  it  will  not  give  it  up  again.  .  .  . ' ' 6 

At  first  France  seemed  wholly  unable  to  decide  what 
action  should  be  taken.  M.  de  Selves  thought  that  a 
French  war-ship  should  be  sent  as  an  immediate  riposte 
to  the  German  thrust,  after  which  further  counsel  could 
be  taken.  M.  Jules  Cambon  supported  the  Foreign 
Secretary  in  his  attitude,  but  M.  Caillaux  hesitated. 
The  attitude  of  M.  Caillaux  in  this  whole  affair  is 
not  yet  entirely  clear,  but  it  was  proved  conclusively 
in  the  Senatorial  inquest  that  while  he  was  still  Minis- 
ter of  Finance  in  the  Monis  cabinet  he  was  carrying 
on  secret  negotiations  with  Germany  in  regard  to  the 
Congo-Cameroon  railroad,  and  that  when  he  became 
Prime  Minister,  he  continued  these  negotiations  wholly 
without  the  knowledge  of  his  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs.7  M.  Caillaux  suggested  that  M.  Delcasse,  now 
Minister  of  Marine,  be  asked  to  give  his  opinion  and  M. 
Delcasse  advised  that  Great  Britain  be  consulted  first, 
in  order  that  her  attitude  might  be  conformable  to  that 

8  J.  Ellis  Barker,  "Anglo-German  Differences  and  Sir  Edward  Grey," 
Fortnightly  Review,  March  1,  1912. 

t  For  a  scathing  indictment  of  M.  Caillaux's  diplomatic  methods  see 
the  speech  of  M.  Jenouvrier  in  the  Senate,  February  5,  1912.  M.  Tar- 
dieu  fails  entirely  to  do  justice  to  this  phase  of  the  affair.  Annalea  du 
Senat,  Vol.  81i,  p.  156. 


306  FKENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

of  France.  His  advice  was  taken  and  M.  Paul  Cam- 
bon,  French  ambassador  at  London,  was  asked  to  ob- 
tain the  views  of  the  British  Foreign  Office.  In  fact 
immediately  upon  learning  of  the  dispatch  of  the 
Panther  M.  Paul  Cambon  had  gone  to  see  Sir  Edward 
Grey  without  awaiting  instructions,  but  in  the  absence 
of  the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  Sir  Arthur  Nicolson, 
Under  Secretary,  assured  him  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment would  model  its  attitude  and  its  decision  upon 
the  attitude  and  decision  of  the  French  Government.8 
It  soon  became  evident  that  France  once  more  in- 
tended to  let  Germany  make  her  proposals.  President 
Fallieres  had  made  all  arrangements  to  start  on  a  trip 
to  Holland  July  3,  and  M.  de  Selves  was  to  accompany 
him.  It  was  decided  that  to  change  their  plans  at 
this  late  moment  would  be  giving  too  much  importance 
to  this  incident.9  This  decision  placed  the  manage- 
ment of  the  situation  for  the  next  few  days  entirely 
in  the  hands  of  M.  Caillaux.  He  first  authorized  M. 
Jules  Cambon  to  enter  into  discussion  with  Germany 
as  to  the  significance  and  purpose  of  its  act,10  and  at 
the  same  time  he  telegraphed  M.  Paul  Cambon  to  the 
effect  that  he  need  not  ask  the  British  Government  to 
join  with  France  in  sending  war-ships  to  Morocco,  as 
France  did  not  intend  to  make  a  naval  demonstration.11 

sAlbin,  "Le  Coup  d'Agadir,"  p.  31. 

»  Kaiser  Wjlhelm  had  also  planned  to  leave  Kiel  for  a  cruise  in  the 
North  Sea  at  this  time,  but  he  found  it  convenient  to  delay  his  trip  un- 
til he  learned  how  France  would  take  the  incident. 

10  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  425. 

ii  Ibid.,  No.  427.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  M.  de  Selves  pro- 
tested vigorously  against  this  telegram  when  he  received  a  copy  of  it 
and  asked  M.  Bapst,  Director  of  Political  Affairs,  to  tell  M.  Caillaux 
that  he  thought  it  advisable  that  the  French  ambassador  should  re- 
frain from  making  any  communication  to  the  British  Government  of 


AGADIR  307 

Whether  an  interview  which  he  was  known  to  have  had 
the  same  morning  with  Herr  Gwinner  of  the  Dentche 
Bank,  who  happened  to  be  in  Paris  at  the  time,  had 
any  influence  upon  his  decision  remains  to  be  proved. 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  immediately  upon  his  return,  in- 
sisted that  any  change  in  the  status  quo  of  Morocco 
called  for  a  diplomatic  discussion  among  the  four 
Powers  principally  interested,  France,  Spain,  Great 
Britain  and  Germany;  but  first  Great  Britain  desired 
to  know  the  views  of  Prance,  and  after  an  agreement 
between  them  a  conversation  a  quatre  would  be  in 
order.12 

The  French  press  on  the  whole  took  the  incident 
almost  as  calmly  as  did  the  President  du  Conseil,  with 
the  exception  of  newspapers  notoriously  anti-German 
such  as  the  ''Eclair"  and  the  "Echo  de  Paris."  The 
conservative  "Journal  des  Debats"  declared  that  it 
was  high  time  to  examine  the  Moroccan  question  with 
sang  froid  and  commonsense.    However,  on  July  8 

such  a  sort  as  to  dissuade  her  from  a  naval  manifestation  if  the  need 
should  arise.     Ibid.,  No.  429. 

12  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  428.  On  July  4,  after  a  cabinet  meeting, 
Sir  Edward  Grey  declared  that  the  British  attitude  could  not  be  a  dis- 
interested one  with  regard  to  Morocco.  She  had  to  take  into  considera- 
tion both  her  treaty  obligations  to  France  and  her  own  interests  in 
Morocco;  in  her  opinion  a  new  situation  had  been  created  by  the 
dispatch  of  a  German  warship  to  Agadir.  He  explained  this  position 
in  Parliament  Nov.  27,  1911,  as  follows:  "I  think  in  the  German  mind 
it  has  sometimes  been  assumed  that  our  agreement  made  with  France 
in  1904  entirely  disinterested  us  with  regard  to  Morocco.  ...  It  is 
quite  true  we  disinterested  ourselves  in  Morocco  politically  but  we  did 
it  on  conditions  laid  down  both  strategic  and  economic.  ...  It  is  ob- 
vious, if  the  Moroccan  question  was  to  be  reopened,  and  a  new  settle- 
ment made,  unless  we  were  consulted,  unless  we  knew  what  was  going 
on,  unless  we  were  in  some  way  parties  to  the  settlement,  the  strategic 
and  economic  conditions  stipulated  for  between  ourselves,  France,  and 
Spain  in  1904  might  be  upset."  Pari.  Debates,  Vol.  32,  p.  43,  5th 
series. 


308  FEENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

the  "Matin"  aroused  public  interest  to  a  white  heat 
by  announcing  that  Germany  wished  a  cession  of  the 
entire  French  Congo  in  return  for  a  free  hand  in  Mo- 
rocco. In  fact  it  was  on  this  day  that  Herr  von  Schoen, 
the  German  ambassador,  declared  that  his  government 
was  willing  to  continue  the  conversations  begun  at 
Kissingen,  declaring  that  his  government  cherished  no 
pretensions  of  a  territorial  order  in  regard  to  Morocco, 
but  that  the  Congo  seemed  to  offer  a  ground  for  nego- 
tiation.13 At  the  same  time,  M.  Jules  Cambon  in- 
formed the  German  Foreign  Secretary  that  the  discus- 
sion could  not  be  limited  to  Paris  and  Berlin,  as  had 
been  suggested  by  Germany;  France  intended  to  keep 
her  allies  and  her  friends  in  touch  with  the  course  of 
events.14  On  July  10,  in  the  course  of  his  first  long 
conversation  with  M.  Cambon,  Herr  von  Kiderlen 
again  reproached  France  for  the  present  situation, 
harping  ever  upon  the  failure  of  the  economic  col- 
laboration. In  conclusion  he  declared:  "You  desire 
that  we  give  up  Morocco  as  entirely  hopeless;  well 
as  far  as  I  am  concerned  I  would  consent  to  it,  but 
in  order  to  have  Germany  accept  it  we  must  present 
ourselves  to  her  as  having  served  her  interests ;  satis- 
faction must  be  given  on  the  colonial  side,  for  example 
in  the  Congo."15 

France  was  to  suffer  now  for  lack  of  a  real  man  at 
the  head  of  the  State.    A  Clemenceau,  a  Delcasse,  a 

is  Doc.  Dip.,  up.  cit.,  No.  439. 

i*  Ibid.,  No.  441. 

15  Ibid.,  No.  444.  As  far  back  as  1905  the  Congo  had  been  suggested 
as  compensation  by  Herr  von  Kuhlmann,  member  of  the  German  lega- 
tion at  Tangier  in  conversations  with  M.  de  Chensey,  the  French  rep- 
resentative.    See  Tardieu,  "Coup  d'Agadir,"  p.  438. 


AGADIR  309 

Millerand,  a  Poincare  would  have  sent  a  war-ship  to 
Agadir  or  some  other  Moroccan  port,  and  would  then 
have  informed  Germany  that  since  she  had  torn  up  the 
Act  of  Algeciras  she  could  state  her  claims  to  the  sig- 
natory Powers.  Another  conference  was  the  last  thing 
that  Germany  wanted,  yet  if  France  had  insisted,  it  is 
hard  to  see  how  Germany  could  have  avoided  it,  after 
the  Algeciras  precedent  that  she  herself  had  set.  But 
M.  de  Selves,  ignorant  not  only  of  diplomatic  methods 
but  also  of  the  whole  background  of  the  affair,  was 
wholly  unable  to  cope  with  the  situation.  As  a  result 
he  took  his  orders  from  M.  Caillaux.  There  was  no 
doubt  as  to  the  ability  of  the  Prime  Minister,  but  there 
was  real  cause  to  question  his  methods.  Nor  was  this 
the  only  factor  prejudicial  to  the  French  cause.  The 
powerful  influence  of  M.  Jaures  in  the  Chamber,  who 
in  his  ardent  pursuit  of  internationalism  always  saw 
his  country's  interests  from  the  German  point  of  view, 
the  out  and  out  pacifism  of  M.  Sembat  and  M.  d'Estour- 
nelles  de  Constant,  who  believed  that  the  only  way  to 
live  as  a  neighbor  to  Germany  was  to  allow  her  to  have 
her  own  way — she  would  have  it  ultimately,  why  bother 
to  fight  about  it? — were  influences  which  Germany 
counted  upon  in  bargaining  unsubstantial  claims  for 
very  substantial  territory.  There  were  other  influ- 
ences still  more  deadly  which  she  knew  about  only  too 
well — especially  the  sinister  power  wielded  by  men  like 
Gustave  Herve,  anti-militarist,  anti-patriot,  anti- 
French,  who  dared  to  come  out  in  his  sheet, ' '  La  Guerre 
Sociale,"  on  July  10,  with  the  following  challenge: 
"We  shall  wreck  your  mobilization  if  you  commit  the 
crime  of  not  coming  to  an  agreement  with  Germany 


310  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

regarding  Morocco — and  while  waiting  we  will  wreck 
(saboterons)  your  diplomacy."16 

Under  these  circumstances  it  is  not  surprising  that 
when  Germany  declared  her  terms  to  M.  Cambon  in  the 
famous  interview  of  July  15,  they  were  found  to  be 
exorbitant  in  the  extreme.  They  were  nothing  less 
than  the  cession  of  the  whole  French  Congo  between 
the  Ocean  and  the  Sangha  River.  M.  Cambon  immedi- 
ately informed  Herr  von  Kiderlen  that  although  French 
opinion  might  consent  to  substantial  compensations  it 
would  never  submit  to  the  loss  of  a  colony.  The  Ger- 
man Foreign  Minister  then  allowed  that  Germany 
might  give  in  return  the  north  of  the  Cameroon  and 
perhaps  even  Togoland.  He  followed  his  concession 
with  a  veiled  threat  of  war,  declaring  that  such  a  con- 
tingency might  be  unavoidably  forced  upon  Germany 
by  the  pressure  of  public  opinion  unless  reasonable 
compensation  were  secured.  "You  have  purchased 
your  liberty  in  Morocco  from  Spain,  England,  and  even 
Italy,  and  you  have  thrust  us  aside.  You  should  have 
negotiated  with  us  before  going  to  Fez. ' '  Fortunately 
for  France,  she  had  in  M.  Jules  Cambon  a  diplomat 
fully  experienced  in  German  methods.  Refusing  flatly 
the  German  suggestion,  he  advised  Herr  Kiderlen  to 
confer  with  the  Minister  of  Colonies,  and  then  if  Ger- 
many really  wanted  to  come  to  an  agreement  with 
France  let  her  make  a  proposal.17 

On  the  whole,  it  seemed  as  though  Great  Britain  was 
more  interested  in  the  affair  than  was  the  French  Gov- 
ernment.   On  July  21  Sir  Edward  Grey  conferred  with 

i«  Cited  in  Le  Matin,  July  11,  1911. 
17  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  455. 


AGADIR  311 

Count  Wolff  Metternich,  the  German  ambassador,  and 
informed  him  of  the  interest  which  Great  Britain  had 
in  the  question,  and  as  the  German  ambassador's  reply- 
was  most  equivocal  in  its  nature,  it  was  felt  necessary 
to  give  public  notice  of  the  British  position.  It  was 
thought  to  be  the  more  necessary  as  the  *  'London 
Times"  had  published  on  July  20  an  account  of  the 
impossible  terms  demanded  by  Germany.  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  was  scheduled  to  speak  for  the  Bankers '  Asso- 
ciation at  the  Mansion  House,  and  here  was  an  oppor- 
tunity for  the  government  to  go  on  record  in  a  semi- 
official way.  The  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  had 
the  reputation  of  being  extremely  pacific  in  his  views, 
and  an  ardent  supporter  of  a  decrease  in  armaments, 
and  as  was  expected  his  speech  extolled  the  blessings 
of  peace.  Therefore  his  conclusion  occasioned  the 
greater  surprise :  "But  if  a  situation  were  to  be  forced 
upon  us  in  which  peace  could  only  be  preserved  by  the 
surrender  of  the  great  and  beneficent  position  Britain 
has  won  by  centuries  of  heroism  and  achievement,  by 
allowing  Britain  to  be  treated  where  her  interests  were 
vitally  affected  as  if  she  were  of  no  account  in  the 
Cabinet  of  nations,  then  I  say  emphatically  that  peace 
at  that  price  would  be  a  humiliation  intolerable  for  a 
great  country  like  ours  to  endure. ' ' 18 

The  "Times"  comment  the  next  day  is  especially 
pertinent:  "Mr.  Lloyd  George's  clear,  decisive,  states- 
manlike reference  last  night  to  the  European  situation 
created  by  the  German  demands  in  West  Africa,  will 
be  endorsed  without  distinction  of  party  by  all  his 
countrymen.    The  purport  of  such  demands  as  were 

is  London  Times,  July  22,  1911. 


312  FEENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

outlined  in  Berlin  last  week  is  nothing  less  than  a  claim 
for  absolute  predominance.  Neither  France  nor  Great 
Britain  could  have  entertained  them  for  a  moment 
without  confessing  themselves  overborne  by  German 
power.  That  is  not  the  intention  of  our  French  neigh- 
bors, nor  is  it  our  own." 

The  publication  in  the  press  of  the  German  demands 
angered  the  Wilhelmstrasse  exceedingly,  and  when  Herr 
Kiderlen  met  M.  Cambon  on  the  20th  his  tone  was  very 
aggressive.  He  declared  that  unless  more  discretion 
were  observed,  further  conversation  was  impossible — 
that  Germany  would  take  her  liberty  of  action,  demand 
the  full  application  of  the  Act  of  Algeciras,  and  if 
necessary  push  matters  to  the  end.  M.  Cambon  was 
not  to  be  browbeaten,  and  he  declared  that  France  was 
prepared  to  go  just  as  far  as  Germany.  Furthermore, 
when  he  learned  that  the  German  Secretary  was  not 
ready  to  make  any  further  proposals,  he  informed  him 
that  unless  Germany  was  prepared  to  disinterest  her- 
self completely  in  Morocco,  it  was  not  worth  while  to 
continue  the  discussion.19  The  Mansion  House  speech 
of  Lloyd  George  changed  the  whole  situation.  At  last 
it  was  brought  to  the  German  comprehension  that  the 
Triple  Entente  was  not  merely  a  paper  agreement,  but 
one  which  a  great  nation  was  willing  to  risk  war  to 
maintain.  The  German  eagle  paid  little  heed  to  the 
crowing  of  the  Gallic  cock,  but  when  accompanied  by 
the  roar  of  the  British  lion  it  was  time  to  take  heed 
to  the  situation.  A  tense  situation  for  some  time  was 
produced  between  Germany  and  Great  Britain,  but  the 
beneficial  effect  of  the  Lloyd  George  speech  was  imme- 

i»Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  463. 


AGADIR  313 

diately  noted  by  M.  Cambon  in  his  next  interview  with 
the  German  Foreign  Minister : ' '  The  conversation  that 
I  had  with  Herr  Kiderlen  last  night  was  carried  on 
in  an  entirely  different  tone  from  that  which  marked 
the  two  preceding.  My  interlocutor  manifested  to- 
wards me,  as  he  has  never  done  up  to  the  present,  his 
desire  of  an  entente  with  us."20  However,  Herr 
Kiderlen  still  insisted  upon  the  whole  of  the  French 
Congo  from  the  Ngoko-Sangha  to  the  sea,  though  he 
was  now  willing  to  offer  definitely  all  of  Togoland  and 
the  northern  part  of  the  Cameroons  in  return.  M. 
Cambon  took  cognizance  of  the  offer,  but  frankly  re- 
fused to  consider  the  abandonment  of  the  French 
Congo.  Another  interview  on  July  28  did  not  advance 
the  situation,  and  the  following  day  Herr  Kiderlen  left 
for  Swinemunde  to  consult  with  the  Kaiser. 

Thus  at  the  first  of  August,  a  month  after  the  send- 
ing of  the  Panther  to  Agadir  the  negotiations  seemed 
to  have  reached  an  impasse.  France  was  willing  to 
exchange  some  of  her  islands  of  Polynesia,  or  of  the 
Indian  Ocean,  and  some  of  her  territory  at  the  east  of 
the  Cameroons,  for  the  Bee  de  Canard,  and  a  free  hand 
in  Morocco.  But  she  was  unwilling  to  cede  any  of  the 
coast  line  of  the  Congo.  Germany,  on  the  other  hand, 
insisted  upon  having  free  access  to  the  sea  between 
Libreville  and  Spanish  Guinea,  thus  completely  en- 

20  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  467.  The  beat  account  of  the  Anglo-Ger- 
man situation  arising  out  of  the  Agadir  Affair/  is  found  in  Bernadotte 
E.  Schmitt,  "England  and  Germany,"  Chap.  XI.  Mr.  E.  D.  Morel  in  his 
highly  colored  expose  which  has  been  published  under  two  titles, 
"Morocco  in  Diplomacy,"  and  "Ten  years  of  Secret  Diplomacy,"  gives  a 
graphic  though  lurid  presentation  of  the  same  situation.  Mr.  Morel 
finds  greater  justification  for  the  German  aims  than  do  the  Germans 
themselves. 


314  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

circling  this  colony,  and  territorial  access  to  the  Congo 
River,  which  meant  that  French  Congo  would  be  cut 
in  two.  "Upon  this  point,"  insisted  Herr  Kiderlen, 
"the  resolution  of  the  German  Government  is  formal." 
In  return  Germany  was  willing  to  give  France  a  free 
hand  politically  in  Morocco.21  In  the  interview  of 
August  4,  Herr  Kiderlen  eliminated  the  question  of  the 
South  Sea  Islands,  renounced  the  demand  for  the  access 
to  the  sea  through  the  Congo,  but  still  demanded  half 
of  the  Gaboon  and  French  Congo  and  the  right  of  pre- 
emption of  Spanish  Guinea;  he  was  no  longer  certain 
as  to  whether  Germany  would  cede  both  Togo  and  the 
Bee  du  Canard.  In  fact,  German  public  opinion 
showed  itself  so  hostile  to  the  cession  of  Togoland 
that  in  the  next  interview,  August  9,  Herr  Kiderlen 
informed  M.  Cambon  this  offer  would  have  to  be  with- 
drawn, although  Germany  was  not  willing  to  abate  any 
of  her  demands.22  Other  interviews  on  the  13th,  14th 
and  17th  were  equally  unproductive  of  results.  As 
France  showed  herself  more  and  more  willing  to  make 
concessions,  Germany  became  more  insistent  in  her 
demands.  M.  Cambon  strove  valiantly  to  hold  his 
ground,  but  his  position  was  the  more  difficult  owing 
to  the  apparent  willingness  of  the  Quai  d'Orsay  to 
compromise  on  almost  any  basis.23  It  was  also  evident 
that  while  France  was  anxious  to  settle  the  Moroccan 
question  once  for  all,  Germany  was  inclined  to  disre- 
gard that  phase  of  the  matter,  her  whole  interest  was 

2i  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  480. 

22  Ibid.,  No.  494. 

23  M.  Jules  Cambon  himself  complained  that  he  had  to  keep  up  the 
fight  having  behind  him  those  who  would  not  have  been  sorry  to  see 
him  lose  it.     Tardieu,  op.  cit.,  p.  478. 


AGADIR  315 

centered  in  the  amount  of  French  territory  she  could 
obtain. 

The  attitude  of  Germany  had  now  become  so  intract- 
able that  negotiations  were  broken  off  and  M.  Cambon 
returned  to  Paris.  Whether  the  secret  negotiations 
carried  on  by  M.  Caillaux,  or  the  fact  that  a  serious 
railway  strike  held  the  attention  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment, gave  encouragement  to  the  German  pretentions, 
a  new  belligerency  of  attitude  was  apparent.  In  his 
last  despatch  before  quitting  the  German  capital,  dated 
August  20,  M.  Cambon  noted  the  increasing  exaspera- 
tion of  the  German  public.  All  the  political  parties  at 
the  approach  of  the  elections  had  commenced  to  sing: 
Deutschland  iiber  alles.  He  had  evidence  that  if  the 
negotiations  should  fail  completely — and  that  seemed 
very  possible — Germany  would  refuse  to  attend  a  con- 
ference, would  maintain  her  hold  on  Agadir  and  await 
developments.24  French  public  opinion  also  showed 
itself  weary  of  the  interminable  discussions  and  in- 
creasingly hostile  to  any  cession  of  the  valuable  Congo 
territory.  A  pathetic  letter  to  President  Fallieres 
from  the  Countess  de  Brazza,  widow  of  the  explorer 
Savorgnan  de  Brazza,  who  had  given  his  life  to  open 
the  Congo  region  to  the  French,  protesting  in  her  dead 
husband's  name  at  the  cession  of  any  part  of  the  French 
Congo  to  Germany,  added  fuel  to  the  flames  of  discon- 
tent.25 The  idea,  that  never  could  the  difficulties  with 
Germany  be  satisfactorily  settled  without  an  appeal  to 
arms  became  prevalent.  If  war  had  to  come,  one 
might  as  well  "en  finir  tout  de  suite."    It  was  under 

24  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  513. 

25  His  last  words  were  said  to  be:  "When  you  bury  me  here,  they  will 
not  dare  to  give  this  country  to  the  Germana." 


316  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

these  inauspicious  circumstances  that  M.  Cambon  re- 
turned to  Paris  August  21,  to  obtain  further  instruc- 
tions. 

2.     THE  FRENCH  OFFERS  AND  THE  FINAL  SETTLEMENT 

If  M-  Joseph  Caillaux  should  ever  write  his  memoirs 
— confessions  would  be  the  better  word — the  historian 
will  have  a  bird's-eye  view  of  a  large  part  of  the  seamy- 
side  of  French  politics  in  the  period  preceding  the  war, 
as  well  as  the  clue  to  many  of  the  traitorous  plans 
hatched  after  the  war  had  begun.  But  even  without 
this  primary  source  of  information,  it  is  not  difficult 
to  prove  that  while  M.  Cambon  was  struggling  vali- 
antly to  serve  his  country  in  Berlin,  and  M.  de  Selves 
was  doing  his  best  in  Paris,  the  Prime  Minister  was 
carrying  on  secret  negotiations  with  German  interests 
which  were  having  a  deadly  influence  upon  the  success 
of  the  French  position.  M.  Jenouvrier,  speaking  in 
the  Senate,  February  5, 1912,  went  so  far  as  to  declare 
that  M.  Caillaux,  in  conference  with  Baron  Gunzbourg, 
one  of  the  directors  of  the  Deutsche  Bank,  on  July  26, 
1911,  formulated  the  basis  of  a  Franco-German  entente 
for  the  settlement  not  only  of  African  but  also  of  Eu- 
ropean affairs.  This  program  promised  the  assistance 
of  France  in  the  Bagdad  Railway  enterprise,  permitted 
German  railway  stocks  and  German  rents  upon  the 
Bourse,  gave  Germany  the  presidency  of  the  surveil- 
lance of  the  Ottoman  debt,  offered  to  abandon  almost 
all  of  French  Congo  to  the  Alima  River,  and  established 
a  general  accord  between  France  and  Germany  for 
their  whole  European  policy.  As  proof  of  his  asser- 
tions, the  Senator  declared  that  an  aide-memoire  to  this 


AGADIB  317 

effect  was  at  present  in  the  archives  of  the  Foreign 
Office.  As  additional  proof,  he  stated  that  on  August 
19,  Baron  Lancken  presenting  himself  at  the  Quai 
d'Orsay,  was  much  disappointed  at  the  attitude  of  a 
high  functionary  who  discussed  the  situation  with  him, 
and  said :  "How  is  this !  What  you  say  to  me  does  not 
coincide  with  what  has  been  offered."  When  the 
French  official  declared  that  whoever  had  made  any 
other  offer  was  not  in  a  position  to  do  so,  the  German 
financier  replied:  "It  was  the  person  the  most  highly 
qualified. ' ' 2e 

M.  Caillaux  also  attempted  to  discourage  British  co- 
operation immediately  after  the  sending  of  the  Panther. 
Baron  Guillaume,  the  Belgian  minister  to  Paris,  writ- 
ing on  August  10,  1911,  made  the  following  report: 
4 'In  my  report  of  July  8th,  I  had  the  honor  to  tell  you 
that  according  to  my  information  at  that  time  it  seemed 
as  if  M.  Caillaux  were  regretting  that  he  had  insisted 
so  much  on  receiving  'the  word  of  command'  from 
London  in  order  to  determine  the  stand  to  be  taken  in 
face  of  the  despatch  of  a  German  man-of-war  to  Agadir, 
and  that  he  appeared  not  to  agree  with  the  attitude 
which  the  cabinet  of  St.  James'  took  at  that  time. 
This  information  seems  to  be  confirmed.  I  am  told 
that  at  first  England  proposed  to  France  that  the  two 
governments  despatch  without  delay  two  men-of-war 
each  to  the  waters  of  Agadir.  The  cabinet  of  Paris 
objected  to  this,  and  there  the  matter  stands. ' ' 27 

However,  in  the  conferences  in  Paris,  August  22,  in 
which  M.  Caillaux  and  M.  de  Selves  thought  it  best  to 

28  Annates  du  Senat,  Vol.  81i,  p.  164. 
27  Belgian  Doc,  No.  80. 


318  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

take  counsel  with  their  confreres,  and  in  which  both  M. 
Jules  and  M.  Paul  Cambon,  and  M.  Barrere,  French 
ambassador  to  Italy,  participated,  it  was  thought  best 
to  establish  first  of  all  the  situation  of  France  in  Mo- 
rocco as  far  as  Germany  was  concerned,  and  only  then 
to  discuss  the  Congo.  This  situation  must  be  a  full 
diplomatic,  military,  and  political  protectorate,  with 
the  capitulations  of  1880  abolished,  the  Accord  of  1909 
discarded,  and  with  the  provision  that  Germany  should 
intervene  with  the  Powers  signatory  of  the  Act  of 
Algeciras  to  obtain  their  adhesion  to  the  new  arrange- 
ments. In  return  France  was  willing  to  cut  her  equa- 
torial Congo  territory  so  as  to  give  Germany  access  to 
both  the  Ubangui  and  Congo  Rivers,  and  to  enlarge 
materially  the  hinterland  of  the  Cameroons,  also  to 
give  another  strip  running  from  the  Ngoko  to  the 
coast.  As  a  rectification  of  the  frontier,  the  Bee  du 
Canard  was  to  go  to  France.  The  terms  were  given 
to  M.  Cambon  in  writing  in  the  form  of  a  projet  de  con- 
vention, and  he  was  not  to  depart  from  them  without 
authorization  by  the  Cabinet.28 

The  negotiations  were  resumed  at  Berlin  September 
4,  and  Herr  Kiderlen  seemed  disposed  to  consent  to  the 
French  protectorate  in  principle ;  but  when  a  few  days 
later  he  presented  the  German  counter-project,  it  was 
found  to  contain,  in  the  words  of  M.  Cambon,  "  every 
precaution  against  us."  France  could  only  intervene 
at  the  Sultan's  request,  mixed  tribunals  were  de- 
manded, Germany  should  still  be  represented  by  a  min- 
ister to  Morocco,  and  along  economic  lines  such  a  list  of 
reservations  and  restrictions  were  included  that  the 

28  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  520  annexe. 


AGADIR  319 

result  amounted  to  internationalization  of  all  the  re- 
sources and  economic  possibilities.29  The  French 
Cabinet  discussed  the  project,  but  would  have  none  of 
it.  M.  Caillaux  attempted  to  concede  on  several  points 
in  opposition  to  M.  de  Selves,  but  the  Conseil  supported 
the  Foreign  Minister  in  his  contentions.  The  French 
reply  was  very  little  different  from  the  original  proj- 
ect. The  unsatisfactory  nature  of  the  proceedings  now 
began  to  have  a  serious  effect  upon  the  financial  situa- 
tion in  Germany,  and  the  10th  of  September  was  a 
"sinister  Saturday"  for  the  Berlin  banks.  Herr 
Kiderlen  finally  began  to  make  some  concessions,  and 
by  September  20,  an  agreement  was  virtually  reached 
as  regards  the  basis  of  settlement  for  Morocco;  but 
not  until  October  11,  after  five  successive  French  texts 
were  submitted  were  the  details  finally  agreed  upon. 
The  interpretative  letters  on  the  text  consumed  three 
days  more. 

The  Moroccan  question  was  finally  liquidated;  the 
question  of  the  territorial  compensation  to  be  sur- 
rendered to  Germany  as  the  price  of  her  political  dis- 
interestedness in  Morocco  remained.  The  latter  was 
bound  to  be  a  delicate  problem,  owing  to  the  highly 
excited  state  of  public  opinion  in  both  countries.  In 
addition,  there  was  a  strongly  organized  propaganda 
in  Germany  against  allowing  France  a  free  hand  in 
Morocco,  and  an  equally  strong  feeling  in  France 
against  giving  up  any  territory  in  the  French  Congo 
as  compensation  to  Germany  for  her  unsubstantial 
claims  in  Morocco.  M.  Jules  Cambon  wrote  from  Ber- 
lin, October  18,  that  a  campaign  against  the  cession  of 

2»  Ibid.,  No.  539,  annexe. 


320  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

German  rights  in  Morocco  for  the  Congo  was  being 
carried  on  in  the  Reichstag  and  regret  was  already 
being  felt  at  the  concessions  made.  The  next  day  he 
believed  that  public  opinion  would  willingly  accept  a 
rupture  of  negotiations  in  order  to  return  to  the  idea 
of  a  partition  in  Morocco.30  Opinion  in  France  had 
become  so  opposed  to  the  coupure  of  the  Congo  that 
even  the  Radical-Socialist  Congress,  held  early  in 
October,  demanded  that  the  government  maintain  the 
continuity  of  the  French  colonies  of  Gaboon  and  Cen- 
tral Africa.31 

At  first  no  progress  was  made.  Germany  insisted 
on  an  outlet  to  the  sea  and  a  territorial  approach  to  the 
Ubangui  and  Congo  Rivers,  while  France  refused  to 
consider  this  cutting  in  two  of  her  Congo  territory. 
A  compromise  was  finally  reached  whereby,  instead 
of  a  solid  stretch  of  territory  along  the  Ubangui  down 
to  the  Congo,  a  stretch  of  territory  in  the  shape  of  a 
lady's  high-heeled  boot  was  blocked  out,  with  the  toe 
on  the  Congo  and  the  heel  on  the  Ubangui — a  piqure 
instead  of  a  coupure.  On  October  26  it  appeared  as 
though  a  satisfactory  solution  had  been  reached  on  all 
questions  at  issue.  But  Germany  still  had  a  last  card 
to  play.  On  October  27  Herr  Kiderlen  raised  the  ques- 
tion of  the  French  right  of  preemption  over  the  Belgian 
Congo,  which  had  existed  ever  since  the  formation  of 
the   Congo  Free    State.32    The   French   Government 

so  Doc  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  Nos.  593,  596. 

si  Albin,  "Le  Coup  d'Agadir,"  p.  298. 

32  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  611.  Here  again  M.  Caillaux  without  con- 
sulting M.  de  Selves  had  attempted  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  the 
Belgian  Foreign  Minister  to  obtain  enough  territory  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Congo  to  assure  France  a  right  of  way  by  land  in  case  she  sur- 
rendered all  the  right  bank  to  Germany.     M.  Fondere,  M.   Caillaux's 


AGADIR  321 

could  not  accept  German  interference  with  this  right, 
but  the  attack  was  cleverly  met  by  a  promise  that  if 
any  changes  should  occur  in  the  Congo  Basin  as  defined 
by  the  Act  of  Berlin  of  1885,  the  Powers  signatory  of 
the  treaty  should  be  notified.  Germany  could  not  do 
otherwise  than  accept,  and  on  November  4,  the  accords, 
their  annexes  and  the  explanatory  letters  were  signed.33 
It  seems  unnecessary  to  give  a  detailed  analysis  of 
these  conventions,  which  finally  settled  the  Moroccan 
question  between  France  and  Germany,  but  a  statement 
of  the  most  essential  features  is  desirable.  In  the  con- 
vention concerning  Morocco,  France  was  granted  com- 
plete freedom  of  action  to  introduce  such  administra- 
tive, judicial,  economic,  financial,  and  military  reforms 
as  should  be  deemed  essential  for  the  good  government 
of  the  empire,  after  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  Moor- 
ish Government.  France  was  to  have  control  of  the 
diplomatic  and  consular  service  of  the  empire,  and  to 
represent  the  Sultan  in  all  his  dealings  with  foreign 
powers.  The  note  accompanying  this  convention  went 
so  far  as  to  state  that  "in  the  event  of  the  French 
Government  deeming  it  necessary  to  assume  the  pro- 
tectorate of  Morocco  the  Imperial  Government  would 
place  no  obstacle  in  the  way."  On  the  other  hand,  in 
the  economic  clauses  France  was  bound  to  maintain  the 
principle  of  commercial  liberty  in  Morocco ;  and  no  in- 
equality as  regards  customs'  duties,  taxes,  or  other  con- 
tributions was  to  be  permitted.  No  export  duty  should 
be  levied  on  iron  ore  exported  from  the  Moorish  ports, 

emissary,  was  informed  that  if  France  wished  to  discuss  the  question, 
Belgium  maintained  an  ambassador  at  Paris  for  that  purpose.     Albin, 
"Le  Coup  d'Agadir,"  p.  314. 
S3  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  644. 


322  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

and  all  contracts  for  works  and  materials  needed  in 
connection  with  any  future  concessions  for  roads,  rail- 
ways, harbors,  telegraphs,  etc.,  were  to  be  alloted  by 
the  Moorish  Government  in  accordance  with  the  rules 
of  adjudication.  It  was  further  agreed  that  the  rights 
and  proceedings  of  the  Morocco  State  Bank,  as  defined 
in  the  Algeciras  Act,  should  be  in  no  way  impeded.34 
To  sum  up  the  Moroccan  situation:  although  France 
did  not  succeed  in  obtaining  a  free  hand  in  Morocco 
economically,  she  did  have  in  her  hands  the  direction 
and  control  of  the  exploitation  and  concession  of  the 
great  enterprises;  while  from  the  political  standpoint 
"it  is  a  real  protectorate  that  we  obtain  and  not  a 
phantom  protectorate."35 

The  convention  in  regard  to  the  Congo  was  not  so 
satisfactory  to  France.  She  had  been  forced  to  cede  a 
tract  of  territory  comprising  over  100,000  square  miles, 
almost  one  half  of  her  Congo  colony.  Besides,  by 
granting  to  Germany  an  outlet  upon  the  Ubangui  and 
the  Congo  Rivers,  she  had  created  an  almost  impos- 
sible frontier.  The  great  stretch  of  territory  extend- 
ing south  from  Lake  Chad  to  the  Belgian  Congo,  and 
thence  west  to  the  Atlantic  was  now  cut  by  two  huge 
German  tentacles,  which  by  a  slow  advance  would  be 
able  to  strangle  the  French  colony.  The  small  tri- 
angle of  swampy  land  south  of  Lake  Chad,  known  as 
the  Bee  du  Canard,  ceded  by  Germany,  was  a  mere 
rectification  of  frontier.  In  the  words  of  M.  Hanotaux : 
"We  had  an  empire,  they  have  left  us  corridors."  89 

Now  that  the  conventions  had  been  signed  by  the  rep- 

84  Doc.  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  644,  annexe  I. 

ss  Tardieu,  "Le  mystere  d'Agadir,"  p.  564. 

36  Hanotaux,  "La  Politique  d'Equilibre,"  p.  391. 


AGADIR  323 

resentatives  of  the  two  Powers,  in  what  spirit  would 
they  be  ratified,  and  would  public  opinion  be  satisfied? 
The  Pan-Germans  had  looked  for  Morocco  and  had  re- 
ceived land  in  Equatorial  Africa  where  a  white  man 
could  scarcely  live.  They  had  looked  for  an  open  port 
on  the  Atlantic  and  had  received  a  river  side  village  on 
the  Congo.  France  had  lost  almost  half  of  the  colony 
which  the  valiant  de  Brazza  had  given  her  in  return 
for  the  right  to  pacify  the  savage  Berbers  and  open 
Morocco  to  the  world's  commerce. 

The  Reichstag  had  an  opportunity  to  express  its 
opinion  before  the  Chambre  des  Deputes.  In  the  ses- 
sion of  November  9,  Herr  von  Bethman-Hollweg  tried 
valiantly  to  prove  that  the  arrangement  was  satisfac- 
tory to  Germany  and  safeguarded  her  interests:  "I 
believe  that  by  thus  multiplying  the  regulations  we 
have  rendered  a  good  service  to  the  German  economic 
interests  in  Morocco.  .  .  .  Before  Fez  and  Agadir, 
Morocco  was  nominally  independent,  but  in  fact  already 
in  the  power  of  France.  But  what  is  the  actual  situa- 
tion? We  have  given  nothing  in  Morocco  which  we 
had  not  already  given  and  we  have  gained  a  great  in- 
crease in  our  colonial  domain."37  The  members  re- 
ceived his  assurances  with  mocking  laughter,  and  the 
Crown  Prince  manifested  his  displeasure  openly. 
Herr  von  Heydebrand,  the  leader  of  the  Conservatives, 
declared  that  Germany  ought  not  to  be  satisfied  with 
an  arrangement  which  imposed  upon  her  considerable 
sacrifices  without  giving  her  in  return  sufficient  com- 
pensation. France  had  come  off  well.  But  it  was  not 
by  concessions  that  peace  would  be  assured  but  by  the 

87  Le  Temps,  Nov.  10,  1911, 


324  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

German  sword.  Then,  referring  to  Great  Britain,  he 
continued:  "Like  a  flash  of  light  all  this  has  shown  to 
the  German  people  where  the  enemy  is.  Now  we  know 
when  we  wish  to  expand  in  the  world  and  have  our 
place  in  the  sun  who  it  is  that  pretends  to  universal 
domination.  .  .  .  Under  these  conditions  the  German 
people  will  know  how  to  give  a  German  reply."  88 

When  the  treaty  came  up  before  the  Chamber  for 
ratification,  December  14,  the  reception  was  equally 
hostile.  Here,  however,  the  diplomatic  methods  of  M. 
Caillaux  were  even  more  harshly  criticised  than  the 
conventions  themselves.  M.  Jules  Delahaye  declared 
that  M.  Caillaux  gave  evidence  of  a  more  open  spirit 
towards  the  conquerors  of  1870  than  towards  the  con- 
quered, "M.  Caillaux,  who  was  too  completely  involved 
in  the  questions  of  international  finance  which  were  for 
the  moment  dominated  by  German  interests."39  M. 
Denys  Cochin  gave  as  his  reasons  for  refusing  to  sign, 
the  three  reasons  that  Herr  von  Bethman-Hollweg  gave 
in  the  Reichstag:  Germany  abandoned  nothing,  ob- 
tained a  large  French  territory,  and  signed  a  treaty 
with  France  for  the  first  time  in  forty  years.40  M. 
Caillaux  made  a  specious  plea  in  defense  of  his  work 
and  he  was  ably  supported  by  MM.  Sembat  and  Jaures, 
who,  as  usual,  found  valid  reasons  for  the  German 
policy.  After  spending  a  week  criticising  the  arrange- 
ment, the  Chamber  ratified  it  as  was  expected  from  the 
beginning,  and  by  a  vote  of  three  hundred  and  ninety- 
three  to  thirty-six. 

The  Senate,  however,  was  not  so  easily  satisfied.    A 

ssQuea.  Dip.  et  Col.,  Dec.  1,  1911. 

39  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  95ii,  p.  1401. 

« Ibid.,  p.  1455. 


AGADIR  325 

special  commission  consisting  of  all  the  former  prime 
ministers  and  former  ministers  of  foreign  affairs  was 
appointed  to  investigate  the  underlying  causes  of  the 
crisis.  M.  Caillaux  was  called  before  the  commission, 
and  as  he  completed  his  testimony  by  swearing  upon 
his  honor  that  he  had  never  carried  on  any  political 
or  financial  transactions  of  any  sort  outside  of  the 
official  diplomatic  negotiations,  M.  Clemenceau  got  up 
and  addressing  himself  to  M.  de  Selves:  "Is  M.  le 
ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  able  to  confirm  this 
declaration!  Can  he  tell  us  whether  certain  documents 
do  not  exist  establishing  the  fact  that  our  representa- 
tive at  Berlin  complained  of  the  intrusion  of  certain 
persons  in  the  Franco-German  diplomatic  relations?" 
"Messieurs,"  replied  M.  de  Selves,  "I  have  always  had 
a  double  care :  the  truth  on  one  side  and  on  the  other 
the  duty  that  my  position  imposed  upon  me.  I  ask  per- 
mission not  to  reply  to  the  question  which  M.  Clemen- 
ceau has  just  addressed  to  me."41 

That  same  day  M.  de  Selves  handed  in  his  resigna- 
tion to  the  President  and  two  days  later  M.  Caillaux 
was  forced  to  follow  suit.  He  had  tried  in  vain  to  ob- 
tain any  one  to  serve  in  his  ministry  as  minister  of 
foreign  affairs.  It  was  with  a  feeling  of  intense  relief 
that  the  press  hailed  his  fall:  "The  occult  negotia- 
tions of  M.  Caillaux  would  have  resulted  in  the  dis- 
memberment of  the  French  African  Empire  without 
visible  compensation,  the  ruin  of  our  influence  in  the 
Levant,  a  rupture  with  Spain,  a  falling  out  with  Eng- 
land, and  the  subordination  of  French  policy  in  Europe 
to  Austro-German  interests.    We  can  understand  the 

4i  Albin,  "Le  Coup  d'Agadir,"  p.  327. 


326  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

regret  manifested  this  morning  by  the  newspapers  of 
Berlin  and  Vienna  at  the  fall  of  their  great  French 
Minister.  For  France  this  fall  is  the  end  of  a  night- 
mare."42 

In  its  report  the  Senatorial  commission  severely 
criticised  the  methods  employed  by  the  Government. 
Two  of  the  members,  MM.  Clemenceau  and  de  Lamar- 
zelle  voted  to  reject  the  agreement  entirely;  but  the 
majority,  against  their  personal  wishes,  voted  to  ac- 
cept it  as  the  only  way  to  terminate  the  Moroccan 
quarrel.  The  accord  came  up  for  discussion  in  the 
Senate  early  in  February,  and  the  senators  expressed 
in  no  uncertain  terms  their  feelings  on  the  whole 
transaction.  M.  Jenouvrier  scathingly  denounced  the 
Caillaux  methods  of  private  diplomacy;  M.  Pichon 
pointed  out  how  carefully  Germany's  economic  inter- 
ests were  protected  in  Morocco — she  took  back  with 
one  hand  what  she  gave  with  the  other ;  M.  Clemenceau, 
remained  bitterly  opposed  to  the  very  end.  ''These 
obscure  negotiations,"  declared  the  Tiger,  "have  led 
by  mysterious  phases  to  the  birth  of  a  sort  of  diplo- 
matic monster  which  is  not  without  likeness  to  that 
famous  Trojan  horse,  which  was  an  offering  to  peace, 
but  which  resounded  with  the  sound  of  arms." 48 

On  the  other  side  M.  Ribot,  although  condemning 
with  equal  force  the  methods  employed,  pointed  out 
that  Europe  was  weary  of  the  whole  affair,  and  it  was 
to  the  ultimate  interest  of  France  to  come  to  an  im- 
mediate settlement.  M.  Poincare,  in  a  brilliant  speech, 
took  the  same  position;  and  as  there  was  really  noth- 

42  Auguste  Gauvain  in  Le  Journal  des  Debats,  Jan.  11,  1912. 
«  Annales  du  S6nat,  Vol.  81i,  p.  272. 


AGADIE  327 

ing  left  to  do,  the  Senate  finally  approved  by  a  vote 
of  two  hundred  and  twenty-two  to  forty-eight,  "avec 
une  repugnance  publique  et  la  mort  dans  I'ame." 

3.     THE   SETTLEMENT  WITH  SPAIN 

It  will  be  remembered  that  early  in  June,  1911,  the 
Spaniards  had  taken  possession  of  both  El  Ksar  and 
Larache  in  flat  violation  of  the  secret  accord  of  1904, 
which  specified  that  Spain  would  only  undertake  mili- 
tary measures  in  Morocco  after  having  first  come  to 
an  agreement  upon  the  subject  with  France.  In  this 
case  the  disembarkment  had  taken  place  first  and 
then  M.  Cruppi  was  notified.  M.  Cruppi  protested  in 
a  friendly  but  vigorous  fashion  on  June  8  and  again 
on  June  ll.44  but  he  was  out  of  power  before  the  end 
of  the  month  and  on  July  1,  the  sending  of  the  Panther 
brought  on  the  crisis  with  Germany.  France  was  not 
equal  to  a  struggle  on  two  sides  at  the  same  time,  and 
no  attempt  was  made  to  come  to  a  definite  settlement 
with  Spain  until  after  an  arrangement  had  been  made 
with  Germany.  Hardly,  however,  had  the  treaty  of 
November  4,  1911,  been  signed,  before  the  ''Matin" 
published  the  secret  treaty  of  1904  between  France  and 
Spain.  The  realization  that,  after  a  four  months' 
struggle  with  Germany  to  obtain  a  free  hand  in  Mo- 
rocco, whose  successful  outcome  had  only  been 
achieved  by  the  surrender  of  a  large  stretch  of  French 
territory  in  the  Congo,  France  now  had  to  share  her 
newly  acquired  territory  with  Spain,  who  had  done 
nothing  to  assist  her  throughout  the  crisis,  provoked 
a  serious  outburst  of  public  opinion  against  submit- 

« Doc.  Dip.,  "Affaires  du  Maroc"  (1910-1912),  Nos.  361,  304. 


328  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ting  to  the  treaty.  Secret  diplomacy  and  its  dis- 
astrous results  came  in  for  a  bitter  arraignment  at 
the  hands  of  French  editors  and  publicists.  At  the 
same  time,  public  opinion  demanded  that  since  France 
had  made  all  the  sacrifices  to  secure  a  free  hand  in 
Morocco,  Spain  should  now  make  certain  concessions 
to  France  as  her  share  in  the  payment. 

The  Cabinet  of  Madrid  saw  the  matter  from  an  en- 
tirely different  standpoint.  In  their  eyes  it  was 
France  that  modified  the  status  quo  in  Morocco  by  her 
march  on  Fez,  and  by  so  doing  gave  Spain  the  same 
freedom  of  action  in  her  sphere  of  influence  as  France 
possessed  in  hers.  If  France  got  into  difficulties  with 
other  nations,  that  did  not  concern  Spain ; ' '  Spain  only 
recognized  the  treaty  of  1904.  This  treaty  by  which 
she  renounced  to  the  profit  of  France  a  part  of  her 
historic  pretensions  created  for  her  a  right.  She  had 
nothing  further  to  pay  because  she  made  use  of  this 
right."45 

Other  more  concrete  difficulties  also  arose  to  inter- 
fere with  a  speedy  and  satisfactory  settlement.  The 
lines  of  demarcation  traced  in  1904  were  now  found 
to  be  unsatisfactory  from  both  a  geographic  and  ethno- 
graphic standpoint.  The  policing  under  this  arrange- 
ment was  made  exceedingly  difficult.  Furthermore, 
the  terms  of  the  agreement  did  not  specify  what  rela- 
tions should  exist  between  the  two  protected  areas; 
the  Sultan's  sovereignty  and  the  territorial  integrity 
of  Morocco  must  be  respected  and  Spain  had  no  in- 
tention of  looking  up  to  France  as  the  Sultan's  prin- 
cipal adviser  in  questions  pertaining  to  her  own  sphere 

«  Tardieu,  "France  et  Espagne,"  Rev.  de  Deux  Mondes,  Dec.  1,  1912. 


AGADIR  329 

of  influence.  Nor  could  Spain  expect  to  have  full  sov- 
ereignty within  her  sphere  of  action  while  France  had 
only  a  protectorate  in  hers. 

The  French  opened  their  negotiations  with  Spain 
early  in  December,  1911.  The  principal  questions  to 
be  settled  were:  the  administration  of  the  Spanish 
zone,  especially  regarding  the  nature  and  extent  of  the 
Sultan's  control  over  this  region;  the  construction  and 
control  of  the  Tangier-Fez  railway,  a  part  of  which 
must  pass  through  the  Spanish  zone;  finally,  certain 
rectifications  of  frontier  which  would  enable  both 
countries  to  administer  their  zones  with  less  friction 
and  in  a  more  efficient  manner.  It  is  not  necessary 
to  go  into  the  long  and  arduous  negotiations  which  fol- 
lowed. New  difficulties  constantly  arose,  the  political 
status  of  Tangier  and  the  collection  of  customs  in  the 
Spanish  zone  proving  particularly  thorny  questions. 
The  Poincare  ministry  must  constantly  suffer  through 
the  latent  suspicion  inspired  in  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment by  the  remembrance  of  the  French  diplomatic 
methods  as  exhibited  by  M.  Caillaux.  Not  until  No- 
vember 27, 1912,  was  the  treaty  finally  signed.  It  was 
of  considerable  length  and  very  exact  in  its  details.46 

The  boundary  question  was  settled  by  certain  recti- 
fications of  frontier;  in  return  for  a  portion  of  the  Biff 
country  Spain  was  given  a  considerable  piece  of  terri- 
tory adjoining  her  colony  Rio  de  Oro  on  the  north. 
France  tried  hard  to  keep  one  suitable  seaport  on  the 
northern  coast,  the  Cap  de  l'Eau  in  particular,  and  as 
Spain  had  two  others,  the  desire  seemed  legitimate; 

46  Text  in  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.,  Dec.  16,  1912;  also  in  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari., 
Feb.  1913,  and  Martens,  "Recueil,"  3d  series,  Vol.  VII,  p.  323. 


330  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

but  Spain  refused  to  make  this  concession.  On  the 
political  side,  the  Sultan  maintained  his  civil  and  re- 
ligious authority  over  all  Morocco.  However,  in  the 
Spanish  zone  the  Sultan's  sovereignty  was  to  be  ex- 
ercised by  a  Khalifa  appointed  by  the  Sultan  from  two 
candidates  named  by  Spain.  France  and  Spain  were 
to  organize  the  courts,  which  would  thus  do  away  with 
exterritoriality  jurisdiction.  On  the  economic  side, 
the  collection  of  the  customs  was  the  most  difficult  to 
adjust;  but  it  was  finally  arranged  that  Spain  should 
administer  the  customs  in  her  zone,  but  each  year 
should  pay  over  to  the  Moroccan  Government  a  sum 
equivalent  to  the  receipts  obtained  the  preceding  year 
in  the  ports  of  the  Spanish  zone.  Provision  was  made 
for  the  settlement  of  the  position  of  Tangier  by  a  spe- 
cial commission,  and  a  protocol  provided  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  railway  from  Tangier  to  Fez,  sixty  per 
cent,  of  the  capital  to  be  subscribed  by  French  inter- 
ests, forty  per  cent,  by  Spain,  and  nine  of  the  fifteen 
members  of  the  Council  of  Administration  were  to  be 
French. 

The  chief  objection  raised  to  the  treaty  was  that 
it  gave  full  liberty  to  the  Spaniards  without  demand- 
ing from  them  corresponding  sacrifices;  also  that  it 
consecrated  the  principle  of  the  separation  of  Morocco 
into  two  distinct  states,  each  administering  affairs  in 
a  wholly  independent  fashion  and  attempting  to  main- 
tain artificial  frontiers  which  the  tribes  would  never 
respect.  Finally,  France  could  not  forget  that  Spain 
with  little  and  no  cession  of  territory,  had  gained  the 
same  control  over  her  sphere  of  influence  as  France 
had  gained  by  the  cession  of  over  a  hundred  thousand 


AGADIR  331 

square  miles  in  the  Congo,  and  only  after  a  war  scare 
that  might  well  have  developed  into  a  death  struggle. 

Both  the  Chamber  and  the  Senate  passed  the  treaty 
with  very  little  discussion.  The  Moroccan  question, 
primarily  one  of  colonial  policy,  had  already  for  too 
long  a  time  thrust  itself  forward  as  the  chief  stumbling 
block  to  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Quai  d'Orsay.  After 
paying  Germany  an  extortionate  price,  after  settling 
with  England  at  almost  her  own  terms,  after  even  con- 
ceding to  Italy  a  free  hand  in  Tripoli  as  the  price  of 
her  withdrawal  from  the  field,  France  could  hardly 
refuse  to  give  a  suitable  compensation  to  Spain,  who 
both  geographically  and  historically  possessed  the  most 
legitimate  claims  of  all.  Besides,  the  two  nations  still 
had  a  difficult  task  before  them;  the  Moroccan  ques- 
tion, within  Morocco  itself,  was  far  from  settled,  and 
a  friendly  cooperation  was  the  only  possible  basis  of 
a  successful  solution.  M.  Pichon,  once  more  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  happily  described  the  situation 
when  the  treaty  came  before  the  Senate,  March  29, 
1913:  "the  satisfactory  conclusion  of  the  negotiations 
have  resulted  in  assuring  the  collaboration  of  two 
governments  and  two  peoples  who  have  already  had 
so  many  reasons  to  come  to  an  understanding,  and  who 
have  henceforth  one  reason  more  to  unite  for  the  daily 
practice  of  a  policy  destined  to  guarantee  upon  the 
African  shore,  the  security,  the  well-being,  and  the 
prosperity  of  an  empire  of  the  future  in  which  they  are 
henceforth  equally  interested."47 

*t  Annates  de  S6nat,  Vol.  83i,  p.  484. 


CHAPTER  Xn 
TOWARDS  THE  WORLD  WAR 

1.     THE  MINISTRY  OP  M.  POINCARE* 

WITH  the  downfall  of  the  dangerous  Caillaux 
ministry  early  in  January,  1912,  came  a 
strong  revulsion  of  feeling  in  France  against  all  anti- 
patriotic,  anti-militarist,  and  defeatist  parties  and  pro- 
grams. A  political  house-cleaning  was  in  order,  and 
public  opinion  demanded  that  it  be  thorough.  Presi- 
dent Fallieres  invited  M.  Raymond  Poincare  to  form 
the  new  ministry,  and  a  glance  at  the  names  of  those 
who  agreed  to  associate  themselves  with  the  new 
premier  will  indicate  why  it  was  immediately  termed 
le  grand  minister e.  With  M.  Briand  as  minister  of 
justice,  M.  Millerand,  minister  of  war,  M.  Delcasse, 
minister  of  marine,  and  M.  Bourgeois,  minister  of  la- 
bor, M.  Poincare  had  a  nucleus  of  men  who  would  rank 
favorably  with  any  cabinet  which  has  directed  the  af- 
fairs of  the  Third  Republic.  M.  Poincare  himself  was 
a  type  of  man  whom  the  French  admire,  a  man  of  keen 
intellect,  highly  cultured,  a  member  of  the  French 
Academy,  of  rather  distant  bearing,  and  a  statesman 
rather  than  a  politician.  The  country  was  weary  of 
socialism  and  pacifism  and  was  prepared  to  return  to 
a  regime  of  nationalism.  The  Poincare  ministry  was 
eminently  fitted  to  furnish  the  right  leadership.  Eng- 
land, which  had  viewed  with  much  misgiving  the  at- 

332 


TOWAEDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  333 

titude  of  the  Caillaux  government,  noted  the  character 
of  the  new  cabinet  with  a  feeling  of  keen  satisfaction. 
The  " Daily  Chronicle"  declared  that  the  formation 
of  the  Poincare  cabinet  was  one  of  the  most  reassur- 
ing manifestations  which  the  history  of  contempo- 
raneous France  had  shown.1 

M.  Poincare  retained  the  portfolio  of  foreign  af- 
fairs in  the  new  ministry,  and  his  speech  to  the  Cham- 
ber was  eagerly  awaited  as  an  indication  of  his  atti- 
tude towards  the  recent  agreement  with  Germany. 
His  ministerial  declaration  did  not  disappoint. 
1 '  This  treaty  permits  the  maintenance  between  a  great 
neighboring  nation  and  France,  in  a  spirit  sincerely 
pacific,  of  relations  of  courtesy  and  frankness,  inspired 
by  the  mutual  respect  of  their  interests  and  their 
dignity.  As  ever,  we  intend  to  remain  faithful  to  our 
alliances  and  to  our  friendships.  We  shall  strive  to 
strengthen  them  with  that  perseverance  and  that  con- 
tinuity which  are  in  diplomatic  action  the  best  pledge 
of  uprightness  and  probity. ' '  2 

Now  that  France  had  a  ministry  well  fitted  to  deal 
with  any  emergency  that  might  arise,  she  was  destined 
to  have  a  rather  uneventful  year.  The  Italians  were 
still  waging  a  desultory  contest  with  Turkey  for  the 
possession  of  Tripoli,  and  immediately  after  the  new 
cabinet  was  installed  several  minor  disputes  arose  re- 
garding questions  of  international  law.  The  Italians 
had  seized  an  aeroplane  on  its  way  to  Tunis  claiming 
that  it  was  contraband  of  war;  they  had  also  stopped 
the  French  steamer  Manouba,  transporting  a  Turkish 

i  Daily  Chronicle,  Jan.  15,  1912. 

2  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  96i,  p.  22. 


334  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

sanitary  commission  to  Tunis,  taken  her  into  port  and 
seized  the  Turkish  subjects.  In  both  cases  Italy 
promptly  agreed  to  allow  the  Hague  tribunal  to  settle 
the  damages.3  With  Austria  openly  hostile  towards 
her  ally's  Libyan  venture  and  Germany  decidedly  an- 
tagonistic, Italy  could  not  afford  to  lose  the  good  will 
of  France. 

An  event  in  the  year  1912  which  should  have  aroused 
France  far  more  than  it  did  was  the  enormous  increase 
in  the  German  budget  for  both  army  and  navy. 
France  had  dared  to  stand  up  for  her  rights  at  Agadir ; 
Germany  immediately  decided  that  her  forces  needed 
to  be  increased.4  France  did  not  yet  seem  to  realize 
the  urgent  need  of  protection.  The  reduction  of  mili- 
tary service  from  three  years  to  two,  one  of  the  fruits 
of  Combism  which  had  been  carefully  preserved  by 
Jaures,  Sembat,  de  Constant  and  their  followers,  had 
placed  France  with  her  almost  stationary  population 
at  a  decided  disadvantage  as  compared  with  Ger- 
many.5 Yet  as  one  living  on  the  side  of  a  volcano 
grows  accustomed  to  the  constant  eruptions  of  smoke 
and  fire  and  often  forgets  the  lava  beneath,  France  had 
become  accustomed  to  the  military  preparations  and 
rattling  of  the  saber  of  her  neighbor  across  the  Vosges. 
She  failed  to  realize  that  nations  need  insurance  as 

8  Stowell  and  Munro,  "International  Cases,"  Vol.  I,  pp.  414,  453. 

*  A  law  of  1911  in  accordance  with  Germany's  regular  plan  of  in- 
creasing her  army  every  six  years  had  made  notable  increases,  but  this 
was  followed  by  the  law  of  May  10,  1912,  which  brought  her  effectives 
to  the  greatest  strength  since  1871.    See  Le  Temps,  May  12,  1912. 

s  M.  Driant  speaking  in  the  Chamber,  June  18,  1912,  pointed  out  that 
by  Oct.  1,  1912,  Germany  would  have  200,000  more  men  under  arms 
than  France.  The  two  year  law  gave  France  505,000  as  opposed  to 
Germany's  705,000.     Annales  d«  la  Chambrs,  Vol.  97,  p.  535. 


TOWAEDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  335 

well  as  individuals.  Individual  economy  had  made 
her  one  of  the  most  wealthy  nations  of  Europe,  but 
national  economy  on  the  war  and  naval  budgets  was 
not  the  best  means  to  guarantee  the  retention  of  that 
position.  Fortunately,  M.  Millerand  in  his  quiet,  ef- 
fective way,  was  bringing  the  forces  that  France  pos- 
sessed to  a  very  high  point  of  efficiency.  But  he  could 
not  remedy  the  fatal  defect  that  France  did  not  have 
enough  forces. 

An  incident  occurred  in  connection  with  the  visit 
which  M.  Poincare  made  to  St.  Petersburg  in  August 
of  this  year  which  might  well  have  been  recognized  as 
a  sinister  portent.  Both  in  going  and  returning  he 
encountered  German  cruisers  at  the  entrance  of  the 
Baltic,  and  they  ostentatiously  saluted  him.  If  the 
French  did  not  see  the  omen  in  it,  the  Germans  were 
willing  to  interpret  it  for  them.  The  "Lokal  An- 
zeiger"  said  on  the  subject:  "The  French  will  be 
perspicacious  enough  to  see  in  this  salute  a  warning 
which  should  resound  in  their  ears.  You  see  the  Ger- 
man fleet  at  its  port  in  the  Baltic.  It  rules  over  this 
sea  and  is  ready  for  any  contingency,  in  times  of  peace 
as  in  times  of  war.  The  Franco-Russian  Convention, 
whether  it  exists  in  actuality  or  whether  it  is  merely 
a  fantasy,  will  make  no  change  in  this  state  of  affairs. 
We,  too,  have  an  important  word  to  say  in  the  world's 
politics.    And  now,  bon  voyage."6 

Russia,  as  well  as  Great  Britain,  had  looked  with  a 
satisfied  eye  upon  the  apparent  change  in  French 
policy,  and  to  show  that  she  was  prepared  to  hold  up 

« Quoted,  Debidour,  "Histoire  Diplomatique  de  PEurope,"  ( 1904- 
1916),  p.  189. 


336  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

her  end  in  the  Triple  Entente,  she  had  made  a  very 
substantial  increase  in  her  naval  budget  for  1912. 
The  reception  of  M.  Poincare  was  rendered  even  the 
more  cordial,  if  possible,  by  the  announcement  just 
previous  to  his  arrival  of  a  new  naval  convention  be- 
tween the  two  Powers.  Apparently  all  lingering 
traces  of  the  coolness  which  had  developed  after  the 
famous  interview  of  Potsdam  between  the  Czar  and 
the  Kaiser  in  1910  had  completely  disappeared. 

Upon  his  return  M.  Poincare  learned  that  the  peace 
of  Europe  was  not  destined  to  live  out  the  year.  The 
Balkan  cauldron,  eternally  seething,  was  about  to 
boil  over  again.  Bulgaria,  Serbia,  and  Greece,  dis- 
appointed at  obtaining  no  improvement  in  their  con- 
dition under  the  Young  Turk  regime,  and  seeing 
Turkey  barely  holding  her  own  with  Italy,  quickly 
patched  up  their  differences  and  brought  on  war  be- 
fore the  European  Powers  could  attempt  to  settle  their 
demands  once  more  at  the  council  board.  They  were 
Weary  of  these  settlements,  which  with  the  Turk  meant 
no  settlement  at  all.  The  "sick  man  of  Europe,"  in- 
stead of  a  rejuvenation  at  the  hands  of  the  Young 
Turks,  had,  as  it  appeared,  received  a  coup  de  grace, 
and  the  Balkan  states  had  a  definite  opinion  as  to  the 
division  of  his  property.  The  Turks  appreciating  the 
danger  of  their  position,  quickly  signed  the  Treaty  of 
Ouchy  with  Italy  conceding  to  her  a  free  hand  in  Tri- 
poli. The  last  of  the  Barbary  states  had  come  under 
European  control,  and  Italy  took  her  place  with  France 
and  Spain  on  the  Mediterranean  shore  of  Africa.  To 
eliminate  any  possibility  of  future  difficulties,  Italy 
signed  an  agreement  of  friendly  accord  with  France, 


TOWARDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  337 

October  28,  confirming  their  agreements  of  1902,  out- 
lining their  mutual  spheres  of  influence  in  Morocco 
and  Tripoli,  and  granting  to  each  other  the  most 
favored  nation  clause  in  all  commercial  enterprises.7 

The  Balkan  situation  now  held  the  attention  of  the 
Powers,  and  in  a  speech  made  at  Nantes,  October  27, 
M.  Poincare  expressed  the  hope  that  an  accord  of  the 
great  Powers  in  regard  to  the  conflict  in  the  Balkans 
would  succeed  in  localizing  the  conflict  and  perhaps 
hasten  the  conclusion  of  peace.  Incidentally,  while 
again  affirming  the  pacific  sentiments  of  France,  he  in- 
sisted upon  the  need  of  a  strong  and  well  trained  army 
and  a  powerful  fleet,  that  they  might  face  calmly  any 
eventuality  which  might  arise.8  In  November,  at  the 
the  request  of  Russia,  M.  Poincare  sounded  the  Powers 
regarding  an  expression  of  territorial  disinterested- 
ness which  might  eventually  serve  as  a  basis  for  col- 
lective action.  The  plan  received  a  very  cold  recep- 
tion at  Vienna.9  Austria  insisted  that  she  desired 
no  territorial  aggrandizement  through  the  war,  but 
absolutely  refused  to  be  bound  by  any  official  agree- 
ment. She  continued  to  maintain  her  harsh  attitude 
towards  Serbia  by  demanding  the  creation  of  an  au- 
tonomous Albania,  thus  shutting  off  the  Slavic  state 
from  an  outlet  upon  the  Adriatic. 

Nor  was  this  plan  of  M.  Poincare  received  with 
unanimous  acclaim  at  home.  The  President  of  the 
Council  had  made  his  proposal  of  mediation  in  the 

7  Martens,  "Recueil,"  3d  Series,  Vol  VIII,  p.  144. 

s  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  Nov.  1912. 

» For  an  excellent  and  detailed  treatment  of  the  Balkan  diplomacy 
of  this  period  see  Larmeroux,  "La  Politique  Exterieure  de  l'Autriche- 
HongriS  (1875-1914),  Vol.  II,  pp.  234,  et  seq. 


338  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

closest  cooperation  with  Russia  and  Great  Britain; 
the  Balkan  states  were  unanimously  grateful  to  France 
for  taking  this  stand;  and  public  opinion  throughout 
France  approved  of  the  demarche;  yet  in  the  Palais 
Bourbon  there  was  a  strong  note  of  criticism.  The 
politicians  could  not  forget  that  a  presidential  elec- 
tion was  at  hand  and  that  M.  Poincare  was  the  strong- 
est candidate.  His  proposal  of  territorial  disinter- 
estedness was  claimed  to  be  a  personal  policy  to  thrust 
himself  forward  as  an  arbiter  in  the  destiny  of  Europe. 
1 '  That  he  failed  to  prevent  the  outbreak  of  war  in  the 
Balkans  was  a  personal  check.  His  diplomatic  suc- 
cesses are  pitilessly  changed  into  failures.  And  why 
all  this  if  you  please!  Simply  to  weaken  the  person- 
ality of  M.  Poincare  on  the  eve  of  the  presidential  elec- 
tion."10 It  seems  to  be  one  of  the  greatest  weak- 
nesses of  democracies  that  except  in  periods  of  crisis 
or  danger,  foreign  policy  is  ever  subject  to  the  control 
of  the  petty  politicians  who  measure  its  value  in  rela- 
tion to  the  votes  of  their  constituents. 

Even  secret  diplomacy  has  its  advantages  at  times, 
and  while  M.  Poincare  was  fighting  the  selfish  political 
interests  at  home,  M.  Paul  Cambon,  ambassador  to 
England,  was  exchanging  identic  notes  with  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey,  the  purport  of  which  was  to  define  more 
accurately  the  scope  of  the  Entente  Cordiale  in  case 
of  attack  by  a  third  power.  Sir  Edward  Grey's  note 
in  substance  declared  that  if  one  of  the  two  Govern- 
ments had  reason  to  fear  an  unprovoked  attack,  this 
Government  ought  to  discuss  immediately  with  the 
other  Government  whether  they  should  act  together 

ioCagniard,  "Politique  Nationale,"  p.  152. 


TOWARDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  339 

to  prevent  the  agression  and  maintain  peace,  and  to 
consider  measures  which  they  might  take  in  common. 
If  military  action  were  necessary,  the  plans  of  the  gen- 
eral staffs  of  each  country  should  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration and  the  Governments  would  then  decide  what 
effect  should  be  given  to  them.  M.  Cambon  accepted 
the  suggestion  in  toto  and  replied  immediately  to  this 
effect.11 

An  armistice  had  been  signed  late  in  November  be- 
tween Turkey  and  the  Balkan  states,  and  the  terms 
of  the  peace  were  to  be  settled  by  a  conference  in  Lon- 
don under  the  auspices  of  Great  Britain.  Both  Sir 
Edward  Grey  and  M.  Paul  Cambon  did  all  in  their 
power  to  moderate  the  exorbitant  demands  of  Turkey, 
and  early  in  January,  M.  Poincare  telegraphed  to  the 
French  ambassador  proposing  European  mediation. 
By  a  collective  note  to  the  Ottoman  Government  the 
Great  Powers  threatened  to  withdraw  all  moral  and 
financial  support  if  their  advice  was  not  taken.12  At 
the  same  time  that  the. representatives  of  the  Balkan 
states  and  Turkey  were  attempting  to  arrive  at  a  sat- 
isfactory basis  of  peace,  the  ambassadors  of  the  Pow- 
ers signatory  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  were  engaged  in 
an  unofficial  reunion  at  London  to  obtain  the  various 
points  of  view  with  the  idea  of  arriving  at  a  satisfac- 
tory and  permanent  solution  of  the  Balkan  problem. 
All  finally  agreed  upon  an  autonomous  Albania  which 
should  allow  Serbia  commercial  access  to  the  Adriatic. 
Austria  wished  Albania  to  be  as  large  as  possible,  and 

"Annates  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  103,  p.  909,  or  British  Blue  Book 
(1914),  No.  105,  inclosures. 
12  Larmeroux,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  p.  287. 


340  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

having  already  mobolized  almost  three-fourths  of  her 
armies,  was  inclined  to  be  arbitrary.  The  negotia- 
tions were  rendered  the  more  difficult  by  the  fact  that 
Austria  was  so  harassed  by  internal  troubles  and  by 
her  great  debt,  that  she  seemed  almost  willing  to  settle 
her  domestic  troubles  by  a  war  abroad.  Attempts  were 
made  by  the  German  and  Austrian  press  to  weaken  the 
friendship  of  France  and  Great  Britain  by  recalling 
the  methods  of  the  Caillaux  ministry,  but  M.  Poincare 
in  his  speech  before  the  Chamber,  December  21,  was 
able  to  assure  the  deputies  that  never  had  the  relations 
between  France  and  England  been  closer  and  more 
confident.  He  did  not  deign  to  reply  to  the  intrigu- 
ing politicians  who  were  attempting  to  weaken  their 
country  by  a  campaign  against  Great  Britain  with  the 
underlying  purpose  of  injuring  him.13  The  Chamber 
received  his  speech  with  great  applause,  and  in  its  edi- 
torial the  next  day  the  "Journal  des  Debats"  expressed 
the  popular  sentiment:  "At  the  moment  when  the 
year  ends  France  can  render  this  homage  to  M.  Poin- 
care, that  always  in  accord  with  our  allies  and  friends 
and  without  giving  cause  of  provocation  to  any  one 
he  has  consecrated  himself  within  the  limit  of  human 
forces  to  the  maintenance  of  general  peace  and  the 
grandeur  of  France. " 14 

With  M.  Poincare  as  the  leading  candidate  for  the 
presidency  in  January,  1913,  it  was  not  surprising 
that  more  than  usual  interest  was  manifested.  Or- 
dinarily a  presidential  election  in  France  causes  very 
little  excitement.    The  fact  that  the  chief  executive 

is  Annates  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  98ii,  p.  1340. 

I*  Gauvain,  "L'Europe  au  Jour  le  Jour,"  Vol.  IV,  p.  364. 


TOWARDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  341 

is  elected  by  parliament  rather  than  by  a  popular  vote, 
and  because  of  the  almost  negligible  power  left  in  the 
president's  hands  by  the  constitution  of  1875,  the 
French  presidential  election  is  of  far  less  interest  and 
importance  than  a  presidential  campaign  in  the  United 
States.  At  the  time  of  this  election,  however,  it  was 
hoped  that  M.  Poincare  might  raise  the  office  of  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic  into  a  position  of  real  power  and 
influence.  The  fear  that  he  might  do  this  very  thing 
lent  strength  to  the  Radical  opposition,  and  it  seemed 
willing  to  go  to  any  lengths  to  prevent  his  election. 
The  difference  between  M.  Pams,  to  whom  the  Rad- 
icals finally  threw  their  support,  and  whose  negative 
qualities  were  his  sole  recommendation  for  the  presi- 
dential office,  and  M.  Poincare,  universally  conceded 
to  be  one  of  the  few  great  Frenchmen  in  the  political 
arena  of  the  day,  showed  to  what  lengths  politics  were 
permitted  to  take  precedence  over  patriotism.  After 
a  bitter  struggle  M.  Poincare  won  on  the  fifth  ballot 
with  a  substantial  majority,  and  the  country  weary  of 
the  politics  of  the  arrondissementiers,  as  they  were 
called,  was  well  satisfied  with  the  result;  although  as 
one  of  the  Poincare  adherents  said,  "On  ne  pent  con- 
tenter  tout  le  monde — et  M.  Clemenceau." 

It  was  during  the  presidential  campaign,  and  while 
the  Powers  were  at  a  deadlock  in  London  concerning 
the  cession  of  Adrianople  and  the  final  disposal  of  the 
islands  of  the  Aegean,  that  the  French  legislative  as- 
sembly showed  its  utter  disregard  for  truly  efficient 
and  patriotic  service  by  forcing  the  resignation  of  M. 
Millerand,  one  of  the  ablest  ministers  of  war  who  had 
served  the  Third  Republic.    The  Radicals  of  the  Ex- 


342  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

treme  Left  made  a  violent  attack  upon  him  for  re- 
instating Lieutenant  Colonel  du  Paty  de  Clam,  one  of 
the  officers  who  had  played  a  leading  role  in  the  con- 
demnation of  Captain  Dreyfus  for  treason.  A  purely 
petty  internal  issue  completely  overshadowed  the  na- 
tional welfare,  though  France  little  realized  at  this 
time  the  need  that  she  had  for  the  services  of  a  Mil- 
lerand.  It  was  realized  across  the  Rhine,  and  a  French 
ambassador  wrote :  * '  The  day  that  M.  Millerand  gives 
up  his  portfolio  of  war  there  will  be  bonfires  in  Ber- 
lin.'' 

His  one  year's  service,  however,  had  brought  about 
the  reveil  de  Varmee  francaise;  its  progress  had  been 
wonderful  because  its  chief  had  set  it  a  wonderful  ex- 
ample. His  greatest  service  was  in  completely  wiping 
out  the  misunderstanding  which  had  existed  between 
France  and  her  army  ever  since  the  scandal  of  the 
Dreyfus  trial.  His  watchword  was  that  an  army  was 
an  implement  of  war,  and  as  such  should  always  be  on 
a  war  footing,  and  in  spite  of  constant  opposition  he 
had  practically  remade  the  French  army.  The  whole 
situation  is  well  stated  by  Gaston  Cagniard : 

''When  I  see  the  Radicals  attacking  the  Poinoare 
Cabinet  at  the  very  hour  when  it  was  making  every  ef- 
fort to  preserve  the  delicate  balance  of  European  peace, 
when  I  hear  them  disparage  the  work  of  military  re- 
organization to  which  the  Minister  of  War  has  devoted 
himself,  simply  because  M.  Millerand  has  resisted  in- 
admissible political  interference,  I  recall  an  occur- 
rence of  forty-five  years  ago.  Marshal  Niel  was  speak- 
ing of  reorganizing  the  French  army  and  demanded 
obligatory  military  service  for  all.    As  he  was  de- 


TOWARDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  343 

fending  his  program  in  the  tribune  of  the  Legislative 
Assembly,  Jules  Favre  cried  to  him  from  his  bench: 
'Are  you  going  to  turn  France  into  a  barracks?' 

"The  Marshal  replied  with  these  words:  'Beware 
lest  you  turn  it  into  a  cemetery. ' 

"  Three  years  later  human  hetacombs  confirmed  the 
prophecy,  and  our  country  paid  for  its  generous  illu- 
sions with  a  terrible  mutilation. ' ' 15 

Even  though  M.  Millerand's  resignation  was  a  ter- 
rible blow  to  the  patriots  who  felt  so  keenly  the  need 
of  national  defence,  his  work  was  not  in  vain,  and  the 
return  to  the  three  years'  service  which  was  to  come 
the  following  year,  may  be  traced  back  to  the  affection 
for  their  army  which  he  caused  to  glow  once  more  in 
the  hearts  of  the  French  people. 

2.     THE  AWAKENING 

A  glance  across  the  Rhine  was  all  that  was  necessary 
to  make  France  realize  the  dangerous  situation  in 
which  she  was  allowing  herself  to  be  placed.  Every 
six  years  Germany  had  been  increasing  her  army  by 
at  least  20,000  men,  and  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Franco- 
Russian  Alliance  she  had  made  an  increase  of  60,000. 
In  1905  there  was  an  increase  of  38,000 ;  an  increase  of 
11,000  in  1911  was  followed  the  very  next  year  by  an 
increase  of  29,000  men  and  8,000  officers.16  General 
Heeringen,  minister  of  war,  explaining  the  law  before 
the  Reichstag,  April  22, 1912,  gave  the  reasons :  "Be- 
tween last  year's  law  and  that  of  this  has  been  the  ex- 

is  "Politique  Nationale,"  p.  196. 

i«  For  a  complete  discussion  of  the  German  effectives  as  increased  by 
the  laws  of  1911  and  1912  see  Bourdon,  "The  German  Enigma,"  Chap. 
XII. 


344  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

perience  of  Agadir,  which  proved  our  increases  insuf- 
ficient. .  .  .  We  wish  to  fortify  our  national  defence 
and  above  all  to  acquire  a  greater  rapidity  in  the 
preparation  of  war. ' ' 17  In  1913  the  increase  of  1912 
was  doubled,  which  put  approximately  850,000  into 
actual  service  to  France's  531,000.  After  1913  there 
was  to  be  an  annual  increase  of  63,000  men.18  For 
France  there  was  but  one  solution,  and  that  was  the 
return  to  the  three  years'  service. 

President  Poincare  realized  the  situation,  and  in 
his  message  to  the  Chamber,  February  20,  1913,  he 
made  a  powerful  plea  for  preparedness:  "Peace  is 
not  decreed  by  the  desire  of  a  single  power.  It  is  pos- 
sible for  a  people  to  be  pacific  in  an  efficacious  way  only 
on  condition  that  they  be  ever  prepared  for  war.  A 
France  denuded,  exposed  by  its  own  fault  to  challenges 
or  to  humiliations,  would  be  France  no  longer.  It 
would  be  committing  a  crime  against  civilization  to  al- 
low our  country  to  fall  behind  in  the  midst  of  so  many 
nations  developing  ceaselessly  their  military  forces. 
Our  army  and  navy  are  the  most  useful  auxiliaries  of 
our  diplomacy.  Let  us  not  recoil  before  any  effort, 
before  any  sacrifice  to  consolidate  them  and  strengthen 
them."19 

One  of  the  first  official  acts  of  President  Poincare 
was  the  appointment  of  M.  Delcasse  as  ambassador  to 
St.  Petersburg.  Although  he  had  been  Minister  of 
Marine  in  the  Monis,  Caillaux,  and  Poincare  cabinets, 
M.  Delcasse 's  forte  lay  in  foreign  affairs,  and  now 
after  almost  eight  years  he  was  given  a  post  where  his 

it  Albin,  "D'Agadir  a  Serajevo,"  p.  16. 

is  Ibid.,  p.  25. 

is  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  99i,  p.  601. 


TOWARDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  345 

ability  would  have  ample  expression.  Ever  since  the 
Potsdam  interview  in  1910  there  had  been  a  slacken- 
ing of  the  bonds  of  the  Dual  Alliance,  and  it  was  felt 
that  no  one  was  better  able  to  strengthen  them  than 
M.  Delcasse.  Although  in  some  circles  the  appoint^ 
ment  was  looked  upon  as  an  act  of  bravado,  of  defiance 
to  Germany,  wiser  minds  saw  in  it  merely  a  part  of 
M.  Poincare's  program  to  strengthen  France.20  "It 
is  not  the  politician,  not  the  parlementarian  who  has 
been  appointed,  it  is  the  former  minister  of  foreign 
affairs,  the  statesman  who  for  seven  years  has  main- 
tained the  alliance  in  intimate  community  of  sentiments 
with  the  Czar  and  his  ministers,  who  accompanied  M. 
Loubet  to  St.  Petersberg  in  1902,  who  has  been  there 
twice  as  minister,  and  who  has  been  one  of  the  princi- 
pal authors  of  the  Anglo-Russian  rapprochement."  21 
Facing  the  enlargement  and  improvement  of  the  Ger- 
man military  machine,  and  the  troubled  European  situ- 
ation which  furnished  an  ever  ready  excuse  for  its  go- 
ing into  action,  France  had  good  reason  for  a  program 
of  national  defence. 

With  the  resignation  of  the  Poincare  cabinet  owing 
to  the  elevation  of  the  Prime  Minister  to  the  presi- 
dency, M.  Aristide  Briand  was  asked  to  form  the  new 
ministry.  One  of  the  first  tasks  presented  was  to  de- 
termine the  best  method  of  increasing  the  French  army 
to  meet  the  new  German  program.    The   Superior 

20  Baron  Guillaume,  the  Belgian  minister  at  Paris,  commenting  on 
this  appointment,  wrote:  "I  believe  that  M.  Poincarg,  the  Lorrainer, 
has  taken  pleasure  in  asserting  from  the  first  day  of  his  high  office 
his  strong  desire  to  take  a  firm  stand  and  to  upraise  the  flag  of  his 
country."     Belgian  Documents  (1905-1914)   No.  99. 

21  Gauvain,  "L'Europe  au  Jour  le  Jour,"  Vol.  V,  p.  37. 


346  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Council  of  War  discussed  the  problem  early  in  March 
and  finally  came  to  a  unanimous  conclusion  that  the 
only  solution  was  the  immediate  return  to  the  three 
years'  service.22  Two  days  later  M.  Briand  laid  be- 
fore the  Chamber  the  project  of  a  law  based  on  these 
recommendations.  France  must  be  protected  what- 
ever the  cost.  However,  the  question  of  electoral 
reform — the  change  from  the  scrutin  d'arrondisse- 
ment  or  election  on  a  small  district  basis,  to  the  scrutin 
de  liste  with  the  department  as  the  unit,  combined  with 
a  system  of  proportional  representation — still  held 
over  from  the  Poincare  ministry.  In  attempting  to 
put  the  law  which  the  Chamber  had  already  adopted 
through  the  Senate,  the  Briand  ministry  failed  to  se- 
cure a  majority  and  was  forced  to  resign.  The  Ger- 
man press,  which  had  attributed  the  reawakened  spirit 
of  the  French  people  in  their  desire  to  prepare  them- 
selves in  case  of  a  German  attack,  to  the  chauvinistic 
tendencies  of  the  Government,  noted  the  downfall  of 
the  Briand  ministry  with  unconcealed  satisfaction. 
Fortunately  for  France,  the  new  Barthou  cabinet  was 
equally  well  fitted  to  carry  out  the  excellent  policies 
of  MM.  Poincare  and  Briand.  M.  Etienne,  who  had 
drawn  up  the  pro  jet  for  the  three  years'  law,  retained 
the  portfolio  of  Minister  of  War,  and  M.  Pichon  once 
more  took  charge  of  the  Quai  d'Orsay.  In  his  minis- 
terial declaration  made  before  the  Chamber,  March 
25,  M.  Barthou  declared:  "The  recent  increase  of 
the  military  forces  of  other  peoples  imposed  upon  the 
preceding  cabinet  the  duty  of  submitting  to  you  the 
project  of  a  law  raising  to  three  years  the  duration  of 

22Albin,  "D'Agadir  a  Serajevo,"  p.  45. 


TOWARDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  347 

service,  equal  for  all.    Both  this  duty  and  this  project 
we  make  our  own. ' ' 23 

It  was  just  at  this  time  that  the  attention  of  Europe 
was  once  more  directed  to  the  Balkan  imbroglio.  The 
representatives  of  the  great  Powers  in  London  had 
caught  a  Tartar  in  the  person  of  King  Nicholas  of  Mon- 
tenegro. He  was  especially  set  on  capturing  Scutari 
and  had  been  besieging  it  since  the  beginning  of  the 
war.  Owing  to  the  bombardment  which  had  damaged 
her  consulate  at  Scutari,  Austria  demanded  the  right 
for  the  civil  population  to  withdraw,  and  the  Powers 
were  forced  to  ratify  the  demand.  Nicholas  granted 
an  armistice  of  fifty  hours;  but  the  Turkish  general, 
having  received  no  official  order,  refused  to  allow  the 
withdrawal,  and  the  Serbs  and  Montenegrins  resumed 
the  bombardment.  Austria  was  ready  to  take  violent 
measures,  and  if  Austria  went  to  war  it  was  almost 
certain  to  embroil  Europe.  King  Nicholas  might  have 
thoroughly  enjoyed  the  situation  if  the  fate  of  his 
kingdom  had  not  been  hanging  by  such  a  slender 
thread.  When  finally,  the  Montenegrins  captured 
Scutari  and  seemed  ready  to  hold  it,  Austria  insisted 
upon  a  naval  demonstration.  Russia,  whose  hostility 
to  Austria  had  been  fanned  to  a  fever  heat,  refused  to 
participate;  England  and  France  did  not  dare  allow 
Austria  to  go  in  alone.  Fortunately  for  all  concerned, 
Nicholas  himself  cut  the  Gordian  knot  by  withdrawing. 
The  Treaty  of  London,  signed  May  30,  1913,  arranged 
the  situation  temporarily,  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  felici- 
tated the  representatives  of  the  Balkan  states  in  his 
best  diplomatic  French  upon  the  happy  result.     Turkey 

28  Annates  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  99ii,  p.  1493. 


348  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

wisely  left  the  Albanian  question  for  Europe  to  set- 
tle. 

If  the  disturbed  condition  of  Europe  was  not  enough 
to  make  the  French  realize  that  it  was  time  to  put 
their  house  in  order,  the  series  of  troublesome  inci- 
dents on  the  German  frontier  ought  to  have  awakened 
them  to  action — a  frontier  which  since  1870  has  been 
the  Achilles  heel  of  France  with  the  Prussian  sword 
of  Damocles  ever  suspended.  In  the  words  of  a  bril- 
liant French  publicist:  " England  has  her  empire  of 
the  sea,  the  United  States  her  Monroe  Doctrine,  and 
France  her  Eastern  frontier.' '  On  April  3,  a  Zeppe- 
lin landed  on  French  territory  at  Luneville,  and  al- 
though the  French  government  allowed  the  occupants 
to  depart  after  an  examination,  the  German  govern- 
ment complained  that  the  French  authorities  had  acted 
in  a  suspicious  and  unfriendly  manner.  On  April  14, 
three  German  soldiers  from  Metz,  who  were  passing 
the  day  at  Nancy,  got  into  trouble  with  some  students 
in  a  wine  shop,  and  were  handled  rather  roughly.  It 
was  afterwards  proved  that  the  Germans  had  pro- 
voked the  quarrel,  but  Herr  von  Jagow,  speaking  in 
the  Reichstag,  took  the  opportunity  of  painting  a  vivid 
picture  of  French  chauvinism.  A  week  later  a  Ger- 
man military  biplane  from  Darmstadt  descended  at 
Arracourt,  five  miles  from  the  frontier.  The  aviators 
claimed  that  they  had  lost  their  way,  and  were  allowed 
to  return.  This  time  M.  Jules  Cambon  called  the  at- 
tention of  the  German  government  to  the  provocative 
nature  of  such  incidents.24 

24Viallate   et   Caudel,   "La   Vie   Politique  dans   les   Deux   Mondes" 
(1912-1913),  p.  50. 


TOWARDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  349 

These  occurrences  might  have  been  accidents,  but 
the  French  Government  had  been  receiving  secret  re- 
ports from  the  embassy,  the  consular  service,  and  other 
sources  in  Germany  of  a  more  serious  nature.  In 
every  possible  manner  the  Imperial  Government  was 
seeking  to  arouse  patriotic  sentiment  by  revising 
memories  of  the  victories  of  1813. 25  The  mere  rumor 
that  the  French  were  contemplating  a  return  to  the 
three  years'  military  service  caused  one  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Reichstag  to  say:  "It  is  a  provocation; 
we  shall  not  allow  it."  Lieutenant  Colonel  Serret  re- 
ported that  people  were  exceedingly  angry  that  France 
would  not  allow  herself  to  be  outdistanced.  This  sec- 
ond-rate power  had  withstood  them  in  1911  and  the 
Government  and  the  Emperor  gave  way.  "People  are 
determined  that  such  a  thing  shall  never  happen 
again."26  The  German  press  did  all  in  its  power  to 
stir  up  ill-feeling  between  the  two  countries,  the 
"Kolnische  Zeitung"  in  its  issue  of  March  10  predicted 
a  war  of  the  revanche  just  as  soon  as  France  felt  her- 
self able  to  force  it.27    In  his  speech  before  the  Reichs- 

25  Doc.  Dip.,  "La  Guerre  Europeenne"  (1914),  No.  1. 

26  Ibid.,  Enc.  1. 

27  In  its  much  talked  of  article  entitled :  "The  Enemy  of  Peace,"  this 
newspaper  declared:  "It  would  not  be  difficult  for  the  German  Govern- 
ment to  justify  the  necessity  of  the  new  law  if  it  should  merely  draw 
the  country's  attention  upon  the  nation  whence  the  peril  comes,  that  is 
to  say  France.  .  .  . 

"Never  have  relations  with  our  Western  neighbors  been  so  tense  as 
to-day,  never  has  the  thought  of  vengeance  shown  itself  in  so  undis- 
guised a  form,  and  never  has  it  been  so  obvious  that  the  Russian 
Alliance  and  the  friendship  of  England  have  been  claimed  only  for  the 
purpose  of  regaining  Alsace-Lorraine. 

"Wherever  the  storm  may  break,  one  thing  is  certain  and  sure — 
we  shall  have  to  cross  swords  with  France.  .  .  .  We  must  not  seek 
too  far  for  the  reasons  of  the  increase  of  our  army  ...  we  should 


350  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

tag  April  7,  Chancellor  von  Bethman-Hollweg,  in  or- 
der to  show  the  need  of  the  new  increase  in  the  army, 
painted  a  vivid  picture  of  the  Balkan  upheaval  and  the 
critical  state  of  European  peace.  He  showed  that 
although  the  relations  between  Germany  and  Russia 
were  still  friendly  the  Pan-Slavic  movement  which 
Bismarck  feared  had  been  strengthened  by  the  vic- 
tories in  the  Balkans.  Then  speaking  of  the  chauvinis- 
tic tendencies  exhibited  by  the  French  he  declared : 

.  .  .  "Across  the  Vosges  they  are  eulogizing  the 
French  army  in  comparison  with  ours.  They  boast  of 
the  superiority  of  the  French  artillery,  of  the  advance 
of  French  aviation,  of  the  better  education  of  the 
French  soldier.  .  .  .  With  their  ardent  temperaments 
the  French  have  seen  in  the  Turkish  defeats  of  Kirk- 
Kilisse  and  Lule-Burgas,  German  defeats,  victories  of 
French  instructors  over  German  instructors.  Already 
they  count  on  the  support  of  the  Balkan  states  and  on 
Alsace-Lorraine.  In  her  illusion  France  has  already 
won  the  war. ' ' 28 

Considering  the  fact  that  the  French  increases  for 
their  army  were  not  even  proposed  until  Germany  had 
made  hers  an  accomplished  fact,  this  criticism  of  the 
German  Chancellor  directed  at  French  chauvinism 
seemed  far  fetched;  and  considering  that  it  was  an 
official  utterance,  it  was  decidedly  unfriendly.  One 
searches  in  vain  among  French  official  utterances  at 
this  time  for  the  expression  of  similar  sentiments. 
However,  the  French  Government  was  receiving  secret 

plainly  point  to  the  West  and  with  outstretched  finger  indicate  where 
the  enemy  of  peace  sits — in  France."    Quoted  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.,  April  1, 
1913. 
28  Ibid.,  April  16,  1913. 


TOWARDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  351 

reports  of  a  far  more  alarming  nature  concerning  the 
German  intentions.  One  in  particular,  dated  April  2, 
and  received  by  M.  Etienne,  minister  of  war,  not  only 
gave  in  detail  the  various  methods  being  employed  to 
strengthen  the  German  army  as  rapidly  as  possible, 
but  also  included  a  statement  of  the  aims  of  the  Im- 
perial national  policy  which  was  extremely  enlighten- 
ing to  the  French.  A  few  excerpts  testify  to  the  real 
desire  of  official  Germany  for  peace : 

"We  must  allow  the  idea  to  sink  into  the  minds  of 
our  people  that  our  armaments  are  an  answer  to  the 
armaments  and  policy  of  the  French.29  We  must  so 
manage  matters  that  under  the  weight  of  powerful 
armaments,  considerable  sacrifices,  and  strained  polit- 
ical relations,  an  outbreak  should  be  considered  as  a 
relief.  .  .  .  We  must  not  be  anxious  about  the  fate  of 
our  colonies.  The  final  result  in  Europe  will  settle 
their  position.  On  the  other  hand  we  must  stir  up 
trouble  in  the  north  of  Africa  and  in  Russia.  ...  In 
the  next  European  war  it  will  also  be  necessary  that 
the  small  states  should  be  forced  to  follow  us  or  be 
subdued.  In  certain  conditions  their  armies  and  their 
strong  positions  can  be  rapidly  conquered  or  neu- 
tralized ;  this  would  probably  be  the  case  with  Belgium 

29  Baron  Beyens  substantiates  this  statement  as  follows:  "A  pass- 
word went  the  round  of  the  newspapers:  dates  were  to  be  confused, 
and  the  French  bill  was  to  be  represented  as  earlier  than  the  German. 
This  flagrant  lie  was  blazoned  abroad  by  the  whole  Press,  with  the 
exception  of  the  Socialist  organs,  as  a  damning  accusation  against 
France.  Dr.  Schieman  in  the  Kreuz  Zeitung  went  so  far  as  to  maintain 
that  the  three  years'  term  had  been  forced  upon  M.  Poincare-  by  the 
Czar,  during  the  visit  of  the  President  (then  Foreign  Minister)  to  St. 
Petersburg  in  the  previous  year.  It  was  the  price  exacted  by  Russia 
for  her  military  aid  and  for  the  upkeep  of  the  alliance."  "Germany 
Before  the  War,"  p.  260. 


352  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

and  Holland.  .  .  .  Our  aim  must  be  to  take  the  offen- 
sive from  the  first  days.  .  .  ." 30 

With  such  documents  in  its  possession,  it  is  hardly 
strange  that  the  Barthou  government  urged  the  legis- 
lators to  pass  immediately  the  law  for  a  return  to  the 
three  years'  service.  There  was  violent  opposition 
from  both  the  Radicals  and  the  Socialists.  M.  Jaures 
fought  the  proposal  in  the  Chamber,  and  his  organ, 
"L'Humanite,''  and  the  anarchistic  sheet  of  M.  Gus- 
tave  Herve,  "La  Guerre  Sociale,"  undoubtedly  did 
much  to  provoke  the  various  manifestations  which  oc- 
curred in  the  garrisons  of  Toul,  Belfort,  Macon,  and 
other  towns,  when  the  government  wisely  decided  to 
keep  under  colors  the  class  which  normally  would  be 
freed  in  the  autumn.31  M.  Caillaux  attacked  the  law 
savagely  at  a  Radical  Socialist  banquet.  But  the  most 
pitiable  sight  of  all  was  the  misguided  effort  of  the 
pacifist  Senator,  M.  d'Estournelles  de  Constant,  to 
tame  Prussian  militarism  by  international  idealism  and 
pacifism. 

The  National  Council  of  Switzerland  had  invited  the 
representatives  of  the  parliaments  of  France  and  Ger- 
many to  an  interparliamentary  conference  at  Berne 
"to  discuss  together  upon  the  neutral  soil  of  the  Hel- 
vetic Confederation  the  question  of  armaments,  and 
to  examine  by  what  ways  and  means  it  would  be  pos- 
sible to  bring  about  a  rapprochement  between  France 
and  Germany."32    M.  d'Estournelles  was  very  suc- 

30  Doc  Dip.,  op.  cit.,  No.  2,  enc.  II. 

si  The  law  of  1905  gave  the  government  this  power;  see  speech  of  M. 
Barthou  in  the  Chamber,  May  15,  1913.  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol. 
lOOi,  p.  106. 

32Albin,  "D'Agadir  a  Serajevo,"  p.  50. 


TOWAKDS  THE  WORLD  WAS  353 

cessful  at  recruiting  in  France  for  this  meeting,  and 
when  the  conference  opened,  May  11,  1913,  there  were 
191  members  of  the  French  legislative  body  present, 
167  deputies  and  24  senators.  M.  Bebel  apparently 
had  not  been  so  persuasive,  as  he  had  succeeded  in 
rounding  up  only  37  members  of  the  Reichstag.  This 
disparity,  however,  by  no  means  indicated  the  differ- 
ence or  relative  importance  of  the  representation  of 
the  two  countries ;  for  it  must  be  remembered  that  the 
French  delegates  were  men  who  held  the  destinies  of 
France  in  their  hands,  while  the  representatives  from 
the  Reichstag  had  no  more  power  or  influence  over  the 
Imperial  Government,  especially  in  its  conduct  of 
foreign  affairs,  than  the  humblest  burgher  of  the 
realm.  They  were  simply  members  of  the  official  Ger- 
man Debating  Society,  allowed  to  discuss  and  give 
their  opinion  on  the  affairs  of  the  empire,  but  their 
opinions  had  little  weight  if  they  conflicted  with  those 
of  the  Bundesrat  or  the  Imperial  Chancellor. 

The  Conference  heartily  approved  Mr.  Bryan's  pro- 
posals for  arbitration  treaties,  demanded  that  all  diffi- 
culties which  could  not  be  settled  by  diplomacy  be  re- 
ferred to  the  Hague,  and  expressed  the  hope  that  a 
rapprochement  between  France  and  Germany  would 
facilitate  an  entente  between  the  two  European  groups. 
M.  Vazeille,  one  of  the  French  Socialist  deputies,  whose 
views  on  internationalism  received  a  very  decided  set- 
back as  a  result  of  his  attendance,  thus  described  his 
impressions:  "It  was  a  day  of  miracles.  You  saw  an 
assembly  conducted  in  German  in  which  about  150 
Frenchmen  and  40  Germans  participated ;  you  saw  the 
French  who  are  usually  considered  loquacious  make 


354  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

one  speech  to  the  seven  or  eight  made  by  the  Germans ; 
you  saw  the  French  Socialists  entrusting  to  M.  Ricklin, 
President  of  the  Alsatian  Landtag,  the  burden  of  con- 
verting William  II  to  disarmament."83  Looking 
backwards  their  ideal  might  be  paraphrased:  "L'utopie 
est  le  reve  d'aujourd'hui  et  le  cauchemar  de  demain." 
France,  at  last  aroused,  determined  to  prepare,  and 
the  only  feasible,  sane,  or  even  possible  way,  was  to  go 
back  to  the  three  years'  military  service.  The  law 
came  before  the  Chamber  on  June  2,  and  on  the  very 
first  day  the  discussion  became  so  bitter  that  General 
Pau  threatened  to  leave  the  Chamber.  M.  Chautemps 
proved  that  a  sudden  attack  against  France  by  Ger- 
many was  impossible ;  34  M.  Thalamas,  who  was  to  gain 
everlasting  opprobrium  in  connection  with  the  Caillaux 
Affair,  declared  that  France  might  as  well  not  try — 
she  could  never  hope  to  rival  Germany  in  point  of 
numbers ; 35  when  he  saw  the  current  had  set  against 
anti-militarism,  M.  Jaures  was  ready  with  a  counter- 
proposal— to  substitute  a  militia  for  an  army.36  The 
law  was  brilliantly  defended  by  MM.  Reinach,  Lefevre, 
and  Benoist,  and  on  June  26,  M.  Barthou  intervened 
and  made  a  stirring  speech  to  the  Chamber,  urging 
them  to  forget  politics  and  think  of  national  duty — the 
time  demanded  it.37  After  almost  a  month  of  acrimo- 
nious debate,  the  measure  passed  the  Chamber,  July  19, 
by  a  vote  of  358  to  204,  and  M.  Caillaux  had  the  doubt- 
ful honor  of  delivering  the  last  attack.38     The  Senate 

33Debidour,  "Histoire  Diplomatique  de  l'Europe"  (1904-1916),  p.  218. 

34  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  lOOi,  p.  427. 

85  Ibid.,  p.  466. 

seAnnales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  lOOi,  p.  836. 

37  Ibid.,  p.  1139. 

»s  ibid.,  Vol.  lOOii,  p.  1859. 


TOWARDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  355 

was  more  awake  to  the  situation;  and  although  M. 
d'Estournelles  proclaimed  his  confidence  in  the  pacific 
solution  of  all  international  difficulties,39  the  law  passed 
on  August  7,  after  about  a  week's  discussion,  by  a  vote 
of  254  to  37.40 

In  the  summer  of  1913  the  attention  of  Europe  was 
turned  once  more  to  the  Balkans,  where  the  autono- 
mous Albania  and  the  sharing  of  Macedonia  had  taxed 
the  rivalries  too  greatly.  Bulgaria,  drunk  with  the 
pride  of  conquest  and  confident  of  her  ability  to  de- 
feat all  rivals,  suddenly  attacked  her  erstwhile  allies. 
She  soon  found  the  armies  of  the  Greeks  and  the 
Serbs  far  different  from  those  of  the  Turks,  and 
when  Roumania  also  came  in  against  her  she  was 
forced  to  sue  for  peace.  Turkey,  now  seeing  an  oppor- 
tunity for  a  share  in  the  booty  which  she  had  lost, 
seized  Adrianople.  The  Powers  once  more  intervened. 
Russia  seemed  willing  that  Bulgaria  should  retain 
Kavala,  but  France  sustained  the  claims  of  Greece; 
Austria  again  showed  herself  hostile  towards  Serbia 
and  insisted  upon  the  continuation  of  an  autonomous 
Albania.  The  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  signed  August  10, 
satisfied  nobody.  Bulgaria,  stripped  of  her  former 
gains,  nursed  a  bitter  resentment  which  needed  only 
the  slightest  opportunity  to  arouse  her  to  a  new  strug- 
gle. Austria  had  gone  so  far  as  to  propose  action 
against  Serbia  and  asked  the  assistance  of  Italy,  but 
the  latter,  declaring  that  a  casus  foederis  could  not  be 

39Annales  du  Senat,  Vol.  83ii,  p.  1560. 

■*o  The  law  provided  that  every  Frenchman  physically  ahle  must  serve 
in  the  active  army  3  years  and  in  the  reserve  11  years,  or  in  the  terri- 
torial army  7  years  and  in  the  territorial  reserve  7  years.  He  enters 
the  service  at  the  age  of  20. 


356  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

established,  refused.41  It  is  very  probable  that  Ger- 
many, who  was  not  yet  fully  prepared,  also  refused  to 
sustain  Austria  at  this  time.42  Again  in  October  Aus- 
tria attempted  to  force  the  issue  by  a  virtual  ultimatum 
to  Serbia,  demanding  the  withdrawal  of  her  troops 
from  the  Albanian  frontier,  and  once  more  peace  was 
purchased  at  the  price  of  Serbian  submission. 

With  the  end  of  the  second  Balkan  war  the  inter- 
national situation  became  somewhat  less  strained,  but 
the  tension  in  the  relations  between  France  and  Ger- 
many was  but  slightly  relaxed.  An  incident  which 
occurred  towards  the  close  of  1913  in  the  little  Alsatian 
town  of  Saverne  aroused  public  sentiment  in  France 
to  the  highest  pitch,  and  proved  that  although  the  spirit 
of  the  revanche  had  died  down,  so  long  as  Prussian 
methods  were  employed  in  the  lost  provinces,  the 
wrong  could  not  be  forgotten.  It  also  showed  how  the 
militarist  element  in  Germany  was  gaining  in  strength, 
how  futile  were  the  efforts  of  the  Reichstag  to  combat 
it,  and  how  utterly  impotent  that  body  was  when  it 
came  into  direct  opposition  to  the  military  party. 

A  young  German  lieutenant,  Baron  von  Forstner, 
quartered  at  Saverne,  angered  at  the  covert  hostility 
shown  by  the  Alsatian  population,  thus  expressed  him- 
self to  his  soldiers :  ' '  If  you  should  be  attacked  by  one 
of  the  Alsatian  dogs  {wackes)  I  hope  you  will  not 
hesitate  to  cut  open  his  hide.  I  myself  will  give  you 
ten  marks  for  every  one  that  you  stick."  43    When  his 

41 M.  Giolitti  brought  this  affair  to  light  in  his  declarations  before 
the  Italian  Chamber  Dec.  5,  1914.  For  the  text  see  Larmeroux,  "Pol. 
Exter.  de  1'Autriche-HongrieV'  Vol.  II,  p.  372. 

*2  Headlam,  "History  of  Twelve  Days,"  p.  5. 

43  Le  Temps,  Nov.  10,  1913. 


TOWARDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  357 

statement  was  noised  abroad,  he  was  hooted  at  in  the 
streets  and  did  not  dare  to  go  about  unattended.  On 
one  occasion  when  a  crowd  had  congregated,  his  su- 
perior officer,  Colonel  von  Reuter,  ordered  the  soldiers 
to  arrest  everyone  they  found  in  the  streets,  and  among 
those  arrested  were  several  German  judges  coming 
from  a  court  session.  On  another  occasion  von  Forst- 
ner  struck  with  his  sword  a  lame  shoemaker  who,  he 
claimed,  had  threatened  him.  The  inquest  showed  that 
the  man  was  unarmed  and  was  held  by  two  German 
soldiers  when  he  threatened  the  German  officer.  For 
once  the  Reichstag  was  aroused  and  demanded  punish- 
ment. When  the  Chancellor  refused,  a  vote  of  censure 
was  passed  by  a  majority  of  more  than  two  hundred. 
In  direct  defiance  of  their  attitude,  the  lieutenant  who 
had  been  given  forty-three  days  in  prison  for  wanton 
attack  on  the  shoemaker,  was  acquitted  on  appeal,  and 
Colonel  von  Reuter,  who  had  upheld  his  actions,  was 
not  only  absolved  from  blame  but  received  a  per- 
sonal letter  of  commendation  from  the  Crown 
Prince.44 

A  final  example  showing  the  change  in  the  attitude 
of  the  Kaiser  himself,  who  as  an  ardent  lover  of  peace 
had  for  his  valiant  efforts  in  that  direction  been 
awarded  the  Nobel  Peace  Prize,  is  given  in  a  despatch 
from  M.  Jules  Cambon  to  M.  Stephen  Pichon,  minister 
for  foreign  affairs,  November  22,  1913.  In  a  conver- 
sation between  King  Albert  of  Belgium  and  the  Kaiser, 
King  Albert  was  greatly  surprised  to  learn  that  Em- 
peror William  had  come  to  believe   that  war  with 

■**  Le  Temps,  Nov.  30,  Dec.  23,  1913.    See  also  Hazen,  "Alsace-Lorraine 
Under  German  Rule." 


358  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

France  was  inevitable,  and  in  such  a  contingency  the 
Kaiser  intimated  that  King  Albert  would  do  well  to 
remember  that  he  was  a  Colburg.  King  Albert's  reply 
does  him  credit:  "I  shall  remember  above  all  that  I 
am  a  Belgian."  ""What  would  you  do,"  the  Kaiser 
then  asked,  "if  my  troops  should  enter  Belgium?" 
The  reply  again  was  straightforward,  "I  should  do 
my  duty."45 

All  indications  pointed  the  same  way.  Europe  was 
not  large  enough  for  an  awakened,  patriotic  France, 
who  would  not  be  browbeaten  with  impunity,  and  a 
powerful,  imperialistic  Germany,  whose  needs  were 
outstripping  her  resources,  and  who  felt  that  she  had 
the  strength  to  obtain  what  she  wanted.  In  Germany 's 
eyes,  France  had  ceased  to  be  a  world  power,  and  if  she 
didn't  realize  the  fact  it  was  time  that  Germany 
brought  it  home  to  her.  An  Austrian  diplomat  speak- 
ing to  Prince  Lichnowsky,  aptly  summed  up  the  situa- 
tion: "Whenever  the  French  begin  to  forget  about 
revanche,  you  always  remind  them  of  it  with  a  jack- 
boot."46 

8.     RADICALISM  VS.  PATRIOTISM. 

Now  that  the  three  years'  service  law  had  been 
passed  and  the  crying  need  for  the  reorganization  of 
the  army  in  accordance  with  the  new  regime  shown  in 
so  many  ways,  one  might  have  supposed  that  the 
Barthou  Cabinet,  which  had  supported  the  change  and 
was  striving  valiantly  to  put  it  into  effect,  would  be 
retained.    But  the  two  deadly  influences  in  French 

♦s  Doc.   Dip.,  op.   cit.,  No.   6;    Debidour,   "Histoire   Diplomatique  de 
l'Europe"  (1904-1916),  p.  227. 

*«  Lichnowsky,  "My  Mission  to  London,"  1911-1914,  p.  2. 


TOWARDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  359 

politics  now  combined — M.  Jaures,  ''who  divided  Par- 
liament in  front  of  the  foreigner,"  and  M.  Caillaux, 
"who  almost  wrecked  French  foreign  policy," — and 
caused  the  downfall  of  the  Barthou  ministry  upon  a 
question  of  taxation  to  increase  the  budget  for  national 
defence.  The  editorial  in  the  ' '  Temps ' '  well  expressed 
the  feeling  in  the  capital:  "Yesterday  will  count  among 
the  most  deplorable  and  most  nefarious  that  we  have 
known ;  they  could  not  overthrow  the  Barthou  ministry 
while  it  was  endowing  France  with  a  stronger  army, 
but  they  have  caused  its  downfall  while  it  was  defend- 
ing with  a  noble  ardor  and  an  admirable  courage  our 
national  credit."  47 

The  vote  was  not  in  reality  upon  a  financial  ques- 
tion, but  an  insidious  revenge  against  those  who  were 
supporting  the  law  of  national  dignity  and  defence. 
The  headlines  of  "L'Humanite"  clearly  indicated  the 
real  issue :  La  Chute  du  ministere  des  trois  ans.  More 
illuminating  than  a  complete  perusal  of  the  "Journal 
Officiel"  was  the  cry  of  the  Socialist,  M.  Vaillant,  at 
the  fall  of  the  ministry: "A  has  les  trois  ans." 

President  Poincare  first  called  upon  M.  Ribot  to 
form  a  ministry,  and  then  upon  M.  Dupuy,  but  both 
failed  owing  to  strong  Radical  opposition.  Being 
forced  to  go  to  the  Radicals,  he  asked  M.  Doumergue, 
the  Radical-Socialist,  who  succeeded  in  forming  a  min- 
istry December  8.  The  new  premier  took  the  portfolio 
of  Foreign  Affairs;  M.  Caillaux  that  of  Finance;  M. 
Moulens,  that  of  War;  and  M.  Monis,  that  of  Navy. 
It  was  suggested  by  M.  Viviani  that  M.  Pichon  be  re- 
tained as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  as  he  had  both 

*7Le  Temps,  Dec.  4,  1913. 


360  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

experience  and  ability,  but  M.  Caillaux  could  not  forget 
M.  Pichon's  speech  in  the  Senate  after  the  crisis  of 
Agadir,  and  M.  Caillaux  was  the  predominating  influ- 
ence in  the  new  cabinet.  ,  M.  Raymond  Recouly  per- 
tinently remarked  that  it  might  be  possible  to  live  under 
such  constant  changes  of  government  in  an  isolated 
planet  or  a  separate  continent,  but  not  in  the  Europe 
of  to-day.48 

M.  Doumergue,  in  his  speech  to  the  Chamber,  prom- 
ised that  as  the  three  years'  service  had  been  voted,  it 
would  be  loyally  applied.49  Considering  that  his  party 
had  always  disapproved  of  the  law,  regarding  it  as  a 
purely  provisional  measure,  and  intended  to  make  it 
an  issue  in  the  coming  elections,  it  was  difficult  to  see 
how  a  loyal  application  was  possible.  M.  Briand  in  his 
speech  at  St.  Etienne,  which  was  widely  commented 
upon,  declared  that  among  the  very  people  who  fought 
against  the  law,  were  the  majority  of  those  whose 
politics  were  responsible  for  it. 

However,  to  prove  that  all  thought  of  "peace  on 
earth  and  good  will  toward  men"  had  not  disappeared, 
M.  d'Estournelles  de  Constant  came  out  in  the  Christ- 
mas number  of  the  " Frankfort  Gazette,"  declaring  that 

is  Rev.  Pol.  et  Pari.,  Jan.  1914,  p.  154.  Commandant  de  Thomasson, 
editor  of  Questions  Diplomatique  et  Coloniales,  was  more  outspoken 
in  his  condemnation:  "One  would  say  that  our  fatal  parliamentarians 
always  choose  the  moment  when  the  international  situation  is  par- 
ticularly troubled  to  overturn  ministries.  To-day  the  Barthou  ministry, 
the  fifty-fourth  that  the  Third  Republic,  more  famished  than  Saturn, 
has  devoured  in  forty-three  years,  falls  when  we  are  engaged  in  difficult 
negotiations  with  Germany  and  Italy,  when  Turkish  affairs  must  be 
followed  with  more  attention  than  ever,  and  when  the  incidents  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  give  evidence  of  a  danger  that  the  blind  alone  do  not 
see."     Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.,  Dec.  16,  1913. 

*»  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  101,  p.  696. 


TOWAEDS  THE  WORLD  WAB  361 

while  two  former  presidents  of  France,  M.  Loubet  and 
M.  Fallieres  had  each  in  his  turn  been  named  "le  pere 
de  la  paix,"  M.  Poincare  passed  in  Germany  for  a  parti- 
san of  the  revanche,  a  dictator,  the  creator  of  poincar- 
ism,  more  enlightened  but  more  dangerous  than  bou- 
langism.  He  explained  this  fact  by  pointing  out  that 
M.  Poincare,  being  a  native  of  Lorraine,  and  a  neighbor 
of  the  frontier,  could  not  help  urging  France  to  be  on 
guard.  But  M.  Poincare  was  too  intelligent  not  to 
know  that  the  revanche,  even  if  victorious,  was  a  leap 
in  the  dark  for  all  concerned.  In  conclusion  he  de- 
clared that  his  formula  had  long  been — "ni  revanche  ni 
oubli,"  and  M.  Poincare  might  well  adopt  it.50 

At  the  beginning  of  the  year  1914  two  influences 
were  becoming  more  and  more  evident,  the  one  tending 
to  weaken  the  Entente,  the  other  to  strengthen  the 
Triplice.  Although  it  was  the  treacherous  calm  which 
precedes  the  storm,  very  few  of  the  officials  of  the 
foreign  offices  or  publicists  in  the  nations  of  the  En- 
tente seemed  to  recognize  the  fact,  and  a  dangerous 
weakening  of  the  rather  lax  bands  of  the  Entente  pro- 
voked little  uneasiness.  Russia,  offended  at  the 
quiescent  attitude  of  France  and  England  over  the  Ger- 
man military  mission  to  Turkey  seemed  disinclined  to 
back  up  her  allies  in  the  Albanian  question  or  on  the 
return  of  the  Aegean  islands.  France  found  that  her 
relations  with  Italy  were  less  friendly  because  of  her 
support  of  Greece  in  the  question  of  the  Aegean  islands. 
Nor  had  Greece  seemed  over  grateful.  King  Con- 
stantine,  while  visiting  in  Berlin  in  the  fall  of  1913, 
declared  that  the  victories  of  the  Greek  army  were  to  a 

eo  Le  Temps,  Dec.  22,  1913. 


362  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

great  extent  due  to  the  excellent  training  which  the 
King  and  his  officers  had  received  in  Germany. 

On  the  other  hand  Lloyd  George  declared  that  Anglo- 
German  relations  were  never  better  and  the  Liberal 
party  must  put  a  limit  to  the  "  organized  insanity  of 
armaments."  Lord  Haldane  had  been  sent  over  in 
1912  at  the  request  of  the  Imperial  Government  to  dis- 
cuss a  closer  relation  between  Great  Britain  and  Ger- 
many. When,  however,  he  proposed  a  mutual  reduc- 
tion of  the  naval  budgets  he  was  met  by  a  counter 
proposal  of  absolute  neutrality  in  case  either  power  be- 
came engaged  in  war  with  a  third  party.  The  proposi- 
tion was  so  drawn  as  to  nullify  Great  Britain's  agree- 
ment with  France  and  Russia  while  it  in  no  way  af- 
fected the  treaties  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  Although  an 
agreement  in  this  form  was  impossible,  throughout  the 
following  year  and  a  half,  a  rapprochement  was  a  lead- 
ing topic  of  discussion  in  both  Chancellories.51 

The  internal  affairs  of  both  France  and  Great  Britain 
were  anything  but  favorable  to  a  successful  foreign 
policy.  The  Home  Rule  question  in  Great  Britain  was 
rapidly  approaching  a  crisis,  which  might  even  lead 
to  civil  war.  The  Ulsterites  openly  declared  them- 
selves ready  to  resist  the  Bill  by  armed  force  if  neces- 
sary, and  they  were  preparing  themselves  so  that  their 
resistance  would  not  be  futile.  France  was  wholly 
engrossed  in  the  strenuous  debates  on  the  income  tax, 
for  although  the  Prime  Minister,  M.  Doumergue,  was 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  everyone  knew  that 

5i  For  an  account  of  the  Haldane  missions  from  an  English  point  of 
view  see  Harold  Begbie,  "The  Vindication  of  Great  Britain,"  Chap. 
Ill;  for  the  German  viewpoint,  see  von  B«ventlow,  "Deutschland's 
Auswartige  Politik,"  3d  ed. 


TOWARDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  363 

he  was  merely  the  presiding  officer,  and  M.  Caillaux, 
Minister  of  Finances,  was  the  actual  director  of  the 
cabinet.  And  so  long  as  M.  Caillaux  was  the  real 
power  in  France,  a  loyal  application  of  the  three  years ' 
service  law  or  any  other  protective  measures  against 
Germany  were  not  to  be  hoped  for.52  Well  might  it  be 
declared  that  the  Triple  Entente,  "this  magnificent  in- 
strument of  diplomatic  action,  presented  a  veritable 
appearance  of  ataxia. ' ' 6S 

On  January  25, 1914,  the  ' '  Echo  de  Paris ' '  appeared 
with  the  sensational  report  that  the  great  Russian 
foundry,  Poutiloff,  which  manufactured  heavy  ord- 
nance in  accordance  with  designs  and  plans  from  the 
Creusot  factories  of  France,  had  arranged  with  the 
bankers  of  the  Krupp  establishments  for  a  loan  of 
twenty  million  roubles.  Such  a  report  galvanized  into 
action  even  the  Doumergue-Caillaux  cabinet.  It  soon 
developed  that  the  Russian  Government  knew  no  more 
about  the  affair  than  did  the  French,  and  the  officials  of 
the  two  governments  were  uncomfortably  busy  during 
the  next  few  days.  Finally,  on  March  19,  M. 
Doumergue  attempted  to  explain  the  whole  affair  to 
the  Chamber.  The  Poutiloff  plant  was  in  urgent  need 
of  a  loan  for  new  equipment,  and  a  representative  of 
the  Creusot  establishment  was  conducting  the  negotia- 

52  Baron  Guillaume,  the  Belgian  ambassador,  wrote  his  government  as 
follows:  "M.  Caillaux,  who  is  the  real  Prime  Minister,  is  known  for 
his  sentiments  in  favor  of  a  rapprochement  with  Germany.  .  .  .  This 
statesman  may  be  dangerous  for  the  finances  of  the  country;  he  may 
cause  divisions  which  are  unhealthy  and  regrettable  for  the  internal 
policy  of  France,  but  I  consider  that  his  stay  in  power  will  diminish 
the  acuteness  of  international  rivalries  and  will  furnish  a  better  basis 
for  the  relations  between  France  and  Germany."  Belgian  Doc.  (1905- 
1914),  No.  110. 

e«Le  Temps,  May  1,  1914. 


364  FEENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

tions  at  St.  Petersburg  when  he  was  suddenly  recalled 
by  the  death  of  his  mother.  In  his  absence  the*  Krupp 
bankers  made  an  offer  in  a  private  capacity.  Both 
Creusot  and  M.  Doumergue  had  been  notified  (his  nego- 
tiation had  come  two  days  after  the  article  had  ap- 
peared in  the  press  and  then  not  through  official  chan- 
nels), and  upon  receipt  of  a  communication  from  the 
Quai  d'Orsay,  the  Russian  Government  had  stepped 
in  and  had  so  arranged  the  situation  that  the  Freneh 
need  fear  no  further  competition  of  this  kind  on  the 
part  of  German  bankers.  The  newspapers  delved  a 
little  more  deeply  and  brought  to  light  the  fact  that 
the  director  of  the  Poutiloff  establishment  and  prac- 
tically the  whole  governing  personnel  were  Germans — 
a  new  phrase  of  pacific  penetration.54 

The  other  influence  becoming  more  and  more  evident 
was  the  chauvinistic  campaign  against  both  France  and 
Russia  waged  by  the  German  press.  To  furnish  addi- 
tional material  the  various  organizations  of  the  mili- 
tarist party,  the  Military  League,  the  Naval  League, 
and  the  Pan-German  Association,  sent  generals  and 
admirals  through  the  German  states  to  arouse  the  peo- 
ple to  the  necessity  for  more  heavy  military  and  naval 
expenditures,  that  they  might  be  better  prepared  for 
the  war  which  was  sure  to  come.  The  return  to  the 
three  years'  service  in  France  was  constantly  brought 
forward  to  prove  that  France  was  preparing  for  the 
revanche,  and  if  Germany  realized  that  war  was  neces- 
sary, it  would  be  foolhardy  not  to  strike  before  the  new 
regime  could  be  put  into  smooth  operation,  and  before 

54  Cf.  version  given  in  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.,  Feb.  16,  1914,  with  the 
speeches  of  M.  Thomas  and  M.  Doumergue  in  the  Chamber,  March  19. 
Annales,  Vol.  102iii,  p.  2039  ff. 


TOWAEDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  365 

the  extra  equipment  could  be  procured.  At  the  same 
time  that  the  newspapers  tried  to  arouse  the  German 
people  to  the  chauvinistic  attitude  of  the  French,  they 
attempted  to  disparage  the  possible  effect  of  the  law. 
With  Jaures  and  Augagneur  to  attack  openly,  with 
Caillaux  to  undermine  secretly,  and  with  the  Radical 
Socialists  in  power,  an  easy  German  victory  was  as- 
sured.   As  the  ' '  Lokal  Anzeiger ' '  declared  : 

"The  spontaneous,  the  heroic  movement  which 
caused  the  adoption  of  the  three  years'  law  was  in 
reality  mere  words.  Doubtless  the  majority  of  the 
deputies  believed  in  it  at  the  time,  but  to-day  more 
than  one  deputy  has  forgotten  his  own  language.  It  's 
a  question  for  each  one  of  being  re-elected  before  any- 
thing else — it  's  a  beautiful  subject,  politics."  55 

The  French  Foreign  Legion  seemed  to  be  the  object 
of  particular  hatred,  and  the  attacks  directed  against 
it  were  most  venomous.  A  League  against  the  Foreign 
Legion  was  formed  and  at  a  great  meeting  in  Berlin 
both  the  war  and  navy  departments  were  officially  rep- 
resented. A  pantomime  was  given,  called  ' '  Die  Wacht 
am  Rhein"  in  which  the  effigy  of  a  French  uniformed 
soldier  was  shot  by  German  sentries,  and  it  was  known 
to  the  audience  that  the  actors  were  in  reality  soldiers 
of  the  German  army.  The  scandal  was  so  great  that 
the  matter  was  brought  up  in  the  Reichstag;  but  no 
action  was  taken.56 

Certain  Frenchmen  were  not  blind  to  the  seriousness 
of  the  situation,  but  they  were  voices  crying  in  the 
wilderness.    The  Commandant  de  Thomasson,  editor 

55  Quoted  by  Le  Temps,  Feb.  26,  1914. 
66  Le  Temps,  May  1,  1914. 


366  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

of  one  of  the  sanest  and  best  informed  periodicals 
devoted  to  politics  in  Europe,  insistently  called  the 
attention  of  his  readers  to  the  feverish  condition  of 
Germany,  and  the  dangerous  influence  which  it  was 
exerting  on  the  peace  of  Europe.67  President  Poincare 
preached  preparedness  upon  all  occasions,  but  unfor- 
tunately, now  that  he  held  the  first  office  in  the  Repub- 
lic, his  words  lacked  the  force  which  they  had  when 
he  was  prime  minister.  M.  Andre  Cheradame  and  M. 
Victor  Berard  had  long  been  striving  valiantly  to  show 
the  danger  of  the  Pan-German  scheme  especially  in  its 
relation  to  Turkey  and  the  Bagdad  Railway.  Now 
after  many  years  of  earnest  effort  to  preserve  French 
interests  in  Asia  Minor,  they  saw  the  complete  an- 
nihilation of  their  hopes  in  the  Franco-German  ar- 
rangement of  February  15,  1914.  The  Doumergue- 
Caillaux  government  had  made  one  more  vain  conces- 
sion to  satisfy  the  insatiable  Welt-politik  of  their 
jealous  neighbors.  For  the  right  to  construct  public 
works  and  to  control  the  railways  and  ports  of  Syria 
and  Northern  Anatolia,  a  right  which  had  to  be  pur- 
chased again  from  the  Turkish  Government  by  a  loan 
of  eight  hundred  million  francs,  France  gave  up  all 
her  interests  in  the  Bagdad  Railway  and  allowed  her 
other  three  railways  in  Asia  Minor  to  be  completely 
isolated.58 

57  See  especially  his  excellent  editorial  on  the  currents  of  public 
opinion  in  Germany  and  his  deductions  from  them  in  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col., 
Feb.  1,  1914. 

ss  Le  Temps,  Feb.  17,  April  12;  see  also  Guyot,  "Causes  and  Conse- 
quences of  the  War,"  p.  177.  Baron  Beyens  writing  from  Berlin  to  the 
Belgian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  had  this  to  say  of  the  situation: 
"Doubtless  France  has  been  excluded  for  all  time  from  the  great  enter- 
prise of  the  Bagdad  Railway,  the  principal  line  which  will  trarerse 


TOWARDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  367 

The  unfortunate  feature  of  this  policy  of  peace  at 
any  price  was  its  utter  futility ;  it  was  positively  per- 
nicious in  its  tendency  to  inspire  false  hopes  of  secur- 
ity. Never  did  a  nation  give  clearer  evidences  of  its 
desire  to  live  at  peace  with  its  neighbors  than  did 
France  in  the  early  months  of  1914.  She  was  so  will- 
ing to  live  and  let  live  that  she  unwisely  attributed 
the  same  kindly  sentiments  to  the  rest  of  Europe.  M. 
Doumergue  in  his  speech  on  French  foreign  relations 
made  in  the  Chamber  March  10,  1914,  showed  clearly 
this  naive  confidence:  "We  cannot  close  our  eyes  to 
this  reality  that  everywhere  a  desire  and  need  for  peace 
is  shown,  and  we  can  well  hope  that  this  common  desire 
of  eliminating  the  causes  of  conflicts  will  end  by  pre- 
vailing over  the  elements  of  disorder.  France  had 
proved  her  sincere  desire  for  peace — she  nourishes  no 
hidden  designs — she  needs  peace  to  accomplish  her 
social  and  economic  reforms.  .  .  . ' ' 59  In  a  world  un- 
inhabited by  nations  seeking  a  place  in  the  sun,  where 
economic  and  racial  rivalries  did  not  exist,  his  ideal 
might  have  proved  a  valuable  foreign  policy,  but  not 
in  Europe  in  the  year  of  our  Lord,  1914. 

The  Caillaux  controlled  ministry  from  its  very  in- 
ception had  been  much  criticised  in  the  press,  but  M. 
Gaston  Calmette  of  the  "Figaro"  now  began  to  assail 
M.  Caillaux  in  a  continuous  campaign  of  carefully  docu- 
mented and  utterly  damning  evidences  of  political 
turpiture,  with  the  avowed  intention  of  forcing  his 
resignation.    When  he  gave  conclusive  evidence  that 

Asia  Minor  draining  it  of  its  products.  But  as  you  know  the  fault  is 
due  to  the  short-sighted  diplomacy  of  the  Quai  d'Orsay.  .  .  ."  Belgian 
Doc,  No.  111. 

59  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  102ii,  p.  1679. 


368  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

M.  Caillaux  had  used  his  official  position  to  put  off  the 
trial  of  a  swindler,  Rochette,  against  whom  there  was 
a  complete  case,  the  question  was  brought  up  in  the 
Chamber,  and  both  M.  Doumergue  and  M.  Jaures  were 
hard  pressed  to  defend  their  colleague.  When  M.  Cal- 
mette  promised  even  more  sensational  disclosures 
Mme.  Caillaux  went  to  the  editorial  rooms  of  the 
"Figaro"  and  shot  down  the  editor  in  cold  blood.  Not 
even  the  affair  of  Madame  Stendhal  had  aroused  such 
intense  interest  in  the  capital.  M.  Caillaux  was  forced 
to  resign  immediately  and  a  commission  of  investiga- 
tion was  appointed  to  go  to  the  bottom  of  the  whole 
affair  and  report  its  findings.  The  English  news- 
papers deplored  the  affair  but  were  very  guarded  in 
their  comments.  The  German  press  seemed  much  per- 
turbed lest  M.  Caillaux  might  lose  his  influence  and 
completely  disappear  from  the  political  arena  at  this 
most  inopportune  time,  with  the  elections  almost  at 
hand  and  the  fate  of  the  proper  enforcement  of  the 
three  years'  service  law  dependent  upon  them. 

The  report  of  the  investigating  commission  proved 
the  truth  of  M.  Calmette  's  allegations,  but  when  it  came 
to  adopting  the  report,  the  Chamber  had  one  of  the 
stormiest  scenes  in  its  history.  The  order  of  the  day 
which  was  finally  passed  showed  that  the  influence  of 
Caillaux  was  almost  as  strong  as  ever.  Instead  of  a 
stinging  rebuke,  the  order  simply  declared  that  the 
Chamber  taking  note  of  the  report  of  the  investigating 
committee  reproved  the  abusive  interventions  of 
finance  into  politics  and  politics  into  the  administration 
of  justice.  To  some  of  the  most  eminent  men  in  the 
Chamber  such  action  was  a  mere  travesty  of  justice. 


TOWARDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  369 

M.  Briand  deplored  the  conditions  of  parliamentary 
practice  which  had  so  degraded  French  public  life,  and 
M.  Maurice  Barres  declared  that  only  a  ministerial 
operation  could  cure  the  pourriture  parlementaire.*0 
One  of  the  inexplicable  phases  of  the  whole  situation 
was  the  fact  that  when  M.  Caillaux  decided  to  stand 
once  more  before  his  constituents  of  Mamers,  upon  a 
record  which  had  been  the  gossip  of  every  nook  and 
cranny  in  Europe,  he  was  reelected.  Well  might  a 
leading  French  publicist  write:  "It  is  especially  these 
detestable  internal  politics  forever  brewing  in  France, 
England  and  Russia  which  tempts  Germany  to  be  arro- 
gant."61 

The  French  had  barely  time  to  complete  their  gov- 
ernmental housecleaning  before  eminent  guests  were 
upon  them  in  the  persons  of  the  King  and  Queen  of 
England.  The  occasion  was  the  tenth  anniversary  of 
the  Entente  Cordiale,  and  a  retrospective  glance  at  the 
results  tended  to  increase  its  popularity.  France, 
with  her  exposed  frontier,  well  realized  that  her  safety 
was  bound  up  with  the  Entente.  The  remembrance 
of  England's  backing  at  Algeciras,  Casablanca,  and 
Agadir  was  still  fresh.  But  with  the  phenomenal 
increase  of  the  German  fleet,  England,  too,  had  cause 
to  be  thankful  that  she  no  longer  stood  isolated  on  her 
sea-girt  isle ;  she,  too,  could  remember  the  aid  of  France 
both  in  forming  and  preserving  the  accord  with  Russia. 
She  felt  that  as  the  Italian  and  Austrian  fleets  were 
increased  in  the  Meriterranean,  an  even  closer  agree- 
ment might  be  advantageous.    Great  Britain  might 

so  Annales  de  la  Chambre,  Vol.  102ii,  p.  2646,  et  seq. 
ei  De  Thomasson,  Ques.  Dip.  et  Col.,  June  1,  1914. 


370  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

soon  need  the  larger  part  of  her  fleet  in  the  North  Sea 
if  the  Kaiser  continued  to  think  that  Germany's  future 
lay  upon  the  ocean. 

The  wild  enthusiasm  displayed  in  Paris  at  the  arrival 
of  the  sovereigns  was  unique,  even  in  that  foyer  of 
excitement.  As  they  drove  into  the  city  under  the  Arc 
de  Triomphe,  and  passed  down  the  Champs  Elysees, 
they  found  almost  the  entire  population  waiting  to  bid 
them  welcome.  The  warmth  of  the  reception,  and  the 
marked  friendliness  and  desire  to  please  shown  by  the 
whole  nation  must  have  warmed  the  heart  of  Queen 
Mary  herself.  The  German  press  did  not  allow  the 
event  to  pass  without  a  few  covert  sneers.  The 
"Kolnische  Zeitung"  thus  expressed  the  German  senti- 
ment: "We  hardly  expected  that  the  toasts  would  be 
so  insignificant,  composed  of  such  stereotyped  banali- 
ties upon  the  pacific  influence  of  the  Entente  Cordiale. 
This  insignificance  is  the  more  surprising  after  the 
floods  of  ink  spilt  in  the  recent  press  campaign  favoring 
a  strengthening  of  the  alliance.  We  may  say  like 
Cholchas  in  'la  Belle  Helene':  'Des  fleurs,  rien  que  les 
fleurs/  and  yet  we  must  add  that  they  are  faded  flowers 
which  have  served  already  many  times  before. ' ' 62 

The  Kaiser  could  comfort  himself  with  the  knowl- 
edge that  the  internal  policy  of  a  state  always  reacts 
powerfully  upon  its  foreign  policy.  While  he  held  the 
internal  policy  of  Germany  in  his  mailed  fist,  both 
France  and  Great  Britain  were  struggling  in  the  throes 
of  domestic  ailments  which  were  bound  to  weaken  them 
to  his  advantage.  In  fact  the  interest  in  the  spring 
elections  in  France  was  so  great  that  even  the  Caillaux 

•2  Quoted  by  Le  Temps,  Apr.  24,  1914. 


TOWARDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  371 

affair  had  lost  its  hold  on  the  public.  Three  mooted 
questions  were  to  be  decided:  the  maintenance  of  the 
three  years'  service  law,  electoral  reform,  and  the  in- 
come tax.  When  the  results  were  in,  no  one  was  en- 
tirely satisfied;  the  three  years'  law  had  a  slight  ma- 
jority, the  electoral  reform  a  substantial  majority, 
while  the  deputies  were  about  evenly  divided  on  the 
income  tax.  "The  only  inference  that  could  be  drawn 
from  the  election  of  1914  was  that  under  the  present 
electoral  system,  Radical  prefects,  guided  by  a  Radical 
cabinet,  were  seen  to  return  a  Radical  majority."  63 

The  Radicals  were  clearly  in  the  majority  and  the 
Socialists  had  increased  their  number.  The  Caillaux- 
Jaures  bloc  was  still  powerful,  but  hardly  strong 
enough  to  prevent  the  application  of  the  three  years' 
service  law.  The  opinion  of  Great  Britain  and  Russia 
as  shown  in  the  press  was  that  France  was  playing 
with  fire,  and  that  it  was  a  dangerous  game.  The 
German  press  seemed  confident  that  from  a  financial 
and  political  standpoint  a  return  to  the  service  of  two 
years  was  essential.  President  Poincare,  in  a  speech 
at  Rennes,  on  the  last  day  of  May,  declared  that  France 
must  have  a  large  army  well  prepared,  or  be  exposed 
to  accept  foreign  domination.  There  was  no  middle 
ground.64 

But  before  the  Chamber  could  finally  settle  down  to 
sane  and  patriotic  service  it  had  to  give  a  final  exhibi- 
tion of  ridiculous  and  criminal  perversity.  At  the 
resignation  of  M.  Doumergue,  President  Poincare 
called  upon  M.  Viviani  to  form  a  cabinet.      But  at  the 

63  Dimmet,  "France  Herself  Again,"  p.  167. 
e*Le  Temps,  June  1,  1914. 


372  FEENCH  FOEEIGN  POLICY 

first  meeting  the  Eadical-Socialist  element  protested 
so  strongly  against  the  maintenance  of  the  three  years* 
service  law  which  he  insisted  upon  putting  in  his  pro- 
gram, that  he  gave  up  the  attempt.  MM.  Deschanel, 
Delcasse,  Dupuy,  and  Petral  refused  to  try.  M.  Eibot 
finally  formed  a  cabinet,  but  the  hostility  of  the  Cham- 
ber was  evident  and  the  very  first  vote  of  confidence 
was  lost.  The  German  press  openly  exulted  at  the 
situation,  predicting  an  utter  failure  of  the  three  years ' 
law.  The  Paris  press  bombarded  the  deputies  with 
denunciation  and  satire.  It  finally  seemed  to  seep  into 
the  minds  of  these  representatives  of  France  that  they 
were  losing  both  the  confidence  and  respect  of  their 
allies  and  were  playing  directly  into  Germany's  hands. 
When  M.  Viviani  was  again  called  in  he  had  little 
difficulty  in  forming  the  cabinet  or  in  carrying  through 
his  plan  for  the  loan  and  income  tax,  and  giving  a  loyal 
application  to  the  three  years'  service  law. 

Fortunate  it  was  that  a  realization  of  the  situation 
had  at  last  come,  for  events  which  were  to  involve  all 
Europe  in  their  train  were  shaping  themselves  with  in- 
creasing rapidity.  While  SazanofF  was  declaring  to 
the  Douma  that  "the  Triple  Entente  is  entirely  free 
from  any  spirit  of  aggression,  and  its  end  is  solely  to 
contribute  to  the  conservation  of  the  European  balance 
of  power  and  is  always  ready  to  cooperate  with  the 
Triple  Alliance  to  preserve  peace,"  the  Kaiser  was  pre- 
paring to  open  the  Kiel  Canal,  enlarged  for  the  passage 
of  his  largest  cruisers, — the  final  event  which  completed 
his  preparations  for  der  Tag.  Less  than  a  week  later 
the  murder  of  Archduke  Ferdinand  raised  the  curtain 
on  the  bloody  drama  for  which  the  whole  world  has  be- 


TOWAKDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  373 

come  the  stage.  The  drama  is  not  yet  played  out.  To 
satisfy  the  imperialistic  ambitions  of  a  Caesar  and  the 
vainglorious  dreams  of  a  deluded  people,  whole  nations 
have  had  their  Calvary,  and  a  century  will  hardly  suf- 
fice to  heal  the  wounds  of  a  stricken  world. 

4.     CONCLUSION 

With  the  crime  at  Serajevo  a  new  period  of  French 
foreign  policy  began — a  period  in  which  the  nations  of 
Europe  seemed  to  lose  their  individual  liberty  and  be- 
come mere  pawns  on  the  chess-board  of  Fate.  Drawn 
up  in  two  great  armed  camps,  the  time  to  play  for  world 
dominion  had  come,  and  Germany  intended  that  the 
game  should  be  played  through  to  the  end.  France 
did  not  want  war ;  she  was  willing  to  make  almost  any 
sacrifice  to  avert  it.  Great  Britain  desired  peace  and 
was  ready  to  do  all  in  her  power  to  maintain  it.  But 
in  a  balance  of  power  one  group  is  helpless  to  maintain 
the  equilibrium.  The  foreign  ministers  of  the  nations 
desirous  of  peace  had  become  mere  puppets,  forced  to 
perform  in  the  dance  of  death  when  the  Kaiser  pulled 
the  strings.  French  diplomacy  was  an  integral  part  of 
the  diplomacy  of  the  Entente,  and  the  diplomacy  of  the 
Entente  could  but  react  to  the  diplomacy  of  the  Triple 
Alliance.  Therefore  in  attempting  to  form  any  con- 
clusions upon  the  subject  of  contemporaneous  French 
foreign  policy,  it  seems  more  essential  to  consider  the 
vital  period  preceding  the  assassination  of  Duke  Ferdi- 
nand when  the  policy  of  France  was  clearly  distinctive, 
than  the  period  when  the  Third  Republic  was  striving 
courageously  but  vainly  in  conjunction  with  her  allies 
to  avert  the  struggle  which  Germany  was  determined  to 


374  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

precipitate.  It  is  this  period,  extending  from  the  en- 
trance of  M.  Delcasse  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay  in  June,  1898, 
when  the  new  orientation  of  French  foreign  policy  in 
the  direction  of  Great  Britain  began,  up  to  the  murder 
of  the  Austrian  Archduke  in  June,  1914,  when  the  result 
of  this  policy  was  the  immediate  and  effective  support 
of  France  by  Great  Britain  and  Russia,  enabling  her 
to  stem  the  onrush  of  the  Teuton  host  and  to  emerge 
finally  victorious,  which  we  have  attempted  to  portray. 
France  undoubtedly  owes  her  present  paramount  po- 
sition in  Europe,  as  established  by  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles, in  a  great  measure  to  the  strong  friendships 
which  she  made  and  retained  in  the  decade  immediately 
preceding  the  Great  War,  and  to  that  extent  her  foreign 
policy  may  be  regarded  as  brilliantly  successful.  On 
the  other  hand  it  must  be  conceded  that  this  result  was 
obtained  in  spite  of  the  wishes  of  many  representative 
French  politicians  rather  than  by  the  consistent  efforts 
of  a  united  majority.  The  two  greatest  faults  of 
French  foreign  policy  seem  to  be  the  inability  of  the 
French  Foreign  Office  to  divorce  itself  from  the  influ- 
ence of  purely  domestic  questions,  and  the  complete 
impotence  of  the  President  in  matters  of  foreign  policy, 
although  his  position  is  particularly  suited  to  exercise 
a  beneficial  influence  in  matter  of  diplomacy  and 
foreign  relations.  As  an  instance  of  the  first,  we  need 
only  recall  the  unfortunate  influence  which  the  contro- 
versies over  the  relations  of  the  church  and  the  state 
have  had  on  the  foreign  policy  of  France;  a  striking 
example  of  the  second,  was  the  unimportant  part  which 
President  Poincare  was  forced  to  play  in  the  greatest 
crisis  of  French  history. 


TOWAEDS  THE  WORLD  WAR  375 

But  in  contrast  with  these  weaknesses  it  must  be 
noted  that  the  Third  Republic  has  for  the  most  part 
been  very  careful  in  the  choice  of  her  ministers  of 
foreign  affairs.  With  such  statesmen  as  Hanotaux, 
Delcasse,  Bourgeois,  Poincare  and  Pichon  in  charge  of 
the  Quai  d'Orsay,  it  is  not  surprising  that  results  have 
been  extremely  satisfactory.  Furthermore,  although 
it  seems  as  though  Frenchmen  will  not  unite  under  the 
flag  until  it  is  threatened,  when  a  realization  of  the 
menace  comes,  factional  interests  are  forgotten  and  all 
parties  and  groups  unite  unreservedly  in  a  union 
sacree.  But  for  all  its  apparent  inconsistencies  and 
instability  French  foreign  policy  is  like  the  French 
Government — "plus  ga  change  plus  c'est  la  meme 
chose" — it  is  rooted  in  right  and  faces  the  stars,  often 
an  opportunist  on  the  surface  it  is  ever  a  knight  errant 
in  its  soul,  and  ultimately  proves  itself  worthy  of 
la  France  etemelle. 


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Debats  Parlementaires,  Vols.  54-103 

Documents  Parlementaires,  Vols.  54-87 
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Debats  Parlementaires,  Vols.  42-85 

Documents  Parlementaires,  Vols.  37-60 
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Haut  Nil  et  Bahr-et-Ghazal 

La   Convention   Franco-Anglais   du   14   Juin   1898   et   la 
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Chine:  Protocol  Final  (Juin-Octobre,  1901) 

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Saint  Siege:  (1899-1903) 

Convention  d 'Arbitrage  avec  1  'Angleterre,  1903 

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Affaires  du  Maroc  (1901-1905) 

Protocoles  et  Comptes  Rendues  de  la  Conference  d'Algeciras 

Affaires  du  Maroc  (1906-1907) 

377 


378  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

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Other  Documents 

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Madagascar,  1899,  Vol.  109  [c9091] 

China,  1901,  Vol.  91  [c436] 

China,  1900,  Vol.  105  [c365] 

Agreements  between  the  United  Kingdom  and  Japan,  1902, 

Vol.  130  [c911] 
Turkey,  Report  by  Major  Law,  1896,  Vol.  96  [c8019] 
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[c2384] 
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Foreign  Office,  1915. 
Stenographische  Berichte  von  den  Verhandlungen  des  Reichs- 
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Albin  Pierre,  Les  Grandes  Traites  Politiques  Depuis  1815 

jusqu'a  nos  jours 
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1879-1914 
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lementaire, January,  1901 

Jaray,  M.  G.  L.,  L 'Accord  entre  la  France  et  l'Angleterre, 
Questions  Diplomatiques  et  Coloniales,  November  16, 
1904 

Lavisse,  Ernest,  Precautions  contre  l'Angleterre,  Revue  de 
Paris,  January  1,  1900 
France  et  Angleterre,  Revue  de  Paris,  February  1,  1899 

Lebon,  Andre,  La  Mission  Marchand  et  le  Cabinet  Meline, 
Revue  de  deux  Mondes,  March  15,  1900 

Lorin,  Henri,  La  Question  du  Maroc,  Revue  Politique  et  Par- 
lementaire, July,  1901 

Millet,  Rene,  Quatre  Ans  de  Politique  Exterieure,  Revue 
Politique  et  Parlementaire,  October,  1902 

Millet,  Rene,  L 'Affaire  du  Siam,  Revue  Politique  et  Parle- 
mentaire, December,  1902 
La  Lutte  Pacifique  entre  la  France  et  L'Angleterre,  Revue 

de  Deux  Mondes,  June  15,  1904 
L 'Accord  Franco-Espangnol,  Revue  Politique  et  Parlemen- 
taire, November,  1904 


384  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

La  Conscience  Nationale,  Revue  Politique  et  Parlementaire, 

March,  1905 
Peril  National,  Revue  Politique  et  Parlementaire,  June, 

1905 
Maroc  devant  l'Europe,  Revue  Politique  et  Parlementaire, 
November,  1907 
Mury,  Francis,  Nouvelle  Traite  avec  le  Siam,  Questions  Diplo- 

matiques  et  Coloniales,  February  16,  1904 
Peyerimhoff,  Henri  de,  Le  Conflit  Franc-Turc,  Questions  Dip- 

lomatiques  et  Coloniales,  November  15,  1901 
Recouly,  Raymond,  Le  Septenat  de  M.  Delcasse,  Revue  Poli- 
tique et  Parlementaire,  June,  1905 
La  Conference  d'Algeciras,  Revue  Politique  et  Parlemen- 
taire, February,  1906 
Rivet,  Gustave,  La  France  et  l'ltalie,  Revue  Politique  et  Par- 
lementaire, June,  1904 
Sabatier,  Camille,  L'Erreur  d'Algeciras,  Revue  Politique  et 

Parlementaire,  November,  1907 
Tardieu,  Andre,  France  et  Espangne,  Revue  de  deux  Mondes, 

December  1,  1912 
Zeta,  The  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  and  After,  Fortnightly 
Review,  March  1,  1902 
Extended  use  has  been  made  of  the  monthly  summaries 
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and  Raymond  Recouly  in  the  "Revue  Politique  et  Parlemen- 
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Exterieure  du  Mois." 

The  Temps  and  the  London  Times  have  also  been  used  ex- 
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newspapers:  Matin,  Echo  de  Paris,  Journal  des  Debats, 
Journal,  Eclair,  Figaro,  Humanite,  Kolnische  Zeitung,  West- 
falische  Zeitung,  Berliner  Tageblatt,  Hamburger  Nachrichten. 


INDEX 


Abdul  Aziz,  becomes  Sultan  of 
Morocco,  139-141;  aids  German 
interests,  196;  indifferent  to 
France,  233,  removes  court,  237; 
seeks  French  aid,  239;  struggle 
with  Mouley-Hafid,  246-253 

Abdul  Hamid,  46;  attitude  to- 
wards Lorando-Tubini  claims, 
47-51 

Abyssinia,  convention  concerning, 
242-243 

Adowa,  disaster  of,  7,  78 

Aehrenthal  Count  von,  260,  268- 
269 

Africa,  British  concessions  to 
France  in,  125-127 

Agadir,  affair  of,  301-331 

Albert,  King  of  Belgium,  357- 
358 

Albin,  Pierre,  quoted,  302 

Algeciras,  197,  204;  Conference  of, 
206-239;  General  Act,  220-221; 
application  of  act,  227-239 

Almodovar,  Duke  d',  207 

Amade,  General  d',  248,  250,  279 

Andre,  General,  176 

Anglo-French  Accord  of  1904,  116— 
127;  ratification  of,  127-132 

Anglo-French  Convention,  concern- 
ing Niger,  27 

Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  69 

Armenia,  massacres,  50,  51 

Associations  Bill,  90 

Austria,  and  Young  Turks,  261- 
262;  and  Bosnia,  267-274;  at- 
titude towards  Serbia,  337;  356 


Bacheract,  M.,  213,  220 

Bagdad  Railway,  50;    British  in- 


terest in,  101 ;  French  attitude 
towards,  102-106;  Russian  at- 
titude towards,  103-104;  France 
gives  up   interests  in,  366 

Bahr-el-Gahzal,  French  possession 
of,  25-27;   30,  31 

Balfour,  Mr.,  28;  on  Bagdad  Rail- 
way, 105 

Bandar-Jisseh,  32 

Barclay,  Sir  Thomas,  quoted,  26; 
aids  approach  to  France,  108- 
111 

Barrere,  M.,  79,  82,  84,  85,  187,  318 

Barres,  M.  Maurice,  369 

Barthou,  M.,  ministerial  declara- 
tion, 346;  ministry  falls,  359 

Basserman,  Herr,  223 

Baudin,  M.,  quoted,  266 

Bebel,   Herr,   353 

Berard,  Victor,  quoted,  149,  366 

Bethman-Hollweg,  Herr  von, 
quoted,  323,  350 

Beyens,  Baron,  quoted,  303-304; 
351 

Bieberstein,  Baron  Marshall,  sug- 
gests Franco-German  entente, 
10;  at  Constantinople,  268 

Bihourd,  M.,  on  Moroccan  situa- 
tion, 161-164;  181;  sums  up 
German  attitude,  183-184;  con- 
fers with  von  Biilow,  194,  197 

Boer  War,  37;  French  attitude 
towards,  38-43;  German  atti- 
tude,  100 

Bosnian  Crisis,  267-274 

Bourgeois,  M.  Leon,  35,  217,  219; 
in  Algeciras,  227;  at  Hague, 
242;    minister  of   labor,   332 

Boxer   Rebellion,   62-67 


38$ 


38G 


INDEX 


Brazza,  Savorgnan  de,  315,  323 

Briand,  M.,  becomes  minister,  276 ; 
resigns,  289;  in  Poincare  minis- 
try, 332;  forms  ministry,  345; 
quoted,  360 

Bu-Hamara,  141,  145,  148,  229, 
280 

Bulgaria,  355 

Biilow,  Herr  von,  visits  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain, 38;  German  attitude  in 
Boer  War,  42;  Far-Eastern  Pol- 
icy, 67;  and  Italy,  78,  86; 
Moroccan  Policy,  147-148;  163. 
165,  168-169;  sums  up  German 
Policy,  170-173;  quoted,  179; 
note  to  Prince  Radolin,  184, 
186;  demands  conference,  188; 
made  prince,   191;    on  Rouviers 

•  Policy,  194;  confers  with  M. 
Bihourd,  197;  with  Baron  Cour- 
cel,  212;  telegram  to  Count 
Witte,  216;  on  Conference  of 
Algeciras,  223-225 ;  reproaches 
France,  237;  outlines  new  Ger- 
man Policy,  262;  in  Morocco, 
266;  on  relations  with  Austria, 
270;    quoted,    274. 

Cagniard,  Gaston,  quoted,  342-343 

Caillard,  Admiral,  49 

Caillaux,  M.,  289,  character  of, 
299-300;  attitude  in  Moroccan 
Affair,  305-325;  opposes  three 
year  service,  352,  354;  influence 
of,  359-360;  minister  of  finance, 
359;  director  of  cabinet,  363; 
scandal  of  367-368;  re-elected, 
369 

Caix,  Robert  de,  quoted,  248, 
note 

Calmette,  M.,  assails  M.  Caillaux, 
367-368 

Cambon,  Jules,  19,  60,  258,  263; 
demands  explanatory  letter  from 
Germany,  265,  note;  266; 
quoted,  291 ;   learns  German  at- 


titude, 296-297;  in  Agadir 
crisis,  305-320;  on  German  in- 
cidents, 348 

Cambon,  M.  Paul,  56;  aids  rap- 
prochement with  England,  109, 
112;  treaty  of  arbitration,  115; 
in  Moroccan  affair,  306;  replies 
to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  338-339 

Cameroon,  310,  313 

Campbell-Bannerman,  Sir  Henry, 
favors  better  relations  with 
France,  28 

Casablanca,  218,  219;  massacre 
in,  236;  deserters  of,  257-261 

Castellane,  Count  de,  quoted,  93 

Cavour,  77 

Chaffee,   General,   62 

Chamberlain,  Joseph,  provocative 
attitude  towards  France,  28; 
favors  alliance  with  Germany, 
38,  39;  on  British  Policy  in 
China,  56;  on  Germany,  87 

Char  bonnier,  M.,  228,  232,  281 

Cheradame,   M.,   quoted,    106,   366 

China,  foreign  exploration  of,  52- 
57;  Boxer  rebellion,  57-67 

Clemenceau,  M.,  208,  217;  forms 
cabinet,  229;  attitude,  230; 
difficulties  of,  239;  visits  Lon- 
don, 255;  in  Casablanca  affair, 
259-260;  ministry  falls,  275- 
276;   in  Agadir  Affair,  325,  326 

Cochin  Denys,  50;  speech  in  Cham- 
ber, 70;  on  Franco-British  ac- 
cord, 130;  criticises  M.  Rouvier, 
210;    quoted,  274,  324 

Combes,  M.,  90,  96,  175,  177 

Constans,  M.,  47,  106 

Constant,  M.  d'Estournelles  de, 
urges  accord  with  England,  29; 
delegate  at  Hague,  35;  favors 
arbitration,  110;  at  Hague,  242; 
favors  understanding  with  Ger- 
many, 352;  quoted,  360-361 

Conty,  M.,  quoted,  291 

Cretan  Affair,  44,  45,  274 


INDEX 


387 


Crispi,  fall  of,  7;    foreign  policy, 

78,79 
Cruppi,  M.,  255,  289,  quoted,  294; 

protests  action  of  Spain,  327 


Debidour,  quoted,  6,  45,  53,  335 

Delahaye,  M.  Jules,  324 

Delcasse\  M.,  becomes  minister  of 
foreign  affairs,  3-5;  relations 
with  Italy,  8;  the  Portuguese 
affair,  11;  attitude  towards  Gt. 
Britain,  12;  mediation  in  Span- 
ish-American War,  18;  colonial 
secretary,  20;  settles  Fashoda 
affair,  23-31;  on  Madagascar, 
33;  favors  Hague  Conference, 
34;  strengthens  Russian  Alli- 
ance, 36;  on  Boer  War,  38-43; 
Cretan  affair,  44^45;  Lorando- 
Tubini  claims,  46-51;  diplomacy 
in  Far-East,  52-76;  draws  close 
to  Italy,  79-89;  relations  with 
Vatican,  89-97 ;  attitude  towards 
Bagdad  Railway,  103-106; 
brings  about  rapprochement 
with  Great  Britain,  107-132; 
gains  Kaiser's  hostility,  135- 
136;  Moroccan  policy,  142-179; 
forced  to  resign,  179-192; 
speech  in  Chamber,  246;  causes 
downfall  of  Clemenceau,  275- 
276;  on  Morocco,  305;  becomes 
minister  of  marine,  332;  ap- 
pointed ambassador,  344 

Deroulede,  Paul,  113 

Deschanel,  M.  Paul,  quoted,  97, 
106,  115;  on  Algeciras,  232;  on 
Eastern  question,  269,  note 

Dilke,  Sir  Charles,  87 

Dillon,  Dr.  E.  J.,  quoted,  81,  128 

Dogger  Bank,  incident,  35 

Donnersmarck,  Prince,  visit  to 
Paris,   185 

Doumer,  M.,  72 

Doumergue,  M.,  forms  ministry, 
359,  360;  explains  Poutiloff  af- 


fair, 363-364;  quoted,  367;  re- 
signs, 371 

Dreyfus,  Affair,  16,  17,  90,  176, 
342 

Drude,  General,  236,  239,  247 

Edward  VII,  70,  107,  108;  visits 
Paris,  112;  attitude  towards 
France,  113;  influence,  114, 
note;  visits  Paris,  213,  note; 
friendly  towards  France  and 
Russia,  256 

Egypt,  French  interests  in,  15; 
British  opposition,  20;  Anglo- 
French  agreement  concerning, 
117-121 

Entente  Cordiale,  107-132;  at  Al- 
geciras, 223;  defined,  338;  anni- 
versary of,  369-370 

Etienne,  M.,  on  Franco-British  ac- 
cord, 129-130;  quoted,  142 

Fallieres,  M.,  209,  256,  299,  306, 
332 

Fashoda,  16,  20-33 

Fez  Expedition,  292-300;  302 

Foreign  Legion,  deserters  of,  257- 
261;  attacked  in  Germany,  365 

Forstner,  Baron  von,  356 

Franco-German  Accord,  263-266 ; 
failure  of,  283-292 

Franco-Russian  Alliance,  forma- 
tion, 5;  Millerand's  opinion  of, 
6;  Jaurg's  opinion  of,  6;  at  Al- 
geciras, 223 

Frederica,  Empress,  visit  to  Paris, 
9 

Fullerton,  W.  M.,  quoted,  7,  12, 
17,  91,  276,  note,  297 

Gambetta,  4,  5 

George,  Mr.  Lloyd,  311-312;  362 
Germany,  relations  with  France, 
9;  during  Boer  War,  37-43;  in 
Orient,  53-71,  accord  with  Great 
Britain,  64-67;  situation  in 
Morocco,  139,  147-148 ;  policy  in 


388 


INDEX 


Morocco,  170-179;  forces  the 
issue,  179-192;  action  in  Mo- 
rocco, 195-205;  at  Algeciras, 
221-226;  new  attitude,  261-263; 
accord  with  France,  263-266; 
and  Near  East,  269-274;  in  Mo- 
rocco, 283-292;  Agadir  Affair, 
301-327 

Great  Britain,  Delcass6's  attitude 
towards,  3-5;  Portuguese  loan, 
10,  11;  relations  with  France, 
12-16;  in  Egypt,  20-30;  agree- 
ment with  France,  30-33;  in 
Boer  War,  37-43;  in  Orient,  53- 
76;  accord  with  Germany,  64- 
67 ;  alliance  with  Japan,  69 ;  re- 
lations with  Italy,  80-81; 
Treaty  of  March  21,  1899,  with 
France,  81;  entente  with  France, 
107-132;  situation  in  Morocco, 
138-139;  attitude  towards 
France,  203 ;  Mediterranean 
agreement,  243;  accord  with 
Russia,  246;  in  Morocco,  287; 
internal  situation,  362;  renews 
entente,  369-370 

Greindl,  Baron,  quoted,  60 

Grey,  Sir  Edward,  speech  on 
Egypt,  21;  on  Franco-British 
accord,  127;  gives  assurances  to 
France,  203;  and  Balkan  situa- 
tion, 268,  272;  on  Moroccan 
situation,  307;  note  to  M.  Cam- 
bon,  338-339;  on  Balkan  situa- 
tion, 347 

Guebbas,  Sidi  Mohammed,  149, 
232,  236 

Guiot  M.,  284 

Gwinner,  Herr,  307 


Hague  Peace  Conference,  33-36; 
second,  240-242 

Haldane,  Lord,  362 

Hanotaux,  Gabriel,  4,  13;  answers 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  22;  Cretan 
solution,  44;   treaty  with  Italy, 


79;    quoted,  90,   92;    as  foreign 

minister,  108;  quoted,  298-299; 

322 
Harris,  W,.  B.  H.,  13,  150 
Hay,    John,    quoted,    66;    on    Del- 

casse's  resignation,  192 
Heeringen,  General,  343 
Henry,  M.  Ren6,  quoted,  65 
Herv€,  Gustave,  quoted,  309;    352 
Heydebrand,  Herr  von,  323 
Hugo,  Victor,  on  world  peace,  240, 

note 

Indo-China,  French,  15 

Isvolsky,  M.,  268,  273 

Italy,  relation  to  Triple  Alliance, 
7;  in  Cretan  Affair,  45;  in 
China,  53;  rapprochement  with 
France,  77-  89;  relations  with 
England,  80-81 ;  and  Austria, 
269-270;  diplomatic  difficulties 
with  France,  333-334;  signs 
agreement,  336-337 

Jagow,  Herr  von,  348 

Japan,  alliance  with  England,  69; 
accord  with  France,  245-246; 
accord  with  Russia,  245 

Jaurgs,  M.,  on  Russian  Alliance, 
6;  on  Franco-Italian  relations, 
95;  attitude  towards  England, 
110;  approves  Triple  Alliance, 
132-133;  Moroccan  policy,  151; 
influence,  176-177;  225;  232; 
speech  of,  247,  note,  on  Moroc- 
co, 279,  298;  influence  in  Cham- 
ber, 309;  supports  M.  Caillaux, 
324;  opposes  three  year  service, 
352,   354;    influence   of,   358. 

Jenouvrier,  M.,  316,  326 

Jonnart,  M.,  149,  150 

Kaiser,  see  William  II 
Kassar-Said,  Treaty  of,  13,  79 
Kiderlen,   Herr  von,  outlines  new 
German  policy,  263;   293;  dubi- 
ous attitude,   295-297;   outlines 


INDEX 


389 


situation,  303-304;  in  Agadir 
affair,  308-320 

Kitchener,  Lord,  at  Fashoda,  21, 
23,  24 

Klass,  Herr,  304 

Koweit,  50,   102,   103 

Kuhlmann,  Herr  von,  declarations 
on  Morocco,  159-160;  quoted, 
178 

Kwang-Chou-Wan,  French  lease 
on,  15,  53 

Labouchere,  H.,  speech  in  House 
of  Commons  on  Egypt,  22,  note 

Lalla-Marnia,  Treaty  of,  141 

Lamarzelle,  M.  de,  objects  to 
Franco-English  accord,  30;  re- 
jects Moroccan  agreement,  326 

Langwerth,  Baron  von,  254 

Lanken,  Herr  von,  on  situation  in 
Morocco,  251 

Lansdowne,  Lord,  Far  Eastern  pol- 
icy, 67-68;  foreign  minister,  70; 
on  Franco-Italian  relations,  87; 
on  Bagdad  Railway,  105;  for- 
eign minister,  108;  agrees  to  ar- 
bitration treaty,  115 

Larache,  public  works  in,  255 

Lavisse,  M.,  quoted,  38,  42 

Law,  Major,  report  on  railways  in 
Asia  Minor,  101 

Leghait,  M.,  despatch  of,  186,  note; 
213,  note 

Lgmonon,  Ernest,  quoted,  11,  38, 
109 

Leo  XIII,  92 

Liotard,  M.,  20,  21 

London,  Convention  of,  15 

Lorando,  claims  against  Turkey, 
46-51 

Loubet,  President,  83,  92-94;  visit 
to  England,  114-115;  refuses 
Delcass£'s  resignation,  183 

Lyautey,  General,  239 

MacLean,  Mr.,  13,  150,  236,  277 
Madagascar,    French    protectorate 
in,  14;  annexation,  32;  Franco- 


British     agreement     concerning, 
122-123 
Mannesman    Brothers,    286,    290 
Marehand,  Expedition,  21-27 
Mauchamp,  Dr.,  234,  235,  281 
Maura,  Senor,  speaks  on  Morocco, 

153 
Mazzini,  8 

Merle,  M.,  quoted,  279 
Mevil,   Andre,   quoted,   10,    11,  41, 

175,  183,  190,  265 
Messimy,  M.,  290,  300 
Metternich,  Count  Wolff,  311 
Millerand,  M.,  on  Russian  Alliance, 
6;     becomes    minister     of     war, 
332,    335;    resignation,    341-343 
Millet,  Rene,  quoted,  74,  121,  128, 

152,  202,  238 
Millevoye,  M.  Lucien,  177 
Moinier,   General,  293,  294 
Mokri,   El,   Envoy  to  Paris,   277- 

278;  280-282 
Monis,  M.,  forms  cabinet,  289;  in- 
jured, 297;   minister  of  marine, 
359 
Monson,    Sir    Edward,    speech    on 

France,  28 
Morocco,  English  attitude  towards, 
13,  14;  Franco-British  agree- 
ment regarding,  117-121;  in- 
ternal condition  of,  137-145; 
Franco-German  program  for, 
197;  two  Sultans  of,  246-253; 
new  attitude  towards  France, 
266;  conditions  in,  292-297 
Mouley-Hafid,  proclaimed  sultan, 
237;  struggle  for  control,  246- 
250;  recognition,  251-253; 
character  of,  254;  makes  agree- 
ment with  France,  277;  protests 
against  Spain,  279;  opposes 
France,  280-281;  critical  situa- 
tion of,  292-293 
Mouravieff,  Count,  34,  36;  40,  41 

Newfoundland,       French       fishing 
rights    in,     16;     Franco-British 


390 


INDEX 


agreement  concerning,   122-125; 

130 
New      Hebrides,       Franco-British 

agreement  concerning,  122-123 
Ngoko-Sangha    Co.,    287,    289-292, 

297 
Nicholas  II,  relations  with  Kaiser, 

135;   199-201 
Nicholas,  King  of  Montenegro,  347 
Nicholson,    Sir   Arthur,    206,    219, 

306 

O'Connor,  General,  149-150 

Panther,  the,  300,  301,  304,  305 

Pelletan,  M.,  176 

Pichon,  M.  Stephen,  54,  58,  59; 
conditions  imposed  upon  China, 
67;  favors  English  rapproche- 
ment, 109;  foreign  minister, 
230;  on  Morocco,  231,  232;  sends 
cruiser,  234;  quoted,  235,  241, 
243,  note;  French  program,  251 ; 
signs  accord  with  Germany, 
263;  on  Eastern  question,  269, 
272;  remains  foreign  minister. 
276;  sends  ultimatum  to  Sultan, 
281;  note  to  Germany,  285;  in 
Ngoko-Sangha,  288;  on  Moroc- 
can solution,  326,  331;  foreign 
minister,  346 

Pinon,  Rene,  quoted,  79,  86,  290 

Pius  X,  92 

Pressensg,  M.  de,  110;  on  Franco- 
British  accord,  130;  on  disarm- 
ament, 241 

Prinetti,  M.,  speech  on  Italian  pol- 
icy, 83-84 

Poincar§,  M.,  on  Agadir  Affair, 
326;  forms  ministry,  332-333; 
visits  Russia,  335;  on  Balkan 
situation,  337-339;  on  relations 
with  Great  Britain,  340;  elected 
president,  341 ;  plea  for  pre- 
paredness, 344;  characterized, 
360-361 ;  urges  preparedness, 
366;  quoted,  371 


Portugal,  question  of  loan,  10-li 
Poutiloff  Affair,  363-364 

Radolin,  Prince,  148,  162,  180,  181, 
193,  265-266 

Radowitz,  Herr  von,  delegate  to 
Algeciras,  207;  confers  with  M. 
Revoil,  208;  opposes  M.  Revoil. 
211,  215 

Raisuli,  156,  157,  210,  228,  229, 
232,  236,  277 

Regnault,  M.,  delegate  to  Alge- 
ciras, 206,  207,  208 ;  on  Moroccan 
situation,  229;  envoy  to  Fez, 
277 

Renschausen,  firm  of,  235 

Reuter,  Colonel  von,  357 

Revoil,  M.,  warns  Shereefian  gov- 
ernment, 142;  resigns,  149;  del- 
egate to  Algeciras,  206;  brings 
up  question   of  police,  211;    214 

Reynald,  Georges,  quoted,  8,  176, 
188 

Ribot,  M.,  5;  favors  accord  with 
England,  29;  quoted,  112;  sup- 
ports government,  234-235 ; 
quoted,  294,  326 

Roosevelt,  President,  attempts  to 
influence  Germany  at  Algeciras, 
212;  hear 8  from  Kaiser,  216 

Root,  Mr.  Elihu,  communicates 
with  Kaiser,  217 

Rosen,  Dr.,  255 

Rouvier,  M.,  supports  Bagdad 
Railway,  106;  forms  cabinet, 
175;  supports  Delcassg,  182;  ne- 
gotiates secretly  with  Germany, 
184,  186;  forces  Delcassg's  res- 
ignation, 189,  190;  at  Quai 
D'Orsay,  192-205;  remains,  209; 
overthrown,  215 

Rudini,  Marquis  de,  80,  82,  84 

Russia,  Alliance  with  France,  5, 
6;  suggests  peace  conference,  33- 
35;  M.  Delcasse's  visit  to,  36; 
attitude  in  Boer  War,  41;  in 
Cretan  Affair,  44 ;  in  Orient,  69 ; 


INDEX 


391 


agreement  with  France,  69-70; 
war  with  Japan,  132-136;  after 
the  war,  200 ;  accord  with  Japan, 
245;  accord  with  Great  Britain. 
246;  and  Near  East,  268-274; 
relations  with  France,  335 


Salisbury,  Lord,  protests  on  Eng- 
lish treatment  in  Madagascar, 
33;  on  Boer  War,  39;  on  French 
concession  in  China,  55;  57; 
favors  German  command  in 
China,  61 ;  accord  with  Germany, 
65;    Anglo-Italian    relations,    80 

Sarrien,  M.,  ministry,  215,  217; 
French  attitude  expressed,  218; 
resignation,  229 

Saverne,  incident  of,  356-357 

Schoen,  Herr  von,  258,  263,  266; 
quoted,  292 

Selves,  M.  de,  becomes  foreign  min- 
ister, 300,  301 ;  policy  in  Agadir 
affair,  305-325 

Sembat,  Marcel,  62,  69,  91,  309 

Serbia,  267,  271-273 

Serret,  Lieut.  Col.,  349 

Shanghai,  concession  of,  55 

Shimonoseki  Treaty,  9,  52 

Siam,  British  attitude  towards, 
15;  relations  with  France,  71- 
76 ;  Franco-British  agreement 
concerning,   121-122 

Spain,  situation  in  Morocco,  138; 
Moroccan  policy  of,  145-146; 
153-156;  secret  agreement  with 
France,  201 ;  at  Algeciras,  209, 
219;  Mediterranean  agreement 
243;  issues  joint  note  with 
France,  252-253 ;  opposes  France, 
278-280,  297-298;  settles  with 
France,  327-331 

Spanish-American  War,  French 
mediation  in,  19 

Taillandier,  M.  Saint-Rene,  157, 
158;  difficulties  at  Fez,  166-167; 


states  French  position  in  Moroc- 
co, 180,  181,  186 

Tangier,  outbreak  in,  228,  231, 
232 ;  constructions  in,  235,  255 

Tardieu,  Andre,  quoted,  80,  114, 
178,  206,  278,  282,  285,  322 

Tattenbach,  Count  von,  interviews 
Sultan,  187;  at  Algeciras,  207, 
208,  209;  proposal  for  State 
Bank,  210,  215 

Thalamas,  M.,  354 

Thomasson,  Commandant  de, 
quoted,  360,  note;   365-366 

Three  years  service  law,  346,  352, 
354-355,  371 

Togoland,  310,  313 

Triple  Alliance,  treaties  of,  88-89 

Tripoli,  79-86 

Tshudi,   Captain  von,  233 

Tubini,  claims  against  Turkey. 
46-51 

Turkey,  relations  with  Crete,  44- 
45;  Turbini  claims,  46-51; 
Young  Turk  Revolution,  261- 
262;  relations  with  Austria, 
267-268;  in  the  Balkans,  336. 
339 

United  States,  war  with  Spain,  19; 
note  to  China,  57,  58;  settle- 
ment with  China,  64;  sends 
squadron  to  Morocco,  157;  at  Al- 
geciras, 216-217 

Vassel,  Dr.,  252 

Vatican,    French    relations    with, 

89-97 
Vazeille,  M.,  353 
Victor  Emmanuel  III,  82,  92 
Visconti-Venosta,  Marquis,  78,  82, 

84,  208 
Viviani,    M.,    256;    forms   cabinet, 

372 
Voyron,  General,  62 

Waldeck-Rousseau,  ministry,  37, 
79,  90;  speech  of,  91 


392 


INDEX 


Waldersee,  Marshal  von,  61,  62 

War,  World,  its  approach,  332-375 

Wei-hai-Wei,  53 

White,  Henry,  208,  212 

William  II,  early  relations  with 
France,  9,  35;  on  Boer  War,  41; 
"Daily  Telegraph"  interview,  41; 
desires  German  command  for  al- 
lied troops  in  China,  61 ;  ad- 
dresses troops,  63;  Bagdad  Rail- 
way, 100;  attitude  during 
Russo-Japanese  war,  135-136; 
speech  to  Sultan  of  Morocco, 
167;  informs  U.  S.  in  regard  to 
China,    174;    visit    to    Tangier, 


179;  meets  Czar  at  Bjorko,  199; 
attitude  on  Algeciras,  212;  tel- 
egraphs President  Roosevelt. 
216;  quoted,  241;  letter  to  Lord 
Tweedmouth,  256;  quoted,  257; 
"Daily  Telegraph"  interview, 
259;  approves  accord  with 
France,  265;  threatens  Russia, 
273;  on  Morocco,  291;  sounds 
King  Albert,  357-358 

Witte,  M.,  199,  212,  216 

Wolff,  Lieutenant,  233 

Zimmerman,    Herr,    296;    quoted, 
301-302;    305 


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